State of New Jersey v. Itiyanah Spruill

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3. SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-0821-24 STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. ITIYANAH SPRUILL, a/k/a ITIYANAH SPRULL, Defendant-Appellant. ________________________ Argued September 22, 2026 – Decided November 2, 2026 Before Judges Gilson, Paganelli, and DeAngelis. On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Essex County, Indictment No. 23-05-1132. Samuel C. Carrigan, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant (Jennifer N. Sellitti, Public Defender, attorney; Samuel C. Carrigan, of counsel and on the briefs). Margaret Myaskovskaya, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for respondent (Theodore N. Stephens II, Essex County Prosecutor, attorney; Margaret Myaskovskaya, of counsel and on the brief). PER CURIAM A jury convicted defendant Itiyanah Spruill of first-degree murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1), and first-degree conspiracy to commit murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2(a)(1) and N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1). The conspiracy conviction was merged into the murder conviction, and she was sentenced to thirty-five years in prison with thirty years of parole ineligibility. Defendant appeals, arguing her convictions should be reversed because the trial court gave incorrect and confusing jury instructions, the prosecutor made inappropriate comments during closing arguments, her statement to law enforcement personnel should have been suppressed, and the cumulative effects of those errors deprived her of a fair trial. Defendant also argues that her sentence was excessive. Having reviewed the record and law, we reject defendant's arguments and affirm. I. During the evening of November 30, 2022, L.S. (Luther) and J.B. (Jay) were walking on a street in Newark, when a masked individual approached them and shot and killed Luther. 1 In the ensuing investigation, law enforcement 1 We use initials and fictitious names for the victim and witnesses to protect their privacy interests. See R. 1:38-3(c). A-0821-24 2 personnel collected evidence and information from Jay, people who had interacted with Luther that evening, surveillance cameras that captured the shooting and activities in the area before and after the shooting, information and data from cell phones, and a statement from defendant. Based on that evidence, law enforcement personnel came to believe that defendant had conspired with the shooter to murder Luther, had driven the shooter to the area where Luther was hanging out, had lured Luther to the location where the shooter was waiting, and had driven the shooter away after the shooting. Police began the investigation when several officers responded to Salem Avenue where the shooting occurred. At the scene, officers found Luther lying dead on the ground. Luther had been shot ten times in the face, chest, hand, arm, and back. They recovered Luther's cell phone from a pocket in his clothing. Officers also searched the area and found a cell phone, which they later determined belonged to Jay. Thereafter, officers interviewed Jay. Jay later testified that on the evening of November 30, 2022, he was with Luther, who he knew as "BU." At around 7:00 p.m. that evening, Luther and Jay went to a gas station located on South Orange Avenue and then walked to Salem Street. On Salem Street, Jay saw a A-0821-24 3 masked individual walking towards them. The individual then shot Luther multiple times. During the shooting, Jay ran away towards a liquor store and dropped his cell phone. He reported that he could not identify the shooter because the shooter wore a face mask. Jay also acknowledged that he had been drinking, had been intoxicated that evening, and he did not remember everything that happened that night. Law enforcement personnel also learned that an hour before the shooting, at approximately 6:30 p.m., Luther had gone to a 7-Eleven where his girlfriend T.A. (Tammy) worked. Tammy later testified that Luther and a man that she knew as "Buddha" had gotten into a fight while at the 7-Eleven. Following further investigation, Detective Xavier Valentin, who was the lead detective investigating the case, came to believe that Buddha was L.M. (Luke). Based on information from a confidential informant, Valentin obtained a warrant for data from a cell phone he believed Luke used. The cell phone data revealed that Luke's cell phone had communicated with Luther's cell phone more than thirty times on the day before the shooting. Valentin also learned that Luke's cell phone had contacted a cell number used by defendant at 6:51 p.m. on November 30, 2022. At trial, however, Valentin acknowledged that the subscriber information for the cell phone he believed to have been