State of New Jersey v. Michael E. Mitchell
CourtNew Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division
Date FiledNovember 17, 2026
DocketA-3600-24/A-3822-24
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-3600-24
A-3822-24
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
MICHAEL E. MITCHELL,
a/k/a MICHAEL MITCHELL,
Defendant-Appellant.
_________________________
Submitted October 15, 2026 β Decided November 17, 2026
Before Judges Currier and Jacobs.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Middlesex County, Indictment No. 14-05-
0525, and Somerset County, Indictment No. 12-08-
0576.
Michael E. Mitchell, self-represented appellant.
Jennifer Davenport, Attorney General, attorney for
respondent State of New Jersey in A-3600-24 (David
M. Galemba, Deputy Attorney General, of counsel and
on the brief).
John P. McDonald, Somerset County Prosecutor,
attorney for respondent State of New Jersey in A-3822-
24 (Emily M. M. Pirro, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
In these cases heard back-to-back and consolidated in one opinion,
defendant Michael Mitchell appeals two orders denying his motions to correct
an illegal sentence. In an appeal originating from Somerset County, he contends
his twenty-year sentence, subject to the No Early Release Act (NERA), N.J.S.A.
2C:43-7.2, is illegal because the indictment, jury charge, and trial proofs did not
align. In an appeal originating from Middlesex County, he argues his life-
without-parole sentence under the Three Strikes Law, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.1(a), is
unconstitutional under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 1 and Erlinger v. United States, 2
and separately challenges the imposition of consecutive terms. We affirm both
orders.
I.
We briefly summarize the facts and procedural history relevant to each
appeal.
1
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
2
Erlinger v. United States, 602 U.S. 821 (2024).
2 A-3600-24
Somerset County Prosecution
The Somerset County matter stems from a robbery committed in 2011, at
a consumer electronics store. A grand jury indicted defendant and co-defendant
Emendo Bowers for first-degree robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1.
At defendant's 2014 jury trial, the State presented evidence showing
defendant and Bowers entered the store in the morning, displayed a handgun,
demanded access to a safe, learned there was no safe, and then took electronics,
game systems, and cash. The manager testified he complied with the duo's
demands out of fright and was ordered to the back of the store before the men
fled. The jury found defendant guilty of first-degree robbery.
After conviction, the State moved for an extended term sentence. The
trial court granted the motion and imposed a twenty-five-year prison term,
subject to NERA, together with fines, restitution, and a five-year period of
parole supervision.
On direct appeal, defendant argued, among other things, the verdict was
against the weight of the evidence because the indictment and jury charge
proceeded on robbery by force under N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1(a)(1), while the evidence
established robbery by threat under N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1(a)(2). Additionally, he
challenged the absence of an eyewitness-identification instruction and the
3 A-3600-24
extended-term sentence. We affirmed the conviction, rejected defendant's attack
on the verdict, and concluded there was sufficient evidence to support first-
degree robbery, although the proofs more closely fit robbery by threat. State v.
Mitchell, No. A-0675-14 (App. Div. May 4, 2017) (slip op. at 7-9). We
nevertheless vacated the sentence because the State had not disclosed extended-
term exposure at the pretrial conference and remanded for resentencing within
the ordinary first-degree range. Id. at 15-16.
On remand, the court resentenced defendant to twenty years in prison,
subject to NERA, to run concurrently with the life sentence defendant had later
received in Middlesex County. The court found aggravating factors three, "[t]he
risk that the defendant will commit another offense," N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(3);
six, "[t]he extent of the defendant's prior criminal record and the seriousness of
the offenses of which the defendant has been convicted," N.J.S.A. 2C:44-
1(a)(6); and nine, "[t]he need for deterring the defendant and others from
violating the law," N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(9), and no mitigating factors.
Thereafter, defendant filed the present motion to correct an illegal
sentence. He again argued the sentence was illegal because he had been indicted
and charged with robbery by force, yet the evidence showed robbery by threat,
and the jury could not lawfully convict him on an uncharged theory. In orders
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of April 14 and June 9, 2025, the Law Division denied the motion and later
denied reconsideration.
Defendant appeals, raising the following arguments:
POINT I
[DEFENDANT] IS SERVING AN ILLEGAL
SENTENCE OF 20 YEARS SUBJECTED TO THE
N.E.R.A. STEMMING FROM AN
UNREMARKABLE ROBBERY; NO VICTIM WAS
INJURED OR HARMED, AND IT IS BEYOND
DISPUTE THAT THE EVIDENCE FAILED TO
ESTABLISH THAT CODEFENDANT EMENDO
BOWERS OR DEFENDANT USED FORCE UPON
THE STORE MANAGER.
