State v. Sholty

[Cite as State v. Sholty, 2026-Ohio-4452.] IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT LOGAN COUNTY STATE OF OHIO, CASE NO. 8-26-01 PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, v. TRISTON SHOLTY, OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. Appeal from Logan County Common Pleas Court General Division Trial Court No. CR 24 01 0010 Judgment Affirmed Date of Decision: November 9, 2026 APPEARANCES: Brian A. Smith for Appellant Nathan Yohey for Appellee Case No. 8-26-01 WALDICK, J. {¶1} Defendant-appellant, Triston Sholty (“Sholty”), brings this appeal from the January 16, 2026 judgment of the Logan County Common Pleas Court sentencing him to prison after he was convicted by a jury of Gross Sexual Imposition in violation of R.C. 2907.05(A)(1), a fourth degree felony. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. Background {¶2} On November 14, 2023, Sholty was indicted for Rape in violation of R.C. 2907.02(A)(2), a first degree felony, and Gross Sexual Imposition in violation of R.C. 2907.05(A)(1), a fourth degree felony. Sholty was scheduled to be arraigned November 28, 2023; however, Sholty failed to appear for arraignment, claiming he had car trouble en route to the courthouse. Sholty was ultimately not arraigned until September 5, 2025, nearly two years later. At that time, Sholty pled not guilty to the charges. {¶3} Sholty proceeded to a jury trial on November 24-25, 2026. The jury ultimately determined that Logan County was not the correct county in which the Rape trial should be held, thus the Rape charge was ultimately dismissed. However, the jury found Sholty guilty of Gross Sexual Imposition as indicted. {¶4} On January 16, 2026, Sholty was sentenced to serve 12 months in prison. A judgment entry memorializing his sentence was filed that same day. It is -2- Case No. 8-26-01 from this judgment that Sholty appeals, asserting the following assignments of error for our review. Assignment of Error No. 1 Because the jury lost its way and created a manifest miscarriage of justice in convicting Appellant, Appellant’s conviction for Gross Sexual Imposition was against the manifest weight of the evidence. Assignment of Error No. 2 The trial court abused its discretion in giving an instruction to the jury on consciousness of guilt, in violation of Appellant’s right against self-incrimination under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 10 of the Ohio Constitution and of Appellant’s right to Due Process and a fair trial under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I, Sections 10 and 16 of the Ohio Constitution. First Assignment of Error {¶5} In his first assignment of error, Sholty argues that his conviction for Gross Sexual Imposition was against the manifest weight of the evidence. Standard of Review {¶6} In determining whether a conviction is against the manifest weight of the evidence, we must examine the entire record, weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of witnesses, and determine whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the factfinder clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the convictions must be reversed and a -3- Case No. 8-26-01 new trial ordered. State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387 (1997). Importantly, the Supreme Court of Ohio has recently clarified that under a manifest weight review, appellate courts “must defer to the fact-finder’s witness-credibility determinations.” State v. Reillo, 2026-Ohio-2701, ¶ 38. When applying the manifest weight standard, “[o]nly in exceptional cases, where the evidence ‘weighs heavily against the conviction,’ should an appellate court overturn the trial court’s judgment.” State v. Haller, 2012-Ohio-5233, ¶ 9 (3d Dist.), quoting State v. Hunter, 2011-Ohio-6524, ¶ 119. Controlling Statute {¶7} Sholty was convicted of Gross Sexual Imposition in violation of R.C. 2907.05(A)(1), which reads as follows: (A) No person shall have sexual contact with another; cause another to have sexual contact with the offender; or cause two or more other persons to have sexual contact when . . . (1) The offender purposely compels the other person . . . to submit by force or threat of force. Evidence Presented {¶8} In November of 2019, C.L. was a 19-year-old sophomore in college. C.L. testified that she made friends with Sholty a few years prior to 2019 through online gaming, but they had never met in person prior to November of 2019. -4- Case No. 8-26-01 {¶9} C.L. and Sholty initially communicated on Xbox through voice chat; however, over time C.L. testified that she communicated with Sholty through various means such as Snapchat, Xbox, Facebook, and Instagram. C.L. also stated that she had exchanged phone numbers with Sholty. C.L. testified