State v. Smith
CourtCourt of Appeals of North Carolina
Date FiledNovember 18, 2026
Docket25-438
JudgeJudge Michael Stading
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute
controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with
the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. COA25-438
Filed 18 November 2026
Mecklenburg County, Nos. 21CR014747-590,21CR216246-590,21CR216248-590
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v.
SHELTON JAMAL SMITH, Defendant.
Appeal by Defendant from final judgment and sentences entered 11 June 2024
by Judge Robert C. Ervin in Mecklenburg County Superior Court. Heard in the Court
of Appeals 15 October 2025.
Attorney General Jeff Jackson, by Assistant Attorney General Meghan E. Boyd
Ward, for the State.
Sarah Holladay, for defendant-appellant.
STADING, Judge.
Shelton Jamal Smith (“Defendant”) appeals from judgment entered after a jury
found him guilty of attempted first-degree murder and assault with a firearm on a
law enforcement officer. The jury also found that Defendant had committed the
offense for the purpose of avoiding arrest, an aggravating factor for sentencing
purposes. On appeal, Defendant argues the trial court erred when calculating his
STATE V. SMITH
Opinion of the Court
prior record level (“PRL”). Defendant also maintains that the trial court abused its
discretion when overruling an objection to the prosecutor’s argument. Defendant
further contends the trial court erred when taking judicial notice and instructing the
jury that Defendant possessed a firearm at the time of the incident. For the reasons
conceded by the State, we vacate the judgment and remand solely for the limited
purpose of appropriately calculating Defendant’s PRL and sentencing him
accordingly. We hold the trial court did not otherwise err.
I. Background
This case arises from two separate trials after a mistrial due to a hung jury on
some of Defendant’s charges at his initial trial. The record from each of Defendant’s
trials tends to show that, on 27 May 2021, Defendant became the focus of an
investigation by Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department (“CMPD”) of an armed
robbery that involved a shooting. Detective Shawn Steward of CMPD investigated
the armed robbery. After reviewing a surveillance video, Detective Steward
identified three suspects and a vehicle connected to the armed robbery. The vehicle
was a Mercury Grand Marquis, “which was tan in color with a white front bumper
and a left red front quarter panel.”
Detective Steward shared the confirmed details of his investigation with
Detective Trey Hinton, Officer William Salazar, and Sergeant Wiggins of CMPD.
Shortly thereafter, Detective Steward learned that a vehicle matching the description
of the Mercury Grand Marquis was observed earlier at a nearby Budget Inn.
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Detective Steward then located “a live video surveillance feed of that motel,” and
observed the vehicle in the parking lot of the Budget Inn. The live footage showed
Defendant walking back and forth between the vehicle and a motel room. After
identifying Defendant as a suspect in the armed robbery, Detective Steward notified
officers in the area over radio so they could “start staging” and “coordinate how they
wanted to approach” Defendant. Multiple officers arrived at the parking lot.
As Detective Hinton approached the vehicle in the parking lot, Defendant took
off running. Detective Hinton pursued Defendant on foot through the premises
breezeway, into another parking lot, and eventually onto Regan Drive towards Sugar
Creek. Officer Salazar and Sergeant Wiggins also pursued Defendant on foot. As
Defendant and the officers were approaching Regan Drive, Defendant’s hand was in
his pocket or his waistband. While Detective Hinton yelled for Defendant to get on
the ground, Defendant turned and looked back at him. Detective Hinton observed
that Defendant had a gun in his right hand which prompted Detective Hinton to draw
his weapon. As Detective Hinton closed in on Defendant—approximately twelve to
fifteen feet away—Defendant turned around and fired a gun at him. Detective Hinton
heard a bullet go past his head and then heard a second shot. Sergeant Wiggins was
approximately thirty yards away from Defendant when shots were fired in their
direction. In response, Detective Hinton returned fire and Defendant fell to the
ground after being struck in the leg.
