Full Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS NOV 10 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 25-5479 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellee, 2:23-cr-00052-TOR-1 v. MEMORANDUM* JASKARAN SINGH, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington Thomas O. Rice, District Judge, Presiding Argued and Submitted October 29, 2026 Seattle, Washington Before: CHRISTEN and MILLER, Circuit Judges, and SYKES, District Judge.** Jaskaran Singh appeals his conviction and sentence for possession of MDMA with intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C). Because the parties are familiar with the facts, we do not recount them here. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm. * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The Honorable Sunshine Suzanne Sykes, United States District Judge for the Central District of California, sitting by designation. We review the district court’s evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Curtin, 489 F.3d 935, 943 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc).1 We review the district court’s interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines de novo, its application of the Guidelines for abuse of discretion, and its underlying factual findings for clear error. United States v. Rojas-Millan, 234 F.3d 464, 472 (9th Cir. 2000). 1. The district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the expert testimony of Agent Lyons. The testimony was relevant because it was offered to rebut the argument that Singh did not know he was transporting MDMA. We have recognized that testimony about drug trafficking organizations’ use of unknowing drug couriers may be relevant and admissible when a defendant argues they did not know they were carrying drugs. United States v. Sepulveda-Barraza, 645 F.3d 1066, 1069–73 (9th Cir. 2011); see also United States v. Murillo, 255 F.3d 1169, 1176–78 (9th Cir. 2001), overruled in part on other grounds by Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93 (2005). The testimony was not impermissibly prejudicial pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 403 because it did not unfairly imply that Singh had knowledge of a large-scale drug trafficking organization. See Sepulveda-Barraza, 645 F.3d at 1072–73. It was helpful to the jury within the meaning of Federal Rule of Evidence 702 because it informed the jury about the techniques and practices of 1 We assume arguendo that Singh preserved his evidentiary objections. 2 25-5479 drug trafficking organizations. See United States v. Figueroa-Lopez, 125 F.3d 1241, 1244–45 (9th Cir. 1997). The testimony did not run afoul of Federal Rule of Evidence 704(b) because Agent Lyons did not opine on Singh’s state of mind and instead limited his testimony to what drug couriers typically know. Diaz v. United States, 602 U.S. 526, 536–37 (2024). 2. The district court did not abuse its discretion by permitting the government to display the seized MDMA inside clear bags. Singh did not object to the jury seeing the MDMA in clear bags during trial and instead urged the court to require the prosecution to first show the MDMA in backpacks, as it appeared when Singh had received it. The jury heard that Singh saw backpacks containing the MDMA and not the MDMA itself. And Singh does not explain how viewing the MDMA would be less prejudicial if it was first unpacked from backpacks in front of the jury. Moreover, the government “is entitled to prove its case by evidence of its own choice.” Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 186 (1997). 3. The district court did not procedurally err by declining to adopt a minor- role reduction in Singh’s sentencing calculation. U.S. Sent’g Guidelines Manual §§ 2D1.1(a)(5), 3B1.2(b) (U.S. Sent’g Comm’n 2024). “[A] defendant may be a courier without being either a minimal or a minor participant.” United States v. Lui, 941 F.2d 844, 849 (9th Cir. 1991). Here, the district court reasonably concluded that Singh was not a minor participant because he alone drove to the 3 25-5479 border, picked up a very large quantity of drugs, and sought to transport those drugs. 4. The district court did not procedurally err by rejecting Singh’s request for a variance under Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85 (2007), on the ground that the Guidelines for MDMA lack an empirical foundation. The district court acknowledged it had authority to vary under Kimbrough and explained that it exercised its discretion not to do so because of the “tremendous” amount of MDMA that Singh picked up. Because the district court was not required to vary from the Guidelines, it did not abuse its discretion. See United States v. Henderson, 649 F.3d 955, 964 (9th Cir. 2011). 5. Singh’s 210-month sentence is not substantively unreasonable. The district court tied its sentence to the circumstances of Singh’s offense, see 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), and imposed a sentence within the Guidelines. United States v. Carty, 520 F.3d 984, 993–94 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc). AFFIRMED. 4 25-5479