Full Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3. SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-2678-25 STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ALEXANDER P. ALLEYNE, Defendant-Respondent. __________________________ Argued October 14, 2026 – Decided October 28, 2026 Before Judges Gooden Brown and Vanek. On appeal from an interlocutory order of the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Union County, Indictment No. 24-07-0636. Milton S. Leibowitz, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for appellant (William A. Daniel, Union County Prosecutor, attorney; Milton S. Leibowitz, of counsel and on the briefs). Scott M. Welfel, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for respondent (Jennifer M. Sellitti, Public Defender, attorney; John Kean, III, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, and Scott M. Welfel, of counsel and on the briefs). PER CURIAM The State appeals from an interlocutory order granting defendant's motion to suppress physical evidence seized from his vehicle after his arrest. Based on our thorough review of the record and prevailing law, we affirm the March 9, 2026 suppression order. I. We recount the salient facts from the evidentiary hearing on defendant's suppression motion at which State Police Trooper Kevin Fowler testified. On January 7, 2024, at approximately 2:00 a.m., Trooper Fowler arrived at the scene of a disabled white Nissan Altima parked on the right shoulder of Interstate 78 near mile marker 53.8 in Hillside Township. Trooper Fowler observed the vehicle to be parked appropriately with its hazard lights flashing. A tow truck was also parked on the shoulder ahead of defendant's vehicle. As he activated his body-worn camera (BWC), Trooper Fowler approached defendant's vehicle and shone his flashlight into the driver's door window. Defendant was reclined back in the driver's seat sleeping. After banging several times on the driver's side window with his open palm in an attempt to awaken defendant, he remained unresponsive. Trooper Fowler then opened the driver's side door, reached into the vehicle to shut off the engine, and A-2678-25 2 removed the key from the ignition, consequently turning off the loud music that was playing. Trooper Fowler tapped defendant's arm three times, finally waking him up. Trooper Fowler asked defendant if he was okay and defendant sat up and replied, "Yeah, I'm good." Defendant stated he was tired and was waiting for his son. Trooper Fowler asked, "Waiting for your son for what?" to which defendant did not coherently respond. Trooper Fowler attempted to engage further with defendant and asked "Where you coming from?" Defendant told Trooper Fowler, "I can't help you." Trooper Fowler continued asking defendant, "Where you coming from?" and eventually defendant told Trooper Fowler, "Oh, that's why. My tire's flat. Yeah, not this side, over on the other side." Trooper Fowler asked, "Ok, how long you been here?" and defendant stated, "Probably two—maybe one and a half hours." At this point, the tow truck operator confirmed the tire was flat and explained that was the reason for his presence at the scene. Trooper Fowler asked defendant how much he had to drink that night and defendant replied, "Not a lot." Trooper Fowler attempted to inquire "How much is not a lot?" but defendant did not respond and began talking on his cell phone A-2678-25 3 with an unidentified individual. Trooper Fowler asked defendant to terminate the call, and defendant complied. Trooper Fowler explained to defendant, "You're asleep on the side of the road, it's concerning," and then asked again, "How much is not a lot?" Defendant responded, "I wasn't drinking at all. Look—listen, Officer, look, I got a flat tire, I can't move. So, it's I- I can't move or go anywhere." Trooper Fowler again asked defendant, "Where you coming from? Where you headed to?" Defendant did not answer Trooper Fowler's questions and proceeded to make another phone call. A second trooper, Trooper Fritz Frage, 1 then approached the car and discussed the flat tire with defendant. Both troopers then stepped away from the vehicle. Trooper Frage asked Trooper Fowler, "Did he say he had anything?" and Trooper Fowler replied, "He said he had not a lot." In deciding on next steps, Trooper Frage pointed his flashlight at the conditions of the ground and said, "I mean the thing is, the ice, I mean we can't, I mean we don't have anyone HGN cert—do you know how to do HGN?" Trooper Fowler did not answer Trooper Frage's question, but instead 1 Trooper Fritz Frage's name alternatively appears as "Fage" and "Frajay" at various places in the record. A-2678-25 4 commented, "I don't really smell anything." Trooper Frage agreed he did not smell alcohol either. Trooper Fowler decided, "I'll talk to him some more and, man, if you want to talk to him, see if you smell anything?" to which Trooper Frage agreed. The troopers returned to the driver's side door, and Trooper Fowler again asked defendant "Where are you coming from? Where are you going?" Defendant replied, "I'm coming from Plainfield, but I don't understand what that means. My tire's flat. That's why I pulled over." Trooper Fowler discussed the flat tire with