used by Luke A-0821-24 4 traced back to a company in Georgia and he could not recall how he had connected Luke to that phone. Ultimately, Luke was never located. Nor was he charged with the murder of Luther. Instead, at the time of trial, the State did not present evidence conclusively identifying the shooter. As part of the investigation, law enforcement personnel collected surveillance footage from cameras located around the area of the shooting. That video footage showed that just before the shooting, a light-colored sports utility vehicle (SUV) was driving in the area. Detective Valentin testified at trial that the vehicle appeared to circle the block twice, stopped at one point in the middle of Salem Street, and moved back and forth before continuing down Salem Street. Video footage from another camera then showed the SUV turn from Salem Street onto Rockland Terrace, park, and turn its lights off. Detective Valentin attempted to identify the license plate number from the surveillance video footage but could not see the license plate. He then searched the automated license plate reader in that area from approximately 12:00 p.m. on November 30, 2022, to shortly after the shooting. That search identified a light-colored BMW SUV, with a license plate number registered to C.P. A-0821-24 5 (Catherine). Catherine was contacted and she informed detectives that she had sold the BMW to defendant in October 2022. Further investigation revealed that the BMW had been stopped the day after the shooting on December 1, 2022, for a motor vehicle violation. At that time, a woman, who was not defendant, was driving the BMW and there was a passenger in the back seat. Catherine told police that defendant had contacted her that same day asking for the insurance card for the BMW. Catherine sent defendant a screenshot of the card using a cell number law enforcement later came to believe was used by defendant. Video footage also captured the shooting. That footage depicted an individual coming from the direction of Rockland Avenue onto Salem Avenue just before the shooting. The individual then moved behind a parked van. At approximately 7:34 p.m., the individual walked towards Luther and Jay and then shot Luther multiple times. Following the shooting, other video footage showed that the shooter ran towards South Orange Avenue. At approximately 7:35 p.m., surveillance footage from another camera showed what appeared to be the shooter get into a light-colored SUV and the SUV drove off. A-0821-24 6  Data obtained from Luther's cell phone showed that just before the shooting Luther had two missed calls from a 973 number. That data also revealed that at 7:31 p.m. on November 30, 2022, Luther made a call to the 973 number and that call lasted for two minutes and fifty-two seconds. Moments after that call ended, Luther was shot. An investigation into the 973 number ultimately led back to an IP address and a 718 number. Further investigation revealed that the 718 cell number had previously been used by defendant. Special Agent John Hauger, who was with the Federal Bureau of Investigation, conducted a cell site location analysis of the 718 phone number associated with defendant and of the cell phone associated with Luke. That analysis revealed that in the minutes leading up to the shooting the cell phone with the number associated with defendant was in the area of the shooting. The data also showed that that cell phone remained in that area until approximately 7:37 p.m. The analysis of Luke's phone number indicated that his phone was also in the area of the shooting on November 30, 2022. On March 7, 2023, defendant was arrested. She was then taken to the Essex County Prosecutor's Office where she was given and waived her Miranda2 rights and agreed to be questioned by detectives. During her interrogation, 2 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). A-0821-24 7 defendant admitted that she owned a blue/light gray BMW. She also admitted that her BMW was at the scene of the shooting. Defendant claimed that she had been in the area of the shooting earlier that day but was not there at the time of the shooting. In that regard, she denied being in the car at the time of the shooting and stated that she did not know who was driving her BMW at that time. Defendant also explained that she frequently changed her cell number and that she had used a 718 number. During her interrogation, defendant also stated that she did not know Luther, but knew he was called "BU." In May 2023, a grand jury indicted defendant for two crimes: (1) first - degree conspiracy to commit murder; and (2) first-degree murder as an accomplice. Before trial, the State moved to admit the statements defendant had given to law enforcement personnel following her arrest. Thereafter, the trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing on the admissibility of defendant's statements to detectives. At that hearing, Detective Valentin testified. When questioned about defendant's demeanor during her interrogation, Valentin stated that he did not see any signs indicating defendant was under the influence of either drugs or alcohol and defendant appeared to be alert and was able to answer questions. A-0821-24 8  At the hearing, defense counsel argued that defendant's statement should be suppressed because there were signs indicating that defendant was intoxicated. The trial court ultimately rejected those arguments, finding that defendant had knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived her Miranda rights before she agreed to be interrogated. Relying on the testimony of Detective Valentin, the court found that defendant was alert and understood what was going on during the interrogation. After reviewing the video of the police interrogation, the trial court found defendant was responsive when she was speaking with the detectives. Thus, on October 10, 2023, the trial court granted the State's motion to admit at trial defendant's statements given to the detectives. A seven-day trial was conducted in June 2024. At trial, the jury heard testimony from Valentin and other officers regarding their investigations and from Hauger concerning his analysis of the cell phone location data. In his testimony, Valentin acknowledged that he had not interviewed Luke and he was uncertain as to what role, if any, Luke had played in the murder. The jury also heard testimony from Jay, Tammy, and Catherine. Additionally, portions of defendant's interrogation by the detectives were played for the jury. Defendant elected not to testify. A-0821-24 9  After hearing the testimony and considering the evidence presented at trial, and having been instructed on the law, the jury convicted defendant of both first-degree conspiracy to commit murder and murder as an accomplice. Thereafter, defendant was sentenced. The court merged the conspiracy conviction with the murder conviction and sentenced defendant on the murder conviction to thirty-five years in prison, with periods of parole ineligibility and parole supervision as prescribed by the No Early Release Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43- 7.2.3 Defendant now appeals from her convictions and sentence. II. On appeal, defendant makes five main arguments with several sub- arguments, which she articulates as follows: POINT I – THE CONVICTIONS MUST BE REVERSED BECAUSE THE JURY WAS MISINSTRUCTED ON CORE LEGAL CONCEPTS AND THE TRIAL COURT COMPOUNDED THE ERROR BY REFUSING TO PROVIDE CLARIFYING GUIDANCE WHEN THE JURY REQUESTED IT. A. The court misstated the law by conflating accomplice liability and conspiracy and provided the jury with an erroneous written charge. 3 The Judgment of Conviction (JOC) incorrectly states that the murder conviction was merged into the conspiracy conviction. Because the JOC is inconsistent with the judge's ruling as reflected in the sentencing transcript, it should be corrected. R. 1:13-1. A-0821-24 10  B. The court failed its duty to respond meaningfully to the jury's note, instead directing them back to a written charge it knew to be flawed. C. The court relied on an archaic, confusing model instruction that it could reasonably have foreseen would compound the jury's confusion. POINT II – THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO ADDRESS THE PREJUDICE CAUSED BY THE PROSECUTOR'S SUMMATION COMMENTS DENIGRATING DEFENSE COUNSEL AS A LIAR, REQUIRING REVERSAL. POINT III – [DEFENDANT]'S STATEMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED BECAUSE SHE WAS INTOXICATED AT THE TIME OF THE PURPORTED WAIVER OF RIGHTS. POINT IV – THE CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF THESE ERRORS WARRANTS REVERSAL OF THE CONVICTIONS AND SENTENCE. POINT V – THE SENTENCE IS EXCESSIVE. A. THE JURY INSTRUCTIONS. Proper jury instructions in a criminal case "are essential to a fair trial." State v. McKinney, 223 N.J. 475, 495 (2015) (quoting State v. Green, 86 N.J. 281, 287 (1981)). Inaccurate instructions on a material issue "are presumed to be reversible error." State v. Lopez, 187 N.J. 91, 101 (2006) (quoting State v. Marshall, 173 N.J. 343, 359 (2002)). Thus, "[e]rroneous instructions are poor A-0821-24 11 candidates for rehabilitation as harmless, and are ordinarily presumed to be reversible error." McKinney, 223 N.J. at 495-96 (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Afanador, 151 N.J. 41, 54 (1997)). When a reviewing court examines a jury charge, it "must not look at portions of the charge alleged to be erroneous in isolation; rather, 'the charge should be examined as a whole to determine its overall effect,' and 'whether the challenged language was misleading or ambiguous.'" Id. at 494 (first quoting State v. Jordan, 147 N.J. 409, 422 (1997) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); and then quoting State v. Nelson, 173 N.J. 417, 447 (2002)). Therefore, in a case where the defendant alleges that parts of the jury instructions were erroneous, "[t]he test to be applied . . . is whether the charge as a whole is misleading, or sets forth accurately and fairly the controlling principles of law." Id. at 496 (alteration and omission in original) (quoting State v. Jackmon, 305 N.J. Super. 