State v. Brock

[Cite as State v. Brock, 2026-Ohio-2036.] IN THE COURT OF APPEALS TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO CLINTON COUNTY STATE OF OHIO, : CASE NO. CA2025-05-027 Appellee, : OPINION AND vs. : JUDGMENT ENTRY 6/1/2026 COREY D. BROCK, : Appellant. : : CRIMINAL APPEAL FROM CLINTON COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS Case No. CRI 2024-5060 Brian A. Shidaker, Clinton County Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. Hughes Law Office and Kevin D. Hughes; and Ostrowski Law Firm Co., L.P.A. and Andrea G. Ostrowski, for appellant. ____________ OPINION SIEBERT, J. {¶ 1} Appellant, Corey Brock, appeals his convictions for various offenses, including the murder of Chad Pauley, in the Clinton County Court of Common Pleas. The State alleged that Brock murdered Pauley following a brief altercation, while Brock argued  Clinton CA2025-05-027 at trial that Pauley's death resulted from self-defense or was accidental during an attempt to defend himself. On appeal, Brock challenges the weight of the evidence, the admissibility of certain evidence, including alleged hearsay statements and the use of character evidence, as well as other issues concerning a grant of immunity, and the imposition of his prison sentence. Upon review, we find Brock's assignments of error to be without merit and therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court. I. Factual and Procedural Background A. Death of Chad Pauley and Subsequent Investigation {¶ 2} In August 2023, Pauley began living in Brock's basement, reportedly due to domestic issues at his own residence. A few days later, Patricia Baker also began staying there with Pauley. The precise sequence of events following Baker's arrival is unclear. Baker testified that she, Pauley, and Kristy Brock (Brock's wife) spent several days in the basement using methamphetamine. Baker described her relationship with Pauley as romantic, though not formally defined, and stated that Pauley was also "friendly" with Kristy. In support of that characterization, Baker testified that she had seen a nude photograph of Kristy on Pauley's cell phone. {¶ 3} Although Brock and Pauley had been friends, the State alleged that Brock had become angry and suspicious that Pauley was sexually involved with Kristy. Brock, whose narrative shifted over time, told others that his primary concern was Pauley's drug use and trouble with the law. {¶ 4} On August 27, 2023, Baker testified that she was in the basement with Pauley when she heard three gunshots from upstairs. She soon encountered Brock descending the stairs while holding a small black handgun. Baker stated that Brock ordered her and Pauley to leave the residence before confronting Pauley. According to Baker, Pauley pleaded, "please don't shoot me," to which Brock responded, "I'm not going -2-  Clinton CA2025-05-027 to shoot you. I'm going to pistol whip you." Baker then heard the gun discharge during the confrontation and saw Pauley fall backwards. {¶ 5} Baker fled the residence and contacted Sheena Wallace, who transported her to the "Wallace Compound," a junkyard property where several individuals resided. While there, Baker told multiple individuals that Pauley had been shot. Some of those individuals went to Brock's residence to look for Pauley but were told by Brock that Pauley had run off. Later that evening, Sergeant Jeremy Meehan responded to Brock's residence regarding a missing-person report for Pauley. Brock stated that Pauley had outstanding felony warrants, had left earlier that day, and he had last seen Pauley walking south on State Route 134. Pauley remained missing for several months, during which rumors concerning his disappearance and Brock's possible involvement circulated within the community. {¶ 6} Almost five months later, law enforcement executed a search warrant at Brock's property and detained him. Brock later admitted that he had a physical altercation with Pauley during which a firearm discharged. He then led officers to the location where he had buried Pauley's body using chains and a backhoe. Pauley's remains were subsequently recovered. [REMAINDER OF PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK] -3-  Clinton CA2025-05-027 B. Summary of Charges, Convictions, and Sentencing {¶ 7} Following a jury trial, Brock was convicted and sentenced as follows: Count Offense, Statute, Offense Level Verdict Sentence/ Consecutive Merger 1 Felonious assault, in violation of R.C. Guilty on Assault Consecutive to 2903.11(A)(2) [deadly weapon] and Assault and Merged with 8 and 9 (D)(1)(a), a second-degree felony found he Count 4, but had a gun 3 years for Firearm specification, R.C. 2941.145(A) supporting Firearm and R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(a)(ii) Firearm specification specification 2 Murder, in violation of R.C. 2903.02(B) Not Guilty N/A N/A