Full Opinion

The slip opinion is the first version of an opinion released by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals. Once an opinion is selected for publication by the Court, it is assigned a vendor-neutral citation by the Clerk of the Court for compliance with Rule 23- 112 NMRA, authenticated and formally published. The slip opinion may contain deviations from the formal authenticated opinion. 1 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 2 Opinion Number: __________ 3 Filing Date: November 10, 2026 4 No. A-1-CA-42327 5 STATE OF NEW MEXICO, 6 Plaintiff-Appellee, 7 v. 8 CHRISTOPHER ANTHONY WADE, 9 Defendant-Appellant. 10 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF BERNALILLO COUNTY 11 Lucy Solimon, District Court Judge 12 Raúl Torrez, Attorney General 13 Santa Fe, NM 14 Michael J. Thomas, Assistant Solicitor General 15 Albuquerque, NM 16 for Appellee 17 Wadsworth Law, LLC 18 Mathew R. Wadsworth 19 Rio Rancho, NM 20 for Appellant 1 OPINION 2 YOHALEM, Judge 3 {1} Defendant Christopher Anthony Wade appeals his convictions for one count 4 of voluntary manslaughter with a firearm, contrary to NMSA 1978, Section 30-2- 5 3(A) (1994), and NMSA 1978, Section 31-18-16 (2022); two counts of tampering 6 with evidence (Counts 3 and 4), contrary to NMSA 1978, Section 30-22-5 (2003); 7 one count of conspiracy to commit tampering with evidence (Count 5), contrary to 8 NMSA 1978, Section 30-28-2 (1979), and Section 30-22-5; and one count of 9 attempted bribery of a witness (Count 6), contrary to NMSA 1978, Section 30-28-1 10 (1963, amended 2024) and NMSA 1978, Section 30-24-3 (1997). On appeal from 11 his conviction for voluntary manslaughter, Defendant argues that the district court’s 12 improper exclusion from evidence of both Victim’s blood alcohol concentration 13 (BAC) and a pathologist’s expert testimony that Victim’s BAC likely caused Victim 14 to behave aggressively, violently, and irrationally just before his death, denied 15 Defendant his right to call witnesses to support his self-defense claim. Defendant 16 also challenges the district court’s exclusion of a second expert’s virtually identical 17 expert opinion testimony based on late disclosure of that witness six days before 18 trial, in violation of the court’s scheduling order. As to his remaining convictions for 19 tampering with evidence, conspiracy, and attempted bribery, Defendant claims that 1 the State presented insufficient evidence to support each conviction. We reverse 2 Defendant’s conviction of attempted bribery and otherwise affirm. 3 PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 4 {2} We begin with a brief procedural background to help clarify confusion about 5 the record applicable to each issue on appeal. 6 {3} Defendant was tried twice. At his first trial, in September 2023, Defendant 7 was charged with first-degree murder, with step-down instructions to the jury on 8 second-degree murder and voluntary manslaughter; two counts of tampering with 9 evidence; one count of conspiracy to tamper with evidence; and one count of 10 attempted bribery. Defendant was convicted of tampering and conspiracy to commit 11 tampering with evidence, and of attempted bribery, but was acquitted of first-degree 12 murder. The jury at the first trial was unable to reach a verdict on either second- 13 degree murder or voluntary manslaughter. The district court, therefore, declared a 14 mistrial on those two lesser included charges. Defendant was tried again in January 15 2024, solely on the second-degree murder and voluntary manslaughter, and was 16 convicted of voluntary manslaughter with a firearm. 17 {4} Defendant appeals the convictions from both his first and second trial. The 18 applicable record for his convictions of two counts of tampering with evidence, one 19 count of conspiracy to tamper with evidence, and one count of attempted bribery is 20 limited to the first trial. Defendant’s appeal from his conviction of voluntary 1 manslaughter, however, challenges both the district court’s ruling excluding Dr. 2 Sperry’s expert testimony as a forensic pathologist at the first trial—a decision which 3 also applied to the second trial—and the exclusion of Dr. Peterson’s expert 4 testimony as a forensic toxicologist at his second trial. We understand Defendant to 5 appeal (1) the district court’s decision granting the State’s motion in limine at the 6 first trial, excluding both Victim’s BAC and Dr. Sperry’s expert testimony regarding 7 the impact of Victim’s BAC on his behavior; and (2) the district court’s exclusion 8 of both Dr. Sperry’s and Dr. Peterson’s similar expert testimony, as well as Victim’s 9 BAC at the second trial. We address each issue in turn. 10 I. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Excluding Dr. 11 Sperry’s Expert Testimony 12 {5} In granting the State’s motion in limine at Defendant’s first trial, the district 13 court excluded both Victim’s blood test results at autopsy, showing Victim’s BAC 14 as 0.139, and Dr. Sperry’s proposed expert testimony tying Victim’s BAC to what 15 Dr. Sperry claimed would have been highly aggressive, violent and irrational 16 behavior by Victim just prior to his death. We first clarify the basis for the district 17 court’s decision excluding this evidence, addressing Defendant’s argument that the 18 basis for its exclusion was the district court’s improper application of the Sixth 19 Amendment’s Confrontation Clause, U.S. Const. amend. VI, to protect the State’s 20 (rather than the accused’s) right to cross-examination. We then affirm the district 21 court’s grant of the motion in limine under Rules 11-702, 11-402, and 11-403 1 NMRA and the continued application of that ruling at Defendant’s second trial to 2 exclude Victim’s BAC and Dr. Sperry’s and Dr. Peterson’s testimony. 3 A. Defendant’s Confrontation Clause Argument 4 {6} Defendant claims that the district court granted the State’s motion in limine 5 and excluded both Victim’s BAC and Dr. Sperry’s expert testimony based solely on 6 what Defendant argues is the court’s misunderstanding of the Sixth Amendment’s 7 Confrontation Clause, U.S. Const. amend. VI. Defendant states in his opening brief, 8 “The [district c]ourt was clear in its ruling that it excluded Dr. Sperry on 9 Confrontation Clause grounds.” 10 {7} We do not agree that the district court’s exclusion of Victim’s BAC and Dr. 11 Sperry’s testimony was based on the district court’s misapplication of the 12 Confrontation Clause to protect the State’s rights, rather than the rights of the 13 accused. The record plainly shows that the district court’s exclusion of both Victim’s 14 BAC, at both trials, and Dr. Sperry’s testimony at both trials was expressly based on 15 the State’s motion in limine and supporting brief, which argued for exclusion under 16 Rules 11-702, 11-402, and 11-403. Because we affirm the district court’s exclusion 17 of both Victim’s BAC and Dr. Sperry’s testimony under Rules 11-702, 11-402, and 18 11-403, we do not address Defendant’s Confrontation Clause argument. See Allen v. 19 LeMaster, 2012-NMSC-001, ¶ 28, 267 P.3d 806 (observing that “courts exercise 1 judicial restraint by deciding cases on the narrowest possible grounds and avoid 2 reaching unnecessary constitutional issues”). 3 B. Rules 11-702, 11-402, and 11-403 Support the District Court’s Exclusion 4 of Both the Toxicology Report and Dr. Sperry’s Expert Testimony 5 1. Standard of Review 6 {8} We review the admission or exclusion of scientific expert opinion testimony 7 and other scientific evidence at trial for an abuse of discretion. See State v. Alberico, 8 1993-NMSC-047, ¶ 58, 116 N.M. 156, 861 P. 2d 192 (“[T]he admission of expert 9 testimony or other scientific evidence is peculiarly within the sound discretion of the 10 trial court and will not be reversed absent a showing of abuse of that discretion.”). 11 “An abuse of discretion occurs when the ruling is clearly against the logic and effect 12 of the facts and circumstances of the case. We cannot say the trial court abused its 13 discretion by its ruling unless we can characterize it as clearly untenable or not 14 justified by reason.” State v. Rojo, 1999-NMSC-001, ¶ 41, 126 N.M. 438, 971 P.2d 15 829 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 16 2. Relevant Principles of Law 17 {9} Rule 11-702, the rule of evidence that governs the foundation that must be 18 laid for the admission of expert testimony, requires the trial court to act as a 19 gatekeeper, determining before admitting expert testimony that the scientific theory 20 expressed or scientific methodology or technology applied to arrive at a conclusion 21 is valid, reliable, and relevant to help the jury reach accurate results. See State v. 1 Fuentes, 2010-NMCA-027, ¶ 23, 147 N.M. 761, 228 P.3d 1181 (recognizing that 2 the prerequisites for admitting expert testimony under Rule 11-702 are “(1) experts 3 must be qualified; (2) their testimony must assist the trier of fact; and (3) their 4 testimony must be limited to the area of scientific, technical, or other specialized 5 knowledge in which they are qualified.” (internal quotation marks and citation 6 omitted)). Our Supreme Court described the role of the district court as follows: 7 “When scientific evidence is employed as a means of obtaining or analyzing data, 8 the trial court must determine whether the scientific technique is based upon well- 9 recognized scientific principle and whether it is capable of supporting opinions 10 based upon reasonable probability rather than conjecture.” Alberico, 1993-NMSC- 11 047, ¶ 47. It follows that, if a scientific opinion is not based on valid, reliable science, 12 it is not relevant or probative of a fact in issue, and it will not assist the jury in 13 reaching a fair decision. See id. ¶ 54. 