Kelli Phillips, a Special Agent with the State Bureau of Investigation,
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investigated the scene. Before Agent Phillips’s arrival, police had recovered a Colt
.25 caliber handgun found in close proximity to Defendant. Also located on the scene,
were 6.35 mm spent shell casings, corresponding to a .25 caliber measurement. Agent
Phillips identified each shell casing found at the scene at trial, including the
headstamp on the casing identifying the brand and caliber. Agent Phillips also
identified the .25 caliber handgun, with live rounds of 6.35 mm ammunition in the
magazine and chamber, found near the location where Defendant had fallen.
Jennifer Pohlheber, a forensic scientist with CMPD’s Crime Lab, determined that the
two 6.35 mm shell casing were fired from the weapon found near where Defendant
had fallen.
On 21 June 2021, the Mecklenburg County Grand Jury returned true bills of
indictment charging Defendant with two counts of attempted first-degree murder,
two counts of assault with a firearm on a law enforcement officer, possession of
firearm by felon, and armed habitual felon. On 13 July 2022, the State served
Defendant with a notice of aggravating factors.
Defendant’s initial trial took place on 14 November 2022. Before trial, the
State moved to join all offenses, Defendant offered no objection, and the trial court
allowed the motion for joinder. Upon deliberating, on 30 November 2022, the jury
found Defendant guilty of possession of firearm by felon. However, the jury found
Defendant not guilty of one attempted first-degree murder charge and one assault
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with a firearm on a law enforcement officer charge.1 And the jury hung on the
remaining counts of attempted first-degree murder and assault with a firearm on a
law enforcement officer.2 The trial court therefore declared a mistrial as to those
charges. Concerning the armed habitual felon indictment, the trial court stated, “[i]t
appeared to me the armed habitual doesn’t apply so there wouldn’t be a second
phase.” The State did not “proceed[ ] on the aggravating factor.” The trial court
entered a prayer for judgment continued on the possession of firearm by felon
conviction by noting “PJC for sentencing date to be determined.” On 13 July 2023,
the trial court sentenced Defendant to imprisonment for a term of 17 to 30 months
based off a sentencing worksheet assessing him seven felony sentencing points and
classifying his PRL as III.3
On 4 June 2024, Defendant was retried on the charges that ended in a hung
jury and on the armed habitual felon indictment. During jury selection at this trial,
Defendant’s trial counsel asked questions about Defendant’s possession of a firearm
and the prosecutor argued “collateral estoppel applies.” The same discussion ensued
after Defendant’s first closing argument.
During Defendant’s first closing, his trial counsel argued to the jury that
1 These charges were for the attempted first-degree murder of and assault with a firearm on Sergeant
Wiggins.
2 These charges were for the attempted first-degree murder of and assault with a firearm on Detective
Hinton.
3 The seven felony sentencing points were calculated from a robbery committed in the Commonwealth
of Virginia with a conviction date of 19 July 2013 and a misdemeanor robbery committed in
Mecklenburg County with a conviction date of 18 August 2010.
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“[t]here’s no evidence at all that the State has indicated or proven there was a gun,”
and “you don’t see anything about him indicating that there was a gun.” He also
argued “we submit to you that there is reasonable doubt as to whether or not these
things were in his hands at any point[.]” Outside the jury’s presence, the prosecutor
argued to the trial court that Defendant’s trial counsel stated Defendant “did not have
a gun in his possession.” Defendant’s trial counsel argued possession did not equate
to Defendant holding the firearm in his hands.
To resolve the matter, the trial court decided to use “the pattern language for
judicial notice” and say, ‘[t]he Court takes judicial notice, as previously been
determined by proof beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant possessed a
firearm at the time of this incident.” The trial court continued, “[a]rguing whether it
was in his hand or not is free game. Arguing whether he fired it is free game.” In
response, Defendant’s trial counsel objected and the trial court noted his objection for
the record. The trial court thus instructed the jury:
Now, the Court takes judicial notice that it has previously
been determined by proof beyond a reasonable doubt that
the defendant, Shelton Jamal Smith, possessed a firearm
at the time of this incident. A judicially noticed fact is one
not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is capable of
accurate and ready determination by sources whose
accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned. You may,
therefore, accept a judicially noticed fact as conclusive, but
you’re not required to do so. You should give it such weight
as you decide it should receive in connection with all the
other evidence presented.