and (D), a special felony Firearm specification, R.C. 2941.145(A) and R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(a)(ii) 3 Felonious assault, in violation of R.C. Guilty, but Merged with N/A 2903.11(A)(1) and (D)(1)(a), a second- found he did Count 4 degree felony not have gun, so did Firearm specification, R.C. 2941.145(A) not support and R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(a)(ii) Firearm specification 4 Murder, in violation of R.C. 2903.02(B) Guilty (B), 15 years– and (D), a special felony but found he Life did not have Firearm specification, R.C. 2941.145(A) gun, so did and R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(a)(ii) not support Firearm specification 5 Murder, in violation of R.C. 2903.02(B) Not Guilty N/A N/A and (D), a special felony Firearm specification, R.C. 2941.145(A) and R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(a)(ii) 6 Aggravated murder, in violation of R.C. Dismissed N/A N/A 2903.01(A) and (C), a special felony Prior to Trial Firearm specification, R.C. 2941.145(A) and R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(a)(ii) 7 Gross abuse of a corpse, in violation of Guilty 12 months Consecutive to R.C. 2927.01(B) and (C), a fifth-degree Count 1 felony 8 Tampering with evidence, in violation of Guilty 18 months Consecutive to R.C. 2921.12(A)(1) and (B), a third- Count 1 degree felony 9 Tampering with evidence, in violation of Guilty 18 months Concurrent to R.C. 2921.12(A)(1) and (B), a third- Count 8 degree felony -4-  Clinton CA2025-05-027 II. Jury Trial A. Pretrial Motions {¶ 8} Prior to trial, the State dismissed Count Six (aggravated murder) and its accompanying firearm specification. The State moved to compel the testimony of Dustin Johnson, a friend of Brock's, asserting that Johnson possessed relevant information regarding Pauley's death. {¶ 9} Brock filed notice of his intent to assert a claim of self-defense. In support, he indicated that he would present evidence that Pauley was a "serial and repeated drug offender with a tendency for violence." Brock further alleged that Pauley was known to carry a firearm, had engaged in violent conduct, and had a propensity to carry other weapons. He also asserted that Pauley had an extensive drug-related criminal history, including an indictment as a major drug offender, which the State obtained before learning of Pauley's death. {¶ 10} The trial court ruled on the pretrial motions, including the State's later motion in limine to exclude improper character evidence of the victim. As relevant here, the trial court granted the State's request to prohibit testimony or evidence—other than Brock's own testimony—offered to establish the victim's propensity for violence. The court explained that Brock could testify as to his personal knowledge of Pauley's propensity for violence, but excluded testimony regarding matters outside his personal knowledge, such as the outstanding warrants. B. Testimony and Evidence {¶ 11} At the five-day jury trial, the State presented testimony from 16 witnesses, and Brock testified in his own defense. {¶ 12} Dr. Bradley Lachey of the Montgomery County Coroner's Office testified that he performed Pauley's postmortem examination and determined the cause of death -5-  Clinton CA2025-05-027 to be a gunshot wound to the left chest. He explained that the bullet traveled through the lower chest, perforated the diaphragm, and lodged in the thoracic spine. A toxicology screen revealed toxic levels of methamphetamine, though Dr. Lachey noted that decomposition and the lack of available blood limited the precision of the results. He nonetheless concluded that Pauley died from the gunshot wound. {¶ 13} Baker testified that on August 27, 2023, she was in the basement with Pauley and Kristy Brock when she heard three rapid gunshots from upstairs. Kristy ran upstairs, and Pauley told Baker they needed to leave. Before they could do so, Brock kicked open the basement door and ordered everyone to leave. As Baker went upstairs, she observed Brock descending the stairs with a firearm. She testified that Brock grabbed Pauley, who pleaded "please don't shoot me," and Brock responded, "I'm not going to shoot you, I'm going to pistol whip you." Baker then heard the gun discharge and saw Pauley fall backward. {¶ 14} Baker testified that she fled the residence and contacted a friend, who picked her up shortly thereafter. She stated that she told several individuals about the shooting but did not initially contact law enforcement because Pauley had instructed her never to involve the police. {¶ 15} She further testified that she had been using methamphetamine that day, which Pauley had provided, though she denied that he was her dealer. She reiterated that she was romantically involved with Pauley. Regarding the alleged nude photographs of Kristy Brock, Baker testified that she recalled