14 {10} If the evidence is found to meet the requirements of Rule 11-702 for scientific 15 validity and reliability, the district court must then determine whether it also meets 16 the requirement for relevance under Rule 11-402, and, if the court concludes the 17 evidence is at least marginally relevant, whether its probative value substantially 18 outweighs the danger of prejudice. See Alberico, 1993-NMSC-047, ¶ 55 (“Even if 19 the expert testimony passes muster under Rule [11-]702, it must still be material to 20 the particular case to be admissible under Rule [11-]401, and even if relevant (that 1 is, material and probative), the scientific evidence may be excluded if its prejudicial 2 effect substantially outweighs its probative value under Rule [11-]403.”). 3 {11} An evidentiary hearing outside the presence of the jury is often required to 4 enable the court to decide whether expert testimony concerns scientific, technical, 5 or other specialized knowledge with a reliable basis. See Fuentes, 2010-NMCA-027, 6 ¶¶ 26-27 (acknowledging hearings with expert testimony about the validity and 7 reliability of the scientific theory or methodology may be required). 8 {12} As the proponent of the expert testimony, Defendant bears the burden to 9 establish the validity, reliability, and relevance of the scientific evidence offered. See 10 State v. Anderson, 1994-NMSC-089, ¶ 14, 118 N.M. 284, 881 P.2d 29 (stating that 11 the party seeking to admit expert testimony bears the burden of showing that the 12 expert is qualified, that the expert’s testimony will assist the trier of fact, and that 13 the expert will “testify only as to scientific, technical[,] or other specialized 14 knowledge with a reliable basis.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); 15 see Fuentes, 2010-NMCA-027, ¶ 24 (same). 16 3. Application of Law to the Expert Testimony 17 {13} In this case, Defendant identified Dr. Sperry at Defendant’s first trial as an 18 expert witness the defense intended to call to support Defendant’s claim that he had 19 acted reasonably, in self-defense, when he shot Victim in the chest. Defendant 20 described Dr. Sperry as a pathologist who would testify that, based on Victim’s BAC 1 of 0.139 as measured in Victim’s toxicology report at autopsy, that it was likely that 2 Victim behaved in a highly aggressive, violent, irrational manner just prior to his 3 death. 4 {14} Defendant provided virtually no information about Dr. Sperry’s proposed 5 testimony, apart from his conclusion about Victim’s behavior. When the defense 6 identified Dr. Sperry as a potential witness, no information was provided on the 7 scientific theory or methodology Dr. Sperry used. Even after the State filed its 8 motion in limine, seeking to exclude both Victim’s BAC and Dr. Sperry’s testimony 9 as to the impact of Victim’s BAC on his behavior, arguing it had not been shown to 10 be scientifically valid or reliable, and would be more prejudicial than probative 11 under Rules 11-702, 11-402, and 11-403, Defendant did not provide the district court 12 with any information about the scientific methodology or theory supporting Dr. 13 Sperry’s expert opinion, did not file an expert affidavit, and did not seek a hearing 14 where the defense could provide testimony on Dr. Sperry’s theory and methodology. 15 Defendant did not even provide the district court with the report Dr. Sperry had 16 prepared for disclosure to the State in discovery. It was the State that informed the 17 court in its motion in limine, without objection or correction from Defendant, that 18 Dr. Sperry’s report stated that Dr. Sperry intended to testify that Victim’s BAC 19 would have impacted his behavior such that Victim would have been “unable to 1 listen to reason, would become physically and verbally very violent very quickly, 2 and that the violence would persist until something else stopped the fight.” 3 {15} At the September 8, 2023 hearing, and at its continuation on September 11, 4 2023, the State argued, in relevant part, that Dr. Sperry’s proffered testimony about 5 Victim’s behavior was neither scientifically valid or reliable under Rule 11-702, and 6 that neither Victim’s BAC, nor Dr. Sperry’s testimony was relevant to prove 7 Victim’s behavior. If the court found the BAC evidence to be marginally relevant, 8 the State argued it was more prejudicial than probative, relying on Rule 11-403. 9 {16} Because the defense failed to offer any evidence concerning Dr. Sperry’s 10 methodology, the parties’ arguments focused on this Court’s opinion in State v. 11 Garcia, 2005-NMCA-042, 137 N.M. 315, 110 P.3d 531. In Garcia, this Court 12 upheld the district court’s exclusion of a toxicology report showing the BAC of a 13 murder victim at autopsy to be 0.245 percent at the time of his death. Id. ¶¶ 31-36. 