Full Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS NOV 17 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 25-5044 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellee, 4:22-cr-02598-SHR-EJM-1 v. MEMORANDUM* JULIAN ANTONIO RODRIGUEZ VELASQUEZ, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Arizona Scott H. Rash, District Judge, Presiding Argued and Submitted September 17, 2026 Phoenix, Arizona Before: M. SMITH and TUNG, Circuit Judges, and DIMKE, District Judge;** Concurrence by Judge DIMKE; Dissent by Judge TUNG. Defendant-Appellant Julian Antonio Rodriguez Velasquez pled guilty to one count of smuggling unlawful goods from the United States after he was caught * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The Honorable Mary K. Dimke, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Washington, sitting by designation. with a 9-millimeter pistol, two 9-millimeter magazines, and 35 rounds of ammunition at a border entry in Douglas, Arizona, and later admitted that he intended to smuggle them into Mexico in exchange for money as he had on two previous occasions. The district court sentenced Rodriguez Velasquez to 48 months of imprisonment based on a base-offense level of 26 pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2M5.2(a)(1), the addition of two levels pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3C1, and a downward variance. Rodriguez Velasquez appeals his sentence, contending that the district court erred by (1) applying a base-offense level of 26 pursuant to § 2M5.2(a)(1) instead of 14 pursuant to § 2M5.2(a)(2); and (2) considering his admissions to prior smuggling incidents. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm. “In reviewing the district court’s application of the Sentencing Guidelines, we review the district court’s identification of the applicable provisions de novo, factual findings for clear error, and application of those Guidelines to the facts in the case for abuse of discretion.” United States v. Kurns, 129 F.4th 589, 594 (9th Cir. 2025). To interpret the Sentencing Guidelines, “we begin as we do for all questions of statutory interpretation, by turning to the text.” United States v. Herrera, 974 F.3d 1040, 1047 (9th Cir. 2020); United States v. Kirilyuk, 29 F.4th 1128, 1137 (9th Cir. 2022) (“In interpreting the Guidelines, we apply the ordinary tools of statutory interpretation and look to the plain meaning of its terms.”). 2 25-5044 1. The parties agree that U.S.S.G. § 2M5.2(a) governs, but dispute which subdivision applies. Specifically, Rodriguez Velasquez contends that the two magazines involved in his offense do not justify the application of § 2M5.2(a)(1) where, as here, his attempt to smuggle a single pistol and 35 rounds of ammunition indisputably would otherwise fall under § 2M5.2(a)(2). The applicable Guideline provides: Exportation of Arms, Munitions, or Military Equipment or Services Without Required Validated Export License (a) Base Offense Level: (1) 26, except as provided in subdivision (2) below; (2) 14, if the offense involved only (A) non-fully automatic small arms (rifles, handguns, or shotguns), and the number of weapons did not exceed two, (B) ammunition for non-fully automatic small arms, and the number of rounds did not exceed 500, or (C) both. U.S.S.G. § 2M5.2. Under the plain text of the Guideline, § 2M5.2(a)(2) does not extend to magazines. Because a magazine is neither ammunition nor a “small arm,” Rodriguez Velasquez does “not qualify” for § 2M5.2(a)(2)’s exemption and the district court correctly applied § 2M5.2(a)(1). United States v. Carper, 659 F.3d 923, 925 (9th Cir. 2011). While § 2M5.2(a)(2) does not define the term “small arms,” we read that term narrowly, pursuant to its ordinary meaning, and consistent with “the examples listed—‘rifles, handguns, or shotguns[.]’” Id. (“PVS–14 devices” did not fall “within the plain meaning” of “small arms” because “the 3 25-5044 relevant arms are firearms, a description which excludes PVS–14 devices.”). “A magazine is a device that automatically feeds ammunition into a firearm whenever the shooter fires a bullet. Although some magazines are permanently affixed to a firearm, most magazines are detachable.” Duncan v. Bonta, 133 F.4th 852, 861 (9th Cir. 2025) (en banc). Magazines are “accessories to firearms that are neither arms themselves nor necessary to the ordinary functioning of a firearm.” Id. at 865; see also id. at 868 (explaining that a “magazine plays no role in the firing mechanism of the firearm” and is an “optional accessory” even if it “undoubtedly provides a benefit for a shooter”). The only mention of magazines elsewhere within the Guidelines supports that they are distinct from—and not synonymous with—firearms. U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1 (discussing offenses involving a “semiautomatic firearm that is capable of accepting a large capacity magazine”); see United States v. Lemus, 93 F.4th 1255, 1261 (9th Cir. 2024). The Guidelines’ explicit reference to magazines in § 2K2.1, but exclusion of any mention of them in § 2M5.2(a)(2), also supports an inference that the Sentencing Commission’s omission of magazines was deliberate. See Lemus, 93 F.4th at 1261. Rodriguez Velasquez concedes that magazines are textually absent from § 2M5.2(a)(2), but argues that magazines must be read into the provision consistent with the overall intent behind the Sentencing Guidelines and to avoid 4 25-5044 otherwise absurd and unnecessarily punitive results. “Unless a guideline provision is ambiguous, the plain meaning of