United States v. Rolon
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Date FiledNovember 3, 2026
Docket25-4322
StatusUnpublished
📰 News Coverage: Read the LAWS.com news report on this case
Full Opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS NOV 3 2026
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 25-4322
D.C. No.
Plaintiff - Appellee, 3:24-cr-00684-LL-1
v.
MEMORANDUM*
MIGUEL ROLON,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of California
Linda Lopez, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted October 30, 2026**
Pasadena, California
Before: R. NELSON and H.A. THOMAS, Circuit Judges, and PITTS, District
Judge.***
Miguel Rolon appeals his convictions for two counts of bringing a
noncitizen to the United States for financial gain under 8 U.S.C.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
***
The Honorable P. Casey Pitts, United States District Judge for the
Northern District of California, sitting by designation.
§ 1324(a)(2)(B)(ii) and one count of conspiracy to bring a noncitizen to the United
States for financial gain under 18 U.S.C. § 371. Rolon argues that the district court
abused its discretion in its admission of expert testimony from Customs and Border
Patrol (CBP) Officer Alexander Medina. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291. We affirm.
We review “the district court’s decision to admit expert testimony for an
abuse of discretion.” United States v. Ruvalcaba-Garcia, 923 F.3d 1183, 1188 (9th
Cir. 2019). “If the district court abused its discretion, we will reverse if the error
was not harmless.” Id. We review for abuse of discretion the district court’s
discovery and evidentiary rulings under Rule 16, but review interpretations of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure de novo. United States v.
Alahmedalabdaloklah, 94 F.4th 782, 837 (9th Cir. 2024).
1. Even assuming the district court was obligated to make an explicit
reliability finding on the record before admitting Medina’s expert testimony, its
failure to do so was harmless. Medina’s testimony was reliable and based on
relevant experience and knowledge—eight years of experience as a CBP officer;
involvement in “over 60” “alien smuggling investigations”; experience reviewing
phones used by and listening to jail calls involving persons charged with “alien
smuggling”; and fluency in Spanish. See United States v. Jimenez-Chaidez, 96
F.4th 1257, 1269 (9th Cir. 2024) (“An error is harmless when the admitted expert
2 25-4322
testimony was relevant and reliable under Daubert [v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc.,
509 U.S. 579 (1993)] based on the record established by the district court.”)
(citation modified); United States v. Mendoza-Paz, 286 F.3d 1104, 1112 (9th Cir.
2002) (In the law enforcement context, reliability depends “heavily on the
knowledge and experience of the expert, rather than the methodology or theory
behind [the testimony].”).
Given that Medina’s testimony was one piece of a trial that featured
overwhelming evidence of Rolon’s guilt—including evidence of Rolon’s changing
stories, logical inconsistencies between Rolon’s statements and other evidence,
testimony from one of Rolon’s undocumented passengers, and video footage of
Rolon’s border entry and post-arrest interview—the jury verdict also more likely
than not would have been the same absent Medina’s testimony. See Jimenez-
Chaidez, 96 F.4th at 1269 (“an error is harmless if the jury more likely than not
would have reached the same verdict even without the expert testimony”). Indeed,
the jury did not need to understand the term pollos to infer that Rolon’s saying “the
pollos are snitching on me” demonstrated that Rolon was not an unknowing driver
doing a favor for a friend.
2. Assuming that the government’s notice of Medina’s testimony was
insufficient under Rule 16 because it failed to include a list of other cases in which
Medina had testified in the prior four years, Rolon was not prejudiced by this error.
3 25-4322
“The prejudice that must be shown to justify reversal for a discovery violation is a
likelihood that the verdict would have been different had the government complied
with the discovery rules, not had the evidence been suppressed.” Mendoza-Paz,
286 F.3d at 1111 (quoting United States v. Baker, 10 F.3d 1374, 1398 n.8 (9th Cir.
1993)).
It is unclear how Rolon would have questioned Medina differently had the
government provided a list of other cases in which Medina had recently testified.
See United States v. Shih, 73 F.4th 1077, 1098 (9th Cir. 2023) (noting that
defendant did not explain how he would have cross-examined expert witness
differently). And given that, as described above, the pollos testimony was one
piece of a substantial volume of evidence against Rolon, it is highly unlikely the
verdict would have been different had the government provided a list of other cases
in which Medina had recently testified.
AFFIRMED.1
1
Rolon’s unopposed motion to supplement the record, Dkt. No. 16, is
granted.
4 25-4322