State v. Andreas M. Erazo
CourtSupreme Court of New Jersey
Date FiledJune 21, 2023
DocketA-16-22
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
SYLLABUS
This syllabus is not part of the Court’s opinion. It has been prepared by the Office
of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor
approved by the Court and may not summarize all portions of the opinion.
State v. Andreas M. Erazo (A-16-22) (086991)
Argued March 13, 2023 -- Decided June 21, 2023
SOLOMON, J., writing for a unanimous Court.
In this appeal, the Court considers whether the Appellate Division properly
reversed defendant Andreas Erazo’s conviction following his plea of guilty to the
rape and murder of A.S. The Appellate Division found that defendant’s confession,
obtained during a second interview, five hours after his initial 90-minute interview,
was not knowing, intelligent and voluntary, and should have been suppressed.
One night in July 2017, eleven-year-old A.S. disappeared. Her mother called
the Keansburg Police Department to report her missing. Responding officers
knocked at defendant’s door, near where A.S.’s brother had seen her earlier.
Defendant denied having seen A.S. that evening and allowed the officers to enter his
apartment to look for her, but they found nothing suspicious. Police returned early
the next morning to conduct a second search but again found nothing. About five
and a half hours later, police discovered A.S.’s body on the roof of a shed behind the
apartment building, below a window of defendant’s apartment.
Police asked defendant to ride with them to the Keansburg Police station to
provide a witness statement. At the time, because of damage from Hurricane Sandy,
the Keansburg Police were temporarily housed in a two-story, converted church. At
the station, defendant sat unrestrained along with others -- including the victim’s
family -- in a makeshift lobby separated from the rest of the station by a barrier. To
go beyond the barrier, civilians needed to be escorted by an officer or employee.
Two detectives met defendant in the lobby and explained that they wanted to
talk to him but needed to find a place to do so. About twenty minutes later, the
detectives escorted defendant to the only available interview room, which was
located on the second floor and was not equipped with audio or video recording
equipment. Defendant stated that he knew there was a missing persons investigation
and agreed to provide any information he had that could help. The detectives
testified that they believed they were taking a witness statement and thus did not
administer Miranda warnings or record the interview.
1
After a 90-minute interview during which defendant explained what he knew
of and when he had last seen A.S., as well as his activities that day, the detectives
asked if defendant needed food, water, or a bathroom break. He asked only to
smoke a cigarette. The detectives left defendant alone, unrestrained, in the interview
room without locking the door. After leaving the interview room, the detectives
were told that a neighbor saw someone matching A.S.’s description enter apartment
16A with someone matching defendant’s description on the day A.S. disappeared.
The detectives now considered defendant to be a suspect and sought to move
him to the first-floor interview room, which had audio and video recording
capabilities, to question him about the neighbor’s statements. Defendant was given
food and water, and another two cigarette breaks outside. At no time between the
interview on the second floor and the recorded interview on the first floor did
officers restrain defendant or discuss the investigation.
The detectives conferred with other investigators and collected information
while defendant waited unrestrained in the unlocked first-floor interview room.
About five hours after defendant’s interview on the second floor ended, the
detectives started to interrogate defendant about the investigation.
Detective Wayne Raynor stated that they would continue on with their
conversation “[b]ut before we do that, because we’re in the police department, okay,
you’re not under arrest, but because we’re in a police department . . . . Because we
want to talk to you about this[,] I’m going to advise you of your Miranda rights.”
Raynor then read the Miranda warnings, after which defendant verbally
acknowledged his understanding. Defendant reviewed his answers to the Miranda
warnings and initialed next to each statement on the Miranda form. Raynor read the
waiver clause: “‘Having these rights in mind I wish to waive or give up these rights
and make a knowing and voluntary statement and answer questions.’ That means
you’re okay with talking to us.” Defendant replied, “Yes.” Defendant and the
detectives then signed and dated the form.
After some questioning, the detectives pointed out several inconsistencies
between defendant’s unrecorded statement and his current Mirandized, recorded
statement. As the interview proceeded, defendant continued to offer theories to
explain the evidence against him. Ultimately, after further questioning and a
cigarette break in the interview room, defendant stated that he would rather talk to
the detectives off-camera, explaining that he would prefer that his mother and
girlfriend not see or hear the interview. Defendant then confessed. When the
detectives asked defendant for a DNA sample, he responded that he would like to
talk to his lawyer. The detectives stopped all questioning at that point and arrested
defendant, who was later indicted on seven counts.
