State v. House
CourtCourt of Appeals of North Carolina
Date FiledNovember 18, 2026
Docket26-114
JudgeJudge Chris Dillon
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute
controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored but may be permitted in accordance with
the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. COA26-114
Filed 18 November 2026
Mecklenburg County, Nos. 19CR236926-590, 19CR236928-590, 19CR236930-590
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v.
TRAVONTE JAMARCUS HOUSE, Defendant.
Appeal by defendant from judgment entered 19 September 2024 by Judge W.
Robert Bell in Mecklenburg County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals
13 October 2026.
Attorney General Jeff Jackson, by Special Deputy Attorney General Caden
William Hayes, for the State.
Lockamy Law Firm, by C. Scott Holmes, for defendant-appellant.
DILLON, Chief Judge.
Defendant Travonte Jamarcus House appeals from a judgment entered upon
a jury verdict finding him guilty of attempted robbery with a dangerous weapon,
possession of a firearm by a felon, and first-degree murder. On appeal, Defendant
argues the trial court erred by misstating certain jury instructions, admitting
STATE V. HOUSE
Opinion of the Court
recordings of jail calls, and excluding certain defense witness statements. For the
reasons below, we conclude Defendant received a fair trial, free from reversible error.
I. Background
The evidence at trial tended to show as follows: In April 2019, Defendant and
three acquaintances went to a Charlotte apartment to rob an individual of drugs and
money. Defendant and a female acquaintance went to the back door while the two
others (Malik Benson and Diyondre Wilson) went to the front door.
Victim Derrick Chambers was shot with a shotgun and killed. Victim’s body
was found in the kitchen area of the apartment, the area accessible via the back door.
In September 2019, Defendant was arrested in connection with the murder of
Victim. At Defendant’s trial, Benson testified for the State, stating Defendant carried
a shotgun to the back of the apartment and shot and killed Victim. Defendant has
previously stated to detectives him and Benson do not get along.
At trial, Wilson testified for the defense, stating Defendant was not at the
apartment that night. Wilson is Defendant’s cousin and is also related to Benson.
The jury found Defendant guilty of attempted robbery with a dangerous
weapon, possession of a firearm by a felon, and first-degree felony murder. The trial
court arrested judgment on the attempted armed robbery charge and sentenced
Defendant to the mandatory life sentence of imprisonment without possibility of
parole for the murder conviction and sentenced him to nineteen to thirty-two months
for possessing a firearm by a felon. Defendant appealed in open court.
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Opinion of the Court
II. Analysis
Defendant presents three arguments on appeal and alternatively moves for
appropriate relief (“MAR”). We address each below.
A. Stipulated Jury Instruction
Defendant argues the trial court violated his right to a jury trial and due
process by misstating an agreed upon jury instruction. For the reasons below, we
decline to address Defendant’s argument.
The State and Defendant entered a written stipulation that Defendant was a
felon and that he knew (based on his felon status) he could not possess a firearm on
the date of the alleged incident relevant to this appeal. The italicized language is the
verbiage from the trial court’s instruction regarding the stipulation with which
Defendant takes issue:
The Defendant has also been charged with possessing a
firearm after having been convicted of a felony. For you to
find Defendant guilty of the offense . . . the State must
prove two things beyond a reasonable doubt. First, that the
Defendant was a convicted felon on April the 6th of 2019.
The State and the Defendant . . . have agreed or stipulated
that certain facts shall be accepted by you as true without
further proof.
The agreed facts in this case are as follows: That Defendant
was convicted of a felony on April 6th, 2019, and that on
[the date of the instant offense], he knew that he could not
legally possess a firearm. And second, that on April 6th,
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Opinion of the Court
2019, the Defendant possessed a firearm.
(Emphasis added).
The actual stipulation Defendant and the State entered, however, stated as
follows: “Defendant was convicted of a felony on December 1, 2009, and on April 6,
2019, knew that he could not legally possess a firearm.”