POINT II
[DEFENDANT] COULD NOT HAVE BEEN
CONVICTED FOR ROBBERY UNDER [ANY]
OTHER THEORY THAT WAS NOT CHARGED TO
THE JURY.
POINT III
THIS ISSUE CURRENTLY BEFORE THIS COURT
HAS NOT YET BEEN LITIGATED. IT ENTAILS
TWO DIFFERENT LEGAL REMEDIES AND LEGAL
STANDARDS AND CONCERNS AN ILLEGAL
SENTENCE. THEREFORE, THE COURT IS NOT
BARRED FROM HEARING IT.
5 A-3600-24
Middlesex County Prosecution
The Middlesex matter arose from a series of robberies of commercial
stores in December 2011 and January 2012. A superseding indictment charged
defendant and others, including Bowers, with offenses stemming from robberies
at three separate wireless carrier stores in Edison and a consumer electronics
store in South Brunswick.
At trial, the State presented testimony from employees of each store,
police officers, and Bowers. The State's proofs showed a recurring pattern. Two
men entered a store, one distracted or questioned the employee while another
displayed what appeared to be a handgun. The employee was directed to a back
room or safe, where the duo took phones, cash, prepaid cards, and electronics.
By the time of the fourth robbery, Edison police were already conducting
surveillance. Officers saw two men exit a black Buick near the store, enter the
store, and then flee. Police stopped the Buick nearby and arrested defendant,
who was driving. Police also arrested Bowers, recovering two pellet guns and
other items connected to the robberies.
The jury convicted defendant of several offenses, including first-degree
robbery. Before sentencing, the State moved to sentence defendant under the
Three Strikes Law based on two prior robbery convictions: a 2004 Middlesex
6 A-3600-24
County robbery conviction for a 2002 offense, and the 2014 conviction for the
October 2011 Somerset County robbery.
At sentencing in 2016, the court admitted certified judgments of
conviction and related charging documents concerning the prior robberies.
Defense counsel did not dispute the existence or dates of those convictions.
Instead, counsel argued the Three Strikes Law should not apply because the
current robbery conviction rested on accomplice liability. The court rejected
that argument, found defendant eligible under N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.1(a), and
imposed life imprisonment without parole on the first-degree robbery count.
The court also imposed additional sentences on the remaining counts, some
concurrent and some consecutive, yielding an aggregate sentence of life without
parole plus fourteen years. In explaining the sentence, the court found the
robberies were separate events committed at different times and places, against
different victims, and involved separate threats of violence and separate
planning.
We affirmed defendant's convictions and sentence in March 2018. State
v. Mitchell, No. A-3259-15 (App. Div. Mar. 26, 2018). Defendant later pursued
an earlier illegal-sentence motion and reconsideration. Both were denied at the
trial level. We affirmed the denials in April 2021. State v. Mitchell, No. A-
7 A-3600-24
3073-18 (App. Div. Apr. 5, 2021). Defendant later sought post-conviction
relief. His petition was denied in May 2023. We affirmed denial in March 2025,
and the Supreme Court denied certification in May 2025. State v. Mitchell, No.
A-3593-22 (App. Div. Mar. 14, 2025); State v. Mitchell, 260 N.J. 561 (2025).
In November 2024, defendant filed the motion underlying the present
Middlesex County appeal. He argued his life-without-parole sentence was
illegal because the facts necessary to impose the Three Strikes enhancement
were found by a judge rather than a jury. He relied on Apprendi v. New Jersey,
530 U.S. 466 (2000), Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013), and Erlinger
v. United States, 602 U.S. 821 (2024). He also argued the court should have
imposed concurrent sentences because his possession of the weapon from
December 2011 through January 2012 was one continuing episode. The motion
court denied relief, reasoning defendant's case was no longer in the pipeline
when Erlinger was decided. Defendant now appeals, raising the following:
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING
PETITIONER'S MOTION TO CORRECT AN
ILLEGAL SENTENCE. THE FIFTH [AND] SIX
AMENDMENTS AND APPRENDI v. NEW JERSEY,
570 U.S. 466, REQUIRES THAT A JURY DECIDE
THE EXISTENCE OF THE FACTS NECESSARY TO
ESTABLISH THE PREDICATE FOR AN
EXTENDED TERM UNDER N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.1(A).
