United States v. Rodriguez Velasquez
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Date FiledNovember 17, 2026
Docket25-5044
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS NOV 17 2026
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 25-5044
D.C. No.
Plaintiff - Appellee, 4:22-cr-02598-SHR-EJM-1
v.
MEMORANDUM*
JULIAN ANTONIO RODRIGUEZ
VELASQUEZ,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
Scott H. Rash, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted September 17, 2026
Phoenix, Arizona
Before: M. SMITH and TUNG, Circuit Judges, and DIMKE, District Judge;**
Concurrence by Judge DIMKE;
Dissent by Judge TUNG.
Defendant-Appellant Julian Antonio Rodriguez Velasquez pled guilty to one
count of smuggling unlawful goods from the United States after he was caught
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The Honorable Mary K. Dimke, United States District Judge for the
Eastern District of Washington, sitting by designation.
with a 9-millimeter pistol, two 9-millimeter magazines, and 35 rounds of
ammunition at a border entry in Douglas, Arizona, and later admitted that he
intended to smuggle them into Mexico in exchange for money as he had on two
previous occasions. The district court sentenced Rodriguez Velasquez to 48
months of imprisonment based on a base-offense level of 26 pursuant to U.S.S.G.
§ 2M5.2(a)(1), the addition of two levels pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3C1, and a
downward variance. Rodriguez Velasquez appeals his sentence, contending that
the district court erred by (1) applying a base-offense level of 26 pursuant to
§ 2M5.2(a)(1) instead of 14 pursuant to § 2M5.2(a)(2); and (2) considering his
admissions to prior smuggling incidents. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm.
“In reviewing the district court’s application of the Sentencing Guidelines,
we review the district court’s identification of the applicable provisions de novo,
factual findings for clear error, and application of those Guidelines to the facts in
the case for abuse of discretion.” United States v. Kurns, 129 F.4th 589, 594 (9th
Cir. 2025). To interpret the Sentencing Guidelines, “we begin as we do for all
questions of statutory interpretation, by turning to the text.” United States v.
Herrera, 974 F.3d 1040, 1047 (9th Cir. 2020); United States v. Kirilyuk, 29 F.4th
1128, 1137 (9th Cir. 2022) (“In interpreting the Guidelines, we apply the ordinary
tools of statutory interpretation and look to the plain meaning of its terms.”).
2 25-5044
1. The parties agree that U.S.S.G. § 2M5.2(a) governs, but dispute which
subdivision applies. Specifically, Rodriguez Velasquez contends that the two
magazines involved in his offense do not justify the application of § 2M5.2(a)(1)
where, as here, his attempt to smuggle a single pistol and 35 rounds of ammunition
indisputably would otherwise fall under § 2M5.2(a)(2). The applicable Guideline
provides:
Exportation of Arms, Munitions, or Military Equipment or
Services Without Required Validated Export License
(a) Base Offense Level:
(1) 26, except as provided in subdivision (2) below;
(2) 14, if the offense involved only (A) non-fully
automatic small arms (rifles, handguns, or
shotguns), and the number of weapons did not
exceed two, (B) ammunition for non-fully
automatic small arms, and the number of rounds did
not exceed 500, or (C) both.
U.S.S.G. § 2M5.2.
Under the plain text of the Guideline, § 2M5.2(a)(2) does not extend to
magazines. Because a magazine is neither ammunition nor a “small arm,”
Rodriguez Velasquez does “not qualify” for § 2M5.2(a)(2)’s exemption and the
district court correctly applied § 2M5.2(a)(1). United States v. Carper, 659 F.3d
923, 925 (9th Cir. 2011). While § 2M5.2(a)(2) does not define the term “small
arms,” we read that term narrowly, pursuant to its ordinary meaning, and consistent
with “the examples listed—‘rifles, handguns, or shotguns[.]’” Id. (“PVS–14
devices” did not fall “within the plain meaning” of “small arms” because “the
3 25-5044
relevant arms are firearms, a description which excludes PVS–14 devices.”).
“A magazine is a device that automatically feeds ammunition into a firearm
whenever the shooter fires a bullet. Although some magazines are permanently
affixed to a firearm, most magazines are detachable.” Duncan v. Bonta, 133 F.4th
852, 861 (9th Cir. 2025) (en banc). Magazines are “accessories to firearms that are
neither arms themselves nor necessary to the ordinary functioning of a firearm.”
Id. at 865; see also id. at 868 (explaining that a “magazine plays no role in the
firing mechanism of the firearm” and is an “optional accessory” even if it
“undoubtedly provides a benefit for a shooter”).
The only mention of magazines elsewhere within the Guidelines supports
that they are distinct from—and not synonymous with—firearms. U.S.S.G.
§ 2K2.1 (discussing offenses involving a “semiautomatic firearm that is capable of
accepting a large capacity magazine”); see United States v. Lemus, 93 F.4th 1255,
1261 (9th Cir. 2024). The Guidelines’ explicit reference to magazines in § 2K2.1,
but exclusion of any mention of them in § 2M5.2(a)(2), also supports an inference
that the Sentencing Commission’s omission of magazines was deliberate. See
Lemus, 93 F.4th at 1261.