defendant, then asked, "You said you were drinking tonight, how much you had to drink?" Defendant stated to the troopers, "I wasn't drinking tonight. That's what I was trying to tell you. I wasn't drinking, for real." Trooper Fowler testified, "After going back and talking to him some more, I leaned in a little closer upon the – the next couple questions I asked him in order to smell and that's where I gathered the se– smell of alcoholic beverage coming from him." Trooper Fowler testified at the evidentiary hearing he then ordered defendant out of the car for field sobriety testing (FST) based on the following: His slurred speech upon initially speaking to him and then as I talked to him further, when I got close to him and while he was speaking to me, the smell of alcoholic A-2678-25 5 beverage . . . . And then, as well as, telling me— I asked him how much he drank and just saying, not a lot. Trooper Fowler administered two field sobriety tests (FST) to defendant— the walk and turn test and the one leg stand test. After defendant failed both tests, Trooper Fowler handcuffed him and placed him under arrest for driving while intoxicated. Defendant complied and was placed in the backseat of a police vehicle. Trooper Fowler and Trooper Frage then conducted a probable cause search of defendant's disabled car, initially searching for intoxicants. Trooper Fowler found a plastic cup in the front center console containing a dark liquid that smelled like hard liquor. During the search, the troopers also located and seized a black and silver Springfield Armory XD-M handgun from the pocket of the rear front passenger seat. The standard issue magazine contained hollow- point ammunition and one round was chambered in the XD-M. On July 3, 2024, a grand jury returned Indictment No. 24-07-00636 charging defendant with second-degree unlawful possession of a weapon (handgun), in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5b(1); fourth-degree possession of prohibited weapons and devices (hollow-nose bullets), in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:39-3f(1); fourth-degree prohibited weapons and devices (possession of a defaced firearm), in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:39-3d; and fourth-degree A-2678-25 6 prohibited weapons and devices (large capacity magazine), in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:39-3j. On October 24, 2025, defendant filed a motion to suppress the physical evidence the troopers seized. After the evidentiary hearing, the court granted defendant's motion in an order accompanied by a written decision. As to the applicability of the community caretaking doctrine, the judge found: Relying on Adubato,2 this court finds the officer was justified in investigating the [stopped] car on the shoulder of Interstate 78. A tow truck operator reported a vehicle with a flat tire. The trooper observed the vehicle on the side of the road at 2:00 [a.m.] Further, the defendant was reclined in his seat. When defendant did not wake from the Trooper[']s knocking on driver's window, he was justified in opening the door to shut [off] the vehicle engine and waking the defendant. The court determined the record did not support the conclusion the troopers had reasonable and articulable suspicion to conduct FST of defendant. The court reviewed the BWC video for the signs of intoxication noted by Trooper Fowler and found although defendant was initially less responsive to questions, as the interaction continued, defendant became "responsive and understandable and [did] not . . . slur his words." The court further found 2 State v. Adubato, 420 N.J. Super. 167, 174 (App. Div. 2011). A-2678-25 7 defendant was not fumbling or slow and was able to hold several conversations on the phone while shifting back to answer the trooper's questions. The court found Trooper Fowler's testimony that he smelled alcohol on defendant when he moved closer to him was inconsistent with the BWC video because there was not "any appreciable change in the distance Trooper Fowler is standing from defendant at either time." The court additionally acknowledged that neither Trooper Fowler nor Trooper Frage initially smelled alcohol and attributed the inconsistency between Trooper Fowler's testimony and the BWC video to "the trooper's memory fading over two years." When considering Trooper Fowler's law enforcement knowledge and experience, the court found: [While] Trooper Fowler testified honestly, at the time of this incident he did not possess the requisite expertise to justify accepting rational inferences he concluded from the facts . . . Trooper [F]owler, at the time of this arrest was not fully trained in standard [FST], not having the HGN certification, had no other specialized training outside of the academy, and a trooper for only [eleven] months . . . . The court found the search of the vehicle would have been lawful under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement had the FST been predicated on reasonable and articulable suspicion of intoxication . However, because it was not, it suppressed the evidence seized from the search. A-2678-25 8 We granted the State leave to appeal the court's order granting defendant's motion to suppress. The State raises