274, 299 (App. Div. 1997)). Defendant did not object to the jury instructions at trial. Accordingly, we review these issues for plain errors. State v. Funderburg, 225 N.J. 66, 79 (2016). Under that standard, an appellate court will "disregard any alleged error 'unless it is of such a nature as to have been clearly capable of producing an unjust A-0821-24 12 result.'" Ibid. (quoting R. 2:10-2). The New Jersey Supreme Court has explained: [I]n the context of jury instructions, plain error is "[l]egal impropriety in the charge prejudicially affecting the substantial rights of the defendant and sufficiently grievous to justify notice by the reviewing court and to convince the court that of itself the error possessed a clear capacity to bring about an unjust result." [McKinney, 223 N.J. at 494 (second alteration in original) (quoting State v. Camacho, 218 N.J. 533, 554 (2014)).] Defendant challenges the jury instructions on three grounds. First, she contends the trial court's instructions conflated accomplice and conspiracy liability resulting in erroneous jury instruction on both charges. Next, she argues the court compounded that error by failing to adequately respond to a jury note concerning the charges. Finally, defendant takes issue with a sentence in the model jury instructions for accomplice liability, arguing the sentence is confusing and difficult to understand. 1. The Accomplice Liability Charge. The trial court began by instructing the jury on the charges of murder and conspiracy. It also explained the concept of vicarious liability through conspiracy. The court's instructions on each of these legal points tracked the A-0821-24 13 applicable model jury charge. See Model Jury Charges (Criminal), "Murder (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3a(1) and 3a(2))" (rev. June 14, 2004); Model Jury Charges (Criminal), "Conspiracy (N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2)" (rev. Apr. 12, 2010); Model Jury Charges (Criminal), "Conspiracy – Vicarious Liability (N.J.S.A. 2C:2-6b(4))" (approved Oct. 17, 1988). Next, the court read the model jury instructions for accomplice liability. In doing so, the court read the following portion from the model charge: In order to find the defendant guilty of the specific crime charged, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt each of the following elements. One, that the defendant and/or the unnamed shooter committed the crime of the murder of [Luther]. I already explained the elements of that offense. Two, that the defendant did aid or agree or attempt to aid the unnamed shooter in planning or committing the offense. Three, that the defendant's purpose was to promote or facilitate the commission of the offense . . . . Four, that the defendant possessed the criminal state of mind that is required to be proved against the person who actually committed the criminal act. So the first element that the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt is that the defendant and/or the unnamed shooter committed the crime of the murder of [Luther]. .... The question of accomplice status should be considered separately by you as to each charge that I just described. A-0821-24 14  Defendant argues that because the court had described the charge of conspiracy earlier in its instructions and then told the jury to consider accomplice liability "as to each charge that I just described," the jury was misled to believe that accomplice liability applies to both murder and conspiracy, instead of just murder. Defendant points out that the same confusing language also appeared in the written instructions provided to the jury during deliberations. Defendant's arguments, however, overlook that when instructing the jury on accomplice liability, the trial court identified only one charge: murder. Indeed, the court was doing what the model jury charge for accomplice liability requires—namely, specifying the charge to which accomplice liability applied. See Model Jury Charges (Criminal), "Liability for Another's Conduct (N.J.S.A. 2C:2-6)," at 2-4 (rev. June 7, 2021). In instructing the jury on accomplice liability, the court identified only murder, and it never expressly referred to conspiracy. Although the court should have omitted the phrase "as to each charge" because accomplice liability applied only to the murder charge, that wording did not