Full Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS NOV 18 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT TODD LEE SMITH, No. 10-99002 Petitioner-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:03-cv-01810-SRB v. MEMORANDUM* DAVID SHINN, Director, Respondent-Appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Arizona Susan R. Bolton, District Judge, Presiding Argued and Submitted November 5, 2026 San Francisco, California Before: W. FLETCHER, NGUYEN, and OWENS, Circuit Judges. Petitioner Todd Lee Smith appeals the district court’s denial of federal habeas corpus relief and denial of a stay and abeyance under Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269 (2005). We review a district court’s denial of a Rhines stay for abuse of discretion. Blake v. Baker, 745 F.3d 977, 980 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Rhines, 544 U.S. at 278–79). For the reasons stated below, we conclude that Smith has * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. satisfied the Rhines criteria with respect to his ineffective assistance of counsel (“IAC”) claims at sentencing. We therefore remand to the district court with instructions to stay and abey Smith’s federal habeas petition. Smith contends that counsel failed to present a constitutionally adequate mitigation case at sentencing. The district court denied his request to stay the case so that he could exhaust his sentencing claim in state court. The district court reasoned that Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2 operated as an independent and adequate state procedural rule that foreclosed Smith’s access to any state remedy. A state’s procedural default rule “applies only when ‘it is clear that the state court would hold the claim procedurally barred.’” Doerr v. Shinn, 176 F.4th 1117, 1126 (9th Cir. 2026) (citing Franklin v. Johnson, 290 F.3d 1223, 1230–31 (9th Cir. 2002)). As we explained in Doerr, it is unclear whether Arizona courts would apply Rule 32.2 to procedurally bar successive post-conviction relief petitions raising unpresented mitigation claims. Doerr, 176 F.4th at 1126–27. Smith’s claim is not procedurally defaulted. Id. at 1131. In order to obtain a Rhines stay, Smith must show: (1) “good cause for his failure” to present the claim in state court; (2) the “potentially meritorious” nature of his unexhausted claim; and (3) “no indication that [he] engaged in intentionally dilatory litigation tactics.” Rhines, 544 U.S. at 278. We conclude that Smith 2 satisfies all three criteria. First, Smith attributes his failure to exhaust to ineffective assistance by his post-conviction relief (“PCR”) counsel. Smith’s PCR counsel admits she never interviewed Smith, failed to investigate Smith’s case beyond the existing trial record, and did not conduct an independent investigation into a mitigation case for Smith. The deficient nature of his PCR counsel’s performance satisfies the good cause requirement. See Blake, 745 F.3d at 983 (finding good cause where PCR counsel conducted no independent investigation to discover facts underlying petitioner’s IAC claim); see also Doerr, 176 F.4th at 1132 (finding ignorance or inadvertence on the part of petitioner’s PCR counsel to satisfy good cause). Second, Smith’s claim is potentially meritorious. Beyond the district court’s certificate of appealability for the claim,1 Smith identifies several significant deficiencies in trial counsel’s performance. See, e.g., Hendricks v. Calderon, 70 F.3d 1032, 1043 (9th Cir. 1995) (suggesting investigation into guilt-phase mitigation does not obviate investigation for penalty-phase mitigation). Smith argues that PCR counsel was ineffective in failing to identify trial counsel’s failure to investigate and present corroborative evidence of Smith’s fetal alcohol syndrome and brain damage as well as failing to present live expert testimony at 1 In Doerr, we suggested the district court’s issuance of a certificate of appealability provides some support for this factor, as that standard is “more demanding than the standard under Rhines.” Doerr, 176 F.4th at 1132. 3 sentencing. Smith has shown the “potentially meritorious” nature of his unexhausted claim, and he meets this Rhines criterion. Third, and finally, nothing in the record suggests intentionally dilatory tactics. Although a considerable amount of time has passed since Smith’s PCR petition, Smith was diligent in seeking all available relief. Smith’s need to exhaust his claim before an Arizona court was not apparent until the Supreme Court decided Shinn v. Ramirez, 596 U.S. 366 (2022), which foreclosed Smith’s ability to pursue his sentencing-phase IAC claim in federal court. After Ramirez, Smith promptly sought a Rhines stay. Because Smith diligently pursued his sentencing- phase IAC claim and promptly sought to exhaust his claim before an Arizona court after an intervening change in law, he did not engage in dilatory tactics. We therefore conclude that Smith has met the requirements for a Rhines stay and abeyance of his federal habeas petition with respect to his claim of IAC at sentencing. We remand to the district court with instructions to stay and abey his habeas petition to allow him to present that claim in state court. REMANDED. 4