2
Defendant moved to suppress the statements he made to the detectives in the
first and second interviews. After hearing Raynor’s testimony and watching the
recording of the second interview, the trial court denied defendant’s motion. The
trial court found that defendant was not in custody at the time of the first interview
and that Miranda warnings were therefore not required. Notwithstanding its
conclusion that the first interview was noncustodial, the trial court analyzed whether
the second, Mirandized interview should be suppressed under State v. O’Neill, 193
N.J. 148 (2007), which applies only in the context of a two-step interrogation in which
officers (1) violate Miranda, warranting suppression, and (2) then seek to redeem
themselves by offering the warnings later. The trial court also found, based on
Raynor’s credible testimony and the video of the second interview, that the State
proved beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant’s Miranda waiver was knowing,
intelligent, and voluntary, and that his confession should be admitted at trial.
Defendant pled guilty to murder and aggravated sexual assault of a victim
under the age of thirteen. He then appealed, arguing that his motion to suppress
should have been granted. The Appellate Division reversed the trial court’s
decision, finding that defendant’s statements from both interviews should have been
suppressed. The Court granted certification . 252 N.J. 154 (2022).
HELD: Defendant voluntarily went to the police station to give a witness statement.
At the police station, defendant was interviewed twice. During his first interview,
defendant was not in custody and thus not yet owed Miranda warnings. The factors
set forth in O’Neill therefore do not need to be considered to assess the admissibility
of the second interview. And before police interviewed defendant the second time,
they properly administered Miranda warnings. With his rights in mind, defendant
executed a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver. During his second interview,
defendant confessed. Neither the Fifth Amendment nor state common law calls for
suppression of defendant’s statements.
1. The Court first considers whether Miranda warnings were necessary prior to the
first interview with defendant, which hinges on whether the trial court correctly
found that defendant was not in custody at the time of the first interview. “Custody”
for the purposes of Miranda requires a formal arrest or restraint on freedom of
movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest. (pp. 24-26)
2. In concluding that defendant was not in custody when he was first interviewed by
the detectives, the trial court relied on several facts it found after listening to the
testimony of Detective Raynor, which the court found to be credible. The Court
reviews those findings -- based upon the trial court’s first-hand observations and
evaluation of Detective Raynor’s testimony -- and notes that they are entitled to
appellate deference. The Court finds no reason to second-guess those findings
because they are not “clearly mistaken.” There is no reason to believe that
3
defendant’s trip to the station was anything but voluntary and, at the station,
defendant’s freedom of action was in no way restrained to a degree associated with
formal arrest. Finally, nothing about the interview suggests that it was custodial.
The interview consisted of defendant providing general biographical information and
insisting that he knew nothing about A.S.’s disappearance. It was only after the
interview, when they learned of the neighbor’s statement that he saw A.S. enter
defendant’s apartment, that the detectives considered defendant a suspect. There is
no basis to upset the trial court’s conclusion that the interview was noncustodial.
And because defendant was not in custody, he was not owed Miranda warnings and
there is no basis to suppress his statements from the first interview. (pp. 26-28)
3. The Court turns to whether defendant’s Miranda waiver at the beginning of his
second interview was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary under the totality of the
circumstances. The State bears the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt
that a defendant’s waiver of his Miranda rights was valid. The Court reviews factors
considered in evaluating the totality of the circumstances. (pp. 28-29)
4. Here, between the first and second interviews, defendant was allowed cigarette
breaks and to use the restroom. The trial court observed that during that time,
although defendant appeared “bored” and “listless,” he did not seem “agitated or
distressed in any way.” At the start of the second interview the detectives read
defendant his Miranda rights. The trial court, after having watched the video of the
interrogation, found that defendant received and understood his Miranda rights, and
the Court agrees. Throughout the second interview, the detectives pressed defendant
about inconsistencies with his first statement, but because there was no initial
Miranda violation, the second interview was not “tainted” by reference to the first.
The Court rejects the argument that police minimized the significance of the
Miranda warnings and the consequences of waiving them. Although Detective
Raynor was persistent, persuasive, and frequently appealed to defendant’s
conscience, he did not undermine Miranda in a way that case law forbids.