constitute plain error. The instructions, read as a whole, made clear that accomplice liability applied only to murder. Indeed, in the remainder of its A-0821-24 15 accomplice liability instruction, the court repeatedly clarified that accomplice liability applied only to the murder charge: In order to convict the defendant as an accomplice to the specific crime charged, which here is murder, you must find that the defendant had the purpose to participate in that particular crime. . . . In sum, in order to find the defendant you are considering here guilty of committing the crime of the murder of [Luther], the State must prove each of the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt. One, that the defendant and/or the unnamed shooter committed the crime of murder of [Luther]. The court later corrected the reference to both charges, by telling the jury: I remind you to consider the accomplice charge separately as to each . . . well, strike that. You are to consider the accomplice charge as to the direct charge of murder. Therefore, when read as a whole, the court's instructions made clear that accomplice liability only applied to the murder charge and not conspiracy. We also note, that to the extent there was any confusion, it was related only to whether accomplice liability applied to the conspiracy charge. The charge concerning murder was correct. Ultimately, the jury convicted defendant of both charges, and the conspiracy conviction was merged into the murder conviction. Thus, defendant has suffered no prejudice from the alleged confusing instructions related to the conspiracy charge. A-0821-24 16  2. The Jury Note. Defendant also asserts the trial court failed to adequately address a jury note concerning the charges. After several hours of deliberation, the jury sent a note, which read: "After lunch, we wish to have another clarification of the definitions of, one, murder, and two, conspiracy." In response the court told the jurors: [A]s far as that question, you have two copies of the jury charge. That's exactly what I read to you. I'm not sure what further clarification you seek and I'm not sure what more I can give you than [what] is already in the charge. So, you have it. If you need a couple more copies of the jury charge, you know, we can accommodate that. If that's what you need, then let me know. The jury sent no further notes and returned its verdict later that same day. Defendant argues that the jury's note indicated the jurors may have been confused regarding the concept of accomplice liability, and that the court erred by directing "them to re-read the written charge—despite knowing that it included mistaken statements of law." As already explained, however, both the court's oral instructions and the written instructions properly informed the jury that accomplice liability applies only to the murder charge. Furthermore, the jury's note did not mention accomplice liability and only asked the court to explain the definitions of murder and conspiracy again. A-0821-24 17  The New Jersey Supreme Court has explained that when jurors pose a simple, unambiguous question to the court, it may be appropriate for the court to simply reread the jury instructions. See State v. Berry, 254 N.J. 129, 146 (2023) ("We appreciate the trial judge's inclination to reiterate only the words of the model jury charge. Depending on the question posed, many times it is entirely appropriate to do so."). In contrast, when a jury poses an ambiguous question, "a trial judge 'must clarify the jury's inquiry by ascertaining the meaning of its request.'" Ibid. (quoting State v. Savage, 172 N.J. 374, 394 (2002)). Here, the jury's question was clear. The jury asked for clarification on the definitions of murder and conspiracy. Given that unambiguous question, it was acceptable for the trial court to refer the jury back to the model charge for each crime. See State v. Parsons, 270 N.J. Super. 213, 221 (App. Div. 1994) ("Sometimes a question is direct and simple to answer. For instance, if the jurors ask to be reminded of a definition or of one or more elements of a crime, the judge may simply repeat the appropriate portion of the instructions."). 3. The Model Charge of Accomplice Liability. Finally, defendant takes issue with one sentence from the model jury charge for accomplice liability, which the trial court read to the jury. A-0821-24 18 Specifically, defendant points to the following sentence and argues it is confusing: While mere presence at the scene of the perpetration of a crime does not render a person a participant in it, proof that one is present at the scene of the commission of the crime without disapproving or opposing it is evidence from which, in connection with other circumstances, it is possible for the jury to infer that he or she assented thereto, lent [to it] his or her countenance and approval, and was thereby aiding the same. We have explained "a jury charge is presumed to be proper when it tracks the model jury charge because the process to adopt model jury charges is 'comprehensive and thorough.'" State v. Cotto, 471 N.J. Super. 