8 A-3600-24
POINT II
PETITIONER'S POSSESSION OF A WEAPON IN
DECEMBER 2011 TH[R]OUGH JANUARY 2012
WAS PART OF THE SAME EPISODE.
THEREFORE, THE MATTER MUST BE
REMANDED AND DEFENDANT'S SENTENCES
SHALL R[U]N CONCURRENT[LY]. [Raised below.]
II.
We review de novo the denial of a motion to correct an illegal sentence
when, as here, the ruling turns on a legal issue. State v. Jones, 478 N.J. Super.
532, 541 (App. Div. 2024); State v. Hawkins, 461 N.J. Super. 556, 560-61 (App.
Div. 2019). A truly illegal sentence may be challenged at any time. State v.
Acevedo, 205 N.J. 40, 47 n.4 (2011). But the concept of an illegal sentence is
narrow. It generally includes a sentence that exceeds the maximum penalty
allowed for the offense, omits a statutorily required term, or is otherwise not
imposed in accordance with law. Id. at 45; State v. Murray, 162 N.J. 240, 247
(2000).
When a defendant challenges the sentencing court's discretionary decision
to impose consecutive rather than concurrent sentences, our review is more
limited. We defer to the trial court's factual findings so long as they are
supported by competent credible evidence, and we disturb the sentence only if
the court violated the sentencing guidelines, relied on unsupported aggravating
9 A-3600-24
or mitigating factors, or imposed a sentence that shocks the judicial conscience.
State v. Torres, 246 N.J. 246, 272 (2021); State v. Bolvito, 217 N.J. 221, 228
(2014).
The Somerset County Appeal
Defendant argues his Somerset sentence is illegal because the indictment
charged robbery by force, the jury was instructed on robbery by force, and the
proofs established robbery by threat. He contends the jury could not convict
him on a theory on which it was not instructed. This argument attacks the
validity of the conviction, not the legality of the sentence. Defendant does not
contend the twenty-year sentence exceeds the statutory maximum for first-
degree robbery, that NERA was improperly applied, or that any component of
the sentence was unauthorized by statute. Instead, he contends he should not
have been convicted at all. Such a claim falls outside the narrow scope of Rule
3:21-10(b)(5). See Acevedo, 205 N.J. at 45-47; State v. Flores, 228 N.J. Super.
586, 595-96 (App. Div. 1988).
Defendant's present argument also substantially reprises the claim he
raised on direct appeal. In our 2017 affirmance of defendant's conviction, we
acknowledged "the record was barren of any direct evidence" that defendant or
Bowers used physical force against the manager, but explained if the jury found
10 A-3600-24
no physical force, "then logically, it must have found non-physical force was
used," and that there was "ample evidence" to support the essential elements of
first-degree robbery, albeit under a threat-based theory. Mitchell, slip op. at 6-
9. We therefore affirmed the conviction, while vacating only the sentence for
an unrelated reason. Defendant may not now recast that same challenge to the
conviction as a motion to correct an illegal sentence.
Even if we were to reach the merits, defendant would not be entitled to
relief. His reliance on State v. Federico, 103 N.J. 169 (1986), is misplaced. In
Federico, the omitted jury instruction concerned the element distinguishing first-
degree from second-degree kidnapping, thereby affecting the degree of the crime
and the sentencing exposure. Id. at 171-72. Here, by contrast, whether the
robbery was accomplished under N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1(a)(1) or (a)(2), it remained
first-degree robbery because the actor was armed with, or threatened the
immediate use of, a deadly weapon. See N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1(b). The claimed
charging defect therefore did not expose defendant to a higher degree of offense
or a greater sentencing range than the jury's verdict otherwise authorized.
The direct-appeal record likewise undermines defendant's present
contention. As we noted in 2017, the defense at trial did not focus on the absence
of force or the absence of robbery. Rather, the defense theory was that the State
11 A-3600-24
had failed to prove defendant's participation. On this record, defendant's present
claim remains what it was on direct appeal β a challenge to the conviction, not
to the sentence.
Accordingly, we affirm the April 14, 2025 order denying defendant's
motion to correct an illegal sentence and the June 9, 2025 order denying
reconsideration.
The Middlesex County Appeal
Defendant principally argues his life-without-parole sentence under the
Three Strikes Law is unconstitutional because the predicate facts supporting the
sentence were found by a judge rather than a jury. He relies on Apprendi and
Erlinger. This argument does not warrant relief because Erlinger does not apply
retroactively to defendant's collateral attack on a sentence that became final
years before that decision was issued. Defendant's direct appeal concluded in
2019, when certification was denied. Erlinger was decided in 2024.
Under settled retroactivity principles, new procedural rules generally do
not apply retroactively on collateral review. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288
(1989); Edwards v. Vannoy, 593 U.S. 255, 262, 271-76 (2021). A rule is new
if it breaks new ground or was not dictated by precedent when the defendant's
conviction became final. State v. Feal, 194 N.J. 293, 308-09 (2008). Although
12 A-3600-24
Erlinger drew from Apprendi, it changed the law as applied to sentencing
schemes that allowed judges to determine whether prior offenses were
committed on separate occasions. Erlinger, 602 U.S. at 834-35. Before
Erlinger, that determination was treated as one falling within the prior-
conviction exception. Erlinger therefore announced a new procedural rule, not
a substantive one. Defendant may not invoke it in this collateral proceeding.
The motion court correctly recognized defendant's case was no longer "in
the pipeline" when Erlinger was decided. In other words, defendant's judgment
was final, and he was seeking collateral review, not direct review.
Even if Erlinger applied, defendant still would not be entitled to relief
because any error was harmless. In State v. Carlton, 262 N.J. 629, 643-44
(2026), our Supreme Court applied Erlinger's reasoning to New Jersey's
persistent-offender statute and held an Erlinger-type error is subject to harmless-
error review. The Court did not require automatic resentencing where the
predicate facts were undisputed and established beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.
at 644-45. Such is the case here. The State presented documentary proof of
defendant's two prior robbery convictions. One arose from a 2002 robbery in
Middlesex County and another from a 2011 robbery in Somerset County. The
current robbery occurred in January 2012. Those offenses were plainly
13 A-3600-24
committed years apart, in different places, and on separate occasions. The
current offense also fell well within ten years of the most recent predicate
offense. N.J.S.A. 2C:44-3(a). Defense counsel did not dispute these procedural
facts at sentencing.
On this record, no rational jury could have found otherwise. Accordingly,
even if we assumed an Erlinger error occurred, it was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt.
Defendant separately contends the Middlesex sentences should run
concurrently because his possession of the pellet gun from December 2011
through January 2012 constituted a single continuing possessory offense.
Defendant's claim is not cognizable in a motion to correct an illegal sentence.
An argument for concurrent rather than consecutive terms attacks the sentencing
court's exercise of discretion, not the sentence's legality. Acevedo, 205 N.J. at
47; State v. Hyland, 238 N.J. 135, 145-48 (2019). Defendant should have raised
the issue on direct appeal. In any event, the argument lacks merit. The
sentencing court conducted a detailed analysis and explained the robberies
occurred on different dates, at different stores, against different victims, and
involved separate planning and separate threats of violence. The court grouped
counts arising from the same incident and ran those terms concurrently, but ran
14 A-3600-24
the sentences for the separate episodes consecutively. That was a reasoned
exercise of discretion under the governing sentencing principles. State v.
Yarbough, 100 N.J. 627, 643-44 (1985); Torres, 246 N.J. at 264-65.
Defendant's reliance on the concept of continuing possession does not
alter the analysis. He was not sentenced merely for possessing a single object
over time. He was sentenced for separate robberies, thefts, conspiracies, and
possession-of-a-weapon-for-an-unlawful-purpose offenses tied to distinct
criminal episodes. See State v. Pillot, 115 N.J. 558, 567 (1989) (holding that
offenses committed at distinct times and places against different victims remain
separate criminal episodes despite a common modus operandi). Here, the
continuity of the weapon did not eliminate the distinct times, places, victims,
and objectives of those crimes. The record therefore supports the imposition of
consecutive sentences.
In sum, in the Somerset County appeal, defendant's motion attacked the
validity of his conviction rather than the legality of his sentence, and the trial
court properly denied relief. In the Middlesex County appeal, defendant sought
retroactive application of Erlinger to a sentence that became final years before
issuance of that decision. Accordingly, the motion court correctly denied relief.
15 A-3600-24
Defendant's separate challenge to the consecutive Middlesex sentences is not
cognizable under Rule 3:21-10(b)(5) and, in any event, lacks merit.
Affirmed.
16 A-3600-24