Full Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3. SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-1350-25 STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. RYAN D. KEOGH, a/k/a RYAN KEOGH, Defendant-Respondent. ________________________ Argued October 6, 2026 – Decided October 23, 2026 Before Judges Rose and Jablonski. On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Somerset County, Indictment No.19- 05-0288. Catlin A. Davis, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for appellant (John P. McDonald, Somerset County Prosecutor, attorney; Catlin A. Davis, of counsel and on the brief). Isaac Wright, Jr. argued the cause for respondent (Hunt, Hamlin & Ridley, attorneys; Isaac Wright, Jr., on the brief). PER CURIAM The State appeals from a November 25, 2025 judgment of conviction (JOC) challenging the legality of the aggregate ten-year prison term, subject to the No Early Release Act (NERA), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2, imposed on defendant Ryan Keogh's conviction for first degree aggravated manslaughter, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4(a)(1). For the reasons that follow, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for correction of the JOC. I. This matter returns to us following a remand ordered in our previous opinion. State v. Keogh, No. A-0565-22 (App. Div. Mar. 4, 2025) (slip op. at 12-20, 40). In that case, we reversed defendant's conviction for first-degree murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1) and (2), on direct appeal. Ibid. We concluded the trial judge erred by failing to instruct the jury on passion/provocation manslaughter as a lesser included offense of murder and the error was not harmless. Id. at 19. We also declined to disturb defendant's conviction for endangering an injured victim, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1.2(a). Id. at 36-40. In so holding, we rejected defendant's alternative arguments that the judge erroneously denied his motion for a judgment of acquittal on that charge and A-1350-25 2 failed to instruct the jury "leaving a deceased victim is not covered by that statute." Id. at 4, 38-40. Defendant did not expressly challenge his remaining convictions: second-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose (PWUP), N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a); third-degree hindering his own apprehension, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-3(b)(4); four counts of fourth-degree false swearing, N.J.S.A. 2C:28- 2(a); fourth-degree tampering with physical evidence, N.J.S.A. 2C:28-6(1); and fourth-degree possession of a large-capacity magazine, N.J.S.A. 2C:39- 3(j). Although the jury acquitted defendant of a fifth count of false swearing, charged in count seven, the narrative portion of the JOC mistakenly reflects defendant was convicted of that count. Accordingly, on remand, the JOC shall be corrected to remove count seven from the counts of conviction. In view of our disposition, we did not address defendant's excessive sentencing argument. 1 Id. at 4. Because the judge's initial pronouncement of sentence is pertinent to this appeal, we now summarize the sentence imposed on August 26, 2022. After merging defendant's PWUP conviction with his murder conviction, the trial judge sentenced defendant to a fifty-year prison term, subject to 1 In his sentencing argument on direct appeal, defendant did not challenge the imposition of a consecutive sentence on his endangering conviction. A-1350-25 3 NERA on the murder conviction; a consecutive three-year prison term on the endangering conviction; a concurrent five-year prison term on the hindering conviction; and concurrent eighteen-month sentences on all fourth-degree convictions. The judge found aggravating factors one (nature and circumstances of the offense), three (risk of reoffending), six (defendant's criminal record), and nine (general and specific deterrence), N.J.S.A. 2C:44- 1(a)(1), (3), (6), and (9), outweighed mitigating factor seven (lack of criminal history), N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(7). Relevant here, in assessing aggravating factor one, the judge summarized the trial testimony, finding defendant left the victim, Terrance Coulanges, on the porch of the Keogh residence for nearly two hours after defendant shot Coulanges, before his mother called emergency services. The judge was convinced "[l]eaving a body on the porch for two hours before calling 9-1-1" was "especially heinous, cruel, and depraved." Shortly after we issued our March 4, 2025 judgment, defendant retained new counsel, who moved for clarification of our decision and