Upon deliberating, the jury found Defendant guilty of attempted first-degree
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Opinion of the Court
murder, assault with a firearm on a law enforcement officer, and of being an armed
habitual felon. The jury also found that Defendant committed these offenses for the
purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest—an aggravating factor. On 11 June
2024, the trial court sentenced Defendant for the attempted first-degree murder
conviction, a class B2 felony, to imprisonment for a term of 214 to 269 months in the
presumptive range based off a sentencing worksheet assessing him eleven felony
sentencing points and classifying him as a PRL IV.4 The trial court sentenced
Defendant for the assault with firearm on a law enforcement officer, a class D felony
elevated to a class C felony on account of Defendant’s armed habitual felon conviction,
to imprisonment for a term of 120 to 156 months—the mandatory minimum under
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-7.71(a) (2025). Defendant filed his notice of appeal on 11 June
2024.
II. Analysis
Defendant argues that, at his subsequent trial, the trial court erred in
sentencing him by factoring in four felony sentencing points for the conviction of
possession of firearm by felon from his initial trial. Defendant also argues the trial
court abused its discretion by overruling his objection to the prosecutor’s argument
that Defendant’s counsel “misrepresent[ed] the truth” and “manipulated evidence.”
4 The eleven felony sentencing points were calculated from a robbery committed in the Commonwealth
of Virginia with a conviction date of 19 July 2013, a misdemeanor larceny committed in Mecklenburg
County with a conviction date of 18 August 2010, and the possession of firearm by felon conviction
from Defendant’s initial trial in Mecklenburg County on 30 November 2022.
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Lastly, Defendant maintains the trial court impermissibly took judicial notice when
instructing the jury that “it has previously been determined by proof beyond a
reasonable doubt that [Defendant] possessed a firearm at the time of the incident.”
We consider each argument in turn.
A. Calculation of Defendant’s PRL
We first consider Defendant’s argument that his conviction for possession of
firearm by felon from the initial trial cannot be used to calculate his PRL for
sentencing at the conclusion of the subsequent trial. Defendant maintains the trial
court erred in calculating his sentence by including a joinable offense when
determining his PRL. The State concedes this assignment of error. We note this
argument and our analysis is limited to consideration of Defendant’s PRL for the
sentence of his attempted first-degree murder conviction at his subsequent trial.5
Defendant argues, and the State also concedes, resentencing is necessary under
binding precedent. Both parties assert that State v. Watlington, 234 N.C. App. 601,
759 S.E.2d 392 (2014) and State v. High, 271 N.C. App. 771, 845 S.E.2d 150 (2020)
are controlling. Even so, we independently consider the applicability of this
authority.
“The determination of an offender’s prior record level is a conclusion of law that
5 The PRL assessed to Defendant after his initial trial is uncontested. We also note after his
subsequent trial, the trial court sentenced Defendant in accordance with the mandatory minimum for
his assault with firearm on a law enforcement officer conviction elevated by his status as an armed
habitual felon.
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is subject to de novo review on appeal.” State v. Bohler, 198 N.C. App. 631, 633, 681
S.E.2d 801, 804 (2009) (citation omitted). “Under a de novo review, the court
considers the matter anew and freely substitutes its own judgment for that of the
lower tribunal.” State v. Hicks, 243 N.C. App. 628, 641, 777 S.E.2d 341, 350 (2015)
(citation omitted). “The prior record level of a felony offender is determined by
calculating the sum of the points assigned to each of the offender’s prior convictions
that the court . . . the jury, finds to have been proved in accordance with this section.”