Moreover, the circumstances suggest that defendant understood the consequences of
giving a statement -- he acknowledged that he was on camera and that other officers
could be watching, and he was concerned only with his mother and girlfriend seeing
the interview. Under the totality of the circumstances, defendant’s Miranda waiver
was valid, and the trial court properly denied his motion to suppress. (pp. 30-35)
REVERSED and REMANDED to the Appellate Division.
CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES PATTERSON, PIERRE-LOUIS,
WAINER APTER, and FASCIALE join in JUSTICE SOLOMON’s opinion.
JUDGE SABATINO (temporarily assigned) did not participate.
4
SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
A-16 September Term 2022
086991
State of New Jersey,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
Andreas M. Erazo,
Defendant-Respondent.
On certification to the Superior Court,
Appellate Division .
Argued Decided
March 13, 2023 June 21, 2023
Melinda A. Harrigan, Special Deputy Attorney
General/Acting Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for
appellant (Raymond S. Santiago, Monmouth County
Prosecutor, attorney; Melinda A. Harrigan, of counsel
and on the briefs).
Morgan A. Birck, Assistant Deputy Public Defender,
argued the cause for respondent (Joseph E. Krakora,
Public Defender, attorney; Morgan A. Birck, of counsel
and on the briefs).
Alan Silber argued the cause for amicus curiae
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers of New Jersey
(Pashman Stein Walder Hayden, attorneys; Alan Silber,
of counsel and on the brief, and Katherine Beilin, on the
brief).
1
Lauren Gottesman (The Innocence Project) of the New
York bar, admitted pro hac vice, argued the cause for
amicus curiae The Innocence Project (Dechert, attorneys;
Lauren Gottesman, of counsel and on the brief, J. Ian
Downes, Rose Marie Wong, of the Pennsylvania bar,
admitted pro hac vice, Christopher J. Merken, of the
Pennsylvania, New York, and District of Columbia bars,
admitted pro hac vice, and Lindsay N. Zanello, of the
New York bar, admitted pro hac vice, on the brief).
JUSTICE SOLOMON delivered the opinion of the Court.
In this appeal, the Court considers whether the Appellate Division
properly reversed defendant Andreas Erazo’s conviction following his plea of
guilty to the rape and murder of eleven-year-old A.S. The Appellate Division
found that defendant’s confession, obtained during a second interview, five
hours after his initial ninety-minute interview, was not knowing, intelligent
and voluntary, such that it should have been suppressed.
We now reverse. Defendant was not in custody at the time of the pre-
confession interview, and thus Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), is not
implicated, nor must we consider the factors set forth by this Court in State v.
O’Neill, 193 N.J. 148 (2007), to assess the admissibility of defendant’s
subsequent, Mirandized confession. We also find that the detectives’ tactics
during the Mirandized interrogation were not coercive, did not minimize the
Miranda warnings, and were consistent with our holding in State v. Sims, 250
2
N.J. 189 (2022). Thus, under the totality of the circumstances, defendant’s
Miranda waiver was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, and the trial court
properly denied his motion to suppress.
I.
A.
The facts derived from the trial court record of defendant’s motion to
suppress reveal that one night in July 2017, eleven-year-old A.S. disappeared.
Earlier that day, A.S.’s older brother saw her playing on the second floor of
their complex near apartment 16A. When he later knocked on that door while
looking for her, he received no response.
That evening, A.S.’s mother called the Keansburg Police Department to
report her daughter missing. Responding officers knocked at 16A. Defendant
answered, identified himself, and denied having seen A.S. that evening.
Defendant allowed the officers to enter his apartment to look for A.S., but they
found nothing suspicious. Police returned to defendant’s apartment early the
next morning to conduct a second search but again found nothing.
About five and a half hours later, police discovered A.S.’s partially
naked body on the roof of a shed behind the apartment building, below a
window of defendant’s apartment. The child’s body was wrapped in a
zippered futon cover that appeared to be stained with blood.
3
Police asked defendant to ride with them to the Keansburg Police station
to provide a witness statement. At the time, because of damage from
Hurricane Sandy, the Keansburg Police were temporarily housed in a two-
story, converted church about three tenths of a mile from defendant’s home.
When defendant arrived at the station, he sat unrestrained along with others --
including the victim’s family -- in a makeshift lobby separated from the rest of
the station by a barrier. To go beyond the barrier, civilians needed to be
escorted by an officer or employee.
