Full Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3. SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-3051-24 STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. DANIEL MATTHEWS, a/k/a MARCUS MATTHEWS, Defendant-Appellant. Argued October 7, 2026 – Decided November 13, 2026 Before Judges Currier, Marczyk, and Puglisi. On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Somerset County, Indictment No. 24-04- 0173. Zachary G. Markarian, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant (Jennifer N. Sellitti, Public Defender, attorney; Zachary G. Markarian, of counsel and on the briefs). Emily M. M. Pirro, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for respondent (John P. McDonald, Somerset County Prosecutor, attorney; Emily M. M. Pirro, of counsel and on the brief). PER CURIAM Defendant appeals from his convictions for the murder and robbery (and additional charges) of Artis Young after a jury trial, alleging error in the jury charges. After a review of the contentions in light of the record and applicable principles of law, we affirm. I. Defendant and co-defendant, Andrew Mumby, were charged in an indictment with first-degree murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1) and (2) (count one); first-degree felony murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(3) (count two); first-degree robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1(a)(1), (2), and (3) (count three); second-degree conspiracy to disturb human remains, N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2(a)(1) and (2) (count four); second-degree disturbing human remains, N.J.S.A. 2C:22-1(a)(1) (count five); and two counts of third-degree hindering apprehension, N.J.S.A. 2C:29- 3(a)(3) and N.J.S.A. 2C:29-3(b)(1) (counts six and seven). In October 2024, Mumby pleaded guilty to count one, as amended to first- degree aggravated manslaughter, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4(a)(1), in exchange for testifying against defendant at trial and a recommended sentence of twenty years imprisonment with an eighty-five percent parole ineligibility period in accordance with the No Early Release Act (NERA), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2. A-3051-24 2 During the 2025 trial, Mumby testified that on December 29, 2023, he and defendant were at defendant's home in Franklin Township "[s]moking weed, listening to music, [and] watching videos." Mumby stated he was sleeping downstairs when defendant "woke [him] up and told [him] to come upstairs" because defendant "was going to rob" Young of "[s]ome weed." Young had arrived at the house with marijuana while Mumby was sleeping. Mumby went upstairs with defendant and grabbed Young, while defendant choked Young with a string. Mumby stated that he "let go" of Young but defendant kept holding on and wrestled Young to the floor, strangling him "until he was dead." Mumby recalled Young bleeding from his head. Thereafter, defendant pulled Young's car into the driveway and asked Mumby to "help him put [Young] in the trunk," which Mumby did. Mumby testified he and defendant drove to defendant's girlfriend's house in Brooklyn late that night. They "went inside the apartment and then came back out, went to the car and [defendant] told [Mumby] to take [Young's] clothes off." After defendants removed Young's clothes, they "drove around the street and left [Young's] body on the sidewalk." They then drove to the Bronx to defendant's sister's house where they cleaned the car, "[t]ook off the license plates," and left them "[s]omewhere in the area." The pair then took the train A-3051-24 3 back to New Jersey and got into a cab to return to defendant's house. Mumby testified the cab stopped at a store on the way, but he did not go inside. The jury reviewed surveillance footage obtained from three locations: the area of the Bronx where Young's car was found; a supermarket in Somerset where defendant and Mumby stopped on the cab ride; and the cab's arrival at defendant's house in Franklin Township. At some point in the early morning hours of December 30, 2023, defendant was captured on a surveillance camera in the Bronx and appeared to be dancing next to the car in which Young's body was still concealed. Somerset County Prosecutor's Office Detective Thomas Laird testified the date and time stamp on the video from the supermarket surveillance footage showed defendant in the store on December 30, 2023, at 10:25 p.m. After watching the footage, Laird walked the same path in the store as the man in the video and determined the man purchased a bottle of bleach. Shameka Nicole Downing, who has a son with Young, testified she last saw Young on December 