that she knew Sholty as “Ren,” because the “name” Sholty used on digital social media platforms was “Ren Zwlof.” {¶10} C.L. testified that she considered Sholty a friend and that she would play video games with Sholty “off and on” over the years. She also testified that they would talk about life issues such as Sholty’s depression. {¶11} C.L. testified that she agreed to meet with Sholty for the first time in- person on November 30, 2019. At that time, C.L. was visiting her parents’ home in West Mansfield. Sholty resided in South Bend, Indiana, and he agreed to drive to West Mansfield to meet C.L. {¶12} C.L. testified that they did not have any specific plans that day, they were just going to meet and make plans afterward. C.L. testified that Sholty arrived at the West Mansfield residence around 3:30 p.m. Shortly thereafter, C.L. and Sholty decided to go to dinner together at Texas Roadhouse in Springfield, which was between 45-60 minutes away. {¶13} C.L. testified that during dinner, Sholty “made a joke about proposing to [C.L.] to embarrass [her] in the middle of the restaurant.” C.L. testified that Sholty -5- Case No. 8-26-01 said he would not propose to her in the restaurant if C.L. took shots of alcohol in Sholty’s vehicle. C.L. agreed, indicating she was embarrassed “very easily.” {¶14} C.L. testified that after they finished eating, they went outside to Sholty’s vehicle and she had a “couple of shots” in his car. She testified that Sholty poured the liquor into her to-go cup. She testified that Sholty was not drinking because he was driving. {¶15} C.L. testified that she had to go to the bathroom so she went with Sholty to the nearby Wal-Mart to use the bathroom and “browse through stuff.” C.L. testified that they left Wal-Mart and went back to Sholty’s vehicle, which he parked in the back of the Wal-Mart lot. According to C.L., they were going to continue to talk and “catch[] up in person.” {¶16} C.L. testified that while they were in the back of the parking lot, Sholty kept pouring more liquor into her drink. C.L. testified that at some point she asked Sholty not to pour anymore liquor into her drink because she was “starting to get blacked out.” She testified that she was not actually blacking out; rather, she just said that so Sholty would stop pouring more liquor. Within an hour C.L. had to use the bathroom again so C.L. and Sholty went back inside the Wal-Mart. Afterward, they returned to Sholty’s vehicle. {¶17} According to C.L., around this time Sholty put his hand on her thigh and she asked him not to “because [she] was not interested romantically in anything during this encounter.” C.L. also indicated she had a boyfriend, and she testified -6- Case No. 8-26-01 that Sholty was aware of that beforehand. C.L. testified that Sholty threatened to leave her in Springfield if she did not agree to let him do “[a]ny more.” Sholty responded by stating that she would not remember the incident regardless. {¶18} C.L. testified she was scared and anxious by Sholty’s threat to leave her in Springfield because it was dark at that time and she was not familiar with Springfield. She also testified that Sholty was significantly larger than her. C.L. testified that Sholty wanted to put his hand down her pants and “insert his fingers in [her] vagina.” C.L. stated that Sholty put his hand down her pants and she tried to pull his hand out. She also asked Sholty not to put his hand down her pants. {¶19} C.L. testified that eventually she “stop[ped] pushing him away because he’s clearly not stopping. And instead of fighting it, [she] tend[s] to dissociate and stop resisting.” C.L. testified that she did not unbutton her own pants, pull them down, or remove her underwear. Nevertheless, she stated Sholty “force[d] his hand into [her] pants” and “his fingers in [her] vagina.” {¶20} C.L. testified that at some point Sholty began driving back toward West Mansfield, but as he drove he still had his hand down her pants. She testified that during the drive, Sholty “und[id] his own pants and forces me to put my hand on his penis while we’re driving home.” She testified specifically that Sholty grabbed her hand from her lap and forcibly placed her hand onto his penis. She remembered going through West Liberty at the time, which is in Logan County. -7- Case No. 8-26-01 C.L. testified that at one point Sholty attempted to force her head down toward his lap. {¶21} C.L. testified that they eventually arrived back at the West Mansfield residence. She went inside the home and went straight to her bedroom to process what had happened. Not long after, C.L. spoke with her mother, who was in the residence at the time, and indicated that she thought she had been sexually assaulted. {¶22} C.L.’s mother called the police and a deputy