Full Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS NOV 20 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 25-5102 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellee, 2:15-cr-00190-KJM-EFB-2 v. MEMORANDUM* JAMES CHRISTOPHER CASTLE, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California Kimberly J. Mueller, District Judge, Presiding Submitted November 17, 2026** Before: CHRISTEN, BUMATAY, and SANCHEZ, Circuit Judges. James Christopher Castle appeals pro se from the district court’s order denying his third motion for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm. The district court denied Castle’s motion for failure to exhaust his * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). administrative remedies as the compassionate release statute requires. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) (permitting a defendant to file a compassionate release motion in the district court after he “has fully exhausted all administrative rights to appeal a failure of the Bureau of Prisons to bring a motion on the defendant’s behalf”). Castle concedes that he did not exhaust his administrative remedies but argues that it would have been futile to do so. Section 3582(c)(1)(A)’s administrative exhaustion requirement is mandatory for each compassionate release motion, however, and must be enforced when properly raised by the government. See United States v. Keller, 2 F.4th 1278, 1282-83 (9th Cir. 2021); see also Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 639 (2016) (“[M]andatory exhaustion statutes . . . establish mandatory exhaustion regimes, foreclosing judicial discretion.”). The district court therefore properly denied Castle’s motion for lack of exhaustion. We do not reach issues that Castle did not specifically and distinctly raise in the opening brief or in the district court. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009). AFFIRMED. 2 25-5102