Here, we decline to address Defendant’s argument because he failed to object
to the trial court’s misstatement at trial. N.C. R. App. P. 10(a)(1); see State v. Ashe,
314 N.C. 28, 39 (1985) (citations omitted) (“As a general rule, [a] defendant’s failure
to object to alleged errors by the trial court operates to preclude raising the error on
appeal.”); see also State v. Hunter, 305 N.C. 106, 112 (1982) (citations omitted)
(stating constitutional questions not presented to the trial court will not be considered
on appeal).
Further, Defendant fails to argue plain error. Thus, we will not review for
plain error. See State v. Reber, 386 N.C. 153, 158 (2024) (“Plain error exists for the
rare cases where the harshness of this preservation rule outweighs its benefits.”) See
also N.C. R. App. P. 28(a) (“Issues not presented and discussed in a party’s brief are
deemed abandoned.”).
Additionally, we decline to invoke Rule 2 to review Defendant’s unpreserved
argument. See also N.C. R. App. P. 2 (stating the appellate rules may be suspended
“[t]o prevent manifest injustice . . . or expedite a decision in the public interest[]”).
In any event, it appears Defendant’s argument lacks merit. It appears the trial
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Opinion of the Court
court was merely outlining the first two elements of felon possession of a firearm—
not stating that Defendant was stipulating to possessing a firearm. See State v.
Wilson, 176 N.C. 751, 754–55 (1918) (citation modified) (“The charge of the court must
be read as a whole, in the same connected way that the judge is supposed to have
intended it and the jury to have considered it[.]”). The court prefaces the first element
with “First, that the Defendant was a convicted felon on April the 6th of 2019[,]” then
states the agreed facts as stipulated to and then concludes by stating the second
element of the charge by stating “And second, that on April 6th, 2019, the Defendant
possessed a firearm.” Thus, we conclude the trial court did not misstate the jury
instruction.
B. Jail Calls
Defendant next argues the trial court erred by admitting two statements of an
unidentified female and two of his statements which occurred during jail calls. For
the reasons below, we conclude there was no prejudicial error.
Evidentiary rulings by the trial court are reviewed for an abuse of discretion.
State v. Blake, 317 N.C. 632, 637–38 (1986). The trial court’s rulings on Rule 401
(relevancy) are not reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard but instead are
given “great deference” on appellate review. State v. Wallace, 104 N.C. App. 498, 502
(1991) (citation omitted).
As an initial matter, the unidentified female’s statements were not hearsay
because the State explained they were not being admitted for the truth of the matters
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Opinion of the Court
asserted. Hearsay is an out-of-court statement offered “to prove the truth of the
matter asserted.” N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 801(c). Statements offered for another
purpose are not hearsay. See State v. Reid, 335 N.C. 647, 661 (1994). In recorded
conversations, a speaker’s statements can be admissible to place the defendant’s
responses in context and make the conversation intelligible to the jury. See State v.
Coffey, 326 N.C. 268, 282 (1990); State v. Saddler, 294 N.C. App. 496, 500 (2024).
Here, the State offered the unidentified female caller’s statements for that
limited purpose. Her remarks provided context for Defendant’s responses and
enabled the jury to understand the meaning of his statements concerning the
investigation, surveillance footage, and efforts to establish an alibi. Because the
statements were not admitted for their truth, they were not hearsay.
Defendant specifically challenges the unidentified female caller’s statement
that he had committed “a violent, violent crime.” Even assuming this statement
carried some potential for prejudice, Defendant’s response was itself probative.
Rather than denying involvement in the charged offenses, Defendant replied that he
“hate[d] being lied to.” The challenged statement therefore supplied context for
Defendant’s response and was admissible for that non-hearsay purpose.
Next, regarding Defendant’s own statements, he argues they lack relevance
and are likewise unfairly prejudicial under Rule 403.