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1340.14(a) (2025). Our statutes address the number of points
assigned to a defendant based on the classification of prior convictions, the number
of points underlying a PRL, and multiple convictions obtained in a calendar week of
superior court. See id. § 15A-1340.14(b)–(d) (2025).
In Watlington, the defendant was tried on six charges all related to a single
robbery.6 234 N.C. App. at 608, 759 S.E.2d at 396. The State moved to join all charges
before trial. Id. At the defendant’s first trial in October 2012, the jury found the
defendant guilty of three of the charges, but the court declared a mistrial when the
jury was unable to reach a unanimous verdict on the remaining three charges. Id.
The defendant was retried and found guilty on the remaining charges in November
2012. Id. On appeal, the defendant argued that the three October convictions should
not have been used to calculate his PRL during sentencing for the three November
6 Charges related to other incidents were also joined for trial but are not relevant to our analysis.
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Opinion of the Court
convictions because they were joined with the charges that resulted in the November
convictions. Id. at 608, 759 S.E.2d at 396. This Court reasoned that, though our
statutes did not specifically address the use of joined offenses in calculating a
defendant’s PRL, it would “be unjust to punish a defendant more harshly simply
because, in his first trial, the jury could not reach a unanimous verdict on some
charges, but in a subsequent trial, a different jury convicted that defendant on some
of those same charges.” Id. at 609, 759 S.E.2d at 397.
In High, the defendant was tried for first-degree murder and robbery with a
dangerous weapon stemming from a single transaction. 271 N.C. App. at 772, 845
S.E.2d at 152. The jury found the defendant guilty on both charges. Id. While
serving the sentence for his convictions, the defendant filed a motion for appropriate
relief. Id. The trial court heard the defendant’s motion for appropriate relief and
pursuant to a plea agreement with the State, the trial court vacated the defendant’s
first-degree murder conviction and the defendant pleaded guilty to second-degree
murder. Id. When sentencing the defendant for second-degree murder, the trial court
treated the related conviction for robbery with a dangerous weapon as a prior
conviction, which elevated his PRL. Id. On appeal, this Court held that the trial
court’s use of the defendant’s robbery conviction in calculating the defendant’s prior
record level was erroneous because the robbery was not a “prior” conviction,
regardless of whether the defendant stipulated to use of the same. Id. at 777, 845
S.E.2d at 155.
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Opinion of the Court
Here, all of Defendant’s charges, arising from a single incident, were joined at
the time of Defendant’s initial trial. Given the highly analogous facts of Watlington,
we are compelled to employ its logic. As in Watlington, here “[i]t is clear that, had
the jury in the first trial reached guilty verdicts on [the charges joined for trial that
resulted in convictions at the subsequent trial], none of the [convictions from the
initial trial] could have been used when calculating Defendant’s prior record level.”
Watlington, 234 N.C. App. at 608, 759 S.E.2d at 396. Since we are bound by the
precedent of a prior panel of this Court, we remand for the sole purpose of
recalculating Defendant’s PRL consistent with this opinion. See In re Civil Penalty,
324 N.C. 373, 384, 379 S.E.2d 30, 37 (1989).
B. State’s Closing Argument
We next consider Defendant’s argument that the trial court “abused its
discretion in overruling an objection to the prosecutor’s argument that defense
counsel ‘misrepresent[ed] the truth.’ ”
Generally, “parties are given wide latitude in their closing arguments to the
jury.” State v. Fletcher, 370 N.C. 313, 319, 807 S.E.2d 528, 534 (2017) (citation
modified). “The standard of review for improper closing arguments that provoke
timely objection from opposing counsel is whether the trial court abused its discretion
by failing to sustain the objection.” State v. Jones, 355 N.C. 117, 131, 558 S.E.2d 97,
106 (2002). An abuse of discretion occurs when “the ruling could not have been the
result of a reasoned decision.” Id. (citation modified). “Thus, the question before us
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Opinion of the Court
is whether the trial court failed to make a reasoned decision when it overruled
defendant’s timely objection . . . .” Id.