sheriff was dispatched to the West Mansfield home and he interviewed C.L. The deputy indicated C.L. was crying and hysterical. C.L. initially told the deputy that she had met Sholty before, but she stated at trial that she was confusing him with another online gamer she had went to meet in the past. C.L.’s underwear was collected and DNA testing was conducted. A swab from the crotch region of C.L.’s underwear contained DNA consistent with Sholty or his male relatives. {¶23} C.L. was not certain of Sholty’s full name when she was initially interviewed because she knew him primarily through his online username. However, she had seen Sholty’s name on a speeding ticket that was in Sholty’s vehicle. She also had his phone number and knew the vehicle he drove. After investigating the matter, a detective confirmed with C.L. that Sholty was the alleged perpetrator. {¶24} C.L. testified that after the incident, she blocked Sholty on most social media platforms. C.L. testified that Sholty contacted her and told her that if she did -8- Case No. 8-26-01 not stop blocking him on social media, he would create more accounts and tell her boyfriend what had occurred between them. {¶25} The detective investigating the matter tried repeatedly to contact Sholty but was unsuccessful. A warrant was issued in 2020 to acquire Sholty’s DNA for comparison purposes, but it was not able to be executed until Sholty was located in October of 2022. The detective indicated that between January of 2020 and October of 2022, he could not locate or even speak to Sholty. {¶26} Sholty was indicted in this matter in November of 2023. He did not appear for arraignment. The arraignment entry, which was introduced into evidence, stated as follows: The Defendant was NOT present but was represented by legal counsel, Robert Beck, Jr. Attorney Beck informed the Court that the Defendant was unable to attend due to car problems enroute [sic] to the courthouse. Attorney Beck will contact the Defendant and will reschedule this arraignment for a new date and will also determine if he will be retained to represent the Defendant in this matter and inform the Court. The Court ORDERS the Prosecutor to reissue the Summons as Warrant on the Indictment. Time is tolled and charged to the Defendant. (Doc. No. 7). -9- Case No. 8-26-01 {¶27} Despite knowing of the indictment and missing his arraignment, Sholty did not appear before the court on the warrant until September 5, 2025, nearly two years later. {¶28} Sholty testified in his own defense at trial. He corroborated the testimony of C.L. until they reached Texas Roadhouse. At that point their stories diverged. {¶29} Sholty testified that he never threatened to propose to C.L. if she did not drink alcohol with him. Sholty testified that after eating at Texas Roadhouse he did hang out with C.L. in the Wal-Mart parking lot and some liquor was consumed in his vehicle. Sholty testified that while they were in his car they began kissing and “making out.” Sholty testified that C.L. climbed over the center console and got on his lap. After a few minutes, Sholty testified that C.L. apologized then indicated she had to go to the bathroom. {¶30} Sholty testified that after the second Wal-Mart trip, C.L. continued to apologize but Sholty indicated his 3-hour trip had been worth it. Sholty testified that C.L. stated she would make his trip even better and she exposed her breasts to him. Shotly testified that C.L. then began stroking his penis outside his pants, then eventually she stroked his exposed penis. {¶31} Sholty testified that when it was close to 8:00 p.m. they left because he still needed to take C.L. home and drive back to Indiana. Sholty testified that C.L. continued to stroke his erect penis while they drove. Sholty testified that he -10- Case No. 8-26-01 used his own saliva to lubricate his penis. He testified that at some point during the drive C.L. began to pleasure herself, and he believed that was how his DNA got into her underwear because he claimed he never put his hand down her pants. {¶32} During his testimony Sholty acknowledged that he had a prior felony conviction in Indiana for fleeing/evading police. As to this case, he indicated he had car trouble on the way to arraignment and he simply thought his lawyer or the court would contact him about rescheduling the arraignment. He also testified that his phone was occasionally shut off for non-payment, which could be why the detective had difficulty contacting him. Analysis {¶33} In this case, C.L. provided clear testimony that Sholty grabbed her hand and put it on his erect penis in or around West Liberty, which is in Logan County. She also testified that Sholty forced her hand down her pants and forced his fingers into her vagina. She testified that