Full Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3. SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-3600-24 A-3822-24 STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. MICHAEL E. MITCHELL, a/k/a MICHAEL MITCHELL, Defendant-Appellant. _________________________ Submitted October 15, 2026 – Decided November 17, 2026 Before Judges Currier and Jacobs. On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Middlesex County, Indictment No. 14-05- 0525, and Somerset County, Indictment No. 12-08- 0576. Michael E. Mitchell, self-represented appellant. Jennifer Davenport, Attorney General, attorney for respondent State of New Jersey in A-3600-24 (David M. Galemba, Deputy Attorney General, of counsel and on the brief). John P. McDonald, Somerset County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent State of New Jersey in A-3822- 24 (Emily M. M. Pirro, on the brief). PER CURIAM In these cases heard back-to-back and consolidated in one opinion, defendant Michael Mitchell appeals two orders denying his motions to correct an illegal sentence. In an appeal originating from Somerset County, he contends his twenty-year sentence, subject to the No Early Release Act (NERA), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2, is illegal because the indictment, jury charge, and trial proofs did not align. In an appeal originating from Middlesex County, he argues his life- without-parole sentence under the Three Strikes Law, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.1(a), is unconstitutional under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 1 and Erlinger v. United States, 2 and separately challenges the imposition of consecutive terms. We affirm both orders. I. We briefly summarize the facts and procedural history relevant to each appeal. 1 Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). 2 Erlinger v. United States, 602 U.S. 821 (2024). 2 A-3600-24 Somerset County Prosecution The Somerset County matter stems from a robbery committed in 2011, at a consumer electronics store. A grand jury indicted defendant and co-defendant Emendo Bowers for first-degree robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1. At defendant's 2014 jury trial, the State presented evidence showing defendant and Bowers entered the store in the morning, displayed a handgun, demanded access to a safe, learned there was no safe, and then took electronics, game systems, and cash. The manager testified he complied with the duo's demands out of fright and was ordered to the back of the store before the men fled. The jury found defendant guilty of first-degree robbery. After conviction, the State moved for an extended term sentence. The trial court granted the motion and imposed a twenty-five-year prison term, subject to NERA, together with fines, restitution, and a five-year period of parole supervision. On direct appeal, defendant argued, among other things, the verdict was against the weight of the evidence because the indictment and jury charge proceeded on robbery by force under N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1(a)(1), while the evidence established robbery by threat under N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1(a)(2). Additionally, he challenged the absence of an eyewitness-identification instruction and the 3 A-3600-24 extended-term sentence. We affirmed the conviction, rejected defendant's attack on the verdict, and concluded there was sufficient evidence to support first- degree robbery, although the proofs more closely fit robbery by threat. State v. Mitchell, No. A-0675-14 (App. Div. May 4, 2017) (slip op. at 7-9). We nevertheless vacated the sentence because the State had not disclosed extended- term exposure at the pretrial conference and remanded for resentencing within the ordinary first-degree range. Id. at 15-16. On remand, the court resentenced defendant to twenty years in prison, subject to NERA, to run concurrently with the life sentence defendant had later received in Middlesex County. The court found aggravating factors three, "[t]he risk that the defendant will commit another offense," N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(3); six, "[t]he extent of the defendant's prior criminal record and the seriousness of the offenses of which the defendant has been convicted," N.J.S.A. 2C:44- 1(a)(6); and nine, "[t]he need for deterring the defendant and others from violating the law," N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(9), and no mitigating factors. Thereafter, defendant filed the present motion to correct an illegal sentence. He again argued the sentence was illegal because he had been indicted and charged with robbery by force, yet the evidence showed robbery by threat, and the jury could not lawfully convict him on an uncharged theory. In orders 4 A-3600-24 of April 14 and June 9, 2025, the