Full Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS NOV 3 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 25-3616 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellee, 5:23-cr-00021-JGB-1 v. MEMORANDUM* JASON EDWARD THOMAS CARDIFF, Defendant - Appellant, ---------------------------------------- LILIA MURPHY, BRIAN KENNEDY, Interested Parties. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 25-3781 Plaintiff - Appellee, D.C. No. 5:23-cr-00021-JGB-1 v. JASON EDWARD THOMAS CARDIFF, Defendant, ---------------------------------------- LILIA MURPHY; BRIAN KENNEDY, * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. Interested Parties - Appellants. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Jesus G. Bernal, District Judge, Presiding Submitted October 30, 2026** Pasadena, California Before: PAEZ, OWENS, and SANCHEZ, Circuit Judges. In these consolidated appeals, Jason Cardiff and sureties Lilia Murphy and Brian Kennedy (“Defendants”) appeal from the district court’s judgment of bond forfeiture. We review a district court’s decision whether to set aside bond under Fed. R. Crim. P. 46(f)(2) for abuse of discretion. United States v. Amwest Surety Ins. Co., 54 F.3d 601, 602 (9th Cir. 1995). As the parties are familiar with the facts, we do not recount them here. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.1 Rule 46(f)(2) allows courts to “set aside in whole or in part a bail forfeiture . . . if . . . it appears that justice does not require bail forfeiture.” Fed. R. Crim. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 1 The government has requested that we dismiss Cardiff’s appeal under the fugitive disentitlement doctrine. Because our decision will be enforceable and will not substantially further the goals of deterrence or efficiency, we decline to do so. See, e.g., Degen v. United States, 517 U.S. 820, 824, 829 (1996); Mastro v. Rigby, 764 F.3d 1090, 1095–96 (9th Cir. 2014). 2 25-3616 P. 46(f)(2). Contrary to Defendants’ argument, the word “appears” in Rule 46(f)(2) does not require the court to apply a lower burden of proof. Rather, the court has “wide discretion” to determine whether to grant relief from forfeiture. United States v. Nguyen, 279 F.3d 1112, 1115 (9th Cir. 2002). The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendants’ motions to set aside bail. Courts consider six nonexhaustive factors when deciding whether to set aside bail: (1) the defendant’s willfulness in breaching a release condition; (2) the sureties’ participation in apprehending the defendant; (3) the cost, inconvenience, and prejudice suffered by the government; (4) mitigating factors; (5) whether the sureties are professionals; and (6) the appropriateness of the bond amount. Amwest, 54 F.3d at 603. First, the court reasonably determined that Cardiff’s failure to return was willful. See, e.g., United States v. Sar-Avi, 255 F.3d 1163, 1168 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding the defendant’s departure “willful” despite his argument that medical treatment in Israel was necessary). Cardiff initially stated that he had “no physical or mental health issues” and had taken at least twenty flights since his arrest, but later asserted that his health conditions “predate[d] the charges in this case” and prevented him from flying. Second, the court reasonably determined that the sureties had limited ability to apprehend Cardiff from a foreign country, deeming this factor “neutral or 3 25-3616 entitled to relatively little weight.” Third, the court reasonably determined that the cost, inconvenience, and prejudice to the government were high because the government would have to extradite Cardiff and because witness memories fade over time. Fourth, the court reasonably determined that the mitigating factors were “unpersuasive in light of Cardiff’s conduct.” See Nguyen, 279 F.3d at 1117 (finding that mitigating factors such as “the Sureties’ nonprofessional status” were “unpersuasive in light of [the defendant’s] egregious conduct”). Fifth, the court reasonably determined that the Sureties, although not professionals, knew the risks they undertook when they signed affidavits of surety. See United States v. Frias-Ramirez, 670 F.2d 849, 852–53 (9th Cir. 1982) (refusing to set aside forfeiture where nonprofessional sureties “entered the bonding agreement aware of the consequences if defendant disappeared”). Sixth, the court reasonably determined that the bond amount totaling $530,000 was appropriate. A “bond functions like liquidated damages in that it must be reasonable when set.” Nguyen, 279 F.3d at 1117. When the court stated that “the bond is the bond” and analogized to “liquidated damages,” the court was explaining why it found the bond amount reasonable: Bond does not depend on the merits of pending motions but on factors known when set. 4 25-3616 Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendants’ motions to set aside bail forfeiture.2 AFFIRMED. 2 Defendants’ motions to strike (25-3616 - Dkt. Nos. 29, 54; 25-3781 - Dkt. Nos. 26, 52) and motions for leave to file supplemental briefing (25-3616 - Dkt. No. 43; 25-3781 - Dkt. No. 42) are denied. The Department of Justice attorney appearing in this case is authorized to appear, and his authorization does not need to be in writing. See 28 U.S.C. § 515(a); 28 C.F.R. § 0.13. 5 25-3616