United States v. Castle
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Date FiledNovember 20, 2026
Docket25-5102
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS NOV 20 2026
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 25-5102
D.C. No.
Plaintiff - Appellee, 2:15-cr-00190-KJM-EFB-2
v.
MEMORANDUM*
JAMES CHRISTOPHER CASTLE,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Kimberly J. Mueller, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted November 17, 2026**
Before: CHRISTEN, BUMATAY, and SANCHEZ, Circuit Judges.
James Christopher Castle appeals pro se from the district court’s order
denying his third motion for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3582(c)(1)(A). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
The district court denied Castle’s motion for failure to exhaust his
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
administrative remedies as the compassionate release statute requires. See 18
U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) (permitting a defendant to file a compassionate release
motion in the district court after he “has fully exhausted all administrative rights to
appeal a failure of the Bureau of Prisons to bring a motion on the defendant’s
behalf”). Castle concedes that he did not exhaust his administrative remedies but
argues that it would have been futile to do so. Section 3582(c)(1)(A)’s
administrative exhaustion requirement is mandatory for each compassionate
release motion, however, and must be enforced when properly raised by the
government. See United States v. Keller, 2 F.4th 1278, 1282-83 (9th Cir. 2021); see
also Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 639 (2016) (“[M]andatory exhaustion statutes . . .
establish mandatory exhaustion regimes, foreclosing judicial discretion.”). The
district court therefore properly denied Castle’s motion for lack of exhaustion.
We do not reach issues that Castle did not specifically and distinctly raise in
the opening brief or in the district court. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985
n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
AFFIRMED.
2 25-5102