Full Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3. SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-2741-24 STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. ROBERT PINERO, Defendant-Appellant. ________________________ Submitted October 15, 2026 – Decided November 4, 2026 Before Judges Mawla and DeAlmeida. On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Passaic County, Indictment No. 19-06-0436. Robert Pinero, self-represented appellant. Camelia M. Valdes, Passaic County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Timothy Kerrigan, Chief Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief). PER CURIAM Defendant Robert Pinero appeals from two Law Division orders: a January 16, 2025 order denying his motion for early termination of a five-year, noncustodial probationary sentence; and an April 4, 2025 order denying his motion for reconsideration of the January 16, 2025 order. We affirm. I. Defendant operated a sandwich shop in a leased space at a Hawthorne strip mall. In the early morning hours of August 18, 2017, a fire erupted at the shop and caused property damage. A subsequent investigation determined defendant conspired with another person to set the store ablaze to collect insurance proceeds. On June 7, 2019, a Passaic County grand jury indicted defendant for: second-degree arson, N.J.S.A. 2C:17-1(a)(2) (count one); second-degree aggravated arson, N.J.S.A. 2C:17-1(a)(3) (count two); second-degree conspiracy to commit aggravated arson, N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2 and 2C:17-1(a)(2) (count three); second-degree insurance fraud, N.J.S.A. 2C:21-4.6 (count four); and fourth-degree tampering with evidence, N.J.S.A. 2C:28-6(1) (count five). On January 9, 2023, pursuant to a plea agreement, the State moved to amend count two of the indictment to third-degree aggravated arson, N.J.S.A. 2C:17-1(b)(3), and count four to third-degree insurance fraud, N.J.S.A. 2C:21- 4.6(a). The court granted the State's motion. Defendant thereafter pleaded guilty to both amended counts. He admitted he intentionally set fire to the A-2741-24 2 sandwich shop, made material false statements to an insurance company about the fire in a claim for coverage, and collected insurance proceeds on the claim. In exchange for the plea, the State agreed to recommend a five-year term of noncustodial probation and the dismissal of the remaining counts of the indictment. At defendant's June 27, 2023 sentencing, the State urged the court to impose a five-year term of noncustodial probation. Defendant's counsel argued the court should sentence him to a one-year term of noncustodial probation. He noted that in the more than four years since his arrest, defendant complied with the condition of pretrial release and did not reoffend. In addition, defendant assisted veterans with post-traumatic stress disorder. The State countered by noting the seriousness of the offenses, defendant's admission to investigators he set the store on fire because the business was insufficiently profitable and he did not like its employees and clientele, and there were employees in an adjoining store whose lives were placed in danger by defendant's actions. In addition, the State noted when an investigating officer informed defendant his phone would be seized, he smashed the device against a chair, destroying evidence. After making findings with respect to the statutory aggravating and mitigating factors, the court sentenced defendant to a five-year term of A-2741-24 3 noncustodial probation. The court rejected a one-year term because defendant's crimes were serious and the State's recommendation of a five-year term was the product of prolonged plea negotiations. It also ordered defendant to pay $10,000 in restitution to his insurance company and $5,000 in restitution to the strip mall owner's insurance company, as well as fines. A July 19, 2023 judgment of conviction memorialized defendant's sentence. His probationary term is set to end on June 27, 2028. Defendant did not appeal from his sentence. After serving just a year and a half of his probationary term, on January 7, 2025, defendant moved pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:45-2(a) to terminate his probation. Defendant argued he satisfied his restitution obligations, paid all fines, and remained offense free since sentencing. He asserted he is dedicated to his spouse and children, and his status on probation restricted his ability to coach his children's sports teams. According to defendant, he manages a portfolio of properties in several states and had recently purchased land in Florida on which he intended to construct a home for his family. He claimed he and his family are burdened by him having to obtain travel passes every other week from