Full Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS NOV 20 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 25-2113 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellee, 2:24-cr-00083-DJC-1 v. MEMORANDUM* MONTE SHEPHERD, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California Daniel J. Calabretta, District Court, Presiding Submitted October 21, 2026** San Francisco, California Before: CALLAHAN and LEE, Circuit Judges, and EZRA, District Judge.*** A federal jury convicted Defendant-Appellant Monte Shepherd of violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), felon in possession of a firearm. Mr. Shepherd appeals on * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). *** The Honorable David A. Ezra, United States District Judge for the District of Hawaii, sitting by designation. three grounds. First, he contends that Deputy Dustin Phillips, who discovered the firearm during a Terry stop and frisk, lacked reasonable suspicion to stop him. Second, Mr. Shepherd contends that, even if Deputy Phillips had reasonable suspicion to stop him, the firearm and its later-recorded serial number should have been suppressed as fruit of the subsequent unlawful arrest. Finally, Mr. Shepherd asserts that criminalizing his possession of a firearm violates the Second Amendment, although he acknowledges that his argument is foreclosed by circuit precedent. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm. We review the district court’s legal conclusions, including those related to reasonable suspicion and whether the exclusionary rule applies, de novo. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996); United States v. McCarty, 648 F.3d 820, 824 (9th Cir. 2011); United States v. Lundin, 817 F.3d 1151, 1157 (9th Cir. 2016). We review the district court’s factual findings for clear error and will “give due weight to inferences drawn from those facts by resident judges.” Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 699. 1. Deputy Phillips had reasonable suspicion to stop Mr. Shepherd when he first arrived at the scene. “[C]onsistent with the Fourth Amendment, [an officer may] conduct a brief, investigatory stop when the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.” Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968)). We must evaluate 2 25-2113 the stop under the “totality of the circumstances.” United States v. Alvarez, 899 F.2d 833, 836 (9th Cir. 1990). While “[a]n individual’s presence in an area of expected criminal activity” alone is not enough to support reasonable suspicion, officers are also “not required to ignore the relevant characteristics of a location.” Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124 (citing Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979)). Moreover, reasonable suspicion may exist where an officer relies on an individual’s proximity to expected criminal activity plus additional factors. See, e.g., Thomas v. Dillard, 818 F.3d 864, 875 (9th Cir. 2016), as amended May 5, 2016. Here, Deputy Phillips arrived on the scene within five minutes of a call to police dispatch from Sacramento Metro Fire Department (“SMFD”) reporting that the female victim of a battery was inside the fire station and the male assailant was “yelling outside on a bike.” Given his quick arrival, the expected reliability of a report by SMFD, and the suspect’s reported on-going belligerence, Deputy Phillips reasonably anticipated that the assailant would still be present. See United States v. Edwards, 761 F.3d 977, 983 (9th Cir. 2014) (acknowledging the import of a tip’s reliability to the reasonable suspicion determination). Moreover, Mr. Shepherd was the only person in the vicinity other than the firefighters, he was male, and he was walking directly away from the station. Deputy Phillips also had no reason to expect other suspects to be nearby given the late hour; he arrived at 1:28 a.m. See United States v. Diaz-Juarez, 299 F.3d 1138, 1142 & n.1 (9th Cir. 2002) (weighing 3 25-2113 the defendant’s presence on an infrequently traveled road late at night in its reasonable suspicion analysis). The collective weight of these details could lead any reasonable officer to suspect Mr. Shepherd of criminal activity. See Alvarez, 899 F.2d at 836. 2. The district court properly admitted Mr. Shepherd’s firearm and its serial number. Although evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment must be suppressed, where the underlying search was reasonable, “any weapons seized [during that search] may properly be introduced in evidence against the person from whom they were taken.” Terry, 392 U.S. at 12, 31. Under the plain language of Terry, the district court properly admitted the firearm because it was seized during a lawful frisk. See id. at 30 –31. While here the district court determined that the subsequent arrest was unlawful, the firearm was properly admitted because the exclusionary rule is designed to discourage lawless police conduct; it has no application where the evidence was legally obtained. See id. at 12. Evidence cannot be the fruit of a poisonous tree whose “toxin . . . was injected only after the evidentiary bud had blossomed.” See United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 472 (1980). There is also no reason to believe that Deputy Phillips would have simply returned the firearm to Mr. Shepherd without inquiring into his identity, even after ruling him out as the suspected assailant. Thus, the firearm was properly admitted. The serial number was also properly admitted as an inherent characteristic of 4 25-2113 an admissible firearm. This comports with the inevitable discovery doctrine because recording the serial number was inevitable after the government lawfully came into possession of the firearm and retained it as evidence. See United States v. Lundin, 817 F.3d 1151, 1161 (9th Cir. 2016). 3. Mr. Shepherd’s argument that “criminalizing his possession of the firearm in this case is unconstitutional following New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022),” fails. As Mr. Shepherd concedes, his argument is foreclosed under circuit precedent. See United States v. Duarte, 137 F.4th 743 (2025) (en banc). AFFIRMED. 5 25-2113