Rodriguez Velasquez concedes that magazines are textually absent from
§ 2M5.2(a)(2), but argues that magazines must be read into the provision
consistent with the overall intent behind the Sentencing Guidelines and to avoid
4 25-5044
otherwise absurd and unnecessarily punitive results. “Unless a guideline provision
is ambiguous, the plain meaning of the Guidelines controls.” United States v.
Rodriguez, 162 F.4th 1016, 1019–20 (9th Cir. 2025). Because a magazine is
unambiguously neither ammunition nor an arm, § 2M5.2(a)(2) does not apply and
our inquiry ends. See Carper, 659 F.3d at 925.1
2. While unclear from the record whether the district court considered
Rodriguez Velasquez’s admissions to the two prior smuggling incidents, the
district court did not clearly err to the extent it did. A base-offense level of 26
independently applied to Rodriguez Velasquez’s conviction. Accordingly,
Rodriguez Velasquez failed to show a reasonable probability that he would have
received a different sentence if the prior smuggling incidents were not considered.
United States v. Christensen, 732 F.3d 1094, 1102 (9th Cir. 2013). We therefore
do not decide whether they constituted relevant conduct for purposes of
sentencing.
AFFIRMED.
1
To the extent that results generated by § 2M5.2(a)’s brightline distinction appear
“at least counterintuitive”—ascribing a higher base-offense level to Rodriguez
Velasquez than someone attempting to smuggle two semiautomatic rifles and 500
rounds of ammunition but no magazine, for instance—any interpretation that
counts firearm accessories as either component parts of arms or distinct arms itself
could generate confusion and other arguably absurd results. See United States v.
Stines, 34 F.4th 1315, 1320 (11th Cir. 2022).
5 25-5044
FILED
United States v. Rodriguez Velasquez, Case No. 25-5044 NOV 17 2026
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
DIMKE, District Judge, concurring in the result: U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
I concur in the judgment affirming Rodriguez Velasquez’s sentence. In my
view, it is unnecessary to decide whether a single magazine accompanying a
handgun may be treated as part of that handgun under U.S.S.G. § 2M5.2(a)(2).
Even treating one of Rodriguez Velasquez’s magazines as part of his pistol, the
second magazine placed his offense outside the exception. I therefore would
affirm on that narrower ground. See PDK Lab’ys Inc. v. U.S. D.E.A., 362 F.3d
786, 799 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (Roberts, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment) (“[I]f it is not necessary to decide more, it is necessary not to decide
more.”).
Section 2M5.2(a)(1) establishes a base offense level of 26, subject to the
exception in subsection (a)(2). 1 That exception provides a base offense level of 14
if the offense involved “only” no more than two “non-fully automatic small arms
(rifles, handguns, or shotguns),” no more than 500 rounds of ammunition for such
arms, or both. The word “only” confines the exception to those articles, so
1
Rodriguez Velasquez argues that his magazines fall outside the guideline’s scope
because they do not appear on the United States Munitions List. The magazines
were nevertheless subject to the Commerce Department’s export controls, and he
admitted that exporting them required a license. Section 2M5.2 applies to his
charged firearms export offense, and its text does not condition its application on
whether the exported articles appear on the Munitions List. See U.S.S.G. §
1B1.2(a); id. § 2M5.2 & cmt. (Statutory Provisions).
1
satisfying the numerical limits does not bring an offense within the exception if it
also involves the unlawful export of other articles. See United States v. Stines, 34
F.4th 1315, 1322 (11th Cir. 2022) (Luck, J., concurring in part and in the
judgment).
Rodriguez Velasquez’s offense involved a disassembled 9mm pistol, two
loaded magazines, and 35 rounds of ammunition. A magazine is a firearm
component that holds ammunition for feeding into the firearm’s chamber. See
United States v. Gonzalez, 792 F.3d 534, 536–37 (5th Cir. 2015). Rodriguez
Velasquez argues that both magazines were intended for use with the same pistol.
Even accepting that intended use, the second magazine supplied an interchangeable
alternative to the magazine assumed to form part of the handgun. On that
assumption, the offense involved a handgun together with a spare component for
use with it.
The exception’s reference to “handguns” does not encompass that spare
magazine based on its intended use with the accompanying handgun. The
additional magazine was neither another handgun nor ammunition, so the
allowance for up to two firearms did not bring it within the exception. Consistent
with that distinction, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the application of a base offense
level of 26 under § 2M5.2(a)(1) to an offense involving one pistol, 100 rounds of
ammunition, and four magazines, treating three of the magazines as “additional
2
component parts.” United States v. Sifuentes, No. 22-40825, 2024 WL 224316, at
*1 (5th Cir. Jan. 22, 2024) (per curiam) (unpublished).