Detective Wayne Raynor of the Monmouth County Prosecutor’s Office
Major Crimes Unit and Detective Joseph Jankowski of the Keansburg Police
Department (the detectives) met defendant in the lobby and explained that they
wanted to talk to him but needed to find a place to do so. About twenty
minutes later, the detectives escorted defendant to the only available interview
room, which was located on the second floor. That room had windows and
could seat five people; it was not equipped with audio or video recording
equipment. Defendant stated that he knew there was a missing persons
investigation and agreed to provide any information he had that could help.
The detectives testified that they believed they were taking a witness statement
and thus did not administer Miranda warnings or record the interview.
4
Detectives spoke with defendant for about ninety minutes, during which
defendant provided biographical information and said that he was familiar with
A.S. and her family, although he stated that he did not know her first name
until other officers told him. Defendant went on to say that he had only one
interaction with A.S. in the past, when she playfully removed his winter hat
while he was talking to a mutual friend of A.S.’s brother. Defendant told the
detectives that he saw A.S. sitting in front of the apartment building on the day
she disappeared. He said that he remembered what she was wearing but stated
that he did not interact with her or see her again that day. He also provided a
timeline of his whereabouts and activities for that day.
After finishing the interview, the detectives asked if defendant needed
food, water, or a bathroom break, but he asked only to smoke a cigarette. The
detectives said they would escort defendant outside for a cigarette break but
asked him to wait while they looked for a secretary to type out a formal
witness statement. The detectives left defendant alone, unrestrained, in the
interview room without locking the door. After leaving the interview room,
the detectives were told that Vernon Linen, who lived in an apartment across
the street from defendant, saw someone matching A.S.’s description enter
apartment 16A with someone matching defendant’s description on the day
A.S. disappeared. Detectives showed Linen a photo of A.S., and he positively
5
identified her. Detectives showed Linen a photo of defendant the following
day, but he was unable to make a positive identification of defendant.
The detectives now considered defendant to be a suspect and sought to
move him to the first-floor interview room, which had audio and video
recording capabilities, to question him about Linen’s statements. Before
moving to the other interview room, the detectives accompanied defendant
outside for a cigarette break and provided him with a bagel and some water.
Defendant asked for another cigarette and a bathroom break after waiting in
the first-floor interview room for about forty minutes, and the detectives
obliged. At no time between the interview on the second floor and the
recorded interview on the first floor did officers restrain defendant or discuss
the investigation.
The detectives conferred with other investigators and collected
information while defendant waited unrestrained in the unlocked first-floor
interview room. During that time, the detectives spoke with “Sammy,” who
resided with defendant and identified the futon cover that A.S. was found
wrapped in as coming from defendant’s room. After eating pizza and drinking
water provided to him, defendant cleaned up the table, threw away the trash,
and fell asleep for a short time. About five hours after defendant’s interview
6
on the second floor ended, the detectives started to interrogate defendant about
the investigation.
Before reading defendant the Miranda warnings, Detective Raynor
stated:
Listen, we spent a considerable amount of time
together, and, you know, you’ve been very forward
with me. You’ve been very easy to talk to. You and I
have spoken to each other today, and it’s been a very
easy conversation, all right, and I expect that that’s
where we’re going to continue on with this, obviously.
But before we do that, because we’re in the police
department, okay, you’re not under arrest, but because
we’re in a police department, this is a matter obviously
we talked about earlier. This is, you know, something
that we want to talk to people about. Because we want
to talk to you about this[,] I’m going to advise you of
your Miranda rights.
Raynor then read the Miranda warnings, after which defendant verbally
acknowledged his understanding. Raynor then explained that a decision to
waive his rights was not final and could be withdrawn at any time, either
before or during questioning, and confirmed that defendant could read and
understand English. Defendant reviewed his answers to the Miranda warnings
and initialed next to each statement on the Miranda form. Raynor read the
waiver clause: “‘Having these rights in mind I wish to waive or give up these
rights and make a knowing and voluntary statement and answer questions.’
7
That means you’re okay with talking to us.” Defendant replied, “Yes.”
Defendant and the detectives then signed and dated the form.
Raynor started the interview by explaining that he would like to “go over
pretty much everything that [they] talked about earlier today,” to which
defendant responded, “No problem.” Raynor asked defendant about his
upbringing and other background information, and defendant offered personal
details about struggles at home, his use of drugs and alcohol, and mental health
issues.1 Defendant also told the detectives that his friend Sammy had moved
into apartment 16A with defendant and his mother.
The detectives ultimately returned to defendant’s activities on the day
A.S. went missing. As he did earlier, defendant recounted a timeline of what
he did that day. The detectives pointed out several inconsistencies between
defendant’s unrecorded statement and his current Mirandized, recorded
statement, explaining:
Raynor: [T]his -- this sounds completely different than
when we spoke earlier, and that’s why -- I don’t mean
to sound like a broken record, going round and round.
I can see that you’re -- you’re changing your -- whether
you’re over thinking, or --
Defendant: It’s just the fact that I’m getting -- like, I’ve
been here for hours. I’m just getting more tired.
1
Other than defendant’s remarks, there is no evidence of record regarding
defendant’s purported mental health issues.
8
Raynor: Yeah. But, listen -- but -- and I understand
that. And that’s why -- that’s why it’s important to talk
to me.
Defendant: I know.
The detectives finally asked defendant if he understood why they were
all sitting there, to which defendant responded, “The most that I know is that
she is missing.” Detective Raynor then informed defendant that he had spoken
extensively to Sammy earlier while defendant was eating, and continued:
You have to -- you have to recognize and understand
that this isn’t an arena that -- this isn’t an arena that you
want to bulls**t around. Okay? Like I said, my job is
to sit here and to help you through this. Okay? I know
mistakes happen. I know things happen. I know that
you’re not a monster.
I know that you have had whatever you have had to deal
with, but I know that s**t happens. Joe and I have done
this job long enough to know that just because of the
person sitting here and the things that we have is not a
direct reflection. All right? But I have to -- I have to
get into a dialogue with you about this because, Dre,
it’s -- we’ve got stuff. We’ve got -- we’re talking with
Sammy. We actually have somebody who saw. Okay?
Somebody who saw her at your house. All right? And
I can understand that, and I can understand. And what
this is is you go into a self-preservation mode. All
right? Your default is to do exactly that. And I get that.
And it’s nothing personal. And I’ve seen it a thousand
times.
But moving forward into that, Dre, is not -- not
something that we can sit here and be stuck on.
9
Detective Raynor clarified that A.S. had been found wrapped in
something that was identified as being from defendant’s apartment. Raynor
also explained that A.S. could be seen around dusk on a surveillance video
near the apartment complex, but that defendant was not on the video despite
his earlier claim that he was walking back to his apartment around that time.
The detectives interpreted that to mean that defendant was at the apartment at
the same time as A.S.
As defendant continued to deny letting A.S. into his apartment or having
anything to do with the matter, Raynor said the following:
Everything is coming back to your apartment, and I
want to talk to you about that. I’ll be happy to -- I’ll be
happy to tell you what is in and out of your apartment,
but I’ve got to -- I’ve got to have you come on board
with me . . . . I want you to understand the gravity that
you’re not being judged. You’re not being looked at.
Things happen.
....
The hardest part right now is for you to understand and
to -- to deal with the fact, be able to open your mouth
and start talking to me about something that you know
is heinous, you know is not good, but you also know
that it’s a mistake.
Defendant continued to offer other theories to explain the evidence against
him, causing Raynor to say:
Don’t let a moment of weakness define you as a person.
I know you feel you have a lot on your plate right now.
10
I know you feel like you have a lot to lose. That’s
understandable. You’re 18 years old. You have your
entire life ahead of you.
....
Don’t let it define you. Don’t let it -- don’t let us --
don’t let this define you. Let’s -- tell me about it, Dre.
Tell me about -- tell me about when it went bad. When
did it come off the rail?
In response, defendant asked to smoke a cigarette, which the detectives
permitted inside the interview room. As defendant smoked, he and the
detectives had the following exchange:
Raynor: I’m glad that you see that the way Joe and I
-- the way we see people, Dre, we see bad things happen
to good people. You didn’t -- you didn’t plan this, did
you?
Defendant: Can I ask you something real quick?
Raynor: Sure.
Defendant: Um -- you said that’s off, right? Where
we’re not on camera?
Raynor: What’s off?
Defendant: The camera.
Raynor: The camera? It’s being recorded.
Defendant: Yeah. I thought so.
Raynor: It’s all right.
11
Defendant: Because I’d rather talk to you two just men
to men.
