Full Opinion

[Cite as State v. Bete, 2026-Ohio-4488.] COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA STATE OF OHIO, : Plaintiff-Appellee, : No. 116273 v. : LEGBORSI BETE, : Defendant-Appellant. : JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: November 12, 2026 Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Case No. CR-25-703110-A Appearances: The Elkhatib Law Office and Issa M. Elkhatib, for appellant. Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Nora C. Bryan, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. SEAN C. GALLAGHER, P.J.: Appellant Legborsi N. Bete appeals from his conviction following a negotiated guilty plea to an amended count of misdemeanor assault. Upon review, we affirm. On June 30, 2025, Bete was charged in an indictment with three felony counts of gross sexual imposition, arising from alleged sexual contact with a child who was under the age of 13 at the time of the offenses. Counts 1 and 2 allege conduct that occurred between November 29, 2001, and November 28, 2002. Count 3 alleges conduct that occurred between November 29, 2004, and November 28, 2005. Bete initially pleaded not guilty to the charges. On September 16, 2025, Bete filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the charges were barred by the 20-year statute of limitations and that the indictment should be dismissed for preindictment delay. The State opposed the motion, asserting that the abuse was not disclosed to a public children services agency and pursuant to R.C. 2901.13(J) the statute of limitations did not begin to run until November 2011. The State further argued that Bete made speculative assertions of prejudice and failed to demonstrate that he was actually prejudiced from preindictment delay. On February 23, 2026, which was the date set for trial, the motion to dismiss was denied during a pretrial conference. Thereafter, a plea offer was placed on the record, and a full Crim.R. 11 colloquy was conducted by the trial court. Pursuant to the negotiated plea agreement, Bete entered a plea of guilty to an amended Count 1 for assault, a misdemeanor of the first degree in violation of R.C. 2903.13(A), and the remaining counts were dismissed. The trial court found that Bete’s plea was knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made. The trial court sentenced Bete to one day in county jail with credit for one day served and a fine of $250, imposed costs of $100, and ordered no contact with the victim. This appeal followed. Bete raises three assignments of error. Under his third assignment of error, which is presented first in his brief, Bete argues that his guilty plea was not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered. Bete argues that the trial court actively created a misunderstanding that the denial of the motion to dismiss was appealable by telling defense counsel during the pretrial conference that he could appeal the ruling, refusing a no-contest plea when defense counsel approached the bench after the plea offer was placed on the record, conditioning the sentencing promise on the entry of a guilty plea, and failing to advise Bete during the Crim.R. 11 colloquy that the entry of a guilty plea would waive his right to appeal the denial of the motion to dismiss. However, the off-record discussions are not a part of the record, and Bete’s assertions are not supported by the record that is before us.1 See App.R. 16(A)(7). Further, contrary to Bete’s arguments, the record shows that his guilty plea was knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered. Bete fails to demonstrate from the record that the trial court actively created a misunderstanding concerning the appealability of the denial of a motion to dismiss. The trial court’s denial of the motion to dismiss was prior to the negotiated plea being entered on the record and when the case was set to proceed to trial. There is no indication that the trial court was involved in any plea negotiations. 1 The case of State v. Engle, 74 Ohio St.3d 525 (1996), and other cases cited by Bete are clearly distinguishable. When the proceeding began, the State set forth the plea offer, which was for Bete, who was facing three felony counts for gross sexual imposition, to plead guilty to an amended Count 1 for assault, a misdemeanor of the first degree, and the remaining counts would be dismissed. Defense counsel and Bete both confirmed their understanding that this was the negotiated plea agreement. Even if there was a sidebar discussion with defense counsel regarding a no-contest plea, the record shows the State’s plea offer was conditioned on a guilty plea. Also, under Crim.R. 11, a trial court may not accept a plea of guilty or no contest without first addressing the defendant personally as required by the rule. Although Bete argues that the trial court failed to comply with the requirement that the court inform the defendant of the effect of the plea because it did not advise him that a guilty plea would not preserve the ruling on the motion to dismiss for appellate review, no such requirement exists under Crim.R. 11. Pursuant to Crim.R. 11(B)(1), a guilty plea is a complete admission of the defendant’s guilt. As the Supreme Court of Ohio has recognized, “[g]iven the commonly understood meaning of the term ‘guilty,’ a court may presume that a defendant understands that a guilty plea is a complete admission of guilt when the defendant has decided to plead guilty after being presented with the charges.” State v. Fontanez, 2026-Ohio- 3281, ¶ 41. Further, “[a] decision to plead guilty is also a consent to judgment without a trial or the rights that would accompany a trial.” Id. at ¶ 40. There is nothing in Crim.R. 11 that requires a court to inform a defendant of their appellate rights. See State v. Carter, 2026-Ohio-3710, ¶ 4 (9th Dist.); State v. Harner, 2025- Ohio-698, ¶ 25-27 (12th Dist.). Moreover, a court does not have to inform a defendant that by pleading guilty he is waiving his right to appeal any pretrial rulings. See State v. Meriwether, 2026-Ohio-2428, ¶ 9 (2d Dist.). In this matter, the record shows that during the plea colloquy, the trial court addressed Bete personally and informed him of his constitutional rights, the nature of the charges, the effect of a guilty plea, and the possible maximum penalties that could be imposed. Bete confirmed his understanding of each. This included Bete’s understanding that by entering a plea of guilty, he was admitting to the conduct charged under Count 1 as amended. Bete also confirmed that no threats or promises had been made. There is nothing in the record that indicates any confusion was created so as to undermine the plea. The record before us shows that Bete’s guilty plea was knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made. The third assignment of error is overruled. Under his second assignment of error, Bete claims the trial court abused its discretion by refusing a no-contest plea tendered off the record without stating any reason. Bete argues that defense counsel tendered a no-contest plea during a sidebar discussion at the bench specifically to preserve the motion to dismiss for appellate review. Pursuant to Crim.R. 12(I), “[t]he plea of no contest does not preclude a defendant from asserting upon appeal that the trial court prejudicially erred in ruling on a pretrial motion[.]” However, Bete has not shown from the record before us that he tendered a no-contest plea or that the trial court refused a no-contest plea. Rather, the record shows that in accordance with the negotiated plea agreement, Bete entered a valid guilty plea to Count 1 as amended and the remaining counts were dismissed. The record further shows that Bete was represented by competent counsel and that he knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered his guilty plea. The second assignment of error is overruled. Under his first assignment of error, which is presented last in his brief, Bete claims the trial court violated his right to due process and Crim.R. 12 when ruling on the motion to dismiss off the record, without holding a hearing, and without stating its factual findings on the record. We note that Bete did not raise any objection in the trial court. Because he did not invoke Crim.R. 12(F) or otherwise bring this issue to the trial court’s attention, he forfeited any error related to its failure to state its findings on the record. See State v. Fortune, 2020-Ohio- 3606, ¶ 11 (9th Dist.). Also, by pleading guilty he waived all constitutional errors apart from those that affected his guilty plea. See State v. Jabbar, 2021-Ohio-1191, ¶ 22 (8th Dist.). Bete has failed to demonstrate that reversible error occurred, and we are not persuaded by any other arguments he has raised. His first assignment of error is overruled. Judgment affirmed. It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant the costs herein taxed. The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. _______________________________ SEAN C. GALLAGHER, PRESIDING JUDGE ANITA LASTER MAYS, J., and TIMOTHY W. CLARY, J., CONCUR