his probation officer to attend to his business obligations and home construction plans. Defendant argued his continuation on probation would A-2741-24 4 "serve[] no rehabilitative purpose and undermine[] the overarching goal of fostering successful reintegration into society." The State opposed the motion. On January 16, 2025, the same judge who sentenced defendant denied his motion without prejudice, finding "[t]he motion for termination of probation [was] too premature[.]" The court entered an order memorializing its decision. Defendant thereafter moved for reconsideration. He argued the court erred because it: (1) concluded his motion was "too premature" when the statute permits an application to terminate probation to be filed at any time; (2) did not seek input from his probation officer; (3) did not grant his request for oral argument; and (4) overlooked key facts and law. He also argued he had recently purchased property in Ecuador, which required his extended presence in that country, and proffered a United States Department of Justice study he claimed demonstrates his risk of recidivism was low. The State opposed the motion. On April 4, 2025, the court issued a written decision and order denying defendant's motion. It found it did not deny defendant's initial motion as untimely but made its decision based on the amount of time elapsed between sentencing and the filing of the motion. It was a substantive denial. [Defendant] has not served even half of his probationary sentence, having completed only [twenty-one] months of the probationary term of [sixty] months. Not enough time has passed for the A-2741-24 5 [c]ourt to assess compliance with the conditions of probation or rehabilitation. The court found defendant did not establish it issued its initial decision on a palpably incorrect or irrational basis, as is required to warrant reconsideration. It reasoned the precedents on which defendant relied were inapplicable because they concerned: (1) whether a period of statutory parole ineligibility can be terminated early, State v. Mendel, 212 N.J. Super. 110 (App. Div. 1986); (2) how a violation of probation must be weighed when a court considers resentencing a defendant from a probationary term to a term of incarceration, State v. Baylass, 114 N.J. 169 (1989); and (3) relieving a defendant of an obligation to make restitution, State v. Bausch, 83 N.J. 425 (1980). The court also found several federal court precedents defendant cited were inapposite and not controlling. The court reiterated its conclusion termination of defendant's probationary term was not warranted. It noted defendant's compliance with the conditions of pretrial release and probation "while commendable," was "not exceptional." Such compliance, the court concluded, "is not just expected, it is required." Defendant's claim his business operations were "severely hindered" by having to obtain travel passes was unsupported and the potential travel complications A-2741-24 6 of his decision to purchase property in Ecuador was "not a persuasive reason to terminate [defendant's] probation." The court also concluded it was within its discretion to decide defendant's motion without oral argument, and it had no obligation to contact defendant's probation officer before deciding the motion. It found defendant had the burden to establish the facts justifying termination of his probation and the onus was not on the court to investigate the validity of his claim. On appeal, defendant raises the following arguments. POINT I THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED LEGAL ERROR AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY SUBSTITUTING A NON-STATUTORY "TIME SERVED" REQUIREMENT FOR THE EXPLICIT STATUTORY STANDARD OF N.J.S.A. 2C:45-2(b). POINT II THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY FAILING TO WEIGH THE CLEAR HARDSHIP AND FRUSTRATION OF REHABILITATION CAUSED BY CONTINUED SUPERVISION AGAINST THE ABSENCE OF ANY COMPELLING NEED. POINT III THE COURT IMPROPERLY DISMISSED PRECEDENT THAT VALIDATES THE RELIEF REQUESTED. A-2741-24 7 POINT IV CONTINUED SUPERVISION IS NOW COUNTERPRODUCTIVE AND PUNITIVE. POINT V THE COURT MISCHARACTERIZED DEFENDANT'S REHABILITATION AS MERE "COMPLIANCE," CONTRARY TO LAW AND LOGIC. POINT VI DEFENDANT'S CITATION TO [STATE V. ERVIN, 241 N.J. SUPER. 