United States v. Shepherd
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Date FiledNovember 20, 2026
Docket25-2113
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS NOV 20 2026
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 25-2113
D.C. No.
Plaintiff - Appellee, 2:24-cr-00083-DJC-1
v.
MEMORANDUM*
MONTE SHEPHERD,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Daniel J. Calabretta, District Court, Presiding
Submitted October 21, 2026**
San Francisco, California
Before: CALLAHAN and LEE, Circuit Judges, and EZRA, District Judge.***
A federal jury convicted Defendant-Appellant Monte Shepherd of violating
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), felon in possession of a firearm. Mr. Shepherd appeals on
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
***
The Honorable David A. Ezra, United States District Judge for the
District of Hawaii, sitting by designation.
three grounds. First, he contends that Deputy Dustin Phillips, who discovered the
firearm during a Terry stop and frisk, lacked reasonable suspicion to stop him.
Second, Mr. Shepherd contends that, even if Deputy Phillips had reasonable
suspicion to stop him, the firearm and its later-recorded serial number should have
been suppressed as fruit of the subsequent unlawful arrest. Finally, Mr. Shepherd
asserts that criminalizing his possession of a firearm violates the Second
Amendment, although he acknowledges that his argument is foreclosed by circuit
precedent. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
We review the district court’s legal conclusions, including those related to
reasonable suspicion and whether the exclusionary rule applies, de novo. Ornelas
v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996); United States v. McCarty, 648 F.3d
820, 824 (9th Cir. 2011); United States v. Lundin, 817 F.3d 1151, 1157 (9th Cir.
2016). We review the district court’s factual findings for clear error and will “give
due weight to inferences drawn from those facts by resident judges.” Ornelas, 517
U.S. at 699.
1. Deputy Phillips had reasonable suspicion to stop Mr. Shepherd when he
first arrived at the scene. “[C]onsistent with the Fourth Amendment, [an officer
may] conduct a brief, investigatory stop when the officer has a reasonable,
articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.” Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S.
119, 123 (2000) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968)). We must evaluate
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the stop under the “totality of the circumstances.” United States v. Alvarez, 899
F.2d 833, 836 (9th Cir. 1990). While “[a]n individual’s presence in an area of
expected criminal activity” alone is not enough to support reasonable suspicion,
officers are also “not required to ignore the relevant characteristics of a location.”
Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124 (citing Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979)). Moreover,
reasonable suspicion may exist where an officer relies on an individual’s proximity
to expected criminal activity plus additional factors. See, e.g., Thomas v. Dillard,
818 F.3d 864, 875 (9th Cir. 2016), as amended May 5, 2016.
Here, Deputy Phillips arrived on the scene within five minutes of a call to
police dispatch from Sacramento Metro Fire Department (“SMFD”) reporting that
the female victim of a battery was inside the fire station and the male assailant was
“yelling outside on a bike.” Given his quick arrival, the expected reliability of a
report by SMFD, and the suspect’s reported on-going belligerence, Deputy Phillips
reasonably anticipated that the assailant would still be present. See United States v.
Edwards, 761 F.3d 977, 983 (9th Cir. 2014) (acknowledging the import of a tip’s
reliability to the reasonable suspicion determination). Moreover, Mr. Shepherd
was the only person in the vicinity other than the firefighters, he was male, and he
was walking directly away from the station. Deputy Phillips also had no reason to
expect other suspects to be nearby given the late hour; he arrived at 1:28 a.m. See
United States v. Diaz-Juarez, 299 F.3d 1138, 1142 & n.1 (9th Cir. 2002) (weighing
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the defendant’s presence on an infrequently traveled road late at night in its
reasonable suspicion analysis). The collective weight of these details could lead
any reasonable officer to suspect Mr. Shepherd of criminal activity. See Alvarez,
899 F.2d at 836.
2. The district court properly admitted Mr. Shepherd’s firearm and its serial
number. Although evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment must be
suppressed, where the underlying search was reasonable, “any weapons seized
[during that search] may properly be introduced in evidence against the person
from whom they were taken.” Terry, 392 U.S. at 12, 31. Under the plain language
of Terry, the district court properly admitted the firearm because it was seized
during a lawful frisk. See id. at 30 –31. While here the district court determined
that the subsequent arrest was unlawful, the firearm was properly admitted because
the exclusionary rule is designed to discourage lawless police conduct; it has no
application where the evidence was legally obtained. See id. at 12. Evidence
cannot be the fruit of a poisonous tree whose “toxin . . . was injected only after the
evidentiary bud had blossomed.” See United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 472
(1980). There is also no reason to believe that Deputy Phillips would have simply
returned the firearm to Mr. Shepherd without inquiring into his identity, even after
ruling him out as the suspected assailant. Thus, the firearm was properly admitted.
The serial number was also properly admitted as an inherent characteristic of
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an admissible firearm. This comports with the inevitable discovery doctrine
because recording the serial number was inevitable after the government lawfully
came into possession of the firearm and retained it as evidence. See United States
v. Lundin, 817 F.3d 1151, 1161 (9th Cir. 2016).
3. Mr. Shepherd’s argument that “criminalizing his possession of the firearm
in this case is unconstitutional following New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc.
v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022),” fails. As Mr. Shepherd concedes, his argument is
foreclosed under circuit precedent. See United States v. Duarte, 137 F.4th 743
(2025) (en banc).
AFFIRMED.
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