Full Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS NOV 10 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 25-7799 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellee, 4:25-cr-00034-BMM-1 v. MEMORANDUM* KRISTIN LOUISE MITCHELL, AKA Kristin Louis Short, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Montana Brian M. Morris, Chief District Judge, Presiding Argued and Submitted October 14, 2026 Missoula, Montana Before: TALLMAN, BEA, and BRESS, Circuit Judges. Kristin Mitchell appeals the judgment entered following her jury conviction for attempted harboring of illegal aliens, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii). She argues that her conviction was not supported by substantial evidence of her mens rea and that the district court erred when it denied her motion * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. for a new trial. We reject both arguments and thus affirm the conviction. 1. Mitchell’s conviction was supported by substantial evidence of her mens rea. The statute under which Mitchell was indicted, 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii), required the government to prove: (1) that Mitchell either knew or recklessly disregarded the aliens’ unlawful status, United States v. Tydingco, 909 F.3d 297, 304 (9th Cir. 2018), and (2) that she intended to violate the alien harboring law, United States v. You, 382 F.3d 958, 965–66 (9th Cir. 2004). Viewed in the light most favorable to the government, United States v. Nevils, 598 F.3d 1158, 1163–65 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc), the trial evidence established that Mitchell twice told law enforcement that the aliens were political asylees and that they had all entered the United States as a group. Other trial evidence, however, established that each of the aliens had entered separately, and that indeed none of them had applied for asylum. Those discrepancies, strengthened by testimony from one of the aliens that Mitchell knew they had “no papers,” and that she had re-registered one of their automobiles in her name, constitute sufficient evidence of both mens rea elements. From that evidence, as well as Mitchell’s conduct and demeanor as recorded on officer bodycam footage on March 4, 2025, a rational jury could infer that Mitchell both knew that the aliens were unlawfully present and “sought to prevent immigration authorities from detecting [their] presence,” Tydingco, 909 F.3d at 304. Thus, we reject Mitchell’s challenge to the sufficiency of the government’s mens rea evidence. 2 25-7799 2. The district court did not err when it denied Mitchell’s motion for a new trial. We review a district court’s denial of such a motion “de novo when the claim involves allegations of juror exposure to extrinsic evidence.” United States v. McChesney, 871 F.3d 801, 806 n.1 (9th Cir. 2017). “A defendant is entitled to a new trial when the jury obtains or uses evidence that has not been introduced during trial if there is a reasonable possibility that the extrinsic material could have affected the verdict.” Dickson v. Sullivan, 849 F.2d 403, 405 (9th Cir. 1988) (cleaned up). Mitchell argues that a prospective juror’s statement to the venire during jury selection that she had read an article about the case including “discussion that maybe something like this had happened previously,” amounted to extrinsic evidence of her previous immigration convictions and “could have affected the verdict.” Dickson, 849 F.2d at 405. We agree with the district court that the statement was too vague to prejudice the jury. United States v. Keating, 147 F.3d 895, 902–03 (9th Cir. 1998) (considering, among other factors, (1) the statement’s ambiguity; (2) the statement’s admissibility; (3) any curative instruction; (4) the trial context; and (5) the statement’s relevance to the issues in the case). Mitchell plausibly argues, based on her citation of newspaper articles, that the prospective juror’s statement may have referred to Mitchell’s prior involvement in similar immigration matters, which local media had covered. Had explicit evidence of those matters reached the jury, that 3 25-7799 evidence would have been both prejudicial and relevant to Mitchell’s mens rea. But the juror’s statement was ambiguous. It did not obviously refer to Mitchell or convey that Mitchell had committed a prior immigration-related offense, and it offered no other details. The district court immediately admonished the venire as to the value of cross-examination to validate information, and later instructed the jury to consider only “the testimony and exhibits received in evidence.” In light of this context, the statement’s brevity, and the fact that the prospective juror was not seated on the jury, we are satisfied that Mitchell received a fair trial. Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 681 (1986) (“[T]he Constitution entitles a criminal defendant to a fair trial, not a perfect one.”). AFFIRMED. 4 25-7799