seeing them on Pauley's phone but could not remember how they were transmitted. She testified "I can't remember. I know I saw the picture. It was on his phone, and it was a message. I don't know." {¶ 16} Steven Lee testified that Baker came to his trailer at the Wallace Compound and told him Pauley had been shot. Over Brock's hearsay objection, the trial court -6-  Clinton CA2025-05-027 admitted this testimony as a prior consistent statement. Lee testified that he and Delbert Wallace, Jr. ("Pee Wee") then went to Brock's residence, where Brock stated that Pauley had run off and asked them to remove Pauley's vehicles. Lee further testified that he later ran into Brock on several other occasions and asked him about Pauley. Brock consistently denied shooting him and claimed that Pauley had run off with a group of bikers. {¶ 17} Sheena Wallace testified that Baker called her in a distressed state and asked to be picked up immediately. Wallace described Baker as panicked and upset. Brock raised only a general objection to this testimony, using language that suggested an intent to challenge its admissibility on the ground that it failed to qualify as an excited utterance. See State v. Leach, 2024-Ohio-3145, ¶ 17 (12th Dist.) (defining an excited utterance as "[a] statement relating to a startling event or condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition."). The trial court permitted Wallace to recount Baker's statements, in which she described the confrontation and shooting. {¶ 18} The State presented testimony from multiple law enforcement officers. Sergeant Terreance Meeham testified that the case began as a missing-person investigation. He conducted a welfare check and testified that Brock had told him of an incident that occurred in an upstairs bedroom after he learned Pauley had outstanding warrants. According to Sergeant Meeham, Brock told him that he ordered Pauley to leave the residence and last saw him walking south of State Route 134. The State also introduced an audio recording of a phone call between Sergeant Meeham and Baker, in which Baker described the events that occurred in the basement earlier that day. Brock again objected, arguing that the recording improperly bolstered Baker's credibility through prior consistent statements, but the trial court overruled the objection. -7-  Clinton CA2025-05-027 {¶ 19} Sheriff Douglas Estes testified that he executed a search warrant at Brock's residence and that, during the investigation, Brock repeatedly altered his account of Pauley's disappearance. Although Brock initially denied any knowledge of Pauley's whereabouts, he later admitted that Pauley died during a physical altercation and that he buried the body. According to Sheriff Estes, Brock offered multiple, inconsistent explanations, claiming at various times that Pauley had pulled a gun, may have suffered a heart attack, ran away, or that Brock later heard a gun discharge after Pauley had already left. Deputy Charlie Saylor likewise testified that Brock first denied knowing Pauley's whereabouts but later acknowledged a physical confrontation, stating that he had "roughed him up" before Pauley fled. {¶ 20} Dustin Johnson testified under a grant of immunity. He stated that Brock confided in him that the altercation stemmed from explicit messages exchanged between Pauley and Kristy. According to Johnson, Brock said he went downstairs to confront Pauley and intended to "pistol whip" him and "scare him," but did not indicate that the firearm had gone off. Johnson further testified that he had little additional information, claiming "I didn't want any more information than what he'd already volunteered." {¶ 21} Detective Karen Abbitt testified that Brock initially denied knowledge of Pauley's death to her but later admitted that he buried the body. She stated that Brock described confronting Pauley in the basement, "chucking" him against a wall, and that the gun discharged. {¶ 22} During the cross-examination of Detective Abbitt, defense counsel attempted to introduce cellular and social media records purportedly showing that there had been little communication between Kristy and Pauley and the records contained no evidence that Kristy had sent Brock a nude photograph. Defense counsel also attempted to introduce purported Facebook messages from Pauley using the alias "Bill Grippin," -8-  Clinton CA2025-05-027 showing him in holding a large block of methamphetamines and using threatening language. The trial court sustained the State's objection for multiple reasons, including a purported lack of authentication. {¶ 23} The State also presented forensic evidence from personnel with the Bureau of Criminal Investigation ("BCI"). Special Agent Matthew Austin and forensic scientist Heidi Tinch testified that multiple areas of the basement floor and stairway yielded "presumptive positive" results