A two-part analysis is used to determine whether “the trial court committed
prejudicial error in overruling defendant’s timely objection to” a remark made during
the prosecutor’s closing argument. State v. Copley, 374 N.C. 224, 228, 839 S.E.2d 726,
729 (2020). First, we “determine if the remarks were improper, and then determine
if the remarks were of such a magnitude that their inclusion prejudiced the
defendant.” Id. (citation modified) (quoting Fletcher, 370 N.C. at 320, 807 S.E.2d at
534). Thus, even “[a]ssuming that the trial court’s refusal to sustain the defendant’s
objection was erroneous, the defendant must show that there is a reasonable
possibility that the jury would have acquitted him had the challenged argument not
been permitted.” Fletcher, 370 N.C. at 320, 807 S.E.2d at 534 (citation omitted); see
also Copley, 374 N.C. at 228, 839 S.E.2d at 729 (“Assuming that the trial court’s
refusal to sustain the defendant’s objection was erroneous, the defendant must show
that there is a reasonable possibility that the jury would have acquitted him had the
challenged argument not been permitted.” (citation omitted)). That is, “we must also
look to the evidence presented by the State to determine whether there is a
reasonable possibility the jury would have acquitted defendant if the prosecutor’s
remarks had been excluded.” Copley, 374 N.C. at 231, 839 S.E.2d at 730 (citation
omitted). Since the “analysis of prejudice is ultimately dispositive, we focus our
attention there.” Id. at 228, 839 S.E.2d at 729.
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When assessing the prejudicial effect of an alleged improper closing argument,
we examine “the statements ‘in context and in light of the
overall factual circumstances to which they refer.’ ” Id.
(quoting State v. Alston, 341 N.C. 198, 239, 461 S.E.2d 687
(1995)). For example, to evaluate the context here, we
consider the entirety of the closing argument, the evidence
presented at trial, and the instructions to the jury.
State v. Goins, 377 N.C. 474, 479, 858 S.E.2d 590, 593 (2021).
Here, during his first closing argument, Defendant’s trial counsel argued:
And I want you to look at the body cam footage and see
whether or not -- yourself will see whether or not -- where
the hand -- and I think you ought to focus at where the
hand of the -- of Mr. Smith was during the course of this
chase which would give rise to a claim that a gunshot would
have passed Officer Hinton’s head. I would submit to you
that you’re going to find that the hand -- prior to any
shooting -- and we submit to you you’re going to see that
the first shots and the only shots, but we’ll submit to you
that the shot -- the first shot that took place came from the
gun of Officer Hinton.
....
And we submit to you is that you -- that when you hear the
-- the -- the body cam footage, all you hear in those seconds
that led up to the three seconds where the guns were fired
is that you hear Officer Hinton, “He has a gun,” and then
you hear instantaneously him firing those first series of
four shots and then that last shot. We submit to you you
don’t hear any of that pop before and that, in fact, if indeed
you see the -- Mr. Smith turn around after he says he has
a gun, and clearly his gun is -- and Officer Hinton’s gun is
visible, that at that point clearly any man would be
provoked if indeed it -- to fire if he indeed fired, but we
submit that he didn’t.
Thereafter, while playing Detective Hinton’s body camera footage for the jury
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Opinion of the Court
during the State’s closing argument, the prosecutor told the jury:
Let’s talk about ingenuity of counsel, because he will have
you believe when you watch the video in conjunction with
the audio of it that you don’t see the defendant shooting the
gun before Officer Hinton does. But watch the video and
listen to the audio. It is completely distorted. It’s not in
sync[ ]. You hear the gunshots before you even see
anything.