she did not consent to the actions, that she verbally said no, and that she initially physically resisted. DNA consistent with Sholty’s was found in C.L.’s underwear. {¶34} Sholty argues that C.L. was not a credible witness, particularly because in her initial interview with law enforcement she indicated that she thought she had met Sholty previously. First, C.L. clarified at trial that she was confused in -11- Case No. 8-26-01 the moment during her interview with law enforcement. Both C.L. and Sholty testified at trial they had never met in person prior to November 30, 2019. {¶35} Second, the Supreme Court of Ohio has recently held that appellate courts “must defer to the fact-finder’s witness-credibility determinations.” State v. Reillo, 2026-Ohio-2701, ¶ 38. The Court held that “[a]n appellate court sits as the thirteenth juror only when evidence contradicts a fact-finder’s findings, . . . or when a witness’s testimony is so inconsistent as to material facts, so impeached, or so fantastical as to make it patently unbelievable.” Here, the minor inconsistencies cited by Sholty in his brief were explained by C.L. at trial, and we do not find that her testimony is so inconsistent, so impeached or so fantastical as to make it patently unbelievable.1 {¶36} Simply put, C.L.’s testimony supports a conviction in this matter. The DNA evidence and the security footage from Wal-Mart also corroborate C.L.’s story. We do not find that this is one of the exceptional cases where the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction, particularly when deferring to the factfinder’s credibility determinations. Therefore, Sholty’s first assignment of error is overruled. 1 Sholty also argues that C.L. had a motive to lie because she had a boyfriend at the time of the encounter. However, C.L. testified that at the time of trial she had not been with that boyfriend for years and thus had no motive to lie at trial to protect the non-existant relationship. -12- Case No. 8-26-01 Second Assignment of Error {¶37} In his second assignment of error, Sholty argues that the trial court erred by giving an instruction to the jury related to “consciousness of guilt.” Standard of Review {¶38} We review a trial court’s decision to give a specific jury instruction under an abuse of discretion standard. State v. Oliphant, 2026-Ohio-2366, ¶ 20 (3d Dist.). An abuse of discretion suggests the trial court’s decision is unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. Relevant Authority {¶39} Trial courts are charged with giving complete and accurate instructions that reflect the issues argued in the case before them. State v. Oliphant, 2026-Ohio-2366, ¶ 21 (3d Dist.). Generally, a trial court must give a requested instruction if it correctly states the law, applies to the facts of the case, and reasonable minds could reach the conclusion it seeks. Id. {¶40} “Courts universally recognize that a defendant’s evasive actions— such as fleeing, escaping custody, resisting arrest, hiding, or using a false name— are admissible to demonstrate a consciousness of guilt, and by extension, guilt itself. Id. at ¶ 22, citing State v. Wilson, 2010-Ohio-2294, ¶ 9 (3d Dist). A jury instruction on consciousness of guilt based upon the flight of the accused or an attempt to avoid -13- Case No. 8-26-01 apprehension is appropriate when supported by sufficient evidence in the record. Id. citing Id. {¶41} Generally, a flight instruction is “neutral in its effect” and “all but innocuous’ if it advises the jury that: (1) any finding of consciousness of guilt is entirely permissive; (2) the instruction applies only if the jury first determines the defendant fled out of a consciousness of guilt; (3) the jury retains the discretion to give such evidence no weight; and (4) flight does not create a presumption of guilt. Oliphant at ¶ 29, citing State v. Vasquez, 2024-Ohio-860, at ¶ 82 (6th Dist.). “This is because such an instruction explains the limited use of flight evidence, instructs the jury to consider flight only if it finds that consciousness of guilt was the defendant’s motive, and allows the jury to disregard flight evidence entirely.” Id. citing Id. Analysis {¶42} Sholty argues that the following jury instruction should not have been given to the jury: Testimony and Exhibit 1 have been admitted, indicating the defendant may have attempted to evade prosecution. You are instructed that Defendant’s attempt, if any, alone, does not raise a presumption of guilt, but it may tend to indicate the defendant’s consciousness of guilt. If you find the facts do not support that the defendant attempted to evade prosecution, or if you find that another motive or circumstances [sic] prompted or caused a delay in the prosecution of -14- Case No. 8-26-01 the defendant, or