14 In Garcia, as in this case, the victim’s BAC was offered to show that the victim 15 behaved aggressively and violently at the time of his death. Id. ¶¶ 32-33. The 16 defendant in Garcia argued that admission of the victim’s BAC was essential to 17 support his self-defense claim: that a reasonable person in the defendant’s position 18 would have used deadly force. Id. ¶ 32. This Court in Garcia quotes with approval 19 the district court’s decision explaining its exclusion of the BAC evidence: 1 While it is certainly scientifically or medically believed that over .08 2 may result in impairment of the ability to safely operate a vehicle, it is 3 not relevant to an essential element in this case or to the defense. 4 As [the court] understand[s] the evidence, everyone was drinking, and 5 the jury is certainly going to know that, and the [c]ourt feels that that 6 evidence can be considered by the jury. The [c]ourt is of the opinion the 7 deceased’s BAC doesn’t indicate whether someone is aggressive, 8 passive, happy, sad, angry, et cetera. There is no criteria or 9 scientifically established principle on that that [the court is] aware of. 10 Id. ¶ 31 (emphasis added) (alterations omitted). 11 {17} This Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion 12 in excluding evidence claiming a correlation between a person’s BAC and their 13 behavior as speculative, rather than scientifically reliable, and as either irrelevant or 14 if marginally relevant, then more prejudicial than probative by stating: 15 There undoubtedly is in many instances a correlation between alcohol 16 and violence. However, as the district court observed, although it is 17 clear that BAC may demonstrate impaired ability to drive a motor 18 vehicle, a correlation between BAC and aggressiveness seems 19 speculative unless tied more specifically to an individual’s history. As 20 such, the probative value of the BAC evidence in this case is 21 questionable at best. . . . Even if some relevance has been found, the 22 district court could properly have determined that any slight probative 23 value that the BAC evidence might have had was outweighed by its 24 prejudicial effect. 25 Id. ¶ 33 (citation omitted). 26 {18} Defendant attempts to distinguish Garcia, arguing that Garcia addressed the 27 admission of a victim’s BAC when the BAC is unaccompanied by an expert’s 28 explanation of its relevance to how the victim behaved. We are not persuaded. To 1 support the admissibility of Victim’s BAC with expert testimony, Defendant had to 2 show the district court, in the exercise of the court’s gateway function, that the 3 expert’s opinion that a person’s behavior could be predicted from their BAC is 4 scientifically valid and reliable. Otherwise, both the BAC itself and the expert’s 5 testimony are properly excluded as irrelevant to prove how Victim behaved. See 6 Alberico, 1993-NMSC-047, ¶ 54. 7 {19} We briefly address Defendant’s argument that the defense failed to make a 8 showing that Victim’s BAC and Dr. Sperry’s testimony were valid, relevant and 9 reliable because the district court failed to give Defendant an opportunity to make 10 that showing. We do not agree that Defendant lacked a full opportunity to address 11 the admissibility of its expert’s testimony. As we have already noted, the burden to 12 establish the validity, reliability and relevance of the defense’s scientific expert 13 evidence was on Defendant. See Fuentes, 2010-NMCA-027, ¶ 24. Defendant could 14 have responded to the State’s motion in limine by providing the court with Dr. 15 Sperry’s report, or providing an affidavit or testimony from Dr. Sperry or other 16 experts describing his methodology, and offered studies or testimony supporting the 17 validity and reliability that methodology and of his opinion derived from that 18 methodology. Defendant did not do any of these things. Defendant’s sole request to 19 the court was to continue the hearing on the State’s motion in limine from September 20 8 until September 11, 2023, to give Defendant more time to prepare its response to 1 the State’s motion in limine. The district court granted that request. Defendant never 2 offered evidence of any sort or asked the court to schedule time for further hearing. 3 {20} Defendant also argues that although the defense did not offer evidence on the 4 validity and reliability of Dr. Sperry’s testimony, Defendant offered evidence that 5 satisfied the exception to the exclusion of this testimony mentioned in Garcia, and 6 supported its argument with this Court’s decision in State v. Maples, 2013-NMCA- 7 052, 300 P.3d 749. Garcia acknowledges “[t]here undoubtedly [is] in many 8 instances a correlation between alcohol and violence.” 2005-NMCA-042, ¶ 33. 