questioned whether our vacatur of defendant's murder conviction included, "impliedly or by operation of law," his PWUP conviction. In its answering brief, the State A-1350-25 4 countered our reversal of defendant's murder conviction was based on a faulty jury charge, not a defect in the State's proofs. We denied defendant's motion, noting on direct appeal defendant did not seek reversal of his PWUP conviction. State v. Keogh, No. M-5139-24 (App Div. June 9, 2025) (order at ¶ 1). We held: Because we conclude reversal of defendant's murder conviction for failure to charge the requested lesser-included passion-provocation charge does not affect the jury's verdict that defendant possessed the firearm for an unlawful purpose, that is to shoot the victim without justification, we decline to disturb our March 4, 2025 judgment. However, our decision should not be construed as prohibiting defendant from moving to dismiss the PWUP conviction if, on retrial, the jury returns a not guilty verdict on the murder count. [(Id. at ¶ 4).] On August 7, 2025, defendant waived his right to trial and pled guilty to first-degree aggravated manslaughter, as amended from first-degree murder. Pursuant to the terms of the negotiated plea agreement, the State agreed to recommend a sentence in the mid-range of the ten to thirty-year prison term for aggravated manslaughter. See N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4(c). The plea form also specifically memorialized defendant's right to "argue for [a] sentence at the A-1350-25 5 lowest range," 2 and the parties' agreement that "[m]erger shall be imposed on [the] weapons conviction." Pertinent to defendant's argument for time-served terms at sentencing, the plea form indicated defendant was not "presently serving a custodial sentence on another charge." During the plea hearing, defendant confirmed his understanding of the plea terms when the judge inquired: You understand I could reject the plea agreement, which specifically calls for a sentence between ten and thirty years, with the State arguing for a sentence in the mid-range, and your attorney arguing for a sentence at the minimum range? Do you understand I could reject that and impose the maximum? So, in other words, in practical terms, the State's going to argue for twenty, your attorney's going to argue for ten, but I could impose up to thirty. You understand all that? Later that month, a dispute arose concerning defendant's sentencing exposure as reflected in a series of email communications among the defense counsel, trial judge, and prosecutor. In an August 30, 2025 email, defense counsel advised he "inadvertently" failed to check the box on the plea form, 2 In the plea form, defendant's intention to seek a "downward departure" for sentencing purposes was stricken from the plea form and replaced with: "[The] State opposes any downward departure at sentencing." A-1350-25 6 which indicates the judge conditionally agreed to sentence defendant to a maximum sentence of "a flat[]10 years" subject to NERA. In the same email, defense counsel sought advice from the judge as to whether that box should be checked and the "Supplemental Plea Form for Non-Negotiated Pleas" executed. In her responding email, the prosecutor "adamantly oppose[d] defense counsel's request" and noted in "[Paragraph] No. 22 of the plea form, defendant . . . agreed that no other promises were made other than what was in the plea form." In his responding email, the trial judge stated: "I think we can address all these concerns at sentencing consistent with all our prior discussions in chambers." The prosecutor's final email indicated "the State would not have entered into a plea [agreement] if a predetermined ten-year sentence was promised by the [c]ourt." The State then moved to "enforce the plea agreement on its written terms" and "bar any sentencing argument beyond the four corners of the written document, particularly any in-chambers discussions or alleged promises made by the [c]ourt to defendant's counsel held off the record in chambers." A-1350-25 7 During the November 5, 2025 return date on the motion, the judge denied the State's request to voir dire defendant regarding his understanding of the sentencing exposure. Defense counsel maintained the judge indicated in chambers, prior to the plea hearing, he would impose a ten-year prison term. The prosecutor disagreed with defense counsel's representations. Having presided over the trial, the judge cited his familiarity with the matter and made clear he had not committed to imposing a ten-year prison. Defense counsel ultimately acknowledged the judge made no guarantees about the sentence he would