United States v. Abdul Kareem

FOR PUBLICATION UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Nos. 20-10155 Plaintiff - Appellee, 21-10315 24-3202 v. D.C. No. 2:15-cr-707-SRB ABDUL MALIK ABDUL KAREEM, OPINION Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Arizona Susan R. Bolton, District Judge, Presiding Argued and Submitted September 17, 2025 Phoenix, Arizona Filed November 6, 2026 Before: Daniel P. Collins, Salvador Mendoza, Jr., and Roopali H. Desai, Circuit Judges. Opinion by Judge Mendoza, Jr.; Partial Concurrence and Partial Dissent by Judge Collins 2 USA V. ABDUL KAREEM SUMMARY * Criminal Law In a case in which the government accused Abdul Malik Abdul Kareem of taking part in a plan to attack a “Muhammad Art Exhibit and Contest,” and in which a jury found Kareem guilty of numerous offenses including conspiracy to provide material support to a foreign terrorist organization in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (Count 5), the panel reversed the district court’s entry of judgment against Kareen on Count 5, and remanded with instructions that the district court enter a judgment of acquittal as to Count 5 and that Kareem be resentenced. The panel restated long-standing circuit precedent concerning review of challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence. Whether or not a defendant preserved the issue below, the governing substantive inquiry remains the same: whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. If the answer is yes, the conviction stands. If the answer is no, reversal is required, because permitting a criminal conviction to stand on insufficient evidence would constitute plain error and a manifest miscarriage of justice The panel held that the government failed to present sufficient evidence to prove that Kareem intended to join a * This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.  USA V. ABDUL KAREEM 3 conspiracy wherein material support would be provided to the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS). • At trial, the government sought to prove that Kareem, Elton Simpson, and Nadir Soofi agreed to provide material support to ISIS by offering either (1) themselves as “personnel” to ISIS, or (2) weapons and training as “services” to ISIS. • There is no evidence that Kareem intended for Simpson, Soofi, or himself to act under ISIS’s “direction or control” or in a manner that went beyond “act[ing] entirely independently of the foreign terrorist organization to advance [the organization’s] goals or objectives.” See 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(h). The evidence was therefore insufficient to sustain Kareem’s Count 5 conviction on the basis that he entered into an agreement for him or his co- conspirators to operate as “personnel” to ISIS. • Under Section 2339B, none of the evidence presented at trial reveals Kareem’s intent to join a conspiracy wherein a service would be provided to ISIS. “Service” as it is understood under Section 2339B cannot include independent advocacy even when that advocacy is undertaken on behalf of a designated terrorist organization. However heinous Kareem’s conduct may be, the government needed to show more than what it did here for a rational juror to find the elements of the charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt. The panel affirmed the district court as to all other issues in a separate memorandum disposition. 4 USA V. ABDUL KAREEM Judge Collins concurred in the judgment in part and dissented in part. He wrote that because Kareem’s core argument on appeal, not asserted below, rested on a legal construction of § 2339B—whether a defendant’s affirmative response to a foreign terrorist organization’s public call for its supporters to commit acts of terrorism counts as the provision of a “service” or “personnel” within the meaning of § 2339B— review of that issue is, at most, for plain error. Disagreeing with the majority’s and Kareem’s narrow reading, Judge Collins would hold that the term “service” includes the performance by an individual of specified acts of assistance that a foreign terrorist organization publicly instructs its supporters to perform, if the individual performs the requested act in response to, because of, and in conformity with the organization’s publicly announced instruction, rather than as the entirely independent action of that individual. Kareem failed to establish legal error on this score, much less plain error. The evidence was sufficient to establish that (1) Simpson and Soofi planned to provide a “service” to ISIS in the form of a terrorist attack in the United States; and (2) Kareem joined Simpson’s and Soofi’s conspiracy with knowledge of its objective and with the intent to help to accomplish it. Judge Collins therefore dissented from the majority’s judgment reversing Kareem’s conviction on Count 5. He otherwise concurred in the majority’s judgment affirming Kareem’s convictions and the denial of his various post-trial motions.  