And you can tell that. You know how you can tell? Because
Officer Hinton - - you hear a gunshot, and then you see
Officer Hinton shooting his gun. Even the slides goes back,
and then the smoke comes out of his gun, and that’s after
you hear a gunshot. That’s ingenuity, right? The audio and
the video does not match because both were slowed down.
You can tell specifically on several different occasions. Let’s
watch it.
(Video played.)
[The State]: And, again, we just heard another gunshot and
then later five seconds later we see gun smoke come out of
Officer Hinton’s gun. It’s ingenuity, folks. It’s crafty.
(Video played.)
[The State]: It’s ingenuity, and it’s craftiness, and it
misrepresents the truth.
Defendant’s counsel then objected to the State’s closing but did not provide a basis
for the objection; the trial court overruled the objection.
Defendant maintains the State’s closing argument prejudiced him since “the
only issue for the jury to decide was whether [Defendant] unlawfully fired a gun at
Officer Hinton,” and the evidence against him was “not overwhelming.” Despite
arguments to the contrary, Defendant has not met his burden to show “that there is
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Opinion of the Court
a reasonable possibility that the jury would have acquitted him had the challenged
argument not been permitted.” Copley, 374 N.C. at 228, 839 S.E.2d at 729 (citation
omitted). Indeed, absent the challenged portion of the State’s closing argument, the
State presented evidence tending to show: “[D]efendant [took] off running,” and then
a lengthy foot chase ensued. Detective Hinton then “noticed that [Defendant] was
running normally with his left hand, but his right hand was in his pants pocket or in
his pants and his arm was at about a 90-degree angle . . . .” And when Defendant
was about fifteen feet away from him, Detective Hinton saw “a gun in [Defendant’s]
hand.” At this point, Defendant “turns back and starts firing at [him].” Detective
Hinton heard gun fire, saw smoke and “a slight muzzle flash,” and felt the bullet go
“directly” past his head. This evidence in the form of Detective Hinton’s testimony
was substantiated by the testimony of the other officers who witnessed the sequence
of events, namely Officer Salazar and Sergeant Wiggins. Moreover, two shell casings
were located nearby and forensically determined to have been fired from the Colt .25
caliber handgun found near Defendant.
Our review leads us to conclude the State adduced “compelling evidence of
defendant’s guilt” of attempted first-degree murder and assault with a firearm on a
law enforcement officer. Id. at 231–22, 839 S.E.2d at 731. Defendant has failed to
show a reasonable possibility that the jury would have acquitted him absent the
State’s remarks during closing arguments. See id. at 228, 839 S.E.2d at 729.
Defendant’s argument to this point is overruled.
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Opinion of the Court
C. Judicial Notice and Jury Instructions
Defendant last argues that, at this retrial, the trial court erred by taking
judicial notice and instructing the jury that it was previously determined by proof
beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant possessed a firearm at the time of this
incident. Specifically, Defendant contends that collateral estoppel did not apply
because the manner of his possession was not necessary and essential to his previous
conviction for possession of firearm by felon. Defendant also maintains that even if
collateral estoppel applies, his trial counsel’s argument was not contrary to the
verdict in his initial trial. Defendant further argues that the trial court’s instruction
taking judicial notice had the effect of expressing a judicial opinion. And with respect
to each alleged error, Defendant argues they were “so prejudicial that a new trial is
required.”
1. Collateral Estoppel and Defendant’s Argument
This section of our analysis begins by addressing Defendant’s arguments that
collateral estoppel did not apply and his argument was proper.
“Whether the doctrine of collateral estoppel is applicable and bars a specific
claim or issue is a question of law subject to de novo review.” State v. Jones, 256 N.C.
App. 266, 269, 808 S.E.2d 280, 283 (2017) (citation omitted). “The doctrine of
collateral estoppel means simply that when an issue of ultimate fact has once been
determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated
between the same parties in any future lawsuit.” Id. at 270, 808 S.E.2d at 283
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(citation modified). As noted by this Court, “collateral estoppel precludes parties from
retrying fully litigated issues that were decided in any prior determination and were
necessary to the prior determination.” State v. Williams, 252 N.C. App. 231, 235, 796
S.E.2d 823, 826 (2017) (citation modified). This doctrine is applicable to both civil
and criminal actions. See id.
