Full Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3. SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-1371-24 STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. VERNON L. BRANTLEY, a/k/a VERNON BRANTLEY, and VERNON BRANTLY, Defendant-Appellant. ___________________________ Submitted October 22, 2026 – Decided November 2, 2026 Before Judges Mawla and Chase. On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Middlesex County, Indictment No. 21-02- 0089. Jennifer N. Sellitti, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Monique Moyse, Designated Counsel, on the briefs). Linda Estremera, Middlesex County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Nancy A. Hulett, Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief). PER CURIAM Defendant Vernon Brantley appeals from a December 9, 2024 Law Division order denying his petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) without an evidentiary hearing. We affirm. I. On October 9, 2020, defendant entered a Krauszer's store in New Brunswick. While the clerk was speaking with another customer, defendant went behind the counter, clutched the right side of his waistband, and demanded money. When the clerk tried to get out from behind the counter, defendant struggled with him and punched him. The clerk escaped from behind the counter and ran outside. Defendant started to chase him, then stopped and ripped the cash register off the counter. The clerk tried to trap defendant inside by locking the door from outside and lowering the metal gate, but defendant used the cash register to smash the glass door and escape. Defendant then ran down the street. Two sanitation workers saw him, chased him, and tackled him. Police arrived while the workers restrained defendant and recovered a large knife under his body. A-1371-24 2 A Middlesex County grand jury indicted defendant for: first-degree robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1(a); third-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:20-3(a); third-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(d); fourth-degree unlawful possession of a weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(d); third-degree criminal mischief, N.J.S.A. 2C:17- 3(a)(1); and third-degree conspiracy to commit third-degree theft, N.J.S.A. 2C:20-3(a) and 2C:5-2. In August 2021, defendant pleaded guilty to first-degree robbery under an agreement with the State. In exchange, the State agreed to recommend a downgraded sentence in the second-degree range of nine years in prison, subject to the No Early Release Act (NERA), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2. The State also agreed to dismiss the remaining counts. As part of the agreement, defendant also pleaded guilty to two violations of probation on two indictments charging third - degree unlawful possession of controlled dangerous substances. The State agreed those sentences would run concurrently with the nine -year sentence. Defendant also agreed to pay $7,600 in restitution. At sentencing, defendant moved to withdraw his guilty plea. He argued: (1) ineffective assistance of counsel; and (2) he was not guilty because he could not remember the incident due to intoxication. A-1371-24 3 The court denied the motion. Pursuant to State v. Slater, 98 N.J. 145 (2009), it found defendant had offered only bare assertions of innocence. It also found he had not supported his claim of involuntary intoxication with specific, credible facts. The court therefore concluded the first Slater factor weighed against withdrawal. It also found the second factor weighed against defendant because video footage clearly showed him committing the offense and possessing the knife. As to the third factor, the court recognized defendant had entered the plea as part of a plea bargain and gave that factor limited weight. On the fourth factor, the court found withdrawal would unfairly prejudice the State because the co-defendant was scheduled for admission into pretrial intervention and the passage of time would impair witness testimony. The court also rejected defendant's ineffective-assistance claim, finding nothing in the record supported it. It then sentenced defendant in accordance with the plea agreement, except it did not order restitution. Defendant appealed and we heard the matter on the Sentencing Oral Argument calendar. On October 26, 2022, we affirmed the judgment of conviction. We held defendant had not satisfied the Slater factors and rejected his argument the factual basis for the plea was inadequate. A-1371-24 4 In February 2023, defendant filed a PCR petition in the Law Division. Assigned counsel submitted a supporting brief, medical records, and a February 28, 2024 report from a forensic narcotics consultant. Defendant argued his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to establish an adequate factual basis for the plea and giving him incorrect advice about voluntary intoxication. He also argued that counsel who handled the motion to withdraw the plea was ineffective for failing to present his medical records, and appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to argue the factual basis was insufficient. After a non-evidentiary hearing, the PCR court denied the petition in a cogent written opinion. The court concluded defendant could not satisfy either prong of the test for ineffective assistance of counsel set out in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984), and adopted by New Jersey in