Law Division denied the motion and later denied reconsideration. Defendant appeals, raising the following arguments: POINT I [DEFENDANT] IS SERVING AN ILLEGAL SENTENCE OF 20 YEARS SUBJECTED TO THE N.E.R.A. STEMMING FROM AN UNREMARKABLE ROBBERY; NO VICTIM WAS INJURED OR HARMED, AND IT IS BEYOND DISPUTE THAT THE EVIDENCE FAILED TO ESTABLISH THAT CODEFENDANT EMENDO BOWERS OR DEFENDANT USED FORCE UPON THE STORE MANAGER. POINT II [DEFENDANT] COULD NOT HAVE BEEN CONVICTED FOR ROBBERY UNDER [ANY] OTHER THEORY THAT WAS NOT CHARGED TO THE JURY. POINT III THIS ISSUE CURRENTLY BEFORE THIS COURT HAS NOT YET BEEN LITIGATED. IT ENTAILS TWO DIFFERENT LEGAL REMEDIES AND LEGAL STANDARDS AND CONCERNS AN ILLEGAL SENTENCE. THEREFORE, THE COURT IS NOT BARRED FROM HEARING IT. 5 A-3600-24 Middlesex County Prosecution The Middlesex matter arose from a series of robberies of commercial stores in December 2011 and January 2012. A superseding indictment charged defendant and others, including Bowers, with offenses stemming from robberies at three separate wireless carrier stores in Edison and a consumer electronics store in South Brunswick. At trial, the State presented testimony from employees of each store, police officers, and Bowers. The State's proofs showed a recurring pattern. Two men entered a store, one distracted or questioned the employee while another displayed what appeared to be a handgun. The employee was directed to a back room or safe, where the duo took phones, cash, prepaid cards, and electronics. By the time of the fourth robbery, Edison police were already conducting surveillance. Officers saw two men exit a black Buick near the store, enter the store, and then flee. Police stopped the Buick nearby and arrested defendant, who was driving. Police also arrested Bowers, recovering two pellet guns and other items connected to the robberies. The jury convicted defendant of several offenses, including first-degree robbery. Before sentencing, the State moved to sentence defendant under the Three Strikes Law based on two prior robbery convictions: a 2004 Middlesex 6 A-3600-24 County robbery conviction for a 2002 offense, and the 2014 conviction for the October 2011 Somerset County robbery. At sentencing in 2016, the court admitted certified judgments of conviction and related charging documents concerning the prior robberies. Defense counsel did not dispute the existence or dates of those convictions. Instead, counsel argued the Three Strikes Law should not apply because the current robbery conviction rested on accomplice liability. The court rejected that argument, found defendant eligible under N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.1(a), and imposed life imprisonment without parole on the first-degree robbery count. The court also imposed additional sentences on the remaining counts, some concurrent and some consecutive, yielding an aggregate sentence of life without parole plus fourteen years. In explaining the sentence, the court found the robberies were separate events committed at different times and places, against different victims, and involved separate threats of violence and separate planning. We affirmed defendant's convictions and sentence in March 2018. State v. Mitchell, No. A-3259-15 (App. Div. Mar. 26, 2018). Defendant later pursued an earlier illegal-sentence motion and reconsideration. Both were denied at the trial level. We affirmed the denials in April 2021. State v. Mitchell, No. A- 7 A-3600-24 3073-18 (App. Div. Apr. 5, 2021). Defendant later sought post-conviction relief. His petition was denied in May 2023. We affirmed denial in March 2025, and the Supreme Court denied certification in May 2025. State v. Mitchell, No. A-3593-22 (App. Div. Mar. 14, 2025); State v. Mitchell, 260 N.J. 561 (2025). In November 2024, defendant filed the motion underlying the present Middlesex County appeal. He argued his life-without-parole sentence was illegal because the facts necessary to impose the Three Strikes enhancement were found by a judge rather than a jury. He relied on Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013), and Erlinger v. United States, 602 U.S. 821 (2024). He also argued the court should have imposed concurrent sentences because his possession of the weapon from December 2011 through January 2012 was one continuing episode. The motion court denied relief, reasoning defendant's case was no longer in the pipeline when Erlinger was decided. Defendant now appeals, raising the following: POINT I THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING PETITIONER'S MOTION TO CORRECT AN ILLEGAL SENTENCE. THE FIFTH [AND] SIX AMENDMENTS AND APPRENDI v. NEW JERSEY, 570 U.S. 466, REQUIRES THAT A JURY DECIDE THE EXISTENCE OF THE FACTS NECESSARY TO ESTABLISH THE PREDICATE FOR AN EXTENDED TERM UNDER N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.1(A). 