USA V. ABDUL KAREEM 5 COUNSEL Jeffrey M. Smith (argued), Attorney, Appellate Section; Sue J. Bai, Head of the National Security Division; National Security Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.; Joseph E. Koehler, Assistant United States Attorney; Timothy Courchaine, United States Attorney; Office of the United States Attorney, United States Department of Justice, Phoenix, Arizona; for Plaintiff- Appellee. Donna L. Elm (argued), Law Practice of Donna Elm, Cottonwood, Arizona; Kathleen Bliss (argued), Kathleen Bliss Law, Henderson, Nevada; Jenny Wilson, Law Office of Jenny Wilson PLLC, Miami, Florida; for Defendant- Appellant. Charles D. Swift, Muslim Legal Fund of America, Richardson, Texas, for Amicus Curiae Muslim Legal Fund of America. 6 USA V. ABDUL KAREEM OPINION MENDOZA, JR., Circuit Judge: History offers no shortage of organizations devoted to harming others. Often, these groups enlist and direct individuals to carry out acts of violence. Other times, individuals independently act on behalf of these organizations without any coordination, direction, or control. Though sometimes ethically indistinguishable, these distinctions matter in the law. In the summer of 2015, Abdul Malik Abdul Kareem (“Kareem”) was accused of taking part in a plan to attack a “Muhammad Art Exhibit and Contest” that was held on May 3, 2015, in Garland, Texas. The government charged Kareem with numerous offenses, including Count 5, a charge of conspiracy to provide material support to a foreign terrorist organization in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2339B. A jury found Kareem guilty on all counts. Kareem now appeals his Count 5 conviction on the basis that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of joining a conspiracy to provide material support to the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (“ISIS”), a foreign terrorist organization. We reverse the district court with respect to Kareem’s Count 5 conviction. 1 The government failed to present sufficient evidence to prove that Kareem intended to join a conspiracy wherein material support would be provided to ISIS. Even assuming (without deciding) that Kareem’s peers agreed to engage in conduct that could constitute the 1 Because we resolve all remaining issues via a separate memorandum disposition, we address only Kareem’s Count 5 evidentiary challenge in this opinion.  USA V. ABDUL KAREEM 7 provision of material support to ISIS within the meaning of Section 2339B, the government failed to present sufficient evidence that Kareem knowingly joined an agreement with that object. At most, the evidence demonstrated that Kareem was independently inspired by ISIS’s ideology and goals. But acts rooted in ideological sympathy toward an organization, standing alone, do not establish that a defendant knowingly agreed to provide material support to that organization or that he intended for a co-conspirator to operate under the organization’s direction or control. Congress and the Supreme Court have carefully circumscribed the range of conduct that constitutes the provision of material support to a foreign terrorist organization. Here, the government presented no evidence that Kareem intended to join a conspiracy wherein such support would be provided to ISIS. The evidence presented against Kareem is therefore insufficient to sustain his conviction under Section 2339B. I. On May 3, 2015, Elton Simpson and Nadir Soofi attacked the “Muhammad Art Exhibit and Contest” at the Curtis Culwell Center in Garland, Texas, intending to kill attendees. Simpson and Soofi brought multiple guns and over a thousand rounds of ammunition. During the attack, Simpson wore a tactical ammunition vest, and Soofi wore an armored one. After shooting a security guard, the two attackers were quickly shot and killed by a police officer. In the aftermath of the shooting, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) opened a counterterrorism investigation. As part of that inquiry, agents examined Simpson’s and Soofi’s backgrounds, communications, and personal connections in the months leading up to the attack. 8 USA V. ABDUL KAREEM One individual identified through that process was Kareem, who had sustained contact with both men during the relevant time period. A. At trial, the government introduced testimonial evidence that from approximately February 2014 through April 2015, Kareem frequently visited the apartment shared by Simpson and Soofi in Phoenix, Arizona. Kareem initially visited “once or twice a week,” but later began visiting more often and staying overnight several times per week. During these visits, Kareem, Simpson, and Soofi spent time together watching and discussing videos and written materials associated with militant Islamist ideology. Much of this content aligned with ISIS propaganda and included depictions of violence, including execution footage. The three men’s interest in these extremist materials intensified in mid-2014, around the time ISIS declared a caliphate in Iraq and Syria. 2 Kareem made statements expressing approval of violence against “nonbelievers” and endorsing extremist views during this period. Simpson also visited Kareem’s residence, where the two watched videos depicting violence against civilians. And a former roommate testified that Kareem stated he was “a part of ISIS.” B. The government also introduced evidence from the FBI’s forensic examinations of electronic devices belonging to Kareem, Simpson, and Soofi. On Kareem’s personal 2 The ISIS caliphate was a self-proclaimed quasi-state established in June 2014 by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi across seized territories in Iraq and Syria.  USA V. ABDUL KAREEM 9 laptop, investigators found evidence that he had accessed a 55-minute ISIS propaganda video titled Flames of War. Metadata associated with the video showed that Kareem clicked through warnings acknowledging that the content was graphic and disturbing. Additional ISIS-related or ISIS-adjacent materials from Kareem’s devices were also revealed to the jury, including public lectures attributed to ISIS leader Anwar al-Awlaki. With respect to Simpson and Soofi, the government showed that their shared desktop computer contained a larger volume of ISIS propaganda. Simpson’s Twitter postings also included pro-ISIS statements and links to extremist content. C. The government presented testimony regarding the men’s reactions to the January 2015 attack on the offices of Charlie Hebdo in France. Kareem, Simpson, and Soofi expressed their vocal approval of the attack and anger that the perpetrators had been killed. Following the Charlie Hebdo attack, the men discussed the need to take action in response to perceived offenses against their extremist beliefs. Kareem asked a friend about obtaining explosives and discussed potential targets in Arizona. In February 2015, Simpson informed Kareem that the “Muhammad Art Exhibit and Contest” was scheduled to take place in Garland, Texas. Kareem and Simpson expressed anger about the contest and called it a sin. Simpson said they should go to Garland to “make a stand.” Kareem agreed that the two should take a stand and expressed a desire for “some type of revenge.” Several witnesses also testified that Kareem was aware that Simpson and Soofi intended to travel to Texas and commit violence at the event. One witness 10 USA V. ABDUL KAREEM testified that Kareem made known his desire to shoot the people hosting the contest. D. The government also introduced evidence concerning Kareem’s involvement with firearms used by Simpson and Soofi. Kareem went shooting with Simpson and Soofi on multiple occasions beginning in January 2015. During such a trip, Kareem, Simpson, and Soofi used firearms that were later recovered at the Garland crime scene. Kareem also gave money to Simpson to acquire an AK- 47 pistol in June 2014 and for Soofi to purchase an AK-74 rifle between January and March 2015. Simpson and Soofi brought both weapons to Garland. Kareem instructed Simpson and Soofi on how to disassemble, clean, lubricate, and reassemble their firearms. A witness testified that Kareem served in an instructional or supervisory role during these activities. Investigators also recovered ammunition with matching lot numbers from Kareem’s residence, Simpson and Soofi’s apartment, and the Garland attack site. Shell casings of the same caliber were also recovered at the scene. E. On May 3, 2015, shortly before the attack, Simpson posted a message on Twitter stating that he and Soofi had given “bay’ah” to “Amirul Mu’mineen,” generally referring to an oath of allegiance to ISIS leaders. Later that day, Simpson and Soofi drove to the Curtis Culwell Center and carried out the attack. Shortly after getting out of their vehicle, Simpson and Soofi shot and wounded a security guard before being killed by a law enforcement officer.  USA V. ABDUL KAREEM 11 Two days after the attack, FBI agents interviewed Kareem. During that interview, Kareem denied knowing about the Garland contest in advance and denied knowing that Simpson and Soofi planned an attack. However, within a week of the attack, Kareem told an acquaintance not to disclose their prior shooting activities if questioned by law enforcement. F. At trial, the government relied on the foregoing evidence to support its Count 5 charge that Kareem conspired with Simpson and Soofi to provide material support or resources to ISIS. The government’s evidence emphasized Kareem’s close association with Simpson and Soofi, his repeated online exposure to ISIS propaganda, his statements endorsing violence, his involvement with firearms and training, and Simpson’s public declaration of allegiance to ISIS on the day of the attack. II. Following trial in March 2016, a jury convicted Kareem on all counts, including Count 5. The district court sentenced Kareem to 360 months’ imprisonment. Kareem thereafter pursued multiple avenues of post-trial relief. Shortly after the verdict, he filed a motion for a judgment of acquittal pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29 and a motion for a new trial, which the district court denied. In 2018, Kareem filed a second motion for a new trial, asserting Brady violations based on allegedly undisclosed evidence concerning other individuals connected to the Garland attack. After conducting an evidentiary hearing, the district court concluded that newly disclosed surveillance footage could have affected the jury’s 12 USA V. ABDUL KAREEM verdict on Kareem’s Count 2 charge of aiding and abetting the interstate transportation of firearms and ammunition. The district court therefore granted a new trial as to Count 2, but denied relief as to all other counts, including Count 5. The government subsequently dismissed Count 2, and the district court resentenced Kareem in October 2021, again imposing a 360-month term of imprisonment. Over the ensuing years, Kareem filed additional post- judgment motions, including further motions for a new trial and motions to compel discovery, again invoking Brady and related due process theories. The district court denied these motions, concluding that they were untimely, procedurally improper, or lacked merit, and declined to order further disclosure or relief. Kareem filed timely notices of appeal from many of those rulings, and the appeals were consolidated. Kareem now appeals his Count 5 conviction. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A). III. Kareem challenges the sufficiency of the evidence used to support his conviction on Count 5. We ordinarily review challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence de novo, asking “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979), superseded on other grounds by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). However, the Government contends that a heightened standard of review applies to Kareem’s insufficiency argument because he failed to raise the specific issue before the district court.  USA V. ABDUL KAREEM 13 When a defendant waives or fails to preserve a sufficiency challenge by failing to move for judgment of acquittal under Rule 29, we have sometimes stated that our review is for “plain error” or to prevent a “manifest miscarriage of justice.” See United States v. Alvarez- Valenzuela, 231 F.3d 1198, 1200–01 (9th Cir. 2000); United States v. Garcia-Guizar, 160 F.3d 511, 516–17 (9th Cir. 1998). But our caselaw makes clear that, in the sufficiency of the evidence context, those formulations do not establish a substantively different test from Jackson. See Alvarez- Valenzuela, 231 F.3d at 1200–01; Garcia-Guizar, 160 F.3d at 516–17; United States v. Vizcarra-Martinez, 66 F.3d 1006, 1010–11 (9th Cir. 1995). Indeed, where review is limited to preventing a “manifest miscarriage of justice,” we “will not reverse in the absence of a clear showing of insufficiency [of the evidence]” and must affirm “[i]f any rational trier of fact could have found the evidence sufficient.” Alvarez- Valenzuela, 231 F.3d at 1201; see also United States v. Atkinson, 990 F.2d 501, 503 (9th Cir. 1993) (“When a defendant so waives his sufficiency claim, we review only to correct plain error or to avoid a manifest miscarriage of justice.”). That language mirrors Jackson’s core command: a conviction must stand unless no rational trier of fact could have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319. Similarly, under plain-error review, reversal is warranted only when there is an “(1) error that is (2) plain, (3) affects substantial rights, and (4) ‘seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.’” United States v. Cruz, 554 F.3d 840, 845 (9th Cir. 2009) (citation modified). But we have explained that “[w]hen a conviction is predicated on insufficient evidence, the last 14 USA V. ABDUL KAREEM two prongs of the plain-error test will necessarily be satisfied.” United States v. Flyer, 633 F.3d 911, 917 (9th Cir. 2011) (citation modified). And if the evidence is constitutionally insufficient under Jackson’s rigorous standard, then the error is necessarily plain, because the Due Process Clause forbids conviction “except upon sufficient proof—defined as evidence necessary to convince a trier of fact beyond a reasonable doubt of the existence of every element of the offense.” Jackson, 443 U.S. at 316. Accordingly, we now restate what our precedent has long recognized. Whether or not a defendant preserved the issue below, the governing substantive inquiry for evidentiary sufficiency challenges raised on appeal remains the same: whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 319. If the answer is yes, the conviction stands. If the answer is no, reversal is required, because permitting a criminal conviction to stand on insufficient evidence would constitute plain error and a manifest miscarriage of justice. 3 See Alvarez-Valenzuela, 231 F.3d at 1201; Garcia-Guizar, 160 F.3d at 516–17. 3 The dissent argues that our reasoning “overlooks the predicate legal question as to how to define the underlying scope of the statutory elements against which the Jackson insufficiency standards will be applied.” Dissent at 41. But this confuses the question before us. At base, Kareem is raising an insufficiency of evidence challenge. The crux of his argument is that the government failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he intended to join a conspiracy wherein resources and services would be provided to ISIS, not whether there was sufficient evidence that Simpson and Soofi conspired to provide resources and services. We explain below what “service” means only to show that there was insufficient evidence establishing Kareem’s participation in a  USA V. ABDUL KAREEM 15 We therefore apply the Jackson standard to Kareem’s sufficiency challenge. IV. On the merits, Kareem argues that the government’s evidence was insufficient to show that he intended to join a conspiracy wherein material support would be provided to ISIS. The government, on the other hand, contends that there was ample evidence to show that Kareem possessed the requisite mental state to join such a conspiracy. Because no evidence shows that Kareem intended to join a conspiracy to provide material support to ISIS—even assuming without deciding that such a conspiracy existed—we disagree. We begin with the statute underlying Kareem’s Count 5 conviction. Section 2339B(a)(1) states: Whoever knowingly provides material support or resources to a foreign terrorist organization, or attempts or conspires to do so, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both, and, if the death of any person results, shall be imprisoned for any term of years or for life. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1) (emphasis added). As defined by Congress, “the term ‘material support or resources’ means any property, tangible or intangible, or service, including currency or monetary instruments or financial securities, financial services, lodging, training, conspiracy with the intent to further its unlawful purpose of providing a service to ISIS. 16 USA V. ABDUL KAREEM expert advice or assistance, safehouses, false documentation or identification, communications equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal substances, explosives, personnel (1 or more individuals who may be or include oneself), and transportation, except medicine or religious materials.” 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b)(1). To convict a defendant of a conspiracy, the government “must prove beyond a reasonable doubt ‘both the existence of the conspiracy alleged and the defendant’s membership in it.’” United States v. Farhane, 634 F.3d 127, 144 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v. Chavez, 549 F.3d 119, 125 (2d Cir. 2008)). In the Section 2339B context, this means that the government must show that “two or more persons agreed to provide material support” to a foreign terrorist organization and that the defendant “knowingly became a member of the conspiracy with the intent to further its unlawful purpose” of providing material support to that foreign terrorist organization. United States v. El-Mezain, 664 F.3d 467, 537 (5th Cir. 2011) (emphasis added), as revised (Dec. 27, 2011). On appeal, Kareem argues there was insufficient evidence to justify his Count 5 conspiracy conviction. Kareem asserts that the government “had no evidence of th[e] more demanding scienter element of the ‘material support’ necessary to convict on this type of conspiracy.” Instead, he contends that “proof of Count 5 was based solely on inferential evidence argued by the government in its conclusory claim that Kareem ‘not only helped and aided his friends who he knew supported the Islamic State and were intending to act out to attack, in the name of the Islamic State, but it also shows that he wanted to attack too.’”  USA V. ABDUL KAREEM 17 The government concedes that it “was required to prove that Kareem and his co-conspirators agreed ‘to provide resources and services to ISIS.’” 4 See Ocasio v. United States, 578 U.S. 282, 287 (2016) (noting that, to convict a defendant of a conspiracy, one must prove that the defendant had “a joint commitment to an ‘endeavor which, if completed, would satisfy all of the elements of [the underlying substantive] criminal offense’” (quoting Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 65 (1997))). The government contends it met this requirement by “demonstrat[ing] that the men conspired to carry out a terrorist attack, and that they did this to provide a service to ISIS, both through witness testimony and exhibits.” The government principally relies on “[t]he extremist materials found to have been viewed by or in the possession of Kareem and his co-conspirators” as well as the “testimony of witnesses who testified about the conspirators’ exorbitant consumption of ISIS propaganda and similar materials” to support the conviction. In sum, the government asserts that “[t]here was overwhelming evidence that Kareem joined . . . a conspiracy to provide material support to ISIS through the commission of a terrorist act in ISIS’s name.” We find the government’s position unavailing. A. The Supreme Court’s decision in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1 (2010) (“HLP”), guides our review of this case. In HLP, the Supreme Court addressed a challenge to Section 2339B by plaintiffs who sought to provide support to two designated foreign terrorist organizations. HLP, 561 U.S. at 23. The HLP plaintiffs 4 The parties stipulated that ISIS was a foreign terrorist organization. 18 USA V. ABDUL KAREEM were concerned that their desired political advocacy on behalf of Kurdish and Tamil people “might be regarded as ‘material support’ in the form of providing ‘personnel’ or ‘service[s]’” to the designated terrorist organizations. Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b)(1) (listing personnel and service as forms of “material support”). The Supreme Court held that the terms “personnel” and “service” did not refer to independent advocacy on behalf of a terrorist organization. Beginning with “personnel,” the Court explained that “[p]roviding material support that constitutes ‘personnel’ is defined as knowingly providing a person ‘to work under that terrorist organization’s direction or control or to organize, manage, supervise, or otherwise direct the operation of that organization.’” HLP, 561 U.S. at 23 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(h)). As for “service,” the Court held that the term “similarly refers to concerted activity, not independent advocacy.” Id. The Court outright rejected any notion that “independent activity in support of a terrorist group could be characterized as ‘service,’” noting that such a construction would contradict the statute’s “specific exclusion of independent activity in the definition of ‘personnel.’” Id. at 24. At trial, the government sought to prove that Kareem, Simpson, and Soofi agreed to provide “material support” to ISIS by offering either (1) themselves as “personnel” to ISIS, or (2) weapons and training as “services” to ISIS. We address each argument in turn. B. There is an absence of evidence showing that Kareem possessed an intent to join a conspiracy wherein material support would be provided to ISIS in the form of  USA V. ABDUL KAREEM 19 “personnel,” and the government fails to address this argument on appeal. Even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, there is no evidence showing that Kareem intended to join a scheme wherein he or his co-conspirators would receive directions from, or be in coordination with, ISIS personnel. In light of the Supreme Court’s explanation that “[t]he statute makes clear that ‘personnel’ does not cover independent advocacy,” no rational juror could find that Kareem intended to join a conspiracy wherein he or his alleged co-conspirators would operate as “personnel” to ISIS. HLP, 561 U.S. at 23. This is because “[i]ndividuals who act entirely independently of the foreign terrorist organization,” even when “advanc[ing] its goals or objectives[,] shall not be considered to be working under the foreign terrorist organization’s direction and control.” 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(h). At most, drawing all inferences in favor of the government, Kareem intended to join a conspiracy wherein he and his co-conspirators would operate as independent advocates of ISIS and its extremist cause. Simpson’s belated pledge of loyalty to ISIS does not alter our conclusion. First, Simpson’s pledge does not evince an agreement to operate under the “direction or control” of ISIS as understood under Section 2339B. See United States v. Ullah, 173 F.4th 399, 415 (2d Cir. 2026) (“That Defendant subjectively conceived of himself as a soldier of ISIS does not establish that ISIS did, in fact, control or direct his actions.”). Simpson’s pledge reveals only his own extremist devotion to ISIS and his ideological support for the terrorist organization. Second, even if Simpson’s pledge constituted an agreement to operate under the “direction or control” of ISIS, there was no evidence presented to the jury that Kareem viewed or was aware of 20 USA V. ABDUL KAREEM the pledge. 5 See United States v. Krasovich, 819 F.2d 253, 255 (9th Cir. 1987) (“Knowledge of the objective of the conspiracy is an essential element of any conspiracy conviction.”). Instead, no evidence presented by the government proved that Kareem intended to join a conspiracy wherein he or his co-conspirators would operate under the direction or control of ISIS. In sum, there is no evidence that Kareem intended for Simpson, Soofi, or himself to act under ISIS’s “direction or control” or in a manner that went beyond “act[ing] entirely independently of the foreign terrorist organization to advance [the organization’s] goals or objectives.” See 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(h). We conclude that the evidence was insufficient to sustain Kareem’s Count 5 conviction on the basis that he entered into an agreement for him or his co- conspirators to operate as “personnel” to ISIS. C. Deviating from its trial arguments, the government now contends that Kareem entered a joint commitment to provide material support to ISIS in the form of “service.” The government principally points to Kareem’s fascination with ISIS propaganda to show that Kareem had the requisite mental state to be convicted of Count 5. However, under 5 Simpson’s oath of loyalty to ISIS is not dissimilar to the oath of allegiance made to al Qaeda by the defendant in Farhane, 634 F.3d at 149. However, that case is distinguishable. In Farhane, the defendant met in-person with a purported al Qaeda member (who was actually an undercover law enforcement agent) and provided contact numbers for al Qaeda members to reach him directly in Saudi Arabia. Id. It was only when “viewed in this context” that the defendant was seen as formalizing “his promise to work as a doctor under the organization’s direction and control.” Id. at 150.  USA V. ABDUL KAREEM 21 Section 2339B, none of the evidence presented at trial reveals Kareem’s intent to join a conspiracy wherein a service would be provided to ISIS. The government raises evidence that Kareem watched Flames of War, a violent ISIS propaganda video. It also references Kareem’s viewing of social media posts that display the murder of a Jordanian pilot. Finally, the government points to Kareem’s watching of ISIS content on Simpson and Soofi’s devices. While the government is correct that this evidence is “highly probative of Kareem’s mental state,” the government is wrong about what mental state this evidence is probative of. The government asserts that Kareem’s fascination with, and inspiration from, ISIS propaganda is “probative of Kareem’s mental state on . . . whether he agreed with Simpson and Soofi to provide a service to ISIS.” But it is irrelevant under Section 2339B that Kareem was inspired by ISIS or independently supportive of ISIS and its aims and values. HLP, 561 U.S. at 24. As the Supreme Court has pointedly explained, “if independent activity in support of a terrorist group could be characterized as a ‘service,’ the statute’s specific exclusion of independent activity in the definition of ‘personnel’ would not make sense,” as “Congress would not have prohibited under ‘service’ what it specifically exempted from prohibition under ‘personnel.’” Id. Thus, the term “service” as it is understood under Section 2339B cannot include independent advocacy even when that advocacy is undertaken on behalf of a designated terrorist organization. However heinous Kareem’s conduct may be, the government needed to show more than what it did here for a rational juror to find the elements of the charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt. 22 USA V. ABDUL KAREEM Decisions from our sister circuits further confirm that Section 2339B conspiracy convictions have been sustained only where the government introduced concrete evidence tying a defendant’s or co-conspirator’s conduct to the direction, control, or involvement of the foreign terrorist organization itself. Perhaps most on point is the Second Circuit’s recent decision in United States v. Ullah, 173 F.4th 399 (2d Cir. 2026). In that case, the defendant carried out a terrorist bombing in a Manhattan subway tunnel after years of consuming ISIS propaganda, publicly expressing support for ISIS, and declaring that he was acting on behalf of the terrorist organization. While acknowledging the “atrocious” nature of Ullah’s acts, the Second Circuit nonetheless reversed Ullah’s conviction under Section 2339B because the evidence failed to show any coordination, direction, or control that the statute requires. Id. at 410. The Second Circuit explained that “the evidence established that Defendant learned about ISIS’s goals and objectives from information publicly broadcast by ISIS and independently tried ‘to advance [those] goals or objectives.’” Id. at 417. However, “to give Congress’s exclusion any meaning, that cannot be enough,” because “[w]hile Defendant was inspired by a general online exhortation by a foreign terrorist organization, the evidence did not prove that he worked or attempted to ‘work under [the] direction or control’ of that organization or coordinated with the organization in any way.” Id. at 410, 417. Indeed, the Second Circuit held that “being inspired by ISIS propaganda and claiming to further ISIS’s cause through his acts do not, by themselves, establish that he acted as ISIS ‘personnel’” and the fact “[t]hat Defendant subjectively conceived of himself as a soldier of  USA V. ABDUL KAREEM 23 ISIS does not establish that ISIS did, in fact, control or direct his actions.” Id. at 415. Ullah is on all fours with this case. Like Ullah, Kareem consumed generalized ISIS propaganda, expressed support for ISIS’s ideology, and allegedly worked with others to carry out violent acts in furtherance of ISIS objectives. But, as in Ullah, the government introduced no evidence that Kareem, Simpson, or Soofi communicated with ISIS leaders, received instructions from ISIS, coordinated with ISIS, or otherwise operated under ISIS’s direction or control. If anything, the government’s evidence presented in this case is far weaker than the government’s case in Ullah. The defendant in Ullah personally carried out a terrorist bombing himself and directly proclaimed that he acted on behalf of ISIS. Yet, the Second Circuit held that the evidence was insufficient because it established only that the defendant “independently tr[ied] to advance” ISIS’s objectives. Id. at 417. Here, the government asks us to infer participation in a material-support conspiracy from evidence that similarly demonstrates, at most, ideological commitment. The Second Circuit’s decision in Ullah unequivocally rejects that theory. We do too. The dissent does not grapple with Ullah and instead rests on the Seventh Circuit’s decision in United States v. Osadzinski, 97 F.4th 484 (7th Cir. 2024). Dissent at 54–55. In Osadzinski, the defendant “contribut[ed] English subtitles and a voiceover” to ISIS propaganda videos, “compiled and organized a massive database of high-resolution ISIS videos for future distribution,” created a computer program that allowed ISIS and its followers to rapidly duplicate propaganda videos online, and “taught fellow ISIS 24 USA V. ABDUL KAREEM supporters how to do the same, spending hours over several days to assist with troubleshooting.” Id. at 486, 493–94. “Throughout, Osadzinski coordinated his actions—or, at the very least, attempted to coordinate them—with ISIS members,” pausing his coordination only when he suspected that he was being monitored by the FBI. Id. at 495. On this record, the Seventh Circuit determined that, “[a]t every step, Osadzinski closely coordinated his activity with ISIS and its media office.” Id. at 493. It thus upheld his conviction for providing material support in violation of Section 2339B. Id. at 486. Osadzinski hinges on a different, fuller, more developed set of facts, not a different understanding of Section 2339B. The Seventh Circuit explained, in line with HLP, that “[a]ny holding that would eliminate—explicitly or otherwise—a person’s right to engage in independent advocacy for a terrorist organization would conflict with long-recognized constitutional principles.” Id. at 493; see HLP, 561 U.S. 1, 23 (“‘[S]ervice’ similarly refers to concerted activity, not independent advocacy.”). Thus, the words “coordination” and “