a singular point for our consideration: THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS. We affirm for the reasons that follow. II. Our review of a trial court's decision regarding a motion to suppress is limited, State v. Ahmad, 246 N.J. 592, 609 (2021), and requires the application of two different standards. We must "defer[] to the trial court's factual findings" so long as they are supported by "sufficient credible evidence in the record . . . ." State v. Nelson, 237 N.J. 540, 551 (2019) (quoting In re J.A., 233 N.J. 432, 445 (2018)). See also State v. Gonzales, 227 N.J. 77, 101 (2016) ("We are obliged to uphold the motion judge's factual findings so long as sufficient credible evidence in the record supports those findings."). Those factual findings warrant particular deference when they "are substantially influenced by [the trial court's] opportunity to hear and see the witnesses and to have the 'feel' of the case, which a reviewing court cannot enjoy." State v. Robinson, 200 N.J. 1, 15 (2009) (quoting State v. Elders, 192 N.J. 224, 244 (2007)). "[A] trial court's findings should be disturbed only if they are so clearly A-2678-25 9 mistaken that the interests of justice demand intervention and correction." Ibid. "A trial court's interpretation of the law, however, and the consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled to any special deference" and its "legal conclusions are reviewed de novo." State v. Gamble, 218 N.J. 412, 425 (2014). III. The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution protect the right of individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV; N.J. Const. art I, ¶ 7. See also State v. Ates, 217 N.J. 253, 265 (2014). These provisions "impose a standard of reasonableness on the exercise of discretion by government officials to protect persons against arbitrary invasions." Gamble, 218 N.J. at 425 (quoting State v. Maristany, 133 N.J. 299, 304 (1993)). i. We discern no error in the court's finding the troopers' interaction with defendant prior to conducting FST was constitutionally permissible under the community caretaking doctrine. The community caretaking doctrine recognizes police officers perform a range of social-welfare services differentiated from traditional law enforcement. A-2678-25 10 State v. Bogan, 200 N.J. 61, 73-74 (2009) (citations omitted). "The United States Supreme Court has recognized that '[l]ocal police officers . . . engage in what, for want of a better term, may be described as community caretaking functions, totally divorced from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a criminal statute.'" Ibid. (omissions in original) (quoting Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441 (1973)). In ascertaining whether the community caretaker exception applies, "'The question is . . . whether the [] actions [of the police], when viewed as a whole, were objectively reasonable' and whether the entry is 'for the legitimate purpose of fulfilling a community caretaker responsibility." Id. at 195-96 (quoting Bogan, 200 N.J. at 81). After observing defendant's vehicle on the shoulder of the highway in the middle of the night, the troopers were permitted to approach the vehicle under the community caretaking doctrine to ensure the driver did not need further assistance. Because Trooper Fowler's actions were executed for the legitimate purpose of ensuring defendant did not need assistance, they were authorized under his community caretaking responsibility. See, e.g., State v. Diloreto, 180 N.J. 264, 281 (2004) ("[T]he responsibility of police officers to . . . aid the ill or A-2678-25 11 injured has never been the subject of serious debate; nor has [the] responsibility of police to provide services in an emergency."). ii. Even if we consider defendant's argument, raised for the first time on appeal, that Trooper Fowler's action in removing defendant's keys from the vehicle's ignition and placing them on the roof of the vehicle transformed the event from a community caretaking event into a Terry stop,3 we discern no constitutional impropriety. New Jersey decisional law directs the inquiry on this issue to "the tenor of the officer's actions and whether an objectively reasonable person in defendant's position would have felt free to exit the encounter." State v. Rodriguez, 172 N.J. 117, 128 (2002). See also State v. Rosario, 229 N.J. 263, 274-75 (2017) (citing Rodriguez and explaining, "Case law tells people to obey 3 Motor vehicle or investigatory stops, also called Terry stops, are seizures for Fourth Amendment purposes. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); State v. Sloane, 193 N.J. 423, 429-30 (2008). "[O]rdinarily, a police officer must have a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the driver of a vehicle, or its occupants, is committing a motor-vehicle violation or a criminal or disorderly persons offense to justify a stop." State v. Scriven, 226 N.J. 20, 33-34 (2016). Unless the totality of the circumstances satisfies the reasonable and articulable suspicion standard, the investigatory stop "is an 'unlawful seizure,' and evidence discovered during the course of an unconstitutional detention is subject to the exclusionary rule." Elders, 192 N.J. at 247 (citation omitted). A-2678-25 12 words and deeds of law enforcement that communicate demands for directed behavior . . . ."). Where "a driver cannot leave so long as the officer has his or her car keys, courts across the country have recognized that 'when [an officer] took defendant's keys . . . that seizure was a . . . Terry stop." However, the Court has held where a defendant's vehicle is also inoperable, there is no constitutional violation where a highway environment already limits vehicle occupants' practical freedom of movement. State v. Elders, 192 N.J. 224, 246-8 (2007) (quoting State v. Pineiro, 181 N.J. 13, 19-20 (2004)) (quoting and accepting the motion judge's observation, "People are not free to walk away [on a limited access highway]. People confronted by the police on the New Jersey Turnpike [are] pretty much restricted in their movement by virtue of the nature of the highway itself."). Similarly, here, with or without keys in hand, defendant's only option to leave appears to have been walking down the ice and slush covered shoulder of Interstate 78. Moreover, defendant demonstrated feeling free to decline to speak with Trooper Fowler by, for example, making phone calls while Trooper Fowler attempted to engage with him and declining to converse with Trooper Fowler by stating, "I can't help you." A-2678-25 13 Thus, we are unconvinced that the Trooper's act of taking defendant's keys out of the ignition elevated the community caretaking encounter into a Terry stop. iii. Because we defer to the court's credibility determinations, we discern no error with the finding the record lacks Fourth Amendment-compliant reasonable and articulable suspicion of intoxication to proceed with FST of defendant . Reasonable suspicion under the Fourth Amendment "is a less demanding standard than probable cause and requires a showing considerably less than preponderance of the evidence, [but] the Fourth Amendment requires at least a minimal level of objective justification for making the stop." Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000). As such, "[t]he officer must be able to articulate more than an 'inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or "hunch"' of criminal activity." Id. at 123-24 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968)). Similarly, the New Jersey Constitution requires "something less than the probable cause standard needed to support an arrest." State v. Thomas, 110 N.J. 673, 678 (1988); State v. Citarella, 154 N.J. 272, 279 (1998). The officer must "'point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational A-2678-25 14 inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant' the intrusion." Thomas, 110 N.J. at 678 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 21). This is an objective standard. Ibid. "'The suspicion necessary to justify a stop must not only be reasonable, but also particularized.'" State v. Smith, 251 N.J. 244, 258 (2022) (quoting State v. Scriven, 226 N.J. 20, 37 (2016)). The determination of whether law enforcement objectively possessed an articulable and particularized suspicion "is a highly fact-intensive inquiry that demands evaluation of 'the totality of circumstances surrounding the police-citizen encounter, balancing the State's interest in effective law enforcement against the individual's right to be protected from unwarranted and/or overbearing police intrusions.'" State v. Nyema, 249 N.J. 509, 528 (2022) (quoting State v. Privott, 203 N.J. 16, 25-26 (2010)). "The principal components of a determination of reasonable suspicion [are] the events which occurred leading up to the stop . . . and then the decision whether these historical facts, viewed from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable police officer, amount to reasonable suspicion." State v. Stovall, 170 N.J. 346, 357 (2002) (alterations in original) (quoting Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696 (1996)). We have held FST must be supported by reasonable, articulable suspicion of intoxication. State v. Bernokeits, 423 N.J. Super. 365, 374-75 (App. Div. A-2678-25 15 2011) (explaining that roadside sobriety testing may be required on the basis of a "'reasonable, articulable suspicion of driver intoxication'") (further citations omitted). Our decisional law instructs that "the mere smell of alcohol and admission of consumption may not, by itself, warrant a sobriety test." State v. Jones, 326 N.J. Super. 234, 246 (App. Div. 1999). Here, the State challenges the court's findings that the troopers did not have a reasonable and articulable suspicion defendant was intoxicated sufficient to order defendant to exit his vehicle and perform FST. The State argues the court erred in finding Trooper Fowler's testimony not credible as to smelling alcohol on defendant, but contends even if there was no odor of alcohol, there were sufficient alternative bases for an objectively reasonable officer to have reasonable and articulable suspicion defendant was intoxicated predicated on: "(1) defendant's decision to stop his car on the shoulder of Route 78 at 2:10 a.m. and then to 'fall asleep,' (2) defendant's failure to awake when the Trooper attempted to rouse defendant, (3) defendant's initial failure