Full Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS NOV 19 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 25-7829 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellee, 8:25-cr-00201-FWS-1 v. MEMORANDUM* CHRISTOPHER ALAN HANSEN, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Fred W. Slaughter, District Judge, Presiding Submitted November 17, 2026** Before: CHRISTEN, BUMATAY, and SANCHEZ, Circuit Judges. Christopher Alan Hansen appeals from the district court’s judgment continuing supervised release and adding a condition requiring eight drug tests per month. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm. Hansen contends that the district court procedurally erred by (1) failing to * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). consider whether the drug tests it ordered were reasonably related to the goals of supervised release and did not involve a greater deprivation of liberty than reasonably necessary, (2) failing to explain the sentence adequately, (3) relying on clearly erroneous facts, and (4) failing to address his nonfrivolous sentencing arguments. We review these claims for plain error, see United States v. Valencia- Barragan, 608 F.3d 1103, 1108 (9th Cir. 2010), and conclude the court did not plainly err. The record makes clear the court understood that positive tests for methamphetamine alone would not show illegal drug use given Hansen’s prescription medication. It nevertheless believed that regular drug testing with multiple panels could deter Hansen from using other illegal drugs—either alone or in combination with methamphetamine—and promote Hansen’s rehabilitation. This explanation reflects the court’s considerations of the goals of supervision, as well as Hansen’s arguments, and is sufficient to permit meaningful appellate review. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(1)-(2); United States v. Carty, 520 F.3d 984, 992 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc). Moreover, the record belies Hansen’s claim that the court relied on clearly erroneous facts in imposing the testing requirement. Hansen also contends the testing condition is substantively unreasonable because the ordered tests are “useless” in that they cannot detect illegal methamphetamine use. As a result, Hansen argues, the testing requirement imposes an unnecessary burden on him and does not serve the goals of sentencing. The 2 25-7829 court did not abuse its discretion, however, in imposing a testing condition that would capture other illicit drug use and thereby serve the goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, and public safety. See United States v. Weber, 451 F.3d 552, 557 (9th Cir. 2006). AFFIRMED. 3 25-7829