9 Garcia concludes that when a person’s BAC is accompanied by historical evidence 10 of that person’s pattern of behavior while intoxicated, the person’s level of 11 intoxication as represented by their BAC becomes a relevant predictor of their 12 behavior. See id. In this case, Defendant relied on a police report of a May 2022 13 incident involving Victim as the historical evidence of Victim’s behavior that the 14 defense claims satisfied Garcia’s requirement for evidence of prior behavior while 15 intoxicated. The record shows, however, that the May 2022 police report was 16 excluded from evidence by the district court as irrelevant. It was irrelevant because, 17 as the State pointed out without contradiction from Defendant, it does not support 18 Defendant’s claim that Victim was intoxicated during that incident. We, therefore, 19 do not agree with Defendant that the Garcia exception, allowing evidence of a 20 person’s BAC when a history of the person’s behavior while intoxicated establishes 1 a pattern of past behavior that allows prediction of future behavior while intoxicated 2 applies to this case. 3 {21} Because Defendant did not present any evidence from Dr. Sperry or other 4 experts establishing the scientific validity and reliability of using a person’s BAC 5 alone to predict how they would behave, Garcia is dispositive here. The district court 6 did not abuse its discretion in relying on Garcia’s holding that, in the absence of 7 examples of the person’s past behavior when intoxicated, any prediction of behavior 8 from a person’s BAC is not scientifically valid or reliable, and is, therefore, not 9 relevant to prove that Defendant acted reasonably in his own defense when he shot 10 Victim. See id. We also agree with the district court’s exclusion of both Victim’s 11 BAC and the expert testimony connecting Victim’s BAC to his behavior as 12 irrelevant under Rule 11-402, and as more prejudicial than probative under Rule 13 11-403. Unreliable scientific testimony is irrelevant to prove any fact in issue and 14 Dr. Sperry’s testimony might well have confused the jury or prejudiced their view 15 of Victim. See Alberico, 1993-NMSC-047, ¶ 54. 16 C. The District Court’s Exclusion of Both Defendant’s BAC and Dr. 17 Peterson’s Expert Testimony at Defendant’s Second Trial Based on Late 18 Disclosure Is Not Reversible Error 19 {22} At the second trial, in addition to stating that the defense was reserving its 20 right to appeal the exclusion of Dr. Sperry as an expert witness, Defendant identified 21 Dr. Peterson, the toxicologist who performed Victim’s blood test at autopsy, as an 1 additional expert witness, offering Dr. Peterson’s testimony both to establish the 2 foundation for the admission of Victim’s BAC results and to explain the relationship 3 between Victim’s BAC and Victim’s behavior prior to his death. The State argued 4 for the exclusion of both Victim’s BAC and Dr. Peterson’s testimony for the reasons 5 of lack of scientific reliability and relevance relied on by the district court to exclude 6 Dr. Sperry’s nearly identical testimony, as well as arguing that Dr. Peterson’s 7 testimony also should be excluded as a sanction for Defendant’s failure to identify 8 Dr. Peterson as an expert witness within the disclosure deadlines set by the district 9 court in its scheduling order. Defendant listed Dr. Peterson as an expert witness six 10 days before trial, many weeks after the scheduling deadline, giving the State no 11 opportunity to interview her before trial. The argument on the exclusion of Dr. 12 Peterson’s testimony concluded on the day trial was set to begin. The district court 13 excluded both Victim’s BAC and Dr. Peterson’s testimony, stating that Dr. Peterson 14 was disclosed too late in violation of the court’s scheduling order and without time 15 to allow the State to interview her. 16 {23} Defendant argues that the exclusion of Victim’s BAC and Dr. Peterson’s 17 testimony at the second trial based on violation of the court’s scheduling order 18 denied Defendant his Sixth Amendment right to present a defense. Defendant relies 19 on our Supreme Court’s recent decision in State v. Garcia, 2025-NMSC-030, ¶ 32, 20 578 P.3d 1073, which requires district courts to analyze the propriety of defense 1 witness exclusion under the factors articulated in McCarty v. State, 1988-NMSC- 2 079, ¶¶ 9-10, 107 N.M. 651, 763 P.2d 360. 