For collateral estoppel to apply, the following is required:
(1) the same parties, (2) the same issue, (3) that the issue
was raised and actually litigated in the prior action, (4)
that the issue was material and relevant to the disposition
of the prior action, and (5) that the determination of the
issue was necessary and essential to the prior judgment.
Id. (citations omitted).
Here, the record shows that Defendant’s trial counsel argued the manner of
possession but also argued a lack of evidence that there was a firearm. Defendant’s
trial counsel’s assertion there was a lack of evidence that Defendant had a firearm
logically and necessarily means that Defendant could not have possessed a firearm.
Yet, at Defendant’s initial trial, the jury found him guilty of possession of firearm by
felon, a verdict that necessarily determined beyond a reasonable doubt that
Defendant possessed a firearm at the time of the incident. Indeed, our de novo review
leads us to conclude this issue had been previously litigated in the prior action, was
material and relevant to the prior action, and that issue was necessary and essential
to the jury’s verdict in his initial trial. See Jones, 256 N.C. App. at 269, 808 S.E.2d
at 283; see also William, 252 N.C. App. at 235, 796 S.E.2d at 826. Defendant’s trial
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Opinion of the Court
counsel’s argument at the retrial that the State had not proven there was a firearm
therefore sought to relitigate an issue already decided. Consequently, debate over
the element of possession, whether constructive or actual, was barred by collateral
estoppel.
2. Judicial Notice
Defendant also maintains that the trial court abused its discretion by taking
judicial notice of the prior determination that he possessed a firearm.
“[T]he decision as to whether judicial notice of facts should be taken is left to
the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal absent an
abuse of discretion.” State v. McDougald, 38 N.C. App. 244, 248, 248 S.E.2d 72, 77
(1978). Put differently, “a trial court’s decision concerning judicial notice will not be
overturned absent an abuse of discretion.” Muteff v. Invacare Corp., 218 N.C. App.
558, 568, 721 S.E.2d 379, 386 (2012). See generally Jones, 355 N.C. at 131, 558 S.E.2d
at 106 (noting that an abuse of discretion occurs when “the ruling could not have been
the result of a reasoned decision” (citation modified)).
Under the North Carolina Rules of Evidence, “[a] judicially noticed fact must
be one not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is either (1) generally known within
the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) capable of accurate and ready
determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.”
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 201 (2025). “An indisputable fact is one that is so well
established as to be a matter of common knowledge.” State v. Bucklew, 280 N.C. App.
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Opinion of the Court
494, 503, 867 S.E.2d 362, 373 (2021) (citation modified). Rule 201 only applies to
“adjudicative facts.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 201. “ ‘A trial court may take
judicial notice of earlier proceedings in the case cause,’ including matters in the file
not offered into evidence.” State v. Isaacs, 261 N.C. App. 696, 700, 821 S.E.2d 300,
303 (2018) (citation omitted).
Here, the trial court took judicial notice of a fact “beyond reasonable
controversy.” Id. at 699–700, 821 S.E.2d at 303. It is undisputed that, at Defendant’s
initial trial, he was convicted for possession of firearm by felon arising from the same
facts at issue in his subsequent trial. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 201. Defendant
does not offer an argument proffering how the trial court abused its discretion by
judicially noticing the issue resolved in his initial trial. Instead, Defendant’s
argument centers on whether the instruction itself was in error and prejudicially
confused the jury. The trial court did not err by taking judicial notice that Defendant
had “possessed a firearm at the time of this incident.”
Furthermore, Defendant cannot show the prejudice of which he complains.