to recall why he stopped on the road and then inconsistent attempts at providing a justification, (4) defendant's non-responsive answers to many of the Trooper's questions, (5) defendant's general conduct and demeanor when questioned, and most importantly, (6) defendant's admission that he drank that night." Defendant A-2678-25 16 opposes, offering alternative explanations and counterarguments to these points . Defendant asserts, "[b]ecause each of the inferences drawn by the trial court could have . . . reasonabl[y] been reached, and 'factual conclusions reached by drawing permissible inferences cannot be clearly mistaken,' this [c]ourt should accordingly defer to [the judge's] findings and affirm the order suppressing evidence." The court's rejection of Trooper Fowler's testimony that he smelled an odor of alcohol on defendant and had slurred speech leaves an insufficient factual predicate to justify FST. The facts the court accepted in this case as credible—that defendant had bloodshot or watery eyes, defendant's statement that he drank "not a lot," and sleeping at a late hour on the highway shoulder with a flat tire and loud music playing—do not provide sufficient reasonable and articulable suspicion to commence FST under prevailing case law. See Adubato, 420 N.J. Super. at 181 (finding reasonable articulable suspicion where the officer observed "odor of alcohol," "bloodshot and watery" eyes, speech that "was also affected," and an admission of drinking); State v. Moskal, 246 N.J. Super. 12, 20 (App. Div. 1991) (upholding probable cause where the officer observed an "extremely flushed face," "drooping and red eyes," a "strong odor of alcohol," and an admission of drinking). A-2678-25 17 To the extent the knowledge and experience of a law enforcement officer is fundamental to the totality of the circumstances analysis, Stovall, 170 N.J. at 363, the court's findings that Trooper Fowler had limited training and expertise bore on its credibility determinations. However, even without significant expertise, Trooper Fowler's testimony remained relevant as New Jersey has long "permitted lay persons to testify that alcohol was the cause of a driver's intoxication because '[t]he symptoms of that condition have become such common knowledge that the testimony is admissible." State v. Olenowski, 255 N.J. 529, 550 (2023) (citing State v. Smith, 58 N.J. 202, 213 (1971); State v. Bealor, 187 N.J. 574, 587 (2006)). In considering the totality of the circumstances, the court found there was not a reasonable, articulated suspicion that the defendant was intoxicated justifying his removal from his vehicle and elevating the detention to require [FST]. The State argues the most probative fact in support of Trooper Fowler's reasonable suspicion "was defendant's admission that he drank that night," which was an inherently trustworthy and reliable statement against interest. Defendant's statement "not a lot," followed by denial of drinking any alcohol, coupled with the evidence the court found credible as to the troopers' other A-2678-25 18 interaction with defendant, does not constitute reasonable and articulable suspicion of intoxication consistent with prevailing case law. The State further argues Trooper Fowler had reasonable and articulable suspicion defendant was driving while intoxicated, because "[i]t is not normal for an individual to stop on the shoulder of Route 78 at 2:10 a.m. and fall into a deep sleep in their car while loud music is playing. Rather, such conduct is consistent with someone who 'passes out' due to intoxication." However, the Court has maintained that otherwise explainable behavior, such as being nervous or lack of eye contact with police "cannot drive the reasonable suspicion analysis given the wide range of behavior exhibited by many different people for varying reasons while in the presence of police." Nyema, 249 N.J. at 533. To find otherwise would lead to conflicting case law as to what is suspicious behavior and what is not. Ibid. (citing United States v. Escamilla, 560 F.2d 1229, 1233 (5th Cir. 1977)). In sum, deference to the court's rejection of Trooper Fowler's testimony as to smelling alcohol on defendant and that his speech was slurred, warrants affirmance of the suppression order because the record lacks evidence of the reasonable and articulable suspicion necessary to proceed with FST. The court's findings are supported by substantial credible evidence, and its credibility A-2678-25 19 determinations are owed deference, as a "trial court [is] uniquely situated to integrate the testimony and the video record to formulate its findings of fact. " State v. Hubbard, 222 N.J. 249, 270 (2015). The BWC video footage in the record does not alter our obligation as a reviewing court to defer to a trial court's findings, having been in the position to evaluate the demeanor of witnesses, observe the presentation of evidence, and resolve discrepancies. Id. at 268-69. Because the court's findings do not appear "so clearly mistaken the interests of justice demand intervention and correction," we decline to set them aside. See State v. Goldsmith, 251 N.J. 384, 398 (2022) (quoting Gamble, 218 N.J. at 425) (internal quotation marks omitted). Affirmed. A-2678-25 20