impose. The judge declined to resolve the motion and ruled sentencing would proceed as scheduled. In his oral pronouncement of sentence on November 14, 2025, the trial judge reevaluated the aggravating and mitigating factors. The judge declined to find aggravating factor one, reasoning because defendant now stood convicted of aggravated manslaughter rather than murder, application of that factor would constitute improper double counting. The judge also declined to find aggravating factor two (gravity of harm to the victim), N.J.S.A. 2C:44 - 1(b)(2), explaining aggravated manslaughter already "contemplates that somebody died." The judge found and assigned "some weight" to aggravating factor three and "significant weight" to aggravating factor nine. The judge A-1350-25 8 rejected aggravating factor six, finding mitigating factor seven applied. The judge also found mitigating factors eight ("[t]he defendant's conduct was the result of circumstances unlikely to recur") and nine (the defendant's character and attitude indicate it is unlikely defendant will reoffend). N.J.S.A. 2C:44 - 1(b)(8) and (9). The judge concluded the mitigating factors outweighed the aggravating factors. In addition to imposing a ten-year NERA sentence on the aggravated manslaughter conviction, the judge resentenced defendant on the convictions we affirmed on direct appeal. Although the judge ordered the appropriate merger on defendant's PWUP conviction with his aggravated manslaughter conviction, the judge issued an unspecified time-served sentence on the merged PWUP conviction. Unlike the five-year sentence previously imposed on defendant's hindering conviction, the judge imposed a three-year time- served sentence. The judge imposed the same prison terms on the remaining counts, but all reflected time-served sentences. The sentences on each conviction—including the endangering conviction—were imposed concurrently. In his decision imposing a concurrent sentence on the endangering conviction, the judge cited our decision in State v. Moon, where we reversed A-1350-25 9 an endangering conviction because the State failed to present evidence "that the victim was alive and 'physically helpless, mentally incapacitated or otherwise unable to care for himself' and that the defendant left the scene of the injury knowing or reasonably believing that the victim was in that condition." 396 N.J. Super. 109, 117 (App. Div. 2007) (quoting N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1.2(a)). Applying his understanding of our holding in Moon to defendant's endangering conviction, the trial judge found: Here there's a divergence of thought as to what happened, but I remember the State medical examiner's testimony [that] . . . the death was practically instantaneous. I did hear from [Coulange's sister] today that he died in the ambulance en route to the hospital. I know there was some sharp facts dispute about that, and this is what led to the victim's family's concern with -- God, if only the Keoghs had called 9-1-1 maybe something would have been different. But the way I remember the medical examiner's testimony, that first shot was so fatal -- it went through major organs. It went through the aorta, if I remember right, through the lung, through the kidney, and the death was -- there was no chance of surviving that first wound. So, I don't think . . . the case law allows me to run the endangering [conviction] consecutive[ly] to the A-1350-25 10 sentence on the . . . aggravated manslaughter [conviction]. The judge then denied as moot the State's motion to enforce the plea agreement. On appeal, the State argues the trial judge: (1) exceeded his authority by resentencing defendant on convictions we affirmed on direct appeal; (2) erroneously imposed a concurrent sentence on defendant's endangering conviction notwithstanding the statutory requirement to impose consecutive sentences and this court's affirmance of the consecutive sentence; (3) "imposed an unauthorized 'time-served' sentence on defendant's merged conviction" for PWUP; and (4) "employed an analysis that fell outside the [Code of Criminal Justice's (Code)] sentencing structure." Having considered the State's contentions in view of the record provided on appeal, we reject the first and fourth arguments. Persuaded by the State's second and third arguments, we remand the matter and direct the court to impose a consecutive sentence on defendant's endangering conviction. We further direct the court to remove the sentence imposed on the merged PWUP count and reflect the aggravated manslaughter conviction was a Graves Act 3 offense. As noted above, we also direct the court to remove the acquitted false 3 N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(c). A-1350-25 11 swearing conviction from the narrative of portion of the JOC listing defendant's convictions. II. We review sentencing determinations under an abuse of discretion standard. State v. Grate, 220 N.J. 317, 337 (2015). "Nonetheless, a reviewing court is not free to ignore an illegal sentence." State v. Moore, 377 N.J. Super. 