if you are unable to decide what the defendant’s motivation was, then you should not consider this evidence for any purpose, including, but not limited to, considering this evidence to prove the character of the defendant to show he acted in conformity with that character. However, if you find that the facts support that the defendant engaged in such conduct, and if you decide that the defendant was motivated by a consciousness of guilt, you may, but are not required, to consider that evidence in deciding whether the defendant is guilty of the crimes charged. You alone will determine the weight, if any to give this evidence. (Nov. 25, 2025, Tr. at 105-06). {¶43} On its face, the “consciousness of guilt” instruction provided to the jury is neutral as suggested by, inter alia, our decision in State v. Oliphant, supra. The instruction clearly permits disregarding of the “flight evidence” entirely if a motive could not be determined by the jury. {¶44} Nevertheless, Sholty argues that there was insufficient evidence presented to support the preceding jury instruction regarding consciousness of guilt. He argues that he never attempted to change his name or conceal his address. Further, he argues that he had the same cell phone number for 11 years. {¶45} Contrary to Sholty’s argument, the State presented evidence that as early as January and February of 2020, law enforcement had left voicemail messages that Sholty did not respond to. Sholty denied receiving the voicemails but stated he was aware that police had come to his mother’s residence looking for him. -15- Case No. 8-26-01 The day after law enforcement went to his mother’s residence, Sholty’s phone was no longer receiving calls. {¶46} In addition, Sholty failed to appear for arraignment due to “car problems.” After failing to appear, Sholty never rescheduled his arraignment or attempted to clear the warrant, substantially delaying the prosecution of this case. {¶47} The State requested the instruction on consciousness of guilt and Sholty’s trial counsel objected. The trial court overruled the objection, citing, inter alia, State v. McDonall, 2018-Ohio-2065, ¶ 47 (8th Dist.), in support. In McDonall, the Eighth District conducted the following analysis: A flight instruction is applicable not only for flight immediately after the crime, but also for flight from subsequent arrest. [State v.] Eaton[, 19 Ohio St.2d 145, 160 [1969]. The state presented evidence in this case that McDonall did not appear for his arraignment. About a week later, an officer saw him at a gas station in Wood County. When McDonall saw the officer, he immediately turned around and started walking the other way. After he was arrested, police found clothes and McDonall's passport in his vehicle. This evidence establishes that a flight instruction was proper and had McDonall’s counsel objected, it would have been futile. {¶48} McDonall, while distinguishable from the case sub judice, does provide some support for the trial court giving the instruction in this case, particularly given that Sholty’s phone was turned off just after law enforcement came looking for him at his mother’s residence. In addition, Sholty’s actions, or inactions, after missing his initial arraignment and knowing an active rape case was -16- Case No. 8-26-01 pending against him in Ohio also support the trial court’s determination to give the instruction here. {¶49} At the very least, we do not find that the trial court abused its discretion by giving the (neutral) consciousness of guilt instruction in this matter as there was evidence to support providing the instruction. State v. Oliphant, 2026-Ohio-2366, ¶ 27. Therefore, Sholty’s second assignment of error is overruled. Conclusion {¶50} Having found no error prejudicial to Sholty in the particulars assigned and argued, his assignments of error are overruled and the judgment of the Logan County Common Pleas Court is affirmed. Judgment Affirmed ZIMMERMAN, P.J. and MILLER, J., concur. -17- Case No. 8-26-01 JUDGMENT ENTRY For the reasons stated in the opinion of this Court, the assignments of error are overruled and it is the judgment and order of this Court that the judgment of the trial court is affirmed with costs assessed to Appellant for which judgment is hereby rendered. The cause is hereby remanded to the trial court for execution of the judgment for costs. It is further ordered that the Clerk of this Court certify a copy of this Court’s judgment entry and opinion to the trial court as the mandate prescribed by App.R. 27; and serve a copy of this Court’s judgment entry and opinion on each party to the proceedings and note the date of service in the docket. See App.R. 30. Juergen A. Waldick, Judge William R. Zimmerman, Judge Mark C. Miller, Judge DATED: /jlm -18-