Full Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3. SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-3449-23 STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. QUADIR R. WEBB, Defendant-Appellant. _______________________ Argued October 14, 2026 – Decided November 12, 2026 Before Judges Rose and Natali. On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Atlantic County, Indictment No. 22-11-1735. Nadine Kronis, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant (Jennifer N. Sellitti, Public Defender, attorney; Nadine Kronis, of counsel and on the briefs). Ashlea D. Newman, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent (Jennifer Davenport, Attorney General, attorney; Ashlea D. Newman, of counsel and on the briefs). PER CURIAM Following a bifurcated trial, a jury convicted defendant of second-degree unlawful possession of a handgun, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b)(1); fourth-degree unlawful possession of hollow nose bullets, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-3(f)(1); and fourth- degree unlawful possession of a large capacity ammunition magazine, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-3(j), charged in a four-count superseding Atlantic County indictment. The trial court thereafter convicted defendant of second-degree certain persons not to have weapons, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7(b)(1), the remaining count charged in the same indictment. Defendant was sentenced to an aggregate prison term of ten years with a five-year parole disqualifier on the certain persons conviction. See N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(c). Prior to the jury trial on the weapons and related charges, the State moved in limine to admit defendant's statements to members of the Atlantic City Police Department (ACPD), and Ali Zubair, the front desk employee of an Atlantic City hotel where defendant and Mariah Taylor1 briefly stayed in a suite comprised of rooms 1218 and 1219. Police were called to the hotel after staff reported a handgun was found in room 1218. After seizing the loaded handgun, police returned to the lobby and confronted defendant. Defendant's statements 1 Taylor was charged in the same three counts of the superseding indictment. The same jury acquitted Taylor of all charges; she is not a party to this appeal. A-3449-23 2 to police and Zubair in the lobby of the hotel were captured on Officer William Akins's body worn camera (BWC), a portion of which was played at the hearing. The court granted the State's unopposed motion. Prior to the bench trial on the certain persons count, the court did not advise defendant of his right to trial by jury. Nor did defendant execute a written waiver of rights. For the first time in his merits brief on appeal, defendant raises the following points for our consideration: POINT I [DEFENDANT]'S CONVICTIONS MUST BE REVERSED BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY ADMITTED HIS INCRIMINATING STATEMENTS CAPTURED ON AKINS'S [BWC] IN VIOLATION OF MIRANDA.[2] [(Not raised below)] [A].[3] [Defendant] Was Subject To Custodial Interrogation When Akins Began The Encounter By Asking To Talk And To Handcuff Him, Prior To Confronting [Defendant] With Evidence Disclosing That He Was The Primary Suspect. 2 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 3 Because defendant does not assert a legal argument in his first subpoint, see R. 2:6-2(a)(1), (6), we redesignate his subpoints. A-3449-23 3 [B]. The Erroneous Admission Of [Defendant]'s Unmirandized And Incriminating Statements Was Extremely Harmful. POINT II [DEFENDANT]'S CERTAIN PERSONS CONVICTION MUST BE REVERSED BECAUSE THERE IS NO RECORD OF THE REQUIRED COLLOQUY ENSURING THAT HE KNOWINGLY AND VOLUNTARILY WAIVED HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL ON THAT CHARGE. (Not raised below) POINT III RESENTENCING IS REQUIRED BECAUSE SENTENCING [DEFENDANT] TO AN EXTENDED TERM AS A PERSISTENT OFFENDER VIOLATED HIS SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS. (Not raised below) In his supplemental brief, defendant raises the following additional point: POINT IV[] [DEFENDANT]'S LARGE CAPACITY MAGAZINE CONVICTION MUST BE VACATED BECAUSE THE STATUTE VIOLATES THE SECOND AMENDMENT. (Not raised below) Based on our review of the record, we reject the contentions raised in point I. We therefore affirm defendant's convictions for unlawful possession of a weapon, hollow point bullets, and a large capacity ammunition magazine. For A-3449-23 4 the reasons that follow, however, we are persuaded by the argument set forth in point II. Accordingly, we vacate defendant's certain persons conviction and remand for a new trial. In view of our disposition, we do not reach the