Full Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED OCT 27 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 24-4325 D.C. No. Plaintiff – Appellee, 2:23-cr-00014-RGK-4 v. MEMORANDUM* GUSTAVO ALDANA-MARTINEZ, Defendant – Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California R. Gary Klausner, District Judge, Presiding Submitted October 23, 2026** Pasadena, California Before: BUMATAY, VANDYKE, and MENDOZA, JR Circuit Judges. * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Defendant Gustavo Aldana-Martinez appeals his July 8, 2024, conviction stemming from his involvement in a drug-trafficking money-laundering conspiracy. This panel has jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm. 1. We review de novo “a district court’s decision denying a motion for acquittal based on sufficiency of the evidence.” United States v. Ubaldo, 859 F.3d 690, 699 (9th Cir. 2017). But we must “consider the evidence presented at trial in the light most favorable to the prosecution.” United States v. Nevils, 598 F.3d 1158, 1164 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc). And we have held that “circumstantial evidence and the inferences drawn from that evidence can sustain a conspiracy conviction.” United States v. Jaimez, 45 F.4th 1118, 1127 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting United States v. Wright, 215 F.3d 1020, 1028 (9th Cir. 2000)). Applying this standard, there was sufficient evidence for a rational juror to have found Defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Defendant, who was a horse-breeding hobbyist who had reported income of $8,100 over a five-year period, testified that he was handpicked by businessmen from Mexico to run their electronics purchasing operation, something he had no experience in. He opened bank accounts just for these transactions, receiving and passing through over $15.5 million in whole-dollar amounts, and earning him $86,000 in commissions. The business that he created, Gamar Electronics, sent thousands of dollars to an entity 2 that had an abandoned storefront and a bare-bones website riddled with errors. Based on these and other facts, a rational jury could have drawn an inference that Defendant had knowledge that he was laundering illicit funds. See Nevils, 598 F.3d at 1164; Jaimez, 45 F.4th at 1123. 2. We review a district court’s decision about whether to give a defense- theory instruction under an abuse-of-discretion standard. For the specific issue of whether the instruction is supported by the evidence presented, there is disagreement in this circuit whether this court reviews de novo or for abuse-of-discretion. Compare United States v. Anguiano-Morfin, 713 F.3d 1208, 1209 (9th Cir. 2013) (abuse of discretion), with United States v. Ehmer, 87 F.4th 1073, 1130 (9th Cir. 2023) (de novo). But under either standard, the district court did not err in failing to give the requested withdrawal-defense jury instruction because the proposed instruction was unsupported by the evidence. Withdrawal from a conspiracy is an affirmative defense that the defendant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence. See Smith v. United States, 568 U.S. 106, 109–10 (2013). “To withdraw from a conspiracy a defendant must either disavow the unlawful goal of the conspiracy, affirmatively act to defeat the purpose of the conspiracy, or take definite, decisive, and positive steps to show that the defendant’s disassociation from the conspiracy is sufficient.” United States v. Lothian, 976 F.2d 1257, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992) (citation modified). Defendants are 3 entitled to present conflicting and contradictory defenses, but they are not entitled to jury instructions on a defense that is unsupported by sufficient evidence. See Mathews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58, 62–64 (1988). In presenting his case, Defendant insisted that he was never a member of a conspiracy and had no knowledge of it. He did not argue or present evidence that he was a member of a conspiracy but later took affirmative steps to withdraw. The only evidence Defendant points to in support of withdrawal is his testimony about the closure of the Gamar Electronics bank account. But Defendant’s trial testimony was ambiguous as to how the account was closed. Although at one point Defendant answered in the affirmative when asked if he had closed the account, he twice stated that “the account was closed” after a period of time elapsed, making it unclear whether he personally closed the account. Thus, there is not sufficient evidence in the record that closure of the account was more than “passive nonparticipation,” and so it was not error to decline to give the withdrawal instruction. Smith, 568 U.S. at 112–13; Ehmer, 87 F.4th at 1130. And Defendant’s requested jury instruction referenced withdrawal “before the overt act,” but the conspiracy charged here—18 U.S.C. § 1956(h) money-laundering conspiracy—“does not require proof of an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy.” Whitfield v. United States, 543 U.S. 209, 219 (2005). 4 3. When the defense fails to object to a modified Allen charge, we review for plain error. See United States v. Banks, 514 F.3d 959, 972–74 (9th Cir. 2008). Under this standard, Allen charges are upheld unless the charge had an “impermissibly coercive” effect on the jury. Id. at 974. Three factors are relevant when considering whether an Allen charge was coercive: (1) the instruction’s form; (2) the time the jury deliberated after the charge compared to the total time deliberated; (3) any other signs of coerciveness. United States v. Freeman, 498 F.3d 893, 908 (9th Cir. 2007). Under the Freeman factors, the district court’s modified Allen charge here was not coercive. The district court directed, after only a half-day of deliberations, for the deadlocked jury to “keep trying” and “talk more about the evidence” and “the law,” and expressly told the jury that if they were unable to come to a unanimous decision “that’s fine.” The instruction’s form was not intimidating, and the speed at which they jury reached a verdict after receiving the instruction is not necessarily indicative of an impermissibly coercive effect. See Freeman, 498 F.3d at 908. As there were no other “indicia of coercion,” the district court did not err in giving the jury a modified Allen charge. Id. AFFIRMED. 5