3 {24} We disagree and explain. Defendant concedes that he was offering Victim’s 4 BAC and Dr. Peterson’s expert testimony for the same purpose that he offered 5 Victim’s BAC and Dr. Sperry’s expert testimony in the first trial: to prove to the jury 6 that Victim’s behavior had been so irrational, aggressive, and violent that it justified 7 Defendant’s use of deadly force. The district court had already correctly ruled at the 8 first trial that both Victim’s BAC and the expert testimony offered for the same 9 purpose were inadmissible under Rules 11-702, 11-402, and 11-403. The court had 10 left that decision in place. Our review of the record shows that the part of the decision 11 excluding both the BAC and the expert testimony applied to both Dr. Sperry’s 12 testimony and Dr. Peterson’s similar testimony when offered at Defendant’s second 13 trial. Both the BAC and Dr. Peterson’s testimony were, therefore, inadmissible. Our 14 Supreme Court’s opinion in Garcia, 2025-NMSC-030, does not require the 15 weighing of the McCarty factors when the evidence excluded for late disclosure is 16 otherwise inadmissible: 17 [W]e emphasize that for a balancing test to meet Sixth Amendment 18 standards, it must begin with a presumption against exclusion of 19 otherwise admissible defense evidence. No other approach adequately 20 protects the right to present a defense. 21 Id. ¶ 43 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The Rules 22 of Evidence apply to a defendant; a defendant does not have either a Sixth 1 Amendment or Fourteenth Amendment right to defend with evidence that is 2 inadmissible. 3 {25} To the extent the district court failed to state this basis for its exclusion of 4 Victim’s BAC and Dr. Peterson’s testimony at the second trial, our doctrine 5 affirming the district court if it is right for any reason applies. See State v. Vargas, 6 2008-NMSC-019, ¶ 8, 143 N.M. 692, 181 P.3d 684 (“Under the ‘right for any 7 reason’ doctrine, we may affirm the district court’s order on grounds not relied upon 8 by the district court if those grounds do not require us to look beyond the factual 9 allegations that were raised and considered below.” (internal quotation marks and 10 citation omitted)). The parties fully argued the admissibility of the BAC and Dr. 11 Peterson’s testimony under Rules 11-702, 11-402, and 11-403. Defendant had an 12 opportunity to respond to the State’s argument and again offered no expert testimony 13 establishing the admissibility under Rule 11-702. Because Victim’s BAC and Dr. 14 Peterson’s expert testimony were inadmissible for the same reasons the district court 15 excluded Dr. Sperry’s expert opinion testimony, even though Dr. Peterson could lay 16 the foundation for admission of blood test results if those results had been shown to 17 be relevant, the district court’s exclusion of this evidence without review of the 18 McCarty factors was correct as a matter of law. 1 II. Sufficiency of the Evidence 2 {26} In reviewing for sufficiency of the evidence on appeal, we determine “whether 3 substantial evidence of either a direct or circumstantial nature exists to support a 4 verdict of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt with respect to every element essential to 5 a conviction.” State v. Baroz, 2017-NMSC-030, ¶ 9, 404 P.3d 769 (internal quotation 6 marks and citation omitted). “Substantial evidence is relevant evidence that a 7 reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. (internal 8 quotation marks and citation omitted). “In reviewing whether there was sufficient 9 evidence to support a conviction, we resolve all disputed facts in favor of the [s]tate, 10 indulge all reasonable inferences in support of the verdict, and disregard all evidence 11 and inferences to the contrary.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 12 Under this deferential standard, “material facts may be proved by inference.” State 13 v. Cotton, 1990-NMCA-025, ¶ 12, 109 N.M. 769, 790 P.2d 1050. “However, 14 evidence supporting a criminal conviction must be based on logical inference and 15 not upon surmise or conjecture.” Id. 16 {27} We consider each of Defendant’s challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence 17 beginning with his two convictions for tampering with evidence. 18 A. Counts 3 and 4: Tampering with Evidence 19 {28} Defendant challenges his conviction for Count 3—tampering with evidence 20 by hiding or disposing of the shotgun—and Count 4—tampering with Facebook 1 electronic data. We look to the jury instructions to determine what the jury was 2 required to find in order to convict Defendant for tampering with evidence. See State 3 v. Holt, 2016-NMSC-011, ¶ 20, 368 P.3d 409 (“The jury instructions become the 4 law of the case against which the sufficiency of the evidence is to be measured.” 5 (alterations, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted)). 6 {29} To convict Defendant of tampering with the evidence by hiding or disposing 7 of the shotgun involved in this case, the jury instruction required the State to prove 8 beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant (1) “hid or disposed of a shotgun,” and 9 (2) “[b]y doing so, [D]efendant intended to prevent the apprehension, prosecution, 10 or conviction of himself for the crime of murder.” Both the act of “hiding or 11 disposing” of the shotgun, and Defendant’s intent in doing so must be proved in 12 order for the jury to convict of tampering with evidence. 13 {30} In this case, there was testimony by multiple eye witnesses to the shooting of 14 Victim that Defendant shot Victim with a homemade shotgun that had no stock and 15 was put together with what appeared to be red duct tape. Defendant admitted that he 16 took the shotgun with him as he fled the scene of the shooting as a passenger with 17 another friend in their car, and that he wrapped the shotgun in some spare clothes 18 from his trunk and put it in the friend’s backseat. Defendant testified that he brought 19 the shotgun to someone named Nickole’s home. On June 10, 2022, internet searches 20 from Defendant’s phone revealed that Defendant searched the phrase “no murder 1 weapon no case” and read an article posted on a law firm’s website entitled, “Is 2 finding the murder weapon that important?” Following Defendant’s arrest, law 3 enforcement conducted a search of Nickole’s home and did not discover the shotgun. 4 {31} Defendant argues that this evidence is insufficient to establish either that he 5 hid or disposed of the shotgun or that he did so with the intent to avoid arrest or 6 prosecution. We do not agree. First, as to the sufficiency of the evidence to prove 7 that Defendant hid the shotgun, we acknowledge, as Defendant argues, that a jury 8 cannot “infer that an overt, intentional act of hiding [or disposing of] the weapon 9 took place based solely on the fact that the police never found the weapon.” See State 10 v. Guerra, 2012-NMSC-027, ¶ 16, 284 P.3d 1076. We do not agree with Defendant, 11 however, that the police not finding the shotgun was the sole basis for the jury’s 12 conviction in this case. The jury was entitled to rely on Defendant’s testimony 13 admitting he took the shotgun with him as he fled the scene of the shooting, that he 14 concealed it in clothes, and that he took it to Nickole’s home, where, knowing that 15 law enforcement was investigating the shooting and looking for him, he avoided 16 arrest for several days. This testimony, together with law enforcement’s failure to 17 find the shotgun in their search of Nickole’s home, is sufficient to allow a jury to 18 reasonably infer that Defendant “hid or disposed of [the] shotgun,” the first element 19 of tampering with evidence. 1 {32} As to Defendant’s intent to avoid arrest, prosecution, or conviction by hiding 2 or disposing of the shotgun, the second element of tampering with the evidence, we 3 agree with the State that Defendant’s web searches for information about whether 4 he could avoid prosecution or conviction if the murder weapon could not be found 5 is sufficient evidence from which to infer his intent to hide or dispose of the shotgun 6 so law enforcement could not seize it, in the hope that “no murder weapon no case” 7 would be true. “[I]ntent is subjective and is almost always inferred from other facts 8 in the case, as it is rarely established by direct evidence.” State v. Cunningham, 2000- 9 NMSC-009, ¶ 27, 128 N.M. 711, 998 P.2d 176 (internal quotation marks and citation 10 omitted). 11 {33} We turn next to Defendant’s conviction for tampering with evidence by hiding 12 Facebook electronic data. We continue to rely on our previous discussion of the 13 elements of the crime of tampering. Defendant argues that the State failed to prove 14 that he hid any evidence on his Facebook account relevant to law enforcement’s 15 investigation of Victim’s death. We do not agree. Defendant admitted in his trial 16 testimony that he deactivated a portion of his Facebook account during the time he 17 was in Nickole’s home where he was plainly staying to avoid arrest. Defendant 18 testified that he deactivated his Facebook account because he was being harassed, 19 and told not to hide evidence from the police. The jury, however, was not required 20 to find his testimony credible or accept his version of the facts. See State v. Telles, 1 2019-NMCA-039, ¶ 21, 446 P.3d 1194 (“The jury is free to disregard a defendant’s 2 testimony if it finds that the defendant is not credible.” 3 {34} Even if the we assume that the evidence that Defendant deactivated his 4 Facebook account during the period he knew law enforcement was looking for him 5 was not enough to create an inference that Defendant did so to hide or dispose of 6 evidence to protect himself from arrest or prosecution, the State presented additional 7 evidence involving Defendant’s communication with a third person (labeled in his 8 phone as “Mama”). Mama advised Defendant to destroy his cell phone devices and 9 “get rid of all text messages to everyone” in order to avoid arrest and prosecution. 