assertions raised in points III and IV. I. A. We summarize the pertinent facts underlying the trial court's decision on the State's motion to admit defendant's statements. We glean from the record provided on appeal, prior to the in limine hearing, the State briefed the issue and provided to the court a transcript of Akins's BWC footage. During the hearing, the State played a portion of the BWC recording without objection from defense counsel.4 In the early morning hours of March 6, 2022, defendant and Taylor checked into room 1219, registered under Taylor's name. They checked out less than twelve hours later at 12:59 p.m. Later that evening, defendant contacted the front desk and advised he left behind a diamond ring in room 1219. The 4 On appeal, defendant provided the State's transcript of the BWC footage, the BWC recording, and footage from the hotel's security cameras. The trial transcripts include the portion of the BWC footage played at the hearing and the footage played during trial. The parties' trial court submissions were not provided on appeal. See R. 2:6-1(a)(2). A-3449-23 5 hotel's housekeeping supervisor checked the suite and discovered a handgun in a drawer of the nightstand in room 1218. Hotel security was alerted and police were contacted. Upon their arrival, ACPD officers were escorted by hotel staff to rooms 1218 and 1219. Police retrieved the loaded handgun from the nightstand in room 1218. Zubair then informed police defendant was downstairs seeking to enter the suite, and the officers returned to the lobby. According to the BWC footage played at the hearing, police approached defendant and the following exchange ensued: AKINS: Which room number are you trying to go up to? [DEFENDANT]: I'm not trying to go nowhere. AKINS: You're not trying to go nowhere? Ask the front desk. . . . Can I talk to you real quick? [DEFENDANT]: What happened? AKINS: Come here real quick. All right. Where you trying to go right now? [DEFENDANT]: Nowhere. AKINS: You're not trying to go nowhere? All right. Put your hands up for me real quick. [DEFENDANT]: What? A-3449-23 6 AKINS: All right. So, we had a call from the front desk basically saying you're trying to go up to room (indiscernible) recovered a handgun in. [DEFENDANT]: Well, I'm not . . . No. AKINS: All right. Put your hands up over here. In their ensuing exchange, much of which was indiscernible, police told defendant they thought he was trying to run. Defendant repeatedly replied he never had a room at the hotel. The trial court granted the motion, noting the defense did not object to the State's application. The court found defendant's statements to police "were in response to background questioning and did not warrant Miranda warnings." The court also admitted defendant's statements to Zubair under N.J.R.E. 803. Prior to opening statements, the trial court amplified its decision. Again noting the defense did not oppose the State's application, the court adopted the State's proffered statement of facts. Citing the governing legal principles, the court reiterated its conclusion that defendant's statements to police were in response to police questioning and, as such, Miranda warnings were not required. The court admitted defendant's statements to Zubair under N.J.R.E. A-3449-23 7 803(b) (statement "offered against a party opponent") and 803(c)(25) (statement against interest). 5 At trial, the State played additional footage from Akins's BWC. Zubair testified at trial defendant approached the front desk and asked if he could reenter room 1219 to retrieve "some of his stuff." Through Zubair, the State introduced into evidence the hotel's activity log setting forth when defendant and Taylor checked in and out of the hotel. The State also introduced into evidence hotel surveillance footage depicting defendant and Taylor entering and exiting the suite. Akins testified police did not review the video until after the incident when they returned to the station. Before us, defendant contends police subjected him to a custodial interrogation because he was not free to leave when the officers disclosed Zubair said defendant attempted to retrieve his gun from the hotel room. Defendant further argues the court's "erroneous admission of [his] repeated, incriminating 5 Effective July 1, 2024, N.J.R.E. 803(c)(25) was relocated to N.J.R.E. 804(b)(3). A-3449-23 8 denials that he ever had a room at the hotel was extremely harmful and clearly capable of producing an unjust result" under Rule 2:10-2.6 The State counters defendant invited the error he now seeks to correct by failing to challenge the admission of his statements before the trial court. 