458 (APP. DIV. 1989)] IS PROPER AND RELEVANT TO THE REHABILITATIVE LIMITS OF PROBATION CONDITIONS. POINT VII FEDERAL CASES CITED BY DEFENDANT SUPPORT HIS POSITION AS PERSUASIVE AUTHORITY. POINT VIII DEFENDANT'S CASE IS DISTINGUISHABLE FROM [UNITED STATES V. WEINTRAUB, 371 F. SUPP. 2d 164 (D. CONN. 2005)] AND SUPPORTED BY NEW JERSEY'S DISCRETIONARY FRAMEWORK. POINT IX THE COURT'S FINAL RATIONALE MISSTATES THE LAW AND IGNORES THE RECORD. A-2741-24 8 POINT X THE COURT FAILED TO PROVIDE BASIC PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS TO A [SELF- REPRESENTED] LITIGANT. II. N.J.A.C. 2C:45-2(a) provides, in relevant part: "The period of probation shall be fixed by the court at not less than [one] year nor more than [five] years. The court, on application of . . . the defendant . . . may discharge the defendant at any time." 1 The decision whether to terminate a probationary term is left to the sound discretion of the sentencing court. We have long reviewed sentencing decisions under an abuse of discretion standard. State v. Bolvito, 217 N.J. 221, 228 (2014). Discretionary review applies to decisions respecting probation. State v. Peters, 129 N.J. 210, 218 (1992). An abuse of discretion "arises when a decision is 'made without a rational explanation, inexplicably departed from established policies, or rested on an impermissible basis.'" Flagg v. Essex Cnty. Prosecutor, 171 N.J. 561, 571 1 Although defendant argues he sought termination of probation under N.J.S.A. 2C:45-2(b), that provision authorizes the court to "modify the requirements imposed" or "add further requirements" on probationary terms. Subsection (a) of the statute addresses the court's authority to discharge a defendant from probation. A-2741-24 9 (2002) (quoting Achacoso-Sanchez v. I.N.S., 779 F.2d 1260, 1265 (7th Cir. 1985)). We have reviewed the record and discern no mistaken exercise of discretion by the motion court. Having had his request for a one-year probationary term rejected at sentencing, defendant returned to court just over a year later seeking termination of his probation. The record supports the motion court's conclusion defendant did not demonstrate sufficient rehabilitation to warrant termination less than halfway through his term. As the motion court found, defendant's compliance with the terms of probation, while commendable, do not mandate termination. Notably, many of the facts on which defendant relies in support of his motion to terminate were considered by the court at his sentencing hearing before it imposed a five-year probationary term. The record supports the motion court's conclusion the conditions of defendant's probation are not so burdensome as to inhibit the rehabilitative objectives of his sentence. Probation officers have accommodated defendant's decision to engage in international and interstate business activities by regularly issuing travel passes. Defendant's desire to have longer stays in Ecuador, coach his children's sports teams, and travel without contacting his probation officer, is insufficient to warrant termination of his probation. In addition, for the A-2741-24 10 reasons stated by the motion court, the legal precedents on which defendant relies do not mandate reversal of its initial decision.2 Nor did the court err when it denied defendant's motion for reconsideration. Although there is no rule addressing motions for reconsideration in criminal matters, such motions are permitted. State v. Timmendequas, 161 N.J. 515, 554 (1999), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 858 (2001). "Reconsideration is not to be granted lightly and the grounds for reconsideration are generally limited. The proper object of reconsideration is to correct a court's error or oversight" on the original motion. State v. Puryear, 441 N.J. Super. 280, 294 (App. Div. 2015) (citing Palombi v. Palombi, 414 N.J. Super. 274, 288 (App. Div. 2010)). The motion "cannot be used to expand the record and reargue a motion." Capital Fin. Co. of Del. Valley v. Asterbadi, 398 N.J. Super. 299, 310 (App. Div. 2008). We review a denial of a motion for reconsideration for an abuse of discretion. Cummings v. Bahr, 295 N.J. Super. 374, 389 (App. Div. 1996). 2 Among the precedents defendant cited is State v. Zordani, 201 N.J. Super. 179, 183 (App. Div. 1985). That citation is to a page in the middle of the opinion in Plaza Road Co-op., Inc. v. Finn, 201 N.J. Super. 174 (App. Div. 1985), and our research uncovered no published New Jersey precedent entitled State v. Zordani. A-2741-24 11 Defendant's motion for reconsideration essentially reiterated the arguments he made in his initial motion. However, as explained above, the court's denial of defendant's motion to terminate his probation was substantively sound. Defendant also argues reconsideration was warranted because the motion court decided his initial motion without granting his request for oral argument or contacting his probation officer. There is no support for defendant's contention the court was required to take either of those steps before deciding his motion. We have considered defendant's remaining arguments and conclude they are without sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11- 3(e)(2). Affirmed. A-2741-24 12