for blood. Special Agent Austin further testified that a backhoe found on Brock’s property also tested "presumptive positive" for blood, and that information obtained during his investigation led to the excavation of Pauley’s body. {¶ 24} After the State rested, Brock moved for acquittal pursuant to Crim. R. 29, which the trial court denied. Brock then testified, offering an alternative account involving alleged threats from two "Mexican gentlemen." He claimed the men approached him at a convenience store and showed him a document containing Pauley's name and address with the word "methamphetamine" written on it. Brock stated that the men then advised him that he needed to get Pauley out "before they come and get him out." Brock testified that he believed the men were affiliated with a Mexican cartel and rushed home to confront Pauley. According to Brock, when he confronted Pauley, Pauley pulled out a firearm, and the gun discharged as Brock grabbed his wrist. C. Verdict and Sentence Summary {¶ 25} As noted in the summary chart, the jury returned a mixed verdict, finding Brock guilty of felonious assault (Count 1) and found he had a gun, supporting the firearm specification, a separate count of felonious assault (Count 3), one count of murder (Count 4), gross abuse of a corpse (Count 7), and two counts of tampering with evidence (Counts 8 and 9). The jury found Brock not guilty of two murder counts (Counts 2 and 5) and found he did not have a gun for the firearm specifications attached to the murder charge in -9-  Clinton CA2025-05-027 Count 4 and the felonious assault charge in Count 3. After merging allied offenses, the trial court imposed an aggregate sentence of 20.5 years to life in prison. Brock now appeals, raising eight assignments of error. III. Appeal A. Sufficiency, Weight, and Inconsistency {¶ 26} In his first assignment of error, Brock contends the trial court erred in denying both his motion for acquittal and his motion for a new trial. He raises three related claims. First, he argues that the jury returned inconsistent verdicts, entitling him to either an acquittal or a new trial. Brock's second and third arguments are that his convictions are not supported by sufficient evidence and are against the manifest weight of the evidence. 1. Sufficiency and Manifest Weight of the Evidence Standard of Review {¶ 27} "When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence underlying a conviction, an appellate court examines the evidence to determine whether such evidence, if believed, would convince the average mind of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Davis, 2025-Ohio-2382, ¶ 43 (12th Dist.). Therefore, "[t]he relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus. {¶ 28} A manifest weight of the evidence challenge, by contrast, concerns the "inclination of the greater amount of credible evidence, offered at a trial, to support one side of the issue rather than the other." State v. Barnett, 2012-Ohio-2372, ¶ 14 (12th Dist.). In resolving such a challenge, a reviewing court must look at the entire record, - 10 -  Clinton CA2025-05-027 weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of the witnesses, and determine whether in resolving the conflicts in the evidence, the trier of fact clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed, and a new trial ordered. State v. Graham, 2009-Ohio-2814, ¶ 66 (12th Dist.). {¶ 29} In reviewing the evidence, an appellate court must be mindful that the original trier of fact was in the best position to judge the credibility of witnesses and determine the weight to be given to the evidence. State v. Blankenburg, 2012-Ohio-1289, ¶ 114 (12th Dist.). An appellate court will overturn a conviction due to the manifest weight of the evidence only in the exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction. State v. Zitney, 2021-Ohio-466, ¶ 15 (12th Dist.). A determination that a conviction is supported by the manifest weight of the evidence will also be dispositive of the issue of sufficiency. State v. Reeder, 2021-Ohio-2988, ¶ 31 (12th Dist.). Applicable Law Murder and Felonious Assault {¶ 30} Brock was convicted of two counts of felonious assault and one count of murder. The murder statute, in relevant part, provides: (B) No person shall cause the death of another as a proximate result of the offender's committing or attempting to commit an offense of violence that is a felony of the first or second degree and that is not a violation of section 2903.03 or 2903.04 of the Revised Code. .... R.C. 2903.02. {¶ 31} Felonious assault is defined in R.C. 2903.11, which prohibits knowingly causing serious physical harm to another or causing or attempting to cause physical harm by means of a deadly weapon. R.C. 2903.11(A)(1) and (2). A person acts knowingly - 11 -  Clinton CA2025-05-027 when, regardless of purpose, "the person is aware