7 Regardless, the State argues the court's decision finds support in the factual circumstances and governing law. B. As a threshold matter, we reject the State's invited error argument. Under the "invited error" doctrine, errors "that 'were induced, encouraged or acquiesced in or consented to by defense counsel ordinarily are not a basis for reversal on appeal.'" State v. A.R., 213 N.J. 542, 561 (2013) (quoting State v. Corsaro, 107 N.J. 339, 345 (1987)). The rationale underscoring the doctrine 6 On appeal, defendant does not challenge the court's decision admitting his statement to the hotel front desk clerk as a statement offered against a party opponent or statement against interest. An issue not briefed is deemed waived. See Gormley v. Wood-El, 218 N.J. 72, 95 n.8 (2014); see also Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, cmt. 5 on R. 2:6-2 (2027). 7 After the jury rendered its verdict, but before defendant was sentenced, defendant retained new counsel, who moved for a new trial raising several claims of error, including the Miranda issue presented on appeal. Following arguments, the trial court reserved decision and thereafter issued a written opinion. In his appellate appendix, defendant provided the order denying defendant's motion but did not include the judge's accompanying decision. A-3449-23 9 recognizes "to rerun a trial when the mistake could easily have been cured on request, would reward the litigant who suffers an error for tactical advantage either in the trial or on appeal." State v. Krivacska, 341 N.J. Super. 1, 43 (App. Div. 2001). In its amplified decision, the motion court quoted N.J.R.E. 104(c), correctly recognizing its duty "to make a preliminary determination as to the admissibility of a statement by the defendant." We therefore turn to the merits of the court's decision. Because the court did not conduct a plenary hearing on the State's motion to admit defendant's incriminating statement, our review is de novo. See State v. Tiwana, 256 N.J. 33, 40-41 (2023). However, we defer to the trial court's findings based on video-recorded or documentary evidence. State v. S.S., 229 N.J. 360, 374-81 (2017) (clarifying the deferential and limited scope of appellate review of factual findings based on video-recorded evidence); see also State v. Tillery, 238 N.J. 293, 314 (2019); State v. McNeil-Thomas, 238 N.J. 256, 271-72 (2019). The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees all persons the privilege against self-incrimination. U.S. Const. amend. V. This privilege applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. U.S. Const. amend. XIV. See Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965). Further, New A-3449-23 10 Jersey recognizes a common law privilege against self-incrimination, codified in N.J.S.A. 2A:84A-19 and N.J.R.E. 503. See Tiwana, 256 N.J. at 40-41. "The predicate requirements of Miranda are that the defendant must be in custody and the interrogation must be carried out by law enforcement." State v. P.Z., 152 N.J. 86, 102 (1997) (citing Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444). "Miranda safeguards come into play whenever a person in custody is subjected to either express questioning or its functional equivalent." State v. Hubbard, 222 N.J. 249, 267 (2015) (quoting Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300-01 (1980)). "[C]ustody exists if the action of the interrogating officers and the surrounding circumstances, fairly construed, would reasonably lead a detainee to believe he [or she] could not leave freely." State v. Coburn, 221 N.J. Super. 586, 596 (App. Div. 1987). Under this objective test, courts consider the time, location, and duration of the detention, the nature of the questioning, and the conduct of the officers in evaluating the degree of restraint. See, e.g., State v. Smith, 374 N.J. Super. 425, 431 (App. Div. 2005); State v. Pierson, 223 N.J. Super. 62, 67 (App. Div. 1988). Quoting Pierson, the trial court correctly recognized: "Miranda is not implicated when the detention and questioning is part of an investigatory procedure rather than a custodial interrogation." 223 N.J. Super. at 66. An A-3449-23 11 investigatory procedure includes detention and questioning during a field investigation. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968) (holding officers may briefly detain a person to investigate circumstances that provoke reasonable suspicion). Although during a field investigation an individual clearly is detained, Miranda warnings are only required if, under the totality of the circumstances, the detention becomes "the functional equivalent of an arrest." Smith, 374 N.J. Super. at 431 (quoting Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 442 (1984)). "The determinative consideration is whether a reasonable innocent person in such circumstances would conclude that after brief questioning[,] he or she would or would not be free to leave." Pierson, 223 N.J. Super. at 67. An "'interrogation' under Miranda refers . . . to any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect." Hubbard, 222 N.J. at 267 (quoting Innis, 446 U.S. at 301). "In resolving whether police conduct constitutes interrogation or its functional equivalent, we consider whether, under the circumstances, a police officer's questioning or the functional equivalent was 'particularly "evocative"' or 'reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response.'" Tiwana, 256 N.J. at 42 (quoting Innis, 446 U.S. at 303). A-3449-23 12 To support his argument, defendant cites our decision in State v. Wright, where we found an officer engaged in the functional equivalent of an interrogation without administering Miranda warnings by providing a suspect in custody information, three separate times, concerning the status of the investigation, including: the defendant fit the description of the perpetrator; the victim was being brought over to see if he could identify the defendant; and the officers had located the gun used in the robbery for which defendant was being held. 444 N.J. Super. 347, 366 (App. Div. 2016). We determined, under those circumstances, the officer's delivery of the information was not inadvertent, was tantamount to a tightening of the proverbial noose, and supported a finding the "officer should surely have known that his meting out of the information in the way he did was reasonably likely to evoke an incriminating response, and thus that it amounted to an interrogation." Ibid. We also viewed the officer's initial statements to the "defendant about why he was being detained" differently, noting those statements did not constitute an interrogation. Ibid. Defendant also cites our decision in State v. Ward, where we found an officer who told a detained defendant about the robbery for which he was being charged and showed evidence related to the investigation violated the A-3449-23 13 defendant's Miranda rights. 240 N.J. Super. 412, 419 (App. Div. 1990). We concluded the defendant's statements made after the officer's actions should have been suppressed. Ibid. We explained, however, statements that are "voluntarily blurted out by an accused in custody where the police had not subjected him [or her] to an interrogative technique" are not violative of the accused's Miranda rights. Ibid. Unlike the circumstances in Wright and Ward, however, police briefly detained defendant in the hotel lobby as the investigation was unfolding. While the officers were in the suite recovering the handgun, Zubair called and advised defendant was downstairs seeking to return to the suite. The officers then encountered defendant in the lobby and asked "[w]hich room number [he was] trying to go up to?" Zubair then said defendant inquired about returning to room 1219 to retrieve a personal item. On this record, we find no basis to conclude defendant's detention was the functional equivalent of an arrest or law enforcement's brief inquiry was the functional equivalent of an interrogation requiring Miranda warnings. Moreover, we are not persuaded by defendant's contentions that his statement to police denying he stayed at the hotel was "extremely harmful." The State's proofs in this matter were substantial and rested largely on lay witness A-3449-23 14 testimony and documentary evidence. Defendant and Taylor were captured on surveillance video entering and exiting the suite; the hotel logs demonstrated their time of entry and egress from the suite; and Zubair testified defendant called the hotel advising he left behind jewelry. We discern no error, let alone plain error, in the admission of defendant's statements to police. II. A. We turn to the contentions raised in defendant's second point. After the court dismissed the jury following its verdict in the first trial, the court addressed the certain persons count, inquiring of counsel, "it's my understanding that we would be proceeding by bench as opposed to jury." Defense counsel responded, "That's correct, Your Honor." The defense then stipulated defendant "ha[d] a predicate offense under the certain persons statute" and the prosecutor submitted the relevant judgments of conviction (JOC). Referencing the pertinent statute and the certified JOCs, the court found defendant guilty as charged. Defendant now seeks reversal of his certain persons conviction based on the court's failure both to follow our Supreme Court's requirements under State v. Blann, 217 N.J. 517 (2014), and ensure he knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to a jury trial on that count of the indictment. The State counters A-3449-23 15 because the certain persons trial immediately