First, his characterization of judicial notice of a conviction, rather than an issue of
fact, is not supported by the instruction provided to the jury, which provided: “Now,
the Court takes judicial notice that it has previously been determined by proof beyond
a reasonable doubt that the defendant, Shelton Jamal Smith, possessed a firearm at
the time of this incident.” Second, while we hold Defendant’s argument is meritless,
even assuming error, Defendant cannot show prejudice. See generally State v. Austin,
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STATE V. SMITH
Opinion of the Court
378 N.C. 272, 277–78, 861 S.E.2d 523, 528 (2021).
The jury convicted Defendant of attempted first-degree murder. “A person
commits the crime of attempted first-degree murder if he specifically intends to kill
another person unlawfully; he does an overt act calculated to carry out that intent,
going beyond mere preparation; he acts with malice, premeditation, and deliberation;
and he falls short of committing the murder.” State v. Cozart, 131 N.C. App. 199,
202–03, 505 S.E.2d 906, 909 (1998).
Here, sufficient evidence exists to permit a reasonable juror to find the
elements of attempted first-degree murder were met. Specific to Defendant’s retrial,
Officer Salazar’s testimony detailed that while Defendant was running from the
officers, his “[r]ight arm was tucked into his waistline pocket.” He then saw
Defendant “turn his body, . . . extend his right arm,” and heard what he “recognized
as gunfire.” Sergeant Wiggins further testified that he noticed Defendant had his
right hand in his waist area. He also “observed a gun . . . approximately 10 feet away
from the suspect’s feet on the ground.” Likewise, Detective Hinton, who was closest
to Defendant, recalled “his right hand was in his pants pocket or in his pants.” He
continues by describing a lengthy foot chase. Detective Hinton recalled, Defendant
“stays on the road running with one arm either in his pants pocket or in his pants[.]”
Then, when Detective Hinton was “maybe 15 feet” from Defendant, he saw Defendant
had “a gun in his hand,” “could see the barrel, the slide, of the firearm in his right
hand.” Detective Hinton then testified that Defendant “turns back and starts firing
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STATE V. SMITH
Opinion of the Court
at me.” He added, “I saw smoke and like a slight muzzle flash, and I heard a gun go
off[.]” Further, he “felt [a bullet] go directly past [his] head[.]” Additionally, evidence
supports that “State’s Exhibit Items 12 and 14,” two spent shell casings collected at
the scene, were fired from “State’s Exhibit 16,” the Colt .25 caliber handgun found
near Defendant.
This evidence is sufficient to satisfy the elements of attempted first-degree
murder. See id.; see also, e.g., State v. Weathers, 339 N.C. 441, 451, 451 S.E.2d 266,
271 (1994) (“Premeditation and deliberation generally must be established by
circumstantial evidence, because they ordinarily are not susceptible to proof by direct
evidence.” (citation modified)). Defendant’s firing a gun at Detective Hinton is an
overt act, going beyond mere preparation. Defendant’s intent to kill Detective Hinton
with malice can be inferred from his shooting at Detective Hinton’s head from a
distance of about fifteen feet. Defendant’s premeditation and deliberation can be
inferred from the fact of the lengthy foot chase while grabbing at his pocket or
waistband for a period of time.
The elements of assault with a firearm on a law enforcement officer are: “(1)
an assault; (2) with a firearm; (3) on a law enforcement officer; (4) while the officer is
engaged in the performance of his duties.” State v. Dickens, 162 N.C. App. 632, 636,
592 S.E.2d 567, 571 (2004); see also N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-14.34.5(a) (2025). “An
assault is an overt act or attempt, with force and violence, to do some immediate
physical injury to the person of another, which show of force or violence must be
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STATE V. SMITH
Opinion of the Court
sufficient to put a person of reasonable firmness in fear of immediate physical injury.”
Dickens, 162 N.C. App. at 636, 592 S.E.2d at 571 (citation modified). “In proving the
element of assault, the State does not have to show the defendant pointed a firearm
at a law enforcement officer.” Id. “Furthermore, to be guilty of this offense, the
defen