the Guidelines controls.” United States v. Rodriguez, 162 F.4th 1016, 1019–20 (9th Cir. 2025). Because a magazine is unambiguously neither ammunition nor an arm, § 2M5.2(a)(2) does not apply and our inquiry ends. See Carper, 659 F.3d at 925.1 2. While unclear from the record whether the district court considered Rodriguez Velasquez’s admissions to the two prior smuggling incidents, the district court did not clearly err to the extent it did. A base-offense level of 26 independently applied to Rodriguez Velasquez’s conviction. Accordingly, Rodriguez Velasquez failed to show a reasonable probability that he would have received a different sentence if the prior smuggling incidents were not considered. United States v. Christensen, 732 F.3d 1094, 1102 (9th Cir. 2013). We therefore do not decide whether they constituted relevant conduct for purposes of sentencing. AFFIRMED. 1 To the extent that results generated by § 2M5.2(a)’s brightline distinction appear “at least counterintuitive”—ascribing a higher base-offense level to Rodriguez Velasquez than someone attempting to smuggle two semiautomatic rifles and 500 rounds of ammunition but no magazine, for instance—any interpretation that counts firearm accessories as either component parts of arms or distinct arms itself could generate confusion and other arguably absurd results. See United States v. Stines, 34 F.4th 1315, 1320 (11th Cir. 2022). 5 25-5044 FILED United States v. Rodriguez Velasquez, Case No. 25-5044 NOV 17 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK DIMKE, District Judge, concurring in the result: U.S. COURT OF APPEALS I concur in the judgment affirming Rodriguez Velasquez’s sentence. In my view, it is unnecessary to decide whether a single magazine accompanying a handgun may be treated as part of that handgun under U.S.S.G. § 2M5.2(a)(2). Even treating one of Rodriguez Velasquez’s magazines as part of his pistol, the second magazine placed his offense outside the exception. I therefore would affirm on that narrower ground. See PDK Lab’ys Inc. v. U.S. D.E.A., 362 F.3d 786, 799 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (Roberts, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“[I]f it is not necessary to decide more, it is necessary not to decide more.”). Section 2M5.2(a)(1) establishes a base offense level of 26, subject to the exception in subsection (a)(2). 1 That exception provides a base offense level of 14 if the offense involved “only” no more than two “non-fully automatic small arms (rifles, handguns, or shotguns),” no more than 500 rounds of ammunition for such arms, or both. The word “only” confines the exception to those articles, so 1 Rodriguez Velasquez argues that his magazines fall outside the guideline’s scope because they do not appear on the United States Munitions List. The magazines were nevertheless subject to the Commerce Department’s export controls, and he admitted that exporting them required a license. Section 2M5.2 applies to his charged firearms export offense, and its text does not condition its application on whether the exported articles appear on the Munitions List. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.2(a); id. § 2M5.2 & cmt. (Statutory Provisions). 1 satisfying the numerical limits does not bring an offense within the exception if it also involves the unlawful export of other articles. See United States v. Stines, 34 F.4th 1315, 1322 (11th Cir. 2022) (Luck, J., concurring in part and in the judgment). Rodriguez Velasquez’s offense involved a disassembled 9mm pistol, two loaded magazines, and 35 rounds of ammunition. A magazine is a firearm component that holds ammunition for feeding into the firearm’s chamber. See United States v. Gonzalez, 792 F.3d 534, 536–37 (5th Cir. 2015). Rodriguez Velasquez argues that both magazines were intended for use with the same pistol. Even accepting that intended use, the second magazine supplied an interchangeable alternative to the magazine assumed to form part of the handgun. On that assumption, the offense involved a handgun together with a spare component for use with it. The exception’s reference to “handguns” does not encompass that spare magazine based on its intended use with the accompanying handgun. The additional magazine was neither another handgun nor ammunition, so the allowance for up to two firearms did not bring it within the exception. Consistent with that distinction, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the application of a base offense level of 26 under § 2M5.2(a)(1) to an offense involving one pistol, 100 rounds of ammunition, and four magazines, treating three of the magazines as “additional 2 component parts.” United States v. Sifuentes, No. 22-40825, 2024 WL 224316, at *1 (5th Cir. Jan. 22, 2024) (per curiam) (unpublished). Rodriguez Velasquez argues that this reading produces an absurd result because exporting two complete non-fully automatic firearms and up to 500 rounds of ammunition can qualify for a lower base offense level. But the Sentencing Commission’s decision to limit the exception to the specified articles is consistent with its concern about trafficking. See Stines, 34 F.4th at 1325 (Luck, J., concurring in part and in the judgment) (rejecting an absurdity challenge because firearm parts can service multiple weapons and are easier for traffickers to conceal than complete firearms). The commentary identifies the threat to national security or foreign policy interests, the volume of commerce, and the extent of planning or sophistication as factors relevant to selecting a sentence within the Guidelines range or determining whether a departure is warranted. U.S.S.G. § 2M5.2 cmt. nn.1-2. The additional magazine thus placed Rodriguez Velasquez’s offense outside § 2M5.2(a)(2), even treating one magazine as part of the pistol. The guideline’s text and structure unambiguously exclude that additional magazine from the exception, so the rule of lenity does not apply. See United States v. Cuevas-Lopez, 934 F.3d 1056, 1068 n.14 (9th Cir. 2019). The district court therefore correctly applied the default base offense level of 26 under § 2M5.2(a)(1). 