Full Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS NOV 17 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 25-5736 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellee, 4:23-cr-00063-BMM-1 v. MEMORANDUM* FARRON GENE AMERICAN HORSE Sr., Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Montana Brian M. Morris, Chief District Judge, Presiding Argued and Submitted October 16, 2026 Missoula, Montana Before: BEA, BRESS, and FORREST, Circuit Judges. Farron Gene American Horse, Sr., appeals the judgment entered following his jury conviction for (1) sexual abuse of Jane Doe 1, a minor, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1153(a), 2242(2)(B), and (2) abusive sexual contact of Jane Doe 2, also a minor, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1153(a), 2244(a)(2). American Horse argues that the district court abused its discretion when it denied his motion to dismiss the * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. indictment based on the Government’s late disclosure of an FBI interview with Jane Doe 2, which contained impeachment material as to Jane Doe 1. Instead of dismissing the indictment, the district court granted American Horse’s motion for a six-week trial continuance, during which the Government continued to investigate him. At trial, the Government called three witnesses whom it had interviewed during that continuance and who had not been listed in its original trial brief; American Horse did not object to their testifying. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm. We review “for abuse of discretion the district court’s decision not to dismiss [an] indictment under its supervisory powers,” United States v. Miller, 953 F.3d 1095, 1105 (9th Cir. 2020), and review any underlying factual findings for clear error, United States v. Bundy, 968 F.3d 1019, 1030 (9th Cir. 2020). A district court may invoke its supervisory authority to dismiss an indictment only if there is (1) “flagrant [prosecutorial] misconduct,” (2) “substantial prejudice,” id. at 1031, and (3) “no lesser remedial action” available to it, United States v. Chapman, 524 F.3d 1073, 1087 (9th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). “Because it is a drastic step, dismissing an indictment is a disfavored remedy.” United States v. Rogers, 751 F.2d 1074, 1076–77 (9th Cir. 1985) (citing United States v. Blue, 384 U.S. 251, 255 (1966)). American Horse argues that the district court should have found that the 2 25-5736 Government’s untimely disclosure constituted “reckless disregard” for its constitutional obligations. “[R]eckless disregard for the prosecution’s constitutional obligations is sufficient to give rise to flagrant misconduct.” Bundy, 968 F.3d at 1038 (internal quotations and citation omitted). But the Government explained to the district court that the delay in disclosure of the interview of Jane Doe 2 was caused by an internal miscommunication and deficient administrative procedures, rather than intentional or reckless conduct. That explanation supports the district court’s determination that the late disclosure resulted from “incompetence and other non-invidious factors” rather than flagrant misconduct. United States v. Kearns, 5 F.3d 1251, 1254 (9th Cir. 1993). Acceptance of that explanation was well within the fact-finding discretion of the district court. Without a finding of flagrant misconduct, the district court could not dismiss the indictment. Bundy, 968 F.3d at 1031. But even if the district court had found differently as to the severity of the Government’s misconduct, it could dismiss the indictment only if the misconduct caused American Horse “substantial prejudice.” Id.; United States v. Ross, 372 F.3d 1097, 1110 (9th Cir. 2004). Because American Horse used the belatedly disclosed interview to cross-examine both Jane Does. American Horse was not substantially prejudiced by the Government’s tardiness. United States v. Aichele, 941 F.2d 761, 764 (9th Cir. 1991) (“When a defendant has the opportunity to present impeaching evidence [based on belated disclosures] to the 3 25-5736 jury, there is no prejudice in the preparation of his defense.”). Finally, American Horse argues that the continuance was improper because it placed him at a “greater disadvantage” than he would have faced had the Government disclosed the interview on time. Bundy, 968 F.3d at 1043. However, the district court acted within its discretion when it concluded that a continuance would “fully address the damage caused by the government’s misconduct.” Id. The trial’s postponement by six weeks afforded American Horse the opportunity to investigate Jane Doe 2’s statements. The continuance thus “fully address[ed]” the specific prejudice caused by the Government’s belated disclosure. Id. American Horse did not request a further continuance to allow him time for further investigation or trial preparation. That the Government continued to investigate American Horse during the continuance does not change the analysis. American Horse does not contend that the ongoing investigation was improper, nor did he object to the new witnesses’ testimony at trial. We conclude that the district court acted within its discretion. It found that a continuance would cure any prejudice from the late disclosure, and so properly declined to impose the “drastic” and “disfavored” remedy of dismissal when a less extreme remedy was available. See Rogers, 751 F.2d at 1076–77. AFFIRMED. 4 25-5736