followed the three-day jury trial on the other offenses, "defendant possessed the requisite knowledge to voluntarily waive his right to a trial by jury." Thus, the State argues, any error was not "clearly capable of producing an unjust result" under Rule 2:10-2. B. Well-settled principles guide our review. The right to a jury trial is a fundamental right guaranteed by the New Jersey and United States constitutions. See U.S. Const. amend. VI; N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 9; see also State v. Dunne, 124 N.J. 303, 316 (1991) (explaining a "trial by jury is fundamental to the American system of criminal justice"). To maintain confidence in the criminal justice system, "[t]rial by jury is the normal and, with occasional exceptions, the preferable mode of disposing of issues of fact in criminal cases above the grade of petty offenses." Dunne, 124 N.J. at 310 (quoting Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 312 (1930)). Accordingly, a waiver of the right to trial by jury should not be presumed, State v. Campbell, 414 N.J. Super. 292, 301 (App. Div. 2010), and must be made "voluntarily, knowingly, and competently," Dunne, 124 N.J. at 317. Rule 1:8-1 governs jury trial waivers. Pursuant to the Rule: "Criminal actions required to be tried by a jury shall be so tried unless the defendant, in A-3449-23 16 writing and with the approval of the court, after notice to the prosecuting attorney and an opportunity to be heard, waives a jury trial." R. 1:8-1(a). In Dunne, our Supreme Court explained, when considering a defendant's request to waive a jury trial in a criminal action, judges "should": (1) determine whether a defendant has voluntarily, knowingly, and competently waived the constitutional right to jury trial with advice of counsel; (2) determine whether the waiver is tendered in good faith or as a stratagem to procure an otherwise impermissible advantage; and (3) determine, with an accompanying statement of reasons, whether, considering all relevant factors, . . . it should grant or deny the defendant's request in the circumstances of the case. [124 N.J. at 317.] Factors relevant to the court's determination of a request to waive a jury trial include the: "gravity of the crime"; "anticipated duration and complexity of the State's presentation of the evidence"; "amenability of the issues to jury resolution"; "existence of a highly-charged emotional atmosphere"; "presence of particularly-technical matters that are interwoven with fact" and "anticipated need for numerous rulings on the admissibility or inadmissibility of evidence ." Ibid. In Dunne, the Court further held, "[t]he sources of principled decision- making will remain rooted in a[n accompanying] statement of reasons," which A-3449-23 17 "will give structure to the trial court's discretionary judgment and will soundly guide appellate review." Id. at 317-18 (citing State v. Roth, 95 N.J. 334, 363- 64 (1984)). Two decades later, in State v. Blann, we reversed a defendant's robbery convictions following a bench trial because the defendant did not sign a written waiver as required under Rule 1:8-1(a), and the court failed to question the defendant regarding his request to waive a jury trial and state its reasons for granting the defendant's request. 429 N.J. Super. 220, 223-24 (App. Div. 2013), rev'd, 217 N.J. 517 (2014). Instead, defense counsel informed the court he had "discussed with [the defendant] his right to a jury trial" and the defendant advised counsel "he is willing to waive his right to a jury trial in this matter." Id. at 228. Our dissenting colleague in Blann agreed "the judge's handling of the jury waiver was inadequate," but this inadequacy did not warrant reversal because the "defendant, in open court on two separate occasions, with the advice of counsel, personally and affirmatively" requested waiver of a jury trial. Id. at 235-36 (Lisa, J.A.D., retired and temporarily assigned on recall, dissenting). The dissent agreed both procedural requirements were missing: the defendant did not sign a required waiver and the court simply asked the "defendant to A-3449-23 18 confirm that he wished to waive a jury," "engaged in no other colloquy," and "made no other findings on the record as to whether the waiver was knowing and voluntary." Id. at 237 (Lisa, J.A.D., dissenting). But the dissent was satisfied, "[t]he record ma[de] clear that [the] defendant knew he had the right to a jury trial and that he personally expressed his wish to waive that right." Id. at 238 (Lisa, J.A.D., dissenting). The dissent in Blann explained, on appeal, "the only issue before us [wa]s whether the trial record contain[ed] sufficient evidence to support the conclusion that defendant's waiver was knowing and voluntary under the totality of the circumstances." Id. at 239 (Lisa, J.A.D., dissenting). Other considerations, such as the remaining two Dunne factors, are "primarily designed to provide assurance that the grant of the waiver will not undermine the public's confidence in the criminal justice system." Ibid. (quoting State v. Jackson, 404 N.J. Super. 