445, 450 (App. Div. 2005). "We review the legality of a sentence de novo, 'affording no special deference to the court['s] interpretation of the relevant statutes.'" State v. Steingraber, 465 N.J. Super. 322, 327 (App. Div. 2020) (quoting State v. Nance, 228 N.J. 378, 393 (2017)). "There are two categories of illegal sentences: those that exceed the penalties authorized for a particular offense, and those that are not authorized by law." State v. Hyland, 238 N.J. 135, 145 (2019). Our Supreme Court has narrowly applied the illegal sentence standard to these two categories, "distinct from the broader 'excessive sentence' standard." State v. Murray, 162 N.J. 240, 246 (2000). Further, there is no temporal limit on a court's ability to review an illegal sentence; "it may be corrected at any time before it is completed." Id. at 247; see also R. 3:21-10(b)(5). "If a defendant's sentence is illegal, a reviewing A-1350-25 12 court must remand for resentencing." Steingraber, 465 N.J. Super. at 328 (citing State v. Romero, 191 N.J. 59, 80-81 (2007)). With these principles in view, we consider the State's contentions seriatim. A. We first address the State's argument our remand was limited to defendant's murder conviction and, as such, the trial judge lacked authority to resentence defendant on the convictions we affirmed on direct appeal. To support its argument, the State cites our June 10, 2025 clarification order, which concluded the reversal of defendant's murder conviction did not affect the jury's verdict on the PWUP conviction. The State further notes: "Neither the plea agreement nor the parties' sentencing arguments contemplated that defendant would be resentenced on all ten convictions." The State therefore contends the trial judge impermissibly disregarded our remand order. See State v. Kosch, 454 N.J. Super. 440, 443-44 (App. Div. 2018). As a threshold matter, in our prior opinion, because we reversed defendant's murder conviction, we had no occasion to address any aspect of his sentence. Simply stated, our remand instruction was limited to a new trial on defendant's reversed murder conviction. Implicit within that instruction was A-1350-25 13 the parties' rights to resolve the open charge through a negotiated plea agreement, or for defendant to plead guilty as charged. Further, our June 10, 2025 order does not support the State's argument. In our order, we preserved the validity of the PWUP conviction; we did not expressly prohibit the judge from reconsidering defendant's sentence following a conviction for murder or a lesser-included offense. We have long recognized, "when the conviction on one or more counts is vacated on appeal, the sentencing court should be able to review what remains of its original sentence plan and to reconstruct the sentence to ensure that the punishment fits both the crime and the criminal." State v. Young, 379 N.J. Super. 498, 508 (App. Div. 2005) (citing State v. Espino, 264 N.J. Super. 62, 70-71 (App. Div. 1993)). Further, on resentencing the trial court "should view [the] defendant as he [or she] stands before the court on that day." State v. Randolph, 210 N.J. 330, 354 (2012); see also State v. Jaffe, 220 N.J. 114, 124 (2014) (concluding the trial court erred in failing to consider post -offense conduct where the defendant was sentenced three years after his guilty plea). In the present matter, the judge's resentencing on all counts of conviction was consonant with these well-established sentencing principles. A-1350-25 14 B. We reach a different conclusion regarding the State's second argument. The State contends the judge unlawfully imposed a concurrent sentence on defendant's endangering conviction in violation of the statute's clear mandate. The State asserts the judge's reliance on our decision in Moon was misplaced because, in that case, we addressed whether the evidence was sufficient to support an endangering conviction, not whether a court may impose a concurrent sentence on the endangering conviction on resentencing. The State further asserts, in our prior opinion in the present matter, we rejected defendant's challenge under Moon. See Keogh, slip op. at 38-39. Defendant maintains, pursuant to our holding in Moon, the consecutive sentencing provision