29, 2023, when he left a house with a bookbag containing marijuana packaged in freezer bags. Young answered the phone when Downing called him around 6:00 p.m., but her call at 9:00 p.m. went to his voicemail, and she did not speak to him again. A-3051-24 4 On December 30, 2023, the New York City Police Department (NYPD) received a 9-1-1 call about an unconscious man on a sidewalk in Brooklyn. When police arrived at the scene, they found a deceased man, later identified as Young, wearing "nothing but underwear," with "ligature marks on [his] neck" and "bruising around [his] body." The medical examiner performed an autopsy and concluded Young died by ligature strangulation. Detectives later located Young's vehicle in the South Bronx after "receiv[ing] information . . . that a [license plate reader] . . . [and] cameras had picked up the vehicle in that area." The front and rear license plates had been removed from the car, but the VIN number on the driver's side dash confirmed the car was Young's. A search of the car identified reddish-brown stains in the trunk consistent with blood. Bloodstains were also found in defendant's garage. A sweatshirt found in defendant's home tested positive for blood. Further DNA testing analysis revealed "very strong support" for the conclusion that defendant and Young were contributors to the DNA mixtures developed from the sweatshirt. Cell phone records traced the movement of phones owned by Mumby, Young, and a person who lived in an apartment near where Young's body was A-3051-24 5 found.1 The number on the tenant's phone was listed in Mumby's contacts as belonging to defendant, using a nickname. This evidence revealed all three phones were near defendant's house in Franklin Township on December 29, 2023, from 6:23 p.m. through 9:54 p.m. The phone number assigned to Young went dark for a period of time before being located in the Bronx on the morning of December 30, 2023. Mumby's phone was detected at defendant's house on December 29 and 30. The phone affiliated with the Bronx tenant left defendant's house and was located in the area of the Goethals Bridge, the Verrazano Bridge, and then in Brooklyn at the location of Young's body, before returning to defendant's home. A search of Mumby's phone revealed that, on December 30, 2023, at 11:41 a.m., Mumby texted a photograph of a freezer bag of marijuana to an unidentified individual. The jury acquitted defendant of felony murder but convicted him of the remaining charges in the indictment. The court sentenced defendant to fifty years imprisonment for the murder conviction and twenty years imprisonment for the first-degree robbery conviction, subject to an eighty-five percent period of parole ineligibility pursuant to NERA. The court merged counts four and five and imposed a ten- 1 Defendant was also listed as a tenant of the apartment. A-3051-24 6 year sentence on that count; and the court sentenced defendant to five years imprisonment on each count of third-degree hindering. The sentences all ran concurrently. II. On appeal, defendant raises the following points for our consideration: POINT I [DEFENDANT'S] MURDER CONVICTION MUST BE REVERSED BECAUSE THE COURT ERRONEOUSLY INSTRUCTED THE JURY THAT IT COULD NOT FIND [DEFENDANT] GUILTY AS AN ACCOMPLICE TO THE LESSER-INCLUDED MANSLAUGHTER OFFENSES, IN VIOLATION OF WELL-SETTLED LAW. POINT II THE COURT'S USE OF "AND/OR" THROUGHOUT ITS CONJOINED ACCOMPLICE LIABILITY CHARGE FOR THE MURDER AND ROBBERY COUNTS FAILED TO ENSURE THAT THE JURY REACHED A UNANIMOUS VERDICT ON EACH DISTINCT COUNT. Defendant challenges two jury instructions, contending they are reversible error requiring a new trial. Appropriate and proper jury instructions are essential for a fair trial. State v. Scharf, 225 N.J. 547, 581 (2016). "[E]rroneous instructions are poor candidates for rehabilitation as harmless, and are ordinarily presumed to be A-3051-24 7 reversible error." State v. McKinney, 223 N.J. 475, 495-96 (2015) (quoting State v. Afanador, 151 N.J. 41, 54 (1997)). "Nonetheless, not every improper jury charge warrants reversal and a new trial. 'As a general matter, [appellate courts] will not reverse if an erroneous jury instruction was "incapable of producing an unjust result or prejudicing substantial rights."'" Prioleau v. Kent. Fried Chicken, 223 N.J. 245, 257 (2015) (alteration in original) (quoting Mandal v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 430 N.J. Super. 287, 296 (App. Div. 2013)). The charge must be read as a whole, and not just the challenged portion, to determine its overall effect. State v. Garrison, 228 N.J. 182, 201 (2017). "The test to be applied . . . is whether the charge as a whole is misleading, or sets forth accurately and fairly the controlling principles of law." State v. Baum, 224 N.J. 147, 159 (2016) (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Jackmon, 305 N.J. Super. 274, 299 (App. Div. 1997)). Instructions given in accordance with the model jury charge, or which closely track the model jury charge, are generally not considered erroneous. Mogull v. CB Com. Real Est., 162 N.J. 449, 466 (2000). See State v. Ramirez, 246 N.J. 61, 70 (2021) (finding no plain error where the "judge read the model A-3051-24 8 charge verbatim, and no objection to the endangering instruction was made at trial"). A. In his first contention regarding the jury charges, defendant asserts "[t]he trial court erroneously charged the jury that, if it found [defendant] acted as an accomplice in causing Young's death, it could only convict [defendant] of murder and not either of the charged lesser[-]ncluded offenses of reckless and aggravated manslaughter." Defendant notes that "[d]uring its lengthy deliberations, the jury asked the court to clarify the offenses for which it could find [defendant] guilty under an accomplice theory, and the [trial] court again said it could not do so for aggravated or reckless manslaughter." Defendant relies on State v. Bielkiewicz, 267 N.J. Super. 520, 534-36 (App. Div. 1993), to support his contention. To properly assess defendant's argument, we must add some context. During the charge conference, the following colloquy took place: THE COURT: Do both parties agree that aggravated manslaughter and . . . manslaughter [are] appropriate charge[s] for this case? .... [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I think the standard here, Judge, is whether or not there's evidence in the record A-3051-24 9 to support the lesser includeds and then the [c]ourt has to charge them. [I] interpret things differently than the State obviously. I just don't see the evidence in the record that would support the lesser includeds. THE COURT: But your theory, I think, is that [defendant] wasn't involved at all with this part. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Umm-hmm. THE COURT: So I can understand your reasoning as to not wanting it. But when you take into account Mr. Mumby's testimony, there does appear to be a reckless component to it. He didn't say rob and kill, he indicated that we're going to rob him of his weed and it appears that it got out of control and result[ed] in his death. So there—they could find that there is a reckless component to it. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: And, again, Judge, just so the record's clear, I disagree. I think when you look at Mr. Mumby's testimony, he says that [defendant]tthews put a rope or a string around [Young's] neck and choked him and then he was dead. It is not that— THE COURT: Well, he fell on the floor. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: And he fell, right, he fell on the floor, yeah. [THE PROSECUTOR]: Judge, I just have grave concern that not [including] lesser[-]included offenses, if there's any possibility of the jury finding—I mean, I've seen reversals on this. I saw a reversal not that long ago on a case in this courthouse where, you know, originally, I think the State asked for it and the defense said no and then they reversed the conviction and said A-3051-24 10 well, the defense was wrong and they should have had it. THE COURT: Umm-hmm. [THE PROSECUTOR]: I think if there is a possibility the jury could find there was reckless conduct here and that it wasn't purposeful or knowing but reckless, then I think it shouldn't be there and, again, it's not my theory of the case either, but— THE COURT: Right. [THE PROSECUTOR]: —I can see where they could get there. THE COURT: Well, the [c]ourt has to make its decision and I do recall a case in which both parties didn't want the charge and . . . the [c]ourt did charge based on the evidence that was submitted and the possibility that they could find an aggravated manslaughter or reckless manslaughter. Again, I do believe it's appropriate based on the evidence that has been put forward by the State today that they could find this defendant not guilty of murder purposeful and knowingly, that he didn't have that intent when he started and that it was really reckless conduct on his part manifesting an extreme indifference to the value of human life. So I will charge the lesser included of aggravated manslaughter and manslaughter in this case. Therefore, over defendant's objection, the court charged the jury with the lesser- included offenses of aggravated manslaughter and manslaughter. A-3051-24 11 Defendant reiterated his objection to the jury being instructed as to lesser- included offenses during the discussion regarding the accomplice liability charge. Defense counsel argued accomplice liability should not apply to aggravated or reckless manslaughter. The following discussion ensued: THE COURT: All right. Okay. Then we get to—we have to go through this liability for another's conduct. So are you saying the accomplice [charge] based on what I'm reading here, which I agree with that it only applies to the murder? [THE PROSECUTOR]: And the robbery. So what I suggested, and I think this is what defense counsel agreed with me, is that . . . with regard to accomplice liability, it applies obviously to the first Count 1, the murder charge, but it does not apply to the lesser includeds of agg[ravated] man[slaughter] and reckless man[slaughter]. It also would apply to the robbery, though what I proposed was striking all of the language in there that dealt with agg[ravated] man[slaughter] or reckless man[slaughter] and just leaving the robbery language in. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: That's correct. And I've had an opportunity to review that, as I know the [c]ourt has as well. The court then engaged in a lengthy discussion with counsel regarding the instruction on accomplice liability. Counsel each made suggested edits, with which the other attorney and court agreed. A-3051-24 12 The trial court again specifically asked to "go through in a little bit of detail here because [it] want[ed] to make sure this lesser included part [wa]s correct [with] regards to accomplice liability." While the parties were discussing the robbery charges, defense counsel stated unprompted: "Judge, I think—it's getting confusing here, but I would add that—that this principle of law [accomplice liability]—not this specific language, but this principle of law does not apply to agg[ravated] man[slaughter] or reckless man[slaughter] I think." Defendant continued to assert he wanted the jury to only consider accomplice liability for the robbery charges, and not aggravated manslaughter or reckless manslaughter. As the discussion continued, defense counsel stated, "I think the record should reflect that this difficulty is coming because [of] the lesser . . . includeds of aggravated manslaughter and reckless manslaughter." Eventually, the trial court and counsel agreed on the following instruction: THE COURT: Okay. So then let me just go over it again, . . . to make sure everyone's in agreement. So . . . if you . . . find the defendant guilty of the specific charges [murder or first-degree robbery], then you need not consider any lesser charges. If, however, you find the defendant not guilty of murder acting as an accomplice, you should go on to consider aggravated manslaughter or reckless manslaughter. Accomplice A-3051-24 13 liability is not applied to aggravated manslaughter or reckless manslaughter. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Yeah, I . . . would just add . . . instead of just saying whether [to] go on to, whether [defendant] is guilty or not guilty, right? THE COURT: You should go on to consider aggravated manslaughter or reckless manslaughter and whether [defendant] is guilty or not guilty of those lesser[-]included offenses. Defense counsel added: [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: If I can make a suggestion that on . . . page . . . 38 where it says again, accomplice status must be considered separately as it relates to each offense, I would specifically say that as it relates to murder, first degree robbery, second degree robbery. That—I think that can't be any clearer than that. THE COURT: Prosecutor, do you agree, or is that going to confuse them? [PROSECUTOR]: No. I think that's fine. [(Emphasis added).] The jury was ultimately charged with the following jury instruction regarding accomplice liability for the murder and robbery charges: If you find that the State has proven each one of the elements as described above beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the defendant guilty of purposeful or knowing murder and/or first degree robbery. If, on the other hand, you find the State had failed to prove one or more of these elements beyond a A-3051-24 14 reasonable doubt, then you must find the defendant not guilty of purposeful or knowing murder and/or first degree robbery. As I previously instructed, any verdict rendered must be unanimous. All 12 deliberating jurors must agree as to guilty or not guilty. Now, as I have previously indicated, you will initially consider whether the defendant should be found not guilty or guilty of acting as an accomplice with . . . Mumby with full and equal responsibility for the specific crimes charged, murder and/or first degree robbery. If you find the defendant guilty of the specific charges, then you need not consider any lesser charges. If, however, you find the defendant not guilty of murder acting as an accomplice of . . . Mumby, you should go on to consider the offenses of aggravated manslaughter or reckless manslaughter and whether [defendant] is guilty or not guilty of those lesser included offenses. You are not, however, to consider accomplice liability as to those offenses as it does not apply, that would be aggravated manslaughter and reckless manslaughter. If, however, you find [defendant] not guilty in acting as an accomplice of . . . Mumby on a specific charge, first degree robbery, then you should consider whether the defendant did act as an accomplice of . . . Mumby but with a purpose of promoting or facilitating the commission of second degree robbery. Our law recognizes that two or more persons may participate in the commission of an offense, but each may participate therein with a different state of mind. The liability or responsibility of each participant of any ensuing offense is dependent on his own state of mind and not on anyone else's. Guided by these legal A-3051-24 15 principles and if you have found [defendant] not guilty of the specific crime charged, first degree robbery, you should then consider whether [defendant] is guilty or not guilty as an accomplice on the lesser charge of second degree robbery. [(Emphasis added).] During the jury's deliberations, they asked several questions, including seeking clarification regarding the "attachment to accomplice charge as it relates to murder charge." The trial court asked the jury to clarify what they meant, and the jury responded: "Does the (indiscernible) liability for another's conduct accomplice, . . . apply to all charges and if not, which ones." Defense counsel stated he was "afraid that . . . was going to happen." The trial court advised it would tell the jury that accomplice liability only applied to the charges of murder, robbery, and disturbing human remains. Defense counsel did not object but asked what language the court would use to answer the jury's question. The trial court stated: "I'm going to indicate you should—you can consider the charge of accomplice liability as to murder, first degree robbery, second degree robbery and disturbing human remains." Defense counsel's only response was "[t]hank you." When the jury returned to the courtroom, the court gave it the exact language discussed with counsel as to which charges it should consider for accomplice liability. A-3051-24 16 During the sentencing hearing, defendant moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and for a new trial. Defendant argued the court erred in charging accomplice liability as to the murder and robbery offenses, which required a new trial. The court denied the motions, finding "[t]he weight of the evidence here clearly shows that an accomplice charge was appropriate and that the defendant was not prejudiced by an error of its inclusion in regard to murder and robbery." Throughout the trial and extensively during the charge conference, defendant urged the court not to charge the jury with any lesser-included offenses. However, in considering the evidence, the court found there was "a reckless component to [the murder]" which required it to charge aggravated manslaughter and manslaughter as lesser-included offenses. Defendant does not assert the court's determination to charge the lesser- included charges was error. Indeed, in State v. Simms, 369 N.J. Super. 466, 471 (App. Div. 2004), we stated: [t]he well-established rule is that if a charge on the lesser[]included is requested, it must be given if rationally based on the evidence, and if not requested, must nevertheless be given if clearly indicated by the evidence. Beyond that, the judge has an independent obligation to instruct on clearly indicated lesser- included offenses even if the defendant objects. A-3051-24 17 [(Internal citations omitted).] However, as seen in the colloquy quoted above, defense counsel remained adamant that the court only charge the jury with accomplice liability regarding the murder and robbery charges and not the lesser-included offenses. Now, on appeal, defendant contends the court erred in complying with his request and instead should have charged accomplice liability as to the lesser-included offenses. "Mistakes at trial are subject to the invited-error doctrine." State v. A.R., 213 N.J. 542, 561 (2013). "Under that settled principle of law, trial errors that '"were induced, encouraged or acquiesced in or consented to by defense counsel ordinarily are not a basis for reversal on appeal . . . ."'" Ibid. (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Corsaro, 107 N.J. 339, 345 (1987)). The doctrine of invited error "is grounded in considerations of fairness[] and is meant to prevent defendants from manipulating the system." Id. at 561-62 (internal citations omitted) (citation modified). The record supports the application of the invited error doctrine. Defense counsel vigorously opposed the accomplice charge regarding the lesser-included offenses, which resulted in the court and counsel spending a significant amount of time painstakingly crafting a charge to defendant's liking. Defense counsel A-3051-24 18 agreed to the ultimate iteration of the charge and there was no objection during the jury instructions. This acceptance of the charge was ratified by counsel's agreement to the court's reiteration to the jury, in response to its question, that accomplice liability only pertained to the murder and robbery charges. We disagree with defendant's contention that Bielkiewicz requires a court to always charge accomplice liability regarding lesser-included charges to murder. 267 N.J. Super. at 527. We considered and rejected that argument in State v. Rue, 296 N.J. Super. 108, 115 (App. Div. 1996), stating: The difference between this case and Bielkiewicz is that the evidence in that case could have supported a finding that defendant Bielkiewicz did not share [co- defendant] Pitts' homicidal state of mind. A jury could reasonably have concluded from his actions that Bielkiewicz was intent on inflicting bodily injury on the victim to help Pitts win the fight, but that he did not share Pitts' intent to cause death or serious bodily injury. That is not the case here. The parties presented the jury with two scenarios. The first was the state's version that defendant himself participated in the vicious beating of the victim which caused the death. The second was that defendant remained in the car and did not participate at all in the crime. Neither of those versions warranted a Bielkiewicz charge, the former because defendant's culpability was as a principal; the latter because defendant was not guilty of a crime at all. Here, as in Rue, defendant claimed he had nothing to do with the murder, while the State's theory was that defendant was the principal and mastermind of A-3051-24 19 the events and strangled Young himself. In addition, the trial court was clear in its instructions to the jury regarding accomplice liability for murder . We acknowledge we may consider whether an induced or invited error on appeal is reversible error if that error "cut mortally into the substantive rights of the defendant." State v. Harper, 128 N.J. Super. 270, 277 (App. Div. 1974). In such cases, the court may decline to apply the invited error doctrine if doing so would "cause a fundamental miscarriage of justice." N.J. Div. v. M.C. III, 201 N.J. 328, 342 (2010) (quoting Brett v. Great Am. Recreation, 144 N.J. 479, 508 (1996)). However, there was no miscarriage of justice established here as there was ample evidence for the jury to reach its guilty verdict. The bloody sweatshirt found in defendant's garage had both his and Young's DNA on it as well as Young's blood. Defendant was seen in video footage dancing next to Young's car while Young was still in the trunk. Cell phone data tracked defendant and Young leaving defendant's home together prior to the murder. In addition, Mumby testified as to defendant's actions regarding the robbery and murder of Young. Even if we disregarded the invited error of counsel regarding the accomplice liability charge, defendant has not demonstrated plain error under A-3051-24 20 Rule 2:10-2 to overturn his conviction on these grounds. See State v. Wakefield, 190 N.J. 397, 473 (2007) (citing State v. Bunch, 180 N.J. 534, 541 (2004)) ("[T]he failure to object to a jury instruction requires review under the plain error standard."). B. We turn to defendant's second contention—that the court's use of "and/or" during the accomplice liability charge failed to ensure the jury reached a unanimous verdict on the separate counts of murder and robbery. Defendant relies on State v. Gonzalez, 444 N.J. Super. 