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Opinion of the Court
Defendant challenges the following statements he made during those calls:
“The only thing I got in the system is I think it’s a larceny s**t[,]” and miscellaneous
references to “court” “lawyer” and “grand jury[.]”
Regarding Defendant’s relevancy argument on these statements, we defer to
the trial court’s ruling because “[it] is better situated to evaluate whether a particular
piece of evidence tends to make the existence of a fact of consequence more or less
probable[.]” State v. Tadeja, 191 N.C. App. 439, 444 (2008) (citation omitted).
Concerning Defendant’s Rule 403 challenge, Defendant argues the statements
undermine his credibility. We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
admitting these statements because “[c]redibility and weight are for determination
by the jury unassisted by the judge.” State v. Walker, 266 N.C. 269, 273 (1966).
However, even if the admission of the jail statements—by the unidentified
female and Defendant—were error, we conclude there is not a “reasonable possibility”
the result of the trial would have been different absent admission of these statements.
See State v. Wilkerson, 363 N.C. 382, 415 (2009) (stating evidentiary error requires a
showing of prejudice which means there must be a “reasonable possibility” that
without the alleged error a different result would have been reached at trial). This is
because Benson inculpated Defendant in the instant criminal acts. Thus, we conclude
there is no prejudicial error in the admission of the four evidentiary statements.
C. Defense Exhibit 8
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Opinion of the Court
Third, Defendant argues the trial court erred by excluding an investigator’s
report including statements by Wilson stating Defendant was not at the apartment
on the night of Victim’s death. We conclude there is no prejudicial error.
In Wilkerson, our Supreme Court stated “[a] defendant is prejudiced by
evidentiary error ‘when there is a reasonable possibility that, had the error in
question not been committed, a different result would have been reached at [] trial[.]”
363 N.C. at 415.
Here, even if we assume the trial court erred in its failure to admit defense
exhibit 8, we conclude Defendant was not prejudiced by this error. We reach this
conclusion because at various other times during Defendant’s trial Wilson testified
favorably for Defendant to the substance of the omitted investigator’s report—i.e., the
witness’s belief that Defendant was innocent. Thus, we conclude any error by the
trial court did not prejudice Defendant because there is not a reasonable possibility,
given other evidence presented at trial, a different result would have occurred with
the exhibit’s admission.
D. Motion for Appropriate Relief
Finally, we address Defendant’s MAR, in which he argues police and detectives
provided Benson with the hope of leniency on his sentences for criminal acts in
connection with Victim’s death, and in exchange, Benson would testify against
Defendant at trial. According to Defendant, this tacit and unwritten agreement
violated both Brady v. Maryland and Naupe v. Illinois. See 373 U.S. 83 (1963); 360
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Opinion of the Court
U.S. 264 (1959).
A MAR must be decided based on the materials before the Court, or remanded
when necessary for an evidentiary hearing. N.C.G.S. § 15A-1418(b).
We decline to reach Defendant’s MAR. Defendant alleges the existence of an
implied agreement between Benson and detectives. While the record contains a
transcript of the conversation between Benson and detectives, the record lacks any
additional conversations between the district attorney and Benson’s attorney, the
parties to which the detectives indicated Benson would have to speak to regarding
any leniency on his sentence. See State v. Dorton, 182 N.C. App. 34, 44 (2007)
(remanding for an evidentiary hearing because the record failed to contain agreement
Defendant alleged existed). Accordingly, we dismiss Defendant’s MAR without
prejudice as to any right Defendant may have to seek an MAR in the trial court. See
id. (citing State v. Thornton, 158 N.C. App. 645, 654 (2003)).
III. Conclusion
We conclude Defendant failed to preserve his jury instruction argument; that
Defendant has failed to meet his burden of showing prejudice by the admission of the
jail call statements nor by the failed attempt to admit defense exhibit 8. And we
dismiss Defendant’s MAR without prejudice.
NO ERROR IN PART, DISMISSED IN PART.
Judges COLLINS and FREEMAN concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
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