489, 543 (App. Div. 2022) (quoting State v. R.B., 183 N.J. 308, 325 (2005)). Moreover, the sentence defendant focuses on is one sentence, which was part of a broader explanation of accomplice liability. Consequently, when read in full context, the charge was clear and did not constitute plain error. B. The Prosecutor's Comments During Summation. Next, defendant contends the assistant prosecutor repeatedly accused defense counsel of lying to the jury and the trial court erred in not giving the jury curative instructions regarding those comments. So, defendant asserts, those uncured comments warrant reversal of her convictions. A-0821-24 19  Defendant points to several comments made by the assistant prosecutor during summation. Those comments were made in response to arguments made by defense counsel in his opening and closing statements. The comments defendant points to are the following statement by the assistant prosecutor: I want to be clear, one anonymous tip here was noted in one of those affidavits. So to indicate that wasn't written down anywhere is just a lie, just like indicating that there were numerous confidential informant tips, anonymous tips. That's a lie. That didn't come out in evidence. That was never testified to. There was only one anonymous tip, and that was testified to and that was written down. So I just want to get those lies out of the way now. .... It's not a coincidence that [defendant] did know the victim. You heard her statement, ladies and gentlemen. Think about [] admit what you must and lie about what you can. Think about that. She admitted things. She knew detectives knew her car was on scene. She didn’t know that they could put her there. She didn't know they could link her to the victim. But if you were listening to her statement closely, at one point, she said his name was B-something. Then said BU. The same name that [Jay] gave you. So when defense opened and said [defendant] had no idea who it was, there's no link, that was clearly a lie. Following these statements, the trial court called for a sidebar and stated to counsel: "My only concern is that you keep saying that [defense counsel] lied in . . . her opening and summation, and there is case law that says if you A-0821-24 20 disparage defense counsel, it could be seen as . . . improper. . . ." After that interaction, the trial court did not give any instructions to the jury. Instead, the assistant prosecutor made the following remarks to the jury: Now, ladies and gentlemen, when I'm talking about essentially defense opening, defense closing, and I'm indicating that there are things that are . . . essentially lies, I'm not talking about [defense counsel]. Okay? I'm talking about the facts, because that's what we're here for. Right? The facts. The fact that the defendant doesn't know the victim? That's a lie. And now, the audio that you heard, that statement, you can listen to that at any point, because what you heard is what matters. .... But I want to be clear, that's not where the investigation started. Defense [counsel] came before you and said the investigation started with 7-Eleven, an anonymous tip to 7-Eleven. That's not true. And I'm not saying [defense counsel] is lying in any way, shape, or form, but that's not what the facts show us. The facts show us that detectives responded to 42 Salem Street that night. They responded to that location. They did the walk-through of the scene, as you heard. As defendant concedes, no objection was made by defense counsel regarding the prosecutor's comments and thus plain error applies. R. 2:10-2; State v. Garcia, 245 N.J. 412, 436-37 (2021). The assistant prosecutor's comments were improper. Both her initial comments and the comment she made after the sidebar essentially expressed her A-0821-24 21 view that defendant had lied during her interrogation by detectives. The trial court was correct in calling for a sidebar. The trial court, however, should have instructed the jury to disregard the lying comments. Moreover, the comment the assistant prosecutor made after the sidebar did not cure the problem because she essentially shifted the focus from defense counsel to defendant, thereby suggesting that defendant had lied. Nevertheless, we determine that the comments did not constitute plain error warranting a reversal. Defense counsel did not object to the initial comments or the comment after the sidebar. That failure to object suggest s that defense counsel did not believe the remarks were prejudicial. See State v. Frost, 158 N.J. 76, 84 (1999) (explaining "[t]he failure to object suggests