set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1.2(d) applies only when a defendant injures a victim then leaves the scene of the incident, not when a defendant kills the victim and leaves the body behind. Stated another way, defendant claims paragraph (d) applies when the related conviction rendered the victim physically helpless, not when the related conviction is a homicide offense. Defendant therefore argues aggravated manslaughter is not a predicate conviction contemplated by subsection (d)'s consecutive sentencing mandate. A-1350-25 15 In our prior opinion, we rejected defendant's argument that, in its case in chief, the State failed to present sufficient evidence to the jury on the endangering charge. Keogh, slip op. at 36. Citing the statute and the applicable model jury charge, see Model Jury Charges (Criminal), "Endangering Injured Victim (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1.2)" (rev. Mar. 14, 2016), we were persuaded the State defeated defendant's Reyes 4 motion at the close of the State's evidence and the court's final instructions to the jury properly tracked the model charge. Keogh, slip op. at 35-37. In reaching our decision in Keogh, we distinguished the facts adduced at defendant's trial from those in Moon, recognizing in that case: the defendant placed a gun to the victim's head, pulled the trigger, and kicked the victim's body to check if he was alive. 396 N.J. Super. at 112. We noted the State did not present any evidence showing that the victim "exhibited any sign of life after he was shot or that [the] defendant or anyone else present knew or reasonably believed that he was alive and incapacitated, helpless or unable [to summon assistance] after he collapsed." Id. at 115. Indeed, the medical examiner opined "the extensive damage to [the victim]'s brain would have incapacitated him instantly, and he was dead or dying when his face hit the ground." Id. at 113. We therefore held N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1.2(a) did not apply to the facts adduced at trial in Moon. Id. at 117. 4 State v. Reyes, 50 N.J. 454 (1967). A-1350-25 16 We determined the State's evidence was inadequate to permit the jury to find the victim was physically helpless or "that [the] defendant left [the victim ] on the street knowing or reasonably believing that he was anything other than dead." Ibid. [Keogh, slip op. at 37-38 (alterations in original).] Turning to the issues raised on direct appeal, we held "[d]efendant's reliance upon Moon [wa]s misplaced." Id. at 38. Comparing the medical evidence adduced at both trials, we stated: the medical examiner here testified Coulanges was shot in the leg and torso "at least six feet away" from defendant; not at point blank range. Further, the evidence adduced at the time of defendant's acquittal motion, including the testimony of his forensic pathologist, suggested Coulanges survived the shooting for at least two to three minutes after he was shot. After defendant shot Coulanges, defendant neither rendered aid nor called emergency services. Instead, defendant left Coulanges for dead, went inside the carriage house, and watched a baseball news show until his mother arrived. There is no evidence in the record suggesting defendant checked whether Coulanges was alive or determined he was dead. Cf. Moon, 396 N.J. Super. at 112. Indeed, it was only after defendant and his parents met at [defendant's father]'s office and devised a story to relate to police that [defendant's mother] finally called emergency A-1350-25 17 services when they arrived home—almost two hours after defendant shot Coulanges. 5 [Id. at 38-39.] We therefore "conclude[d] the State presented sufficient evidence to warrant the jury's consideration of the endangering charge under N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1.2(a)." Id. at 39. We also rejected defendant's argument that the model jury charge "require[d] the court instruct the jury the victim must not be dead" for defendant to be found guilty under the statute. Id. at 40. Against the evidence adduced at trial, we turn to the State's contention on this appeal that the trial judge improperly imposed a concurrent sentence on the endangering conviction. N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1.2(d) provides, in pertinent part, the sentence imposed for endangering an injured victim "shall be ordered to be served consecutively to that imposed for any conviction of the crime that rendered the person physically helpless or mentally incapacitated." Accordingly, because we affirmed defendant's endangering conviction on direct appeal, on remand the trial judge was required to impose a consecutