Todd Smith v. David Shinn
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Date FiledNovember 18, 2026
Docket10-99002
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS NOV 18 2026
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
TODD LEE SMITH, No. 10-99002
Petitioner-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:03-cv-01810-SRB
v.
MEMORANDUM*
DAVID SHINN, Director,
Respondent-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
Susan R. Bolton, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted November 5, 2026
San Francisco, California
Before: W. FLETCHER, NGUYEN, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.
Petitioner Todd Lee Smith appeals the district court’s denial of federal
habeas corpus relief and denial of a stay and abeyance under Rhines v. Weber, 544
U.S. 269 (2005). We review a district court’s denial of a Rhines stay for abuse of
discretion. Blake v. Baker, 745 F.3d 977, 980 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Rhines, 544
U.S. at 278–79). For the reasons stated below, we conclude that Smith has
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
satisfied the Rhines criteria with respect to his ineffective assistance of counsel
(“IAC”) claims at sentencing. We therefore remand to the district court with
instructions to stay and abey Smith’s federal habeas petition.
Smith contends that counsel failed to present a constitutionally adequate
mitigation case at sentencing. The district court denied his request to stay the case
so that he could exhaust his sentencing claim in state court. The district court
reasoned that Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2 operated as an independent
and adequate state procedural rule that foreclosed Smith’s access to any state
remedy.
A state’s procedural default rule “applies only when ‘it is clear that the state
court would hold the claim procedurally barred.’” Doerr v. Shinn, 176 F.4th 1117,
1126 (9th Cir. 2026) (citing Franklin v. Johnson, 290 F.3d 1223, 1230–31 (9th Cir.
2002)). As we explained in Doerr, it is unclear whether Arizona courts would
apply Rule 32.2 to procedurally bar successive post-conviction relief petitions
raising unpresented mitigation claims. Doerr, 176 F.4th at 1126–27. Smith’s
claim is not procedurally defaulted. Id. at 1131.
In order to obtain a Rhines stay, Smith must show: (1) “good cause for his
failure” to present the claim in state court; (2) the “potentially meritorious” nature
of his unexhausted claim; and (3) “no indication that [he] engaged in intentionally
dilatory litigation tactics.” Rhines, 544 U.S. at 278. We conclude that Smith
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satisfies all three criteria.
First, Smith attributes his failure to exhaust to ineffective assistance by his
post-conviction relief (“PCR”) counsel. Smith’s PCR counsel admits she never
interviewed Smith, failed to investigate Smith’s case beyond the existing trial
record, and did not conduct an independent investigation into a mitigation case for
Smith. The deficient nature of his PCR counsel’s performance satisfies the good
cause requirement. See Blake, 745 F.3d at 983 (finding good cause where PCR
counsel conducted no independent investigation to discover facts underlying
petitioner’s IAC claim); see also Doerr, 176 F.4th at 1132 (finding ignorance or
inadvertence on the part of petitioner’s PCR counsel to satisfy good cause).
Second, Smith’s claim is potentially meritorious. Beyond the district court’s
certificate of appealability for the claim,1 Smith identifies several significant
deficiencies in trial counsel’s performance. See, e.g., Hendricks v. Calderon, 70
F.3d 1032, 1043 (9th Cir. 1995) (suggesting investigation into guilt-phase
mitigation does not obviate investigation for penalty-phase mitigation). Smith
argues that PCR counsel was ineffective in failing to identify trial counsel’s failure
to investigate and present corroborative evidence of Smith’s fetal alcohol
syndrome and brain damage as well as failing to present live expert testimony at
1
In Doerr, we suggested the district court’s issuance of a certificate of
appealability provides some support for this factor, as that standard is “more
demanding than the standard under Rhines.” Doerr, 176 F.4th at 1132.
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sentencing. Smith has shown the “potentially meritorious” nature of his
unexhausted claim, and he meets this Rhines criterion.
Third, and finally, nothing in the record suggests intentionally dilatory
tactics. Although a considerable amount of time has passed since Smith’s PCR
petition, Smith was diligent in seeking all available relief. Smith’s need to exhaust
his claim before an Arizona court was not apparent until the Supreme Court
decided Shinn v. Ramirez, 596 U.S. 366 (2022), which foreclosed Smith’s ability to
pursue his sentencing-phase IAC claim in federal court. After Ramirez, Smith
promptly sought a Rhines stay. Because Smith diligently pursued his sentencing-
phase IAC claim and promptly sought to exhaust his claim before an Arizona court
after an intervening change in law, he did not engage in dilatory tactics.
We therefore conclude that Smith has met the requirements for a Rhines stay
and abeyance of his federal habeas petition with respect to his claim of IAC at
sentencing. We remand to the district court with instructions to stay and abey his
habeas petition to allow him to present that claim in state court.
REMANDED.
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