State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 58 (1987). First, the court found counsel had properly advised defendant an intoxication defense was not viable. Nothing supported a claim of involuntary intoxication because defendant had voluntarily ingested the illegal drug. Next, the court reviewed the elements of robbery and compared them to defendant's admissions during the plea colloquy. It concluded defendant had provided an adequate factual basis for the guilty plea. A-1371-24 5 The court also rejected defendant's claim his motion counsel was ineffective for failing to produce his medical records. The omission had not been fatal to the motion and, in any event, the records did not support plea withdrawal or defendant's claim his counsel had misadvised him. The court likewise rejected defendant's claim against appellate counsel. It reasoned defendant's challenge to the factual basis and the Slater analysis had already been resolved on direct appeal. The court denied the claims raised in defendant's self-represented PCR application, because he had not provided any supporting evidence to show trial counsel failed to adequately investigate the case or prepare a defense. It reiterated the medical records did not support an intoxication defense. To the extent defendant argued the State should have presented his intoxication evidence to the grand jury, the court found the evidence was not exculpatory within the meaning of State v. Hogan, 144 N.J. 216, 237-39 (1996). On appeal, defendant raises the following: POINT I. [DEFENDANT] IS ENTITLED TO AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING ON HIS CLAIMS THAT HIS TRIAL ATTORNEY RENDERED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL BY FAILING TO INVESTIGATE PRETRIAL AND ADVISE HIM OF A VIABLE DEFENSE, AND BY A-1371-24 6 ALLOWING HIM TO PLEAD GUILTY WITHOUT A FACTUAL BASIS; THAT HIS MOTION ATTORNEY RENDERED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE BY FAILING TO PRESENT HIS MOTION TO WITHDRAW HIS PLEA IN A MEANINGFUL MANNER; AND THAT APPELLATE COUNSEL RENDERED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE BY FAILING TO PRESENT THESE ISSUES ADEQUATELY ON APPEAL. II. When, as here, the PCR court denies relief without an evidentiary hearing, we review de novo "both the factual inferences drawn from the record" by the PCR court and the court's legal conclusions. State v. Balbosa, 481 N.J. Super. 497, 519 (App. Div. 2025), certif. denied, 262 N.J. 410 (2026). However, "[w]e review a [court]'s decision to deny a PCR petition without a hearing for abuse of discretion." State v. Vanness, 474 N.J. Super. 609, 623 (App. Div. 2023). "[PCR] is New Jersey's analogue to the federal writ of habeas corpus." State v. Afanador, 151 N.J. 41, 49 (1997) (citing State v. Preciose, 129 N.J. 451, 459 (1992)). "It is a safeguard to ensure that a defendant was not unjustly convicted." Ibid. (citing State v. McQuaid, 147 N.J. 464, 482 (1997)). PCR provides a final opportunity for a defendant to raise a legal error or constitutional issue, including violation of the right to the effective assistance of counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and A-1371-24 7 Article I, Paragraph 10 of the New Jersey Constitution, that may have caused an unjust result. State v. Hess, 207 N.J. 123, 144-46 (2011); see also Afanador, 151 N.J. at 49 ("Ordinarily, PCR enables a defendant to challenge the legality of a sentence or final judgment of conviction by presenting contentions that could not have been raised on direct appeal." (citing McQuaid, 147 N.J. at 482- 83)). To establish an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, a defendant must demonstrate: (1) "counsel's performance was deficient"; and (2) "the deficient performance prejudiced the defense." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687; see also Fritz, 105 N.J. at 58. Rule 3:22-10(b) provides a court should hold an evidentiary hearing on a PCR petition only if the defendant establishes a prima facie case in support of PCR, "there are material issues of disputed fact that cannot be resolved by reference to the existing record," and "an evidentiary hearing is necessary to resolve the claims for relief." To satisfy the first prong of the Strickland/Fritz test, a defendant must show "that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed . . . by the Sixth Amendment." State v. Hernandez Peralta, 261 N.J. 231, 247 (2025) (omission in original) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687). Reviewing courts afford "a strong presumption that counsel's A-1371-24 8 conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. " Ibid. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689); see also State v. Barclay, 479 N.J. Super. 451, 459 (App. Div. 2024), certif. denied, 259 N.J. 306 (2024). "Mere dissatisfaction with a 'counsel's exercise of judgment' is insufficient to warrant overturning a conviction." State v. Nash, 212 N.J. 518, 542 (2013) (quoting State v. Echols, 199 N.J. 344, 358 (2009)) (internal quotation marks omitted). "When raising a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant 'must do more than make bald assertions that [they ] w[ere] denied the effective assistance of counsel.'" State v. Holland, 449 N.J. Super. 427, 435 (App. Div. 2017) (quoting State v. Cummings, 321 N.J. Super. 