8 A-3600-24 POINT II PETITIONER'S POSSESSION OF A WEAPON IN DECEMBER 2011 TH[R]OUGH JANUARY 2012 WAS PART OF THE SAME EPISODE. THEREFORE, THE MATTER MUST BE REMANDED AND DEFENDANT'S SENTENCES SHALL R[U]N CONCURRENT[LY]. [Raised below.] II. We review de novo the denial of a motion to correct an illegal sentence when, as here, the ruling turns on a legal issue. State v. Jones, 478 N.J. Super. 532, 541 (App. Div. 2024); State v. Hawkins, 461 N.J. Super. 556, 560-61 (App. Div. 2019). A truly illegal sentence may be challenged at any time. State v. Acevedo, 205 N.J. 40, 47 n.4 (2011). But the concept of an illegal sentence is narrow. It generally includes a sentence that exceeds the maximum penalty allowed for the offense, omits a statutorily required term, or is otherwise not imposed in accordance with law. Id. at 45; State v. Murray, 162 N.J. 240, 247 (2000). When a defendant challenges the sentencing court's discretionary decision to impose consecutive rather than concurrent sentences, our review is more limited. We defer to the trial court's factual findings so long as they are supported by competent credible evidence, and we disturb the sentence only if the court violated the sentencing guidelines, relied on unsupported aggravating 9 A-3600-24 or mitigating factors, or imposed a sentence that shocks the judicial conscience. State v. Torres, 246 N.J. 246, 272 (2021); State v. Bolvito, 217 N.J. 221, 228 (2014). The Somerset County Appeal Defendant argues his Somerset sentence is illegal because the indictment charged robbery by force, the jury was instructed on robbery by force, and the proofs established robbery by threat. He contends the jury could not convict him on a theory on which it was not instructed. This argument attacks the validity of the conviction, not the legality of the sentence. Defendant does not contend the twenty-year sentence exceeds the statutory maximum for first- degree robbery, that NERA was improperly applied, or that any component of the sentence was unauthorized by statute. Instead, he contends he should not have been convicted at all. Such a claim falls outside the narrow scope of Rule 3:21-10(b)(5). See Acevedo, 205 N.J. at 45-47; State v. Flores, 228 N.J. Super. 586, 595-96 (App. Div. 1988). Defendant's present argument also substantially reprises the claim he raised on direct appeal. In our 2017 affirmance of defendant's conviction, we acknowledged "the record was barren of any direct evidence" that defendant or Bowers used physical force against the manager, but explained if the jury found 10 A-3600-24 no physical force, "then logically, it must have found non-physical force was used," and that there was "ample evidence" to support the essential elements of first-degree robbery, albeit under a threat-based theory. Mitchell, slip op. at 6- 9. We therefore affirmed the conviction, while vacating only the sentence for an unrelated reason. Defendant may not now recast that same challenge to the conviction as a motion to correct an illegal sentence. Even if we were to reach the merits, defendant would not be entitled to relief. His reliance on State v. Federico, 103 N.J. 169 (1986), is misplaced. In Federico, the omitted jury instruction concerned the element distinguishing first- degree from second-degree kidnapping, thereby affecting the degree of the crime and the sentencing exposure. Id. at 171-72. Here, by contrast, whether the robbery was accomplished under N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1(a)(1) or (a)(2), it remained first-degree robbery because the actor was armed with, or threatened the immediate use of, a deadly weapon. See N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1(b). The claimed charging defect therefore did not expose defendant to a higher degree of offense or a greater sentencing range than the jury's verdict otherwise authorized. The direct-appeal record likewise undermines defendant's present contention. As we noted in 2017, the defense at trial did not focus on the absence of force or the absence of robbery. Rather, the defense theory was that the State 11 A-3600-24 had failed to prove defendant's participation. On this record, defendant's present claim remains what it was on direct appeal β€” a challenge to the conviction, not to the sentence. Accordingly, we affirm the April 14, 2025 order denying defendant's motion to correct an illegal sentence and the June 9, 2025 order denying reconsideration. The Middlesex County Appeal Defendant principally argues his life-without-parole sentence under the Three Strikes Law is unconstitutional because the predicate facts supporting the sentence were found by a judge rather than a jury. He relies on Apprendi and Erlinger. This argument does not warrant relief because Erlinger does not apply retroactively to defendant's collateral attack on a sentence that became final years before that decision was issued. Defendant's direct appeal concluded in 2019, when certification was denied. Erlinger was decided in 2024. Under settled retroactivity principles, new procedural rules generally do not apply retroactively on collateral review. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989); Edwards v. Vannoy, 593 U.S. 255, 262, 271-76 (2021). A rule is new if it breaks new ground or was not dictated by precedent when the defendant's conviction became final. State v. Feal, 194 N.J. 293, 308-09 (2008). Although 12 A-3600-24 Erlinger drew from Apprendi, it changed the law as applied to sentencing schemes that allowed judges to determine whether prior offenses were committed on separate occasions. Erlinger, 602 U.S. at 834-35. Before Erlinger, that determination was treated as one falling within the prior- conviction exception. Erlinger therefore announced a new procedural rule, not a substantive one. Defendant may not invoke it in this collateral proceeding. The motion court correctly recognized defendant's case was no longer "in the pipeline" when Erlinger was decided. In other words, defendant's judgment was final, and he was seeking collateral review, not direct review. Even if Erlinger applied, defendant still would not be entitled to relief because any error was harmless. In State v. Carlton, 262 N.J. 629, 643-44 (2026), our Supreme Court applied Erlinger's reasoning to New Jersey's persistent-offender statute and held an Erlinger-type error is subject to harmless- error review. The Court did not require automatic resentencing where the predicate facts were undisputed and established beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 644-45. Such is the case here. The State presented documentary proof of defendant's two prior robbery convictions. One arose from a 2002 robbery in Middlesex County and another from a 2011 robbery in Somerset County. The current robbery occurred in January 2012. Those offenses were plainly 13 A-3600-24 committed years apart, in different places, and on separate occasions. The current offense also fell well within ten years of the most recent predicate offense. N.J.S.A. 2C:44-3(a). Defense counsel did not dispute these procedural facts at sentencing. On this record, no rational jury could have found otherwise. Accordingly, even if we assumed an Erlinger error occurred, it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Defendant separately contends the Middlesex sentences should run concurrently because his possession of the pellet gun from December 2011 through January 2012 constituted a single continuing possessory offense. Defendant's claim is not cognizable in a motion to correct an illegal sentence. An argument for concurrent rather than consecutive terms attacks the sentencing court's exercise of discretion, not the sentence's legality. Acevedo, 205 N.J. at 47; State v. Hyland, 238 N.J. 135, 145-48 (2019). Defendant should have raised the issue on direct appeal. In any event, the argument lacks merit. The sentencing court conducted a detailed analysis and explained the robberies occurred on different dates, at different stores, against different victims, and involved separate planning and separate threats of violence. The court grouped counts arising from the same incident and ran those terms concurrently, but ran 14 A-3600-24 the sentences for the separate episodes consecutively. That was a reasoned exercise of discretion under the governing sentencing principles. State v. Yarbough, 100 N.J. 627, 643-44 (1985); Torres, 246 N.J. at 264-65. Defendant's reliance on the concept of continuing possession does not alter the analysis. He was not sentenced merely for possessing a single object over time. He was sentenced for separate robberies, thefts, conspiracies, and possession-of-a-weapon-for-an-unlawful-purpose offenses tied to distinct criminal episodes. See State v. Pillot, 115 N.J. 558, 567 (1989) (holding that offenses committed at distinct times and places against different victims remain separate criminal episodes despite a common modus operandi). Here, the continuity of the weapon did not eliminate the distinct times, places, victims, and objectives of those crimes. The record therefore supports the imposition of consecutive sentences. In sum, in the Somerset County appeal, defendant's motion attacked the validity of his conviction rather than the legality of his sentence, and the trial court properly denied relief. In the Middlesex County appeal, defendant sought retroactive application of Erlinger to a sentence that became final years before issuance of that decision. Accordingly, the motion court correctly denied relief. 15 A-3600-24 Defendant's separate challenge to the consecutive Middlesex sentences is not cognizable under Rule 3:21-10(b)(5) and, in any event, lacks merit. Affirmed. 16 A-3600-24