Full Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS OCT 26 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 26-192 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellee, 1:24-cr-00154-SPW-1 v. MEMORANDUM* STEVEN DWAYNE SCOTT, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Montana Susan P. Watters, Senior District Judge, Presiding Argued and Submitted October 15, 2026 Missoula, Montana Before: TALLMAN, BRESS, and FORREST, Circuit Judges. Steven Dwayne Scott appeals his conviction and 324-month prison sentence for attempted coercion and enticement of a minor (Count 1), 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b), and possession of child pornography (Count 2), id. § 2552A(a)(5)(B), (b)(2). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm. * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. 1. The evidence was sufficient to convict Scott of the charged offenses. “When the issue of sufficiency of the evidence is preserved by making a motion for acquittal, we review the district court’s denial of the motion de novo.” United States v. Jackson, 24 F.4th 1308, 1311 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting United States v. Shea, 493 F.3d 1110, 1114 (9th Cir. 2007)). We “view[] the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution” and ask if “any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Perez, 962 F.3d 420, 446 (9th Cir. 2020) (quoting United States v. Phillips, 929 F.3d 1120, 1123 (9th Cir. 2019)). At trial, the government presented extensive evidence connecting Scott to the charged conduct, including electronic records, victim and law enforcement testimony, and photographs. The jury was not required to accept Scott’s speculative assertion that his electronic accounts were hacked or that he was framed. Accordingly, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the evidence was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find that Scott attempted to coerce a minor to engage in sexual activity and possessed child pornography. 2. We reject Scott’s contention that the district court erred in denying his motion to exclude evidence of prior child molestation under Federal Rule of Evidence 414. We review a district court’s denial of a motion in limine to exclude evidence for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Sutcliffe, 505 F.3d 944, 958 2 26-192 (9th Cir. 2007). There was no abuse of discretion here. As the parties clarified in their appellate briefing and at oral argument, as to Count 2, the testimony of the two Jane Does was not propensity evidence of prior crimes or bad acts, but rather direct evidence for the Count 2 child pornography charge. Neither below nor on appeal did Scott request that the jury be instructed that the testimony of the two Jane Does could be considered only as to Count 2. We do not address Scott’s argument that his Count 1 charge under 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b) is not a crime of “child molestation” within the meaning of Rule 414. Scott did not raise this argument below, and he did so on appeal only in his reply brief. The argument is thus forfeited. See, e.g., Graves v. Arpaio, 623 F.3d 1043, 1048 (9th Cir. 2010); Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009) (per curiam). Regardless, this issue would appear to be of limited practical effect, considering that it would at most support a jury instruction that Scott did not request. Scott also argues that his prior conviction for sexual abuse of a minor should have been excluded from evidence once the government dropped its Count 3 charge for Scott’s failure to register as a sex offender. Scott failed to present this argument to the district court once Count 3 was dropped, so this issue is forfeited. See Padgett, 587 F.3d at 985 n.2. Regardless, the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Scott’s prior conviction for sexual abuse of a minor was admissible as to Counts 1 and 2 because it demonstrated Scott’s intent. See United States v. 3 26-192 LeMay, 260 F.3d 1018, 1029 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Prior acts evidence need not be absolutely necessary to the prosecution’s case in order to be introduced; it must simply be helpful or practically necessary.”); see also United States v. Thornhill, 940 F.3d 1114, 1120–21 (9th Cir. 2019) (holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting prior conviction because the defendant “was contesting the identity of who actually downloaded the photographs”). Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion in conducting a prejudice analysis under Rules 403 and 414. See LeMay, 260 F.3d at 1028 (explaining that in deciding whether to admit evidence under Rule 414, courts must evaluate “(1) the similarity of the prior acts to the acts charged, (2) the closeness in time of the prior acts to the acts charged, (3) the frequency of the prior acts, (4) the presence or lack of intervening circumstances, and (5) the necessity of the evidence beyond the testimonies already offered at trial”) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Doe ex rel. Rudy-Glanzer v. Glanzer, 232 F.3d 1258, 1268 (9th Cir. 2000)). The district court reasonably and conscientiously balanced these factors and did not treat Rule 414 as “a blank check entitling the government to introduce whatever evidence it wishes.” Id. at 1022. 3. We reject Scott’s challenge to his sentence. “[O]ur review of the substantive reasonableness of a sentence is deferential and will provide relief only in rare cases.” United States v. Bradford, 148 F.4th 699, 709 (9th Cir. 2025) (quoting 4 26-192 United States v. Ressam, 679 F.3d 1069, 1088 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc)). We will “only vacate a sentence if the district court’s decision not to impose a lesser sentence was illogical, implausible, or without support in inferences that may be drawn from the facts in the record.” Id. (quoting United States v. Wilson, 8 F.4th 970, 978 (9th Cir. 2021) (per curiam)). The district court in this case sufficiently explained why Scott was deserving of a significant term of imprisonment, albeit one at the low end of the recommended Sentencing Guidelines range. In particular, the district court discussed the seriousness of Scott’s crimes involving young victims and determined there was no basis to vary downward from the Guidelines calculation. The court also addressed Scott’s argument about his health by recommending that he serve his sentence in a medical facility. Although the district court “did not mention several of [Scott’s] mitigating arguments,” our review of the record confirms that the district court “‘listened to [Scott’s] arguments’ and ‘then simply found these circumstances insufficient to warrant a sentence lower than the Guidelines range.’” United States v. Amezcua-Vasquez, 567 F.3d 1050, 1054 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 358 (2007)).)); see also United States v. Taylor, 153 F.4th 934, 941 (9th Cir. 2025) (“[T]he district court need not tick off each of the § 3553(a) factors to show that it has considered them.” (quoting United States v. Carty, 520 F.3d 984, 992 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc))). 5 26-192 AFFIRMED. 6 26-192