10 Defendant responded with a cell phone message agreeing to do as Mama advised 11 just before he deleted his Facebook account from his phone. This evidence is 12 sufficient to support the jury’s finding that Defendant deactivated the account with 13 the intention of avoiding “apprehension, prosecution, or conviction.” See 14 Cunningham, 2000-NMSC-009, ¶ 27. 15 B. Count 5: Conspiracy to Tamper with Evidence 16 {35} Defendant next claims that substantial evidence does not support his 17 conviction of Count 5 (conspiracy to tamper with evidence). To prove conspiracy 18 the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that “[D]efendant and 19 another person by words or acts agreed together to commit tampering with 1 evidence,” and that “[Defendant] and the other person intended to commit tampering 2 with evidence.” 3 {36} “A conspiracy is defined as a common design or agreement to accomplish an 4 unlawful purpose or a lawful purpose by unlawful means.” State v. Herrera, 2024- 5 NMCA-025, ¶ 9, 544 P.3d 260 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “In 6 order to be convicted of conspiracy, the defendant must have the requisite intent to 7 agree and the intent to commit the offense that is the object of the conspiracy.” State 8 v. Trujillo, 2002-NMSC-005, ¶ 62, 131 N.M. 709, 42 P.3d 814 (internal quotation 9 marks and citation omitted). “The criminal agreement is the gist of the crime of 10 conspiracy.” State v. Carrasco, 1997-NMSC-047, ¶ 39, 124 N.M. 64, 946 P.2d 1075. 11 “An overt act is not required and the crime of conspiracy is complete when the 12 felonious agreement is reached.” State v. Torres, 2018-NMSC-013, ¶ 50, 413 P.3d 13 467 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 14 {37} The State relied primarily on State’s Exhibit 113, which is the transcription of 15 two text message exchanges with Mama. The conversation between Defendant and 16 Mama on June 10, 2022, read in relevant part: 17 Mama: “If you’re Gina Day you didn’t do it then stick to” 18 Mama: “Gonna say” 19 Mama: “You need a new phone n destroy this one” 20 The next day, on June 11, 2022, a second conversation reads as follows: 1 Mama: Keep all the pics but get rid of all text messages to 2 everyone. They can get all you text messages that’s why I wanted 3 you to get rid of the phone. Or reset it clean it out. 4 Defendant: Ok I will 5 Mama: Please 6 Mama: After you do that use a substitute way of talking. 7 Mama: A Call text app. 8 Mama: Write everything down out your phone. need them reset it 9 then use a text app. 10 Defendant: Ok. 11 {38} These communications, on their face, show that Mama instructed Defendant 12 to destroy his phone, by texting him to delete “all text messages to everyone,” or 13 “reset it clean it out.” The reasonable inference based on the timing of the 14 messages—in the days following the shooting—is that Mama was requesting that 15 Defendant “commit tampering with evidence” by destroying incriminating 16 communications that law enforcement (“they”) would try and obtain for purposes of 17 prosecution. And Defendant plainly agreed to Mama’s requests, texting, “Ok I will,” 18 and later, “Ok.” 19 {39} These multiple communications, which occurred across two days, also show 20 Defendant and Mama “intended to commit tampering with evidence.” The clarity of 21 Defendant and Mama’s messages to each other sufficiently supports an inference of 22 shared intent, even though action was left to Defendant. But there was far more 1 evidence the jury could have relied upon. Contemporaneously, Defendant “hid or 2 disposed” of the murder weapon, fled from law enforcement, deactivated his 3 Facebook account, and drafted a handwritten letter directing his roommate Audree 4 to bribe eye witnesses into testifying falsely. Defendant points out that he never 5 destroyed his phone or deleted text messages from it. But completion of the object 6 of the conspiracy was not required for the jury to have found Defendant guilty of 7 conspiracy. See State v. Armijo, 1931-NMSC-008, ¶ 7, 35 N.M. 533, 2 P.2d 1075 8 (“It is quite possible for [the defendants] to have conspired to commit [larceny], 9 without having committed, the larceny.”). To the extent Defendant argues his lack 10 of tampering with the phone shows a lack of intent to do so, the jury was free to 11 reject that theory. They could have instead relied on his use of a new phone and his 12 installation of “Text Free: Call & Texting App,” an encrypted texting app designed 13 to hide his identity as evidence that he intended to follow-through on his agreement 14 with Mama, but that he was arrested before he could delete messages from his old 15 phone. Substantial evidence supports Defendant’s conviction of Count 5, conspiracy 16 to commit tampering with evidence. 17 C. Count 6: Attempt to Commit Bribery 18 {40} Finally, Defendant claims that the evidenc