3 I also conclude that the district court did not clearly err in finding Rodriguez Velasquez’s admissions to prior firearms activity sufficiently reliable to consider at sentencing. See United States v. Franklin, 18 F.4th 1105, 1125 (9th Cir. 2021). He admitted to transporting firearms into Mexico on two prior occasions and purchasing firearm components for the person who supplied the pistol in this case. The detail and self-inculpatory nature of those admissions supported the district court’s reliability determination. The offense of conviction independently supported a base offense level of 26, so I would not reach whether the prior incidents qualified as relevant conduct for calculating that level. 4 FILED United States v. Rodriguez Velasquez, Case No. 25-5044 NOV 17 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS TUNG, Circuit Judge, dissenting: This case asks whether a defendant is entitled to a lower base-offense level of 14 (or a higher level of 26) under a federal sentencing guideline that deals with the export of arms, munitions, or military equipment or services without a required valid export license. The lower level applies “if the offense involved only (A) non-fully automatic small arms (rifles, handguns, or shotguns), and the number of weapons did not exceed two, (B) ammunition for non-fully automatic small arms, and the number of rounds did not exceed 500, or (C) both.” U.S.S.G. § 2M5.2(a)(2). Here, the defendant’s offense involved a 9mm pistol, two 9mm magazines (that defendant says were fitted for the pistol), and 35 rounds of ammunition. Both Judge Smith and Judge Dimke conclude that the lower level does not apply—though for different reasons: Judge Smith says that the defendant’s possession of a magazine means that the defendant was transporting something other than a firearm and ammunition, and so the defendant’s offense did not involve “only” firearms and ammunition; Judge Dimke says that one of the magazines can be treated as part of the firearm (and thus not separate from it), but that possession of the second magazine disqualifies the defendant from the lower base-offense level. Respectfully, I disagree with both views. 1 Magazines are critical parts of small arms. Accordingly, “small arms” should reasonably be construed to encompass their parts, including magazines, such that transporting an arm with its accompanying magazine should not be viewed as transporting more than an arm. We would not say a person transports more than a bag because the bag contains a strap. Or that a person transports more than a stroller because the stroller comprises wheels, a frame, and a handle. Of course, a strap is not literally a bag; and wheels, frames, and handles are not literally strollers. But when we say a person transports a bag or a stroller we usually consider (implicitly) its parts to be transported with it, and we do not say that a person is transporting the bag or the stroller plus its parts. So too here—the term “small arms” encompasses their parts, including at least their magazines. Judge Dimke sees this but would find the second magazine disqualifying. I would not. If the second magazine (like the first) were intended for the pistol (which the defendant says it was, and the government has not proven otherwise), then it should be considered as much a part of the pistol as is the first magazine. Guns often come with spare magazines, just as cars come with spare tires. In any event, even if the spare magazine were not considered part of the defendant’s pistol, it should be considered (as part of another firearm) a “small arm” for purposes of the guideline. See United States v. Stines, 34 F.4th 1315, 1319–20 (11th Cir. 2022). On that reading, 2 the defendant would still be entitled to the lower base-offense level because the number of “small arms” would not have exceeded two. Any other position would lead to an absurdity. Under Judge Smith’s position, a defendant who possessed two rifles (sans magazines) and 500 rounds of ammunition would receive a far lesser sentence than a defendant who possessed only a single magazine (with no accompanying gun or ammunition). And under Judge Dimke’s position, a defendant who possessed two rifles (with two magazines) and 500 rounds of ammunition would also receive a lesser sentence than a defendant who possessed only one magazine. How does that make any sense? It does not, and nothing in the text of the guideline here compels such a topsy-turvy result. Once a magazine is understood to be a critical part of an arm, the question resolves itself. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent and would reverse the district court’s judgment.1 1 I would not affirm on the alternative ground that the defendant’s prior smuggling attempts constitute “relevant conduct” to sustain the sentence. The government has repeatedly disavowed this ground, and I would hold it to its waiver. See United States v. Dreyer, 804 F.3d 1266, 1277 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc). 3