62 (App. Div. 2016), to support his argument. As there was no objection to the jury instruction, we review for plain error. R. 2:10-2. In applying this standard to an alleged erroneous jury instruction, we examine the record to determine whether "impropriety in the charge prejudicially affect[ed] the [defendant’s] substantial rights . . . and . . . [had the] clear capacity to bring about an unjust result." State v. Nero, 195 N.J. 397, 407 (2008) (quoting State v. Hock, 54 N.J. 526, 538 (1969)). In reviewing any claim of error relating to a jury charge, the "charge must be read as a whole in determining whether there was any error," State v. Torres, 183 N.J. 554, 564 (2005), and the effect of any error must be considered "in light A-3051-24 21 of the overall strength of the State's case." State v. Walker, 203 N.J. 73, 90 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Chapland, 187 N.J. 275, 289 (2006)). Prior to the substantive jury charge, the trial court informed the jury: Now, there are seven offenses charged in the indictment. They are separate offenses by separate counts in the indictment. In your determination of whether the State has proven the defendant guilty of the crimes charged in the indictment beyond a reasonable doubt, . . . defendant is entitled to have each count considered separately by the evidence which is relevant and material to that particular charge based on the law as I will give it to you. Thereafter, the court charged the jury as to the elements of murder and robbery in separate sections. The court did not use and/or in any part of those instructions. In charging the jury as to accomplice liability, the court followed the model jury charge verbatim, Model Jury Charges (Criminal), "Liability for Another's Conduct: Accomplice (N.J.S.A. 2C:2-6)" (rev. June 7, 2021), stating: A person is an accomplice of another person in the commission of an offense if with the purpose of promoting or facilitating the commission of the offense, he, [(a)], solicits such other person to commit it and/or [(b)], aids or agrees or attempts to aid such other person in planning or committing it. This provision of the law means not only is the person who actually commits the A-3051-24 22 criminal act responsible for it, but one who is legally accountable as an accomplice is also responsible. Now, this responsibility as an accomplice may be equal and the same as . . . he who actually committed the crimes or they may be responsible or there may be responsibility in a different degree depending on the circumstances as you may find them to be. [(Emphasis added).] In Mogull, 162 N.J. at 466, the Supreme Court noted "[i]t is difficult to find that a charge that follows the Model Charge so closely constitutes plain error." We have similarly stated that "a jury charge is presumed to be proper when it tracks the model jury charge because the process to adopt model jury charges is 'comprehensive and thorough.'" State v. Cotto, 471 N.J. Super. 489, 543 (App. Div. 2022) (quoting State v. R.B., 183 N.J. 308, 325 (2005)). See also State v. Whitaker, 402 N.J. Super. 495, 513-14 (App. Div. 2008), aff'd, 200 N.J. 444 (2009) ("When a jury instruction follows the model jury charge, although not determinative, 'it is a persuasive argument in favor of the charge as delivered.'"). In Gonzalez, we reversed the defendants' convictions after concluding the trial court's repeated use of "and/or" in the jury instructions created ambiguity as to whether the jury was unanimous as to all elements of all offenses. 444 N.J. Super. at 77. We also reversed the defendant's conviction in State v. Fair, 469 N.J. Super. 538, 558, 541 (App. Div. 2021), after determining the trial court A-3051-24 23 failed to instruct the jury it needed to arrive at a unanimous decision on which provision the defendant allegedly violated after he was "charged in a one-count indictment of making terroristic threats within the meaning of 'N.J.S.A. 2C:12 - 3a and/or b.'" After our careful review of the record, we are satisfied the jury instructions at issue here do not present the same troubling ambiguities as those in Gonzalez and Fair because the trial court followed the phrasing of the model jury charges and clearly instructed the jury regarding its consideration of the instructions. The trial court instructed the jury with the model jury charge for the murder and robbery charges. The court clearly expressed the jury must consider each offense separately, assessing the elements that pertain to each crime. Moreover, the court did not use "and/or" in explaining the elements of the charges, instead articulating the elements of each offense separately. In addition, the trial court stated it was using "and/or" in certain instances because the elements applied to both murder and robbery, but the jury did not have to find defendant guilty of both offenses. And, the instructions explicitly provided that the jury's verdict must be unanimous. A-3051-24 24 We are satisfied defendant has not demonstrated the trial court's jury instructions were plain error "clearly capable of producing an unjust result." Whitaker, 200 N.J. at 465; R. 2:10-2. Affirmed. A-3051-24 25