that the person's conduct will probably cause a certain result or will probably be of a certain nature." R.C. 2901.22(B); State v. Haines, 2022-Ohio-1145, ¶ 35 (12th Dist.). Self-Defense {¶ 32} In addition to the elements of murder and felonious assault set forth above, the State also had the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that Brock did not act in self-defense. R.C. 2901.05(B)(1). The self-defense statute places the initial burden of production on the defendant to present evidence "that tends to support" a claim of self- defense. State v. Sturgill, 2020-Ohio-6665, ¶ 19 (12th Dist.). Accordingly, "a defendant charged with an offense involving the use of force has the burden of producing legally sufficient evidence that the defendant's use of force was in self-defense." State v. Messenger, 2022-Ohio-4562, ¶ 25. Once the defendant satisfies this burden, however, the burden of persuasion shifts to the State, which must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not use the force in self-defense. Sturgill at ¶ 17. {¶ 33} This appeal does not concern whether Brock satisfied his initial burden of production, but whether the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Brock did not act in self-defense. See State v. Elam, 2022-Ohio-1895, ¶ 13 (12th Dist.). The Ohio Supreme Court has instructed that the State's burden to disprove a claim of self-defense is reviewed on appeal under a manifest-weight standard. Messenger at ¶ 27. {¶ 34} As to self-defense, this court has explained that: An accused is justified in the use of force against another if (1) the accused was not at fault in creating the situation giving rise to the affray; (2) the accused had a bona fide belief that he was in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm and that his only means of escape from such danger was in the use of such force; and (3) the accused did not violate any duty to retreat or avoid the danger. State v. Byrd, 2020-Ohio-3073, ¶ 23 (12th Dist.). The elements of self-defense are - 12 -  Clinton CA2025-05-027 cumulative and therefore self-defense is inapplicable to a defendant who fails to satisfy any one element. State v. McFarland, 2022-Ohio-2326, ¶ 42 (12th Dist.). {¶ 35} A subsequent change in Ohio law—the "stand your ground law"— eliminated the duty to retreat before using force in self-defense when a person is in a "place in which the person lawfully has a right to be." R.C. 2901.09(B). Because Brock was lawfully present in his own home, we turn to the remaining elements of self-defense. {¶ 36} The first element, often described as the "not at fault" requirement, requires that the defendant not be the initial aggressor in the incident. State v. Turner, 2007-Ohio- 1346, ¶ 23 (2d Dist.), citing State v. Robbins, 58 Ohio St.2d 74 (1979). However, "the first element of a self-defense claim does not require in all situations that the [defendant] must have refrained from throwing the first punch." State v. Nichols, 2002-Ohio-415 (4th Dist.); State v. Gillespie, 2007-Ohio-3439, ¶ 17 (2d Dist.). Rather, the inquiry focuses on whether the defendant was at fault in creating the situation that gave rise to the affray. State v. Crawford, 2024-Ohio-691, ¶ 26 (12th Dist.). This concept extends beyond identifying the initial aggressor and instead examines the conduct leading to the confrontation. State v. Elam, 2022-Ohio-1895, ¶ 14 (12th Dist.). In particular, courts consider whether the defendant escalated the encounter, such as by transforming a verbal dispute into a physical altercation or by introducing a weapon into the conflict. State v. Mitchell, 2023- Ohio-2604, ¶ 22 (1st Dist.); State v. Messenger, 2021-Ohio-2044, ¶ 51 (10th Dist.). {¶ 37} The second element, i.e., the bona fide belief requirement, contains both objective and subjective components. State v. Smith, 2020-Ohio-4976, ¶ 56 (1st Dist.). The defendant must have honestly believed that he was in immediate danger of death or great bodily harm, and that belief must also be objectively reasonable under the circumstances. Id. Thus, it is not enough that the defendant subjectively feared harm; that fear must be one a reasonable person would have held under the same conditions. Courts - 13 -  Clinton CA2025-05-027 have consistently held that when a defendant uses deadly force in self-defense, the perceived threat must rise to the level of death or serious bodily harm. Sturgill, 2020-Ohio- 6665, at ¶ 26; State v. Sims, 2005-Ohio-5846, ¶ 16 (8th Dist.). Analysis {¶ 38} Brock does not dispute that Pauley died following a struggle in the basement. Instead, he contends that he did not possess or control a firearm, emphasizing that the jury found he did not have a gun in the firearm specifications related to Counts 3 and 4. He maintains that Pauley produced the gun and that he did not knowingly discharge it. He further asserts that he acted in self-defense, arguing that he had no duty to retreat in his home and that the State failed to disprove that defense. {¶ 39} These arguments lack merit. The jury plainly rejected Brock's account and accepted the State's version of events, a determination squarely within its role as factfinder. State v. McFarland, 2022-Ohio-2326, ¶ 47 (12th Dist.), citing State v. Simmons, 2021-Ohio-3563, ¶ 75 (12th Dist.). The jury was likewise free to disbelieve Brock's claim of self-defense and credit the State's evidence. See State v. Pittman, 2021-Ohio-1051, ¶ 19 (9th Dist.). {¶ 40} The record contains ample evidence supporting the jury's verdict. Baker testified that Brock entered the basement in an agitated and aggressive state while Pauley pleaded with him not to shoot. Although Brock reportedly stated he intended only to "pistol whip" Pauley, Baker testified that she then heard a gunshot and saw Pauley fall backwards. The State also presented testimony from Dustin Johnson, who stated that Brock had told him he intended to scare and pistol whip Pauley after learning that Pauley and Kristy were exchanging explicit messages. {¶ 41} Brock's own account largely mirrored this sequence of events, though his version of the incident shifted over time. Initially, he claimed Pauley had run off and did - 14 -  Clinton CA2025-05-027 not disclose the shooting or that he had buried Pauley's body. He repeated similar versions of this account to law enforcement until confronted with the imminent use of cadaver dogs, at which point he admitted to an altercation and burial. By trial, however, Brock offered a different explanation, asserting that the incident involved individuals connected to a Mexican cartel and that he acted in self-defense. {¶ 42} If the jury believed this evidence, the State could have met its burden to prove the relevant charges beyond a reasonable doubt and to defeat at least one prong of Brock's self-defense assertion. Baker testified she heard three gunshots upstairs, she saw Brock aggressively charge down the basement stairs, heard Brock say he was going to pistol whip Pauley, and heard Pauley plead with Brock not to shoot before she heard the gunshot leading to Pauley’s death. Brock's aggressive charge down the stairs and his statements about wanting to pistol whip Pauley could serve two purposes within the context of the State's case. {¶ 43} First, it undermines the claim of self-defense by demonstrating that Brock was at fault in creating the situation that gave rise to the affray. Byrd, 2020-Ohio-3073, at ¶ 23 (12th Dist.). If Brock did not charge down the stairs and aggressively confront Pauley, there would have been no "affray" leading to the assault, the gunshot, and Pauley's death. Although Brock suggests that Pauley escalated the situation by introducing the firearm, the jury could reasonably reject that account in light of contrary evidence. Messenger, 2021-Ohio-2044, at ¶ 51 (recognizing escalation where a defendant introduced or controls a weapon during a confrontation). {¶ 44} Moreover, Brock's statements about intending to "pistol whip" Pauley permit the inference that he exercised control over the firearm at some point during the encounter. After all, how can you "pistol whip" someone if you do not have and control a gun? And if Brock controlled the gun enough to have the intention to pistol whip Pauley, - 15 -  Clinton CA2025-05-027 then Brock could not have a "bona fide belief that he was in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm and that his only means of escape from such danger" was shooting Pauley. Byrd at ¶ 23. If believed by the jury, this evidence would support the jury concluding the State met its burden to disprove Brock acted in self-defense, by defeating both justification prongs of that defense. {¶ 45} Second, Baker and Johnson's testimony regarding Brock's statements that he wanted to "scare" and "pistol whip" Pauley and the subsequent altercation could support that Brock knowingly caused or attempted to cause serious physical harm to Pauley, which would satisfy the felonious assault conviction. Brock's murder conviction rested on Brock causing Pauley's death as a proximate result of committing the felonious assault against Pauley. {¶ 46} The jury was not required to accept Brock's evolving explanations. When conflicting evidence is presented, a conviction is not against the manifest weight of the evidence merely because the jury chose to believe the State's witnesses. State v. Lunsford, 2011-Ohio-6529, ¶ 17 (12th Dist.). Here, the jury reasonably credited the State's evidence and rejected Brock's inconsistent accounts. It was free to believe all, part, or none of the testimony presented. State v. Roberts, 2021-Ohio-3073, ¶ 23 (12th Dist.). {¶ 47} After reviewing the entire record, weighing the evidence and inferences, and considering witness credibility, we conclude that the jury did not lose its way. The convictions are supported by sufficient evidence and are not against the manifest weight of the evidence. 