that defense counsel did not believe the remarks were prejudicial at the time they were made"). Moreover, even though the assistant prosecutor's comments were improper, they fell short of being so prejudicial as to warrant reversal. When considered in the overall context of the trial, and the evidence presented, the prosecutor's references to lies did not deprive defendant of a fair trial. Defendant's main defense was that she was not a participant in the planning for or murder of Luther. That defense was clearly presented to the jury, but the jury A-0821-24 22 rejected it. Significantly, the jury was instructed to focus on the evidence and was told that the prosecutor's and defense counsel's statements during opening and closing were not evidence. So, considered in full context, the limited references to lies made during the assistant prosecutor's closing did not deprive defendant of a fair trial. See State v. McNeil-Thomas, 238 N.J. 256, 275 (2019) (explaining that "even when a prosecutor's [comments] stray over the line of permissible commentary," reversal is not required unless it "deprive[d] defendant of a fair trial" (quoting State v. Wakefield, 190 N.J. 397, 437 (2007))). C. Defendant's Statements. In her third argument, defendant contends that she was intoxicated before and during her interrogation and, therefore, she did not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive her Miranda rights. The evidence presented at the Miranda hearing and the findings made by the trial court rebut this argument. An appellate court's review of a suppression hearing is limited. State v. Handy, 206 N.J. 39, 44-45 (2011). "Generally, on appellate review, a trial court's factual findings in support of granting or denying a motion to suppress must be upheld when 'those findings are supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record.'" State v. A.M., 237 N.J. 384, 395 (2019) (quoting State v. S.S., 229 N.J. 360, 374 (2017)). This deference extends to "fact findings A-0821-24 23 based solely on video or documentary evidence." S.S., 229 N.J. at 379. Accordingly, "[a] trial court's finding should be disturbed only if they are so clearly mistaken 'that the interests of justice demand intervention and correction.'" A.M., 237 N.J. at 395-96 (alteration in the original) (quoting State v. Elders, 192 N.J. 224, 244 (2007)). In contrast, questions of law are reviewed de novo. Id. at 396. Before police can question a suspect, they must inform the suspect of her or his constitutional rights under Miranda. State v. O.D.A.-C., 250 N.J. 408, 420 (2022). "The State must also prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the individual knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived those rights 'in light of all the circumstances.'" Ibid. (quoting State v. Sims, 250 N.J. 189, 211 (2022)). Courts consider several factors to determine whether a Miranda waiver was voluntary. Id. at 421. These factors "include the suspect's 'education and intelligence, age, familiarity with the criminal justice system, physical and mental condition, . . . drug and alcohol problems,' how explicit the waiver was, and the amount of time between the reading of the rights and any admissions." Ibid. (omission in the original) (quoting 49 Geo. L.J. Ann. Rev. Crim. Proc. 233- 36 (2020)). In short, the court must look at all relevant facts to determine if A-0821-24 24 waiver was voluntary. State v. Warmbrun, 277 N.J. Super. 51, 62 (App. Div. 1994). Here, defendant's arguments are rebutted by Detective Valentin's testimony, as well as the video recording of the interrogation. At the motion hearing, Valentin testified that defendant was alert, displayed no signs of intoxication from drugs or alcohol, and answered his questions clearly and coherently. The trial court found Valentin's testimony to be credible. Additionally, the trial court reviewed the video and audio recording of defendant's interrogation. The court found defendant to be "responsive," and did not find "the fact that she was sleeping prior to the interview as anything necessarily suggesting that she had to be under the influence of some sort of drugs or alcohol." The trial court's findings are supported by substantial credible evidence in the record. D. The Cumulative Effects of the Alleged Errors. Defendant also asserts that, even if none of the three alleged errors already discussed independently warrants reversal, their cumulative effect deprived her of a fair trial and require reversal. We are not persuaded by this argument. "An appellate court may reverse a trial court's judgment if the cumulative effect of a series of errors is so great as to deprive a defendant of a fair trial." A-0821-24 25 State v. Butler, 263 N.J. 2, 31-32 (2026) (quoting State v. Burney, 255 N.J. 1, 29 (2023)). Importantly, however, "[a] defendant is entitled to a