United States v. American Horse, Sr.
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Date FiledNovember 17, 2026
Docket25-5736
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS NOV 17 2026
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 25-5736
D.C. No.
Plaintiff - Appellee, 4:23-cr-00063-BMM-1
v.
MEMORANDUM*
FARRON GENE AMERICAN HORSE Sr.,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Montana
Brian M. Morris, Chief District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted October 16, 2026
Missoula, Montana
Before: BEA, BRESS, and FORREST, Circuit Judges.
Farron Gene American Horse, Sr., appeals the judgment entered following his
jury conviction for (1) sexual abuse of Jane Doe 1, a minor, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1153(a), 2242(2)(B), and (2) abusive sexual contact of Jane Doe 2, also a minor,
in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1153(a), 2244(a)(2). American Horse argues that the
district court abused its discretion when it denied his motion to dismiss the
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
indictment based on the Government’s late disclosure of an FBI interview with Jane
Doe 2, which contained impeachment material as to Jane Doe 1. Instead of
dismissing the indictment, the district court granted American Horse’s motion for a
six-week trial continuance, during which the Government continued to investigate
him. At trial, the Government called three witnesses whom it had interviewed during
that continuance and who had not been listed in its original trial brief; American
Horse did not object to their testifying. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §
1291, and we affirm.
We review “for abuse of discretion the district court’s decision not to dismiss
[an] indictment under its supervisory powers,” United States v. Miller, 953 F.3d
1095, 1105 (9th Cir. 2020), and review any underlying factual findings for clear
error, United States v. Bundy, 968 F.3d 1019, 1030 (9th Cir. 2020). A district court
may invoke its supervisory authority to dismiss an indictment only if there is (1)
“flagrant [prosecutorial] misconduct,” (2) “substantial prejudice,” id. at 1031, and
(3) “no lesser remedial action” available to it, United States v. Chapman, 524 F.3d
1073, 1087 (9th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). “Because it is a drastic step,
dismissing an indictment is a disfavored remedy.” United States v. Rogers, 751 F.2d
1074, 1076–77 (9th Cir. 1985) (citing United States v. Blue, 384 U.S. 251, 255
(1966)).
American Horse argues that the district court should have found that the
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Government’s untimely disclosure constituted “reckless disregard” for its
constitutional obligations. “[R]eckless disregard for the prosecution’s constitutional
obligations is sufficient to give rise to flagrant misconduct.” Bundy, 968 F.3d at
1038 (internal quotations and citation omitted). But the Government explained to
the district court that the delay in disclosure of the interview of Jane Doe 2 was
caused by an internal miscommunication and deficient administrative procedures,
rather than intentional or reckless conduct. That explanation supports the district
court’s determination that the late disclosure resulted from “incompetence and other
non-invidious factors” rather than flagrant misconduct. United States v. Kearns, 5
F.3d 1251, 1254 (9th Cir. 1993). Acceptance of that explanation was well within
the fact-finding discretion of the district court.
Without a finding of flagrant misconduct, the district court could not dismiss
the indictment. Bundy, 968 F.3d at 1031. But even if the district court had found
differently as to the severity of the Government’s misconduct, it could dismiss the
indictment only if the misconduct caused American Horse “substantial prejudice.”
Id.; United States v. Ross, 372 F.3d 1097, 1110 (9th Cir. 2004). Because American
Horse used the belatedly disclosed interview to cross-examine both Jane Does.
American Horse was not substantially prejudiced by the Government’s tardiness.
United States v. Aichele, 941 F.2d 761, 764 (9th Cir. 1991) (“When a defendant has
the opportunity to present impeaching evidence [based on belated disclosures] to the
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jury, there is no prejudice in the preparation of his defense.”).
Finally, American Horse argues that the continuance was improper because it
placed him at a “greater disadvantage” than he would have faced had the
Government disclosed the interview on time. Bundy, 968 F.3d at 1043. However,
the district court acted within its discretion when it concluded that a continuance
would “fully address the damage caused by the government’s misconduct.” Id. The
trial’s postponement by six weeks afforded American Horse the opportunity to
investigate Jane Doe 2’s statements. The continuance thus “fully address[ed]” the
specific prejudice caused by the Government’s belated disclosure. Id. American
Horse did not request a further continuance to allow him time for further
investigation or trial preparation.
That the Government continued to investigate American Horse during the
continuance does not change the analysis. American Horse does not contend that
the ongoing investigation was improper, nor did he object to the new witnesses’
testimony at trial.
We conclude that the district court acted within its discretion. It found that a
continuance would cure any prejudice from the late disclosure, and so properly
declined to impose the “drastic” and “disfavored” remedy of dismissal when a less
extreme remedy was available. See Rogers, 751 F.2d at 1076–77.
AFFIRMED.
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