Rodriguez Velasquez argues that this reading produces an absurd result
because exporting two complete non-fully automatic firearms and up to 500 rounds
of ammunition can qualify for a lower base offense level. But the Sentencing
Commission’s decision to limit the exception to the specified articles is consistent
with its concern about trafficking. See Stines, 34 F.4th at 1325 (Luck, J.,
concurring in part and in the judgment) (rejecting an absurdity challenge because
firearm parts can service multiple weapons and are easier for traffickers to conceal
than complete firearms). The commentary identifies the threat to national security
or foreign policy interests, the volume of commerce, and the extent of planning or
sophistication as factors relevant to selecting a sentence within the Guidelines
range or determining whether a departure is warranted. U.S.S.G. § 2M5.2 cmt.
nn.1-2.
The additional magazine thus placed Rodriguez Velasquez’s offense outside
§ 2M5.2(a)(2), even treating one magazine as part of the pistol. The guideline’s
text and structure unambiguously exclude that additional magazine from the
exception, so the rule of lenity does not apply. See United States v. Cuevas-Lopez,
934 F.3d 1056, 1068 n.14 (9th Cir. 2019). The district court therefore correctly
applied the default base offense level of 26 under § 2M5.2(a)(1).
3
I also conclude that the district court did not clearly err in finding Rodriguez
Velasquez’s admissions to prior firearms activity sufficiently reliable to consider at
sentencing. See United States v. Franklin, 18 F.4th 1105, 1125 (9th Cir. 2021).
He admitted to transporting firearms into Mexico on two prior occasions and
purchasing firearm components for the person who supplied the pistol in this case.
The detail and self-inculpatory nature of those admissions supported the district
court’s reliability determination. The offense of conviction independently
supported a base offense level of 26, so I would not reach whether the prior
incidents qualified as relevant conduct for calculating that level.
4
FILED
United States v. Rodriguez Velasquez, Case No. 25-5044 NOV 17 2026
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
TUNG, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
This case asks whether a defendant is entitled to a lower base-offense level of
14 (or a higher level of 26) under a federal sentencing guideline that deals with the
export of arms, munitions, or military equipment or services without a required valid
export license. The lower level applies “if the offense involved only (A) non-fully
automatic small arms (rifles, handguns, or shotguns), and the number of weapons
did not exceed two, (B) ammunition for non-fully automatic small arms, and the
number of rounds did not exceed 500, or (C) both.” U.S.S.G. § 2M5.2(a)(2). Here,
the defendant’s offense involved a 9mm pistol, two 9mm magazines (that defendant
says were fitted for the pistol), and 35 rounds of ammunition.
Both Judge Smith and Judge Dimke conclude that the lower level does not
apply—though for different reasons: Judge Smith says that the defendant’s
possession of a magazine means that the defendant was transporting something other
than a firearm and ammunition, and so the defendant’s offense did not involve “only”
firearms and ammunition; Judge Dimke says that one of the magazines can be treated
as part of the firearm (and thus not separate from it), but that possession of the second
magazine disqualifies the defendant from the lower base-offense level. Respectfully,
I disagree with both views.
1
Magazines are critical parts of small arms. Accordingly, “small arms” should
reasonably be construed to encompass their parts, including magazines, such that
transporting an arm with its accompanying magazine should not be viewed as
transporting more than an arm. We would not say a person transports more than a
bag because the bag contains a strap. Or that a person transports more than a stroller
because the stroller comprises wheels, a frame, and a handle. Of course, a strap is
not literally a bag; and wheels, frames, and handles are not literally strollers. But
when we say a person transports a bag or a stroller we usually consider (implicitly)
its parts to be transported with it, and we do not say that a person is transporting the
bag or the stroller plus its parts. So too here—the term “small arms” encompasses
their parts, including at least their magazines.
Judge Dimke sees this but would find the second magazine disqualifying. I
would not. If the second magazine (like the first) were intended for the pistol (which
the defendant says it was, and the government has not proven otherwise), then it
should be considered as much a part of the pistol as is the first magazine. Guns often
come with spare magazines, just as cars come with spare tires. In any event, even if
the spare magazine were not considered part of the defendant’s pistol, it should be
considered (as part of another firearm) a “small arm” for purposes of the guideline.
See United States v. Stines, 34 F.4th 1315, 1319–20 (11th Cir. 2022). On that reading,
2
the defendant would still be entitled to the lower base-offense level because the
number of “small arms” would not have exceeded two.
Any other position would lead to an absurdity. Under Judge Smith’s position,
a defendant who possessed two rifles (sans magazines) and 500 rounds of
ammunition would receive a far lesser sentence than a defendant who possessed only
a single magazine (with no accompanying gun or ammunition). And under Judge
Dimke’s position, a defendant who possessed two rifles (with two magazines) and
500 rounds of ammunition would also receive a lesser sentence than a defendant
who possessed only one magazine. How does that make any sense? It does not, and
nothing in the text of the guideline here compels such a topsy-turvy result. Once a
magazine is understood to be a critical part of an arm, the question resolves itself.
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent and would reverse the district court’s judgment.1
1
I would not affirm on the alternative ground that the defendant’s prior smuggling
attempts constitute “relevant conduct” to sustain the sentence. The government has
repeatedly disavowed this ground, and I would hold it to its waiver. See United
States v. Dreyer, 804 F.3d 1266, 1277 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc).
3