2. Inconsistent Verdicts {¶ 48} Brock also argues that the jury returned inconsistent verdicts, and the trial court therefore erred in denying his Crim. R. 29(C) motion for acquittal. In the alternative, - 16 -  Clinton CA2025-05-027 he contends that he was entitled to a new trial because the alleged inconsistency affected his substantial rights. {¶ 49} As noted above, the jury found Brock guilty one count of felonious assault with a firearm specification (finding Brock had a gun), a separate count of felonious assault, and one count of murder as charged in Count 4 of the indictment. The jury, however, found Brock not guilty of the murder charges set forth in Counts 2 and 5 of the indictment. It also found he did not have a gun for the firearm specifications attached to the felonious assault charge in Count 3 and the murder charge in Count 4. {¶ 50} Under Crim.R. 29(A), a defendant may be acquitted at trial by the court "if the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction of such offense or offenses." Accordingly, appellate courts review the denial of a Crim.R. 29 motion under the same standard applicable to sufficiency-of-the-evidence claims. State v. Maloney, 2023-Ohio- 2711, ¶ 40 (12th Dist.), citing State v. Mota, 2008-Ohio-4163, ¶ 5 (12th Dist.). {¶ 51} Crim. R. 33(A) sets forth the grounds upon which a trial court may grant a new trial. Such motions, however, "are not to be granted lightly." State v. Spradlin, 2017- Ohio-876, ¶ 9 (12th Dist.). The decision to grant or deny a motion for a new trial rests within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. State v. Litton, 2016-Ohio-7913, ¶ 17 (12th Dist.). {¶ 52} Brock contends that the jury's verdicts are irreconcilably inconsistent. He emphasizes that the jury found him guilty of felonious assault with a firearm specification in Count 1 but found him guilty of felonious assault in Count 3 and murder in Count 4 while finding he did not have a gun for the firearm specifications attached to those counts. According to Brock, because the State's theory was that each offense involved a firearm, the jury could not logically convict him of the underlying offenses while simultaneously finding he did not have a gun for each specific charge with a firearm specification. - 17 -  Clinton CA2025-05-027 {¶ 53} Brock relies on State v. Koss, 49 Ohio St.3d 213 (1990). In Koss, the defendant was charged with murder with a firearm specification. Id. at 213-214. The jury acquitted her of murder, convicted her of voluntary manslaughter, and found her not guilty of the firearm specification. Id. at 214. The Ohio Supreme Court found the verdicts inconsistent under those particular circumstances, as the victim's death by gunshot was undisputed and the jury rejected the only means alleged. Id. at 219. {¶ 54} However, Koss did not address the Court's earlier decision in State v. Perryman, 49 Ohio St.2d 14 (1976), vacated in part on other grounds, 438 U.S. 911 (1978). In Perryman, the Court held that a principal offense and its accompanying specification are not interdependent. Id. at 25-26. A specification is considered only after finding guilt on the underlying offense and does not alter or negate that finding. Id. at 26. Thus, an acquittal on a firearm specification does not invalidate a conviction on the principal charge. {¶ 55} Ohio appellate courts considering Koss and Perryman together have generally limited Koss to its unique facts involving voluntary manslaughter. State v. Ayers, 2013-Ohio-5601, ¶ 24 (10th Dist.), citing State v. Davis, 2002-Ohio-3046, ¶ 29 (6th Dist.). As the Tenth District explained in Ayers: "[a]s long as sufficient evidence supports the jury's verdict at issue, other seemingly inconsistent verdicts do not undermine the otherwise sufficient evidence." [citing State v. Crabtree, 2010-Ohio-3843, ¶ 19 (10th Dist.)]. "A jury need not deliver rationally consistent verdicts in order for the verdicts to be upheld. . . . As long as sufficient evidence supports the jury's verdict at issue, other seemingly inconsistent verdicts do not undermine the otherwise sufficient evidence." Id., citing Trewartha at ¶ 15. See also, State v. Smith, 2007-Ohio-6772, ¶ 42 (10th Dist.). Id. at ¶ 24. - 18 -  Clinton CA2025-05-027 {¶ 56} Consistent with that reasoning, Ohio courts have repeatedly upheld convictions despite acquittals on accompanying firearm specifications. In State v. Allen, 2006-Ohio-6288, ¶ 31-32 (1st Dist.), the court upheld an aggravated burglary conviction despite acquittals on the related firearm specifications. Likewise, in State v. Glenn, 2011- Ohio-829, ¶ 71 (1st Dist.), the court affirmed an aggravated robbery conviction after concluding that the underlying offense was not dep