154, 170 (App. Div. 1999)); see also State v. Kearny, ___ N.J. ___, ___ (2026) (slip op. at 27) (same). Counsel's alleged "failure to raise unsuccessful legal arguments does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel." State v. Worlock, 117 N.J. 596, 625 (1990); see also Balbosa, 481 N.J. Super. at 520. The second prong of the Strickland/Fritz test "requires the defendant show 'that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.'" Barclay, 479 N.J. Super. at 460 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687). The defendant must demonstrate "a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the A-1371-24 9 proceeding would have been different." State v. Young, 474 N.J. Super. 507, 516 (App. Div. 2023) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). "A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. " State v. Gideon, 244 N.J. 538, 551 (2021) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). In the context of a guilty plea, the prejudice prong of the Strickland test requires defendant to show "but for counsel's errors, [they] would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial." Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985); State v. DiFrisco, 137 N.J. 434, 457 (1994). To this end, a defendant must show a decision to reject a plea offer and go to trial would have been "rational under the circumstances." State v. Maldon, 422 N.J. Super. 475, 486 (App. Div. 2011) (quoting Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 372 (2010)). III. Defendant repeats the same arguments he raised before the PCR judge. The PCR judge addressed those arguments in a careful written opinion, and we affirm substantially for the reasons expressed by the judge. We add the following comments. Defendant argues trial counsel misadvised him about a viable intoxication defense and, if properly advised, he would not have pleaded guilty. He also A-1371-24 10 contends counsel compounded that error by failing to investigate whether the knife bore his fingerprints. We are not persuaded. Two attorneys from the same firm represented defendant before he entered the plea. In written correspondence, counsel explained: As stated above, you do not deny the allegations. Instead, you stated that you do not remember what happened. In fact, you claim to only remember the night before, where you smoke[d] marijuana laced with K2 and then waking up in the hospital. You have maintained this stance since the day we first met at your detention hearing. However, loss of memory is not a defense at trial. Additionally, [i]ntoxication may be a valid defense at trial. However, according to [N.J.S.A.] 2C:2-8, voluntary intoxication is not a defense, where you voluntarily smoke the marijuana laced with K2, where no one forced you. After considering the evidence in this case, I believe the best trial strategy is to argue the lesser included charges. We need to convince a jury that you are not guilty of robbery. Instead, you are guilty of theft and criminal mischief. That is the defense I would like to run. However, you may still be sentenced to [ten] years prison time since you are extended term eligible. At court, you stated that you did not have all the discovery to make a knowing choice to head to trial. As such, I will resend you all the paper discovery in your file. I will not ask for fingerprints because if they come back with your fingerprint, we have absolutely no case. Moreover, you stated that you do not remember what happened, so you do not know if you had a knife. Please do not hesitate to reply to this letter if you need any more discovery. A-1371-24 11 This correspondence shows counsel gave defendant reasoned advice, grounded in the facts and the available defenses. Counsel told defendant intoxication can, in some circumstances, be a defense, but voluntary intoxication would not support such a defense on these facts. Also, counsel explained the strategic reason for not requesting fingerprint testing. That advice reflects professional judgment, not deficient performance. Defendant also cannot satisfy the prejudice prong. He has not shown the absence of fingerprint testing affected his decision to plead guilty or would have changed the outcome. During the plea proceedings he stated he was entering the plea knowingly and voluntarily. Counsel also negotiated a favorable agreement under which the State recommended a sentence in the second-degree range on a first-degree robbery charge. We add one further point. Although the PCR judge addressed the merits of defendant's challenge to the denial of his motion to withdraw the plea, that issue had already been resolved on direct appeal and was procedurally barred. A PCR claim is barred if it is identical or substantially equivalent to a claim already adjudicated on direct appeal. Afanador, 151 N.J. at 51; see also R. 3:22- 5. PCR is not a substitute for a direct appeal, nor does it allow a defendant to relitigate the merits of previously decided issues. State v. Szemple, 247 N.J. 82, A-1371-24 12 97 (2021). On defendant's direct appeal, we held the trial court properly denied the motion to withdraw the plea and defendant had supplied an adequate factual basis. In sum, we see no reason to disturb the PCR judge's conclusion that defendant failed to establish a prima facie claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Because defendant did not meet that threshold, the judge properly denied both the PCR petition and the request for an evidentiary hearing. To the extent we have not specifically addressed any of defendants ' remaining arguments, we deem them without sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2). Affirmed. A-1371-24 13