483, 490 (App. Div. 2009) (holding "a defendant who has persuaded the trial court to grant his motion to waive the right to a jury trial may challenge that decision only if he can show that his waiver was not voluntary and knowing")). Nonetheless, the dissent in Blann recognized "the better practice is for judges in these circumstances to engage in colloquy with defendants to further be assured that, before granting a waiver, a defendant possesses a deeper A-3449-23 19 understanding of the choice he or she has." Id. at 246 (Lisa, J.A.D., dissenting). Our dissenting colleague astutely "recommend[ed] that the Criminal Practice Committee consider the advisability of proposing the promulgation of an official jury waiver request form for statewide use, pursuant to Rule 1:8-1(a)." Id. at 250 (Lisa, J.A.D., dissenting). The dissent then proposed four requirements for inclusion in the revised form 8: The defendant has further been advised that (1) a jury is composed of 12 members of the community, (2) a defendant may participate in the selection of jurors, (3) all 12 jurors must unanimously vote to convict in order for a conviction to be obtained, and (4) if a defendant waives a jury trial, a judge alone will decide his/her guilt or innocence. [Ibid. (Lisa, J.A.D., dissenting).] Accordingly, Judge Lisa concluded "[he] would affirm defendant's conviction, without prejudice to his right to further pursue in a [post-conviction relief] proceeding" his contention that he was improperly denied his right to a trial by jury. Id. at 250-51 (Lisa, J.A.D., dissenting). 8 The dissent also suggested that the Criminal Practice Committee "consider the advisability of incorporating this change in Rule 1:8-1(a) itself or in the official comment to the Rule." Blann, 429 N.J. Super. at 250 (Lisa, J.A.D., dissenting). To date, the Rule has not so been revised. A-3449-23 20 The Court reversed our decision in Blann "substantially for the reasons expressed in Judge Lisa's opinion." 217 N.J. 517, 518 (2014). Exercising its supervisory powers, see N.J. Const. art. VI, § 2, ¶ 3, the Court established two requirements to ensure defendants possess a full understanding of their "choice" when deciding to waive the right to a jury trial. Ibid. (quoting Blann, 429 N.J. Super. at 245 (Lisa, J.A.D., dissenting)). Initially, a defendant must sign a "written waiver form" advising all four items suggested in Judge Lisa's dissent. Ibid. Secondly, trial judges must "engage in a colloquy with defendants that includes those four items, at a minimum, to assess the voluntariness of a waiver request." Ibid. In its decision, the Court "ask[ed] the Director of the Administrative Office of the Courts to help implement the above approach within thirty days. " Ibid. Thereafter, the Judiciary promulgated a revised jury waiver form for statewide use in criminal cases. Admin. Off. of the Cts., Admin. Directive #03- 14, Waiver of Criminal Jury Form, attach. 1 (June 27, 2014). Against these principles we are constrained to vacate defendant's certain persons conviction and remand for a new trial. Although we recognize defendant exercised his right to a jury trial on the other offenses charged in the indictment and the certain persons count was tried immediately thereafter, there A-3449-23 21 is no dispute the trial court failed to follow the Court's dictate in Blann to conduct a colloquy with defendant discussing, "at a minimum," the four requirements set forth in the waiver of rights form. See 217 N.J. at 518. Indeed, Blann requires the trial court to decide whether a defendant understands his or her rights and is making a voluntary, knowing, and competent waiver of those rights. A court cannot make those determinations without conducting the in- court colloquy required by Blann, during which the court can assess the defendant's knowledge of his or her rights and the implications of waiver of those rights. The importance of the court discussing waiver with defendant is highlighted here, given the mandatory-minimum prison term imposed. See N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7(b)(1). We therefore conclude, in the present matter, the court's failure to engage in a verbal exchange with defendant to evaluate whether he understood and waived his right to a jury trial requires reversal of his certain persons conviction. Affirmed in part, vacated and remanded in part. Jurisdiction is not retained. A-3449-23 22