Raynor: Man to man?
Defendant: Yes. No video, no nothing. And then -- I
know obviously I need to say it out loud, but I’d rather
talk to you two men to men.
Raynor: I understand that. Here’s -- here’s -- I’m going
to ask you to listen to me. This is why -- this is why
the dialogue is important. I -- the only thing that that
recording does is show you. Okay?
Defendant: So, it’s not (indiscernible)?
Raynor: No. I mean, it’s -- no, I don’t mean that
literally.
Defendant: Oh.
....
Raynor: Figuratively what that camera does is show
that Joe and I aren’t -- it shows you. It shows you as a
human. It shows you as a person.
Jankowski: And you want that. You want -- you want
us to -- you want people -- you want us to see that.
Raynor: That’s my point. It shows you --
Jankowski: You need to see that.
Defendant: Basically -- all right. Why isn’t anyone
watching it, besides like a police officer? Like, is, like,
my mom watching --
Raynor: No.
12
Jankowski: No.
Raynor: No, no, no, no.
Defendant: Okay.
Raynor: Absolutely not. Nobody knows this is
happening right now.
Defendant: So, I mean, if it’s another police officer,
whatever, I’d just rather, one, my mother and my
girlfriend, obviously, don’t see it, hear it, whatever.
Raynor: Uh-huh.
Defendant then explained that the murder was not planned, and that he
was in his apartment with most of the lights off when A.S. unexpectedly
entered through the unlocked front door. He said that he was using a knife in
the kitchen when he heard a bang, but because it was dark, he did not know
that it was A.S. Fearing that an intruder was in the apartment, defendant
stated, he made a motion with his knife, accidentally stabbing A.S. in the
throat. Defendant said that when he turned the lights on, he saw A.S. on the
floor, struggling like a “fish out of water” until she stopped moving.
Defendant claimed that he “kind of blacked out” at that point, but
remembered trying to stop A.S.’s bleeding with towels, cleaning up the blood,
and retrieving Sammy’s green mattress cover to wrap around A.S. Defendant
claimed he felt remorse but panicked and bound A.S.’s hands and feet with
computer wire before placing her outside Sammy’s window, intending to move
13
her later. Detective Raynor confirmed that defendant’s account of how he
wrapped A.S.’s body was consistent with what the police found.
Raynor then confronted defendant with the fact that A.S.’s pants and
underwear were missing. Defendant maintained that he blacked out and did
not remember everything that happened. Raynor reminded defendant that a
witness had seen A.S. and defendant entering the apartment together. He also
told defendant that a lab report confirmed that A.S. had been sexually
assaulted, to which defendant responded, “From this point on there’s no way
for me to lie.”
Defendant again stated that he blacked out after stabbing A.S., and that
he was “freaked out” and could not remember much except seeing A.S. in the
green mattress cover. Raynor then asked if defendant had sex with A.S. after
she died. Defendant replied, “No. Not after. So, if I did, which, I mean, by
the way it looks [it’s] apparent that I did -- after? No.” The detectives told
defendant that they did not believe his account of blacking out, to which he
responded, “The only thing that I know would make me capable of [the sexual
assault] is because I’ve been off my meds for months.” Defendant maintained
that his memory was spotty, so the detectives offered him more water and let
him smoke another cigarette.
14
The detectives asked defendant for a DNA sample and defendant
responded that he would like to talk to his lawyer. The detectives stopped all
questioning at that point and arrested defendant for the murder and sexual
assault of A.S.
B.
A Monmouth County Grand Jury returned a seven-count indictment,
charging defendant with first-degree murder, first-degree felony murder, three
counts of first-degree aggravated sexual assault, fourth-degree unlawful
possession of a weapon, and fourth-degree possession of a weapon for an
unlawful purpose.
After his indictment, defendant moved to suppress the statements he
made to the detectives in the first and second interviews. After hearing
Raynor’s testimony and watching the recording of the second interview, the
trial court denied defendant’s motion.
First, the trial court found that the statements made during the first
interview were not subject to suppression because defendant was not in
custody at the time and thus Miranda warnings were not required. In reaching
that determination, the judge found that defendant expressed the desire to
provide information that would help in the missing persons investigation; he
voluntarily agreed to be transported to the police station and there was no
15
evidence that he was restrained while en route; there was no evidence that any
discussion took place between defendant and the transporting officer; upon
arrival at the police station, defendant, without prompting, took a seat in the
secured common area where about five other witnesses, including members of
A.S.’s family, were also seated, waiting to be interviewed; while still
unrestrained, the detectives escorted defendant to the second-floor interview
room that had no video or audio recording equipment; the conversation lasted
only about an hour and a half; and the detectives never secured or locked the
interview room door, frequently asked defendant if he needed a break, food, or
water, and never told him he could not leave. The trial judge also found
credible Raynor’s testimony that the detectives conducted the questioning for
investigative purposes only, as evidenced by the facts that the detectives did
not ask about A.S.’s death and defendant did not implicate himself.
Notwithstanding its conclusion that the first interview was noncustodial,
the trial court analyzed whether the second, Mirandized interview should be
suppressed under O’Neill, which applies only in the context of a two-step
interrogation in which officers (1) violate Miranda, warranting suppression,
and (2) then seek to redeem themselves by offering the warnings later.
The trial court also found, based on Raynor’s credible testimony and the
video of the second interview, that the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt
16
that defendant’s Miranda waiver was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, and
that his confession should be admitted at trial. In reaching that conclusion, the
court examined the totality of the circumstances, and considered that defendant
was 18 years of age but had not graduated high school; defendant had been at
the station for six hours when he received the warnings; detectives frequently
offered defendant breaks and food; Raynor spoke in a “quiet, conversational,
almost paternalistic tone”; and the detectives were not physically overbearing
toward defendant, as evidenced by his behavior throughout the interview, such
as wiping crumbs off the table “as casually as if he were in his own home.”
Defendant pled guilty to first-degree murder and first-degree aggravated
sexual assault of a victim under the age of thirteen. Defendant was sentenced
in accordance with the plea agreement to a term of life imprisonment subject
to the No Early Release Act (NERA), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2, for murder and to a
concurrent prison term of fifty years, also subject to NERA, for aggravated
sexual assault. The State dismissed the remaining charges.
C.
Defendant appealed, arguing that his motion to suppress should have
been granted by the trial court. The Appellate Division reversed the trial
court’s decision, finding that defendant’s statements from both interviews
should have been suppressed. The Appellate Division found that the trial
17
court’s judgment was not supported by the evidence and that the delayed
Miranda warnings were ineffective because of minimization tactics used by
interrogating police officers.
The Appellate Division described the events leading to defendant’s first
interview as follows:
[A]n eighteen-year-old boy was taken in the backseat
of a marked police vehicle to a stationhouse, with no
apparent means of returning home or even being told he
could leave to go home or elsewhere, and was placed in
an area where he was not allowed to move about freely,
including getting up and leaving if he chose to do so
because anyone seeking to move about had to be
escorted.
Concluding that the first interview was custodial, the court stated that
defendant was taken from the common space “further into the recesses of the
stationhouse, on the second floor,” and could not take breaks without an
escort. The Appellate Division concluded that “no reasonable person would
have thought at any time they were free to leave. Rather, it was clear that
[defendant’s] liberty was restrained.”
As to the second interview, the court held that the detectives minimized
the significance of the Miranda warnings by telling defendant that they were
providing the warnings only because they were in a police station. The court
found that the detectives’ comments were especially problematic given
defendant’s age, education, minimal experience with the criminal justice
18
system, purported mental health issues, and the many hours he spent at the
station. The Appellate Division also determined that the detectives had
impermissibly implied that defendant’s statement was being videotaped for his
benefit and suggested that defendant was not being judged and that it was their
job to help him through this situation.
In finding that the Miranda warnings were minimized, the Appellate
Division relied heavily on the fact that the detectives did not disclose the
seriousness of the offense about which defendant was being questioned.
Because “the detectives’ knowledge established probable cause,” the court
reasoned, there was a “need to inform defendant of his true status.” According
to the court, the detectives knew defendant was the prime suspect at least
before the second interview, if not before the first. The Appellate Division
found that failing to tell defendant about A.S.’s death was “designed or
reasonably likely to convey to defendant that he was facing a significantly less
serious [situation] than he actually faced.” (alteration in original).
Additionally, citing O’Neill, the Appellate Division found that
inconsistencies between defendant’s first and second interviews were used to
obtain his confession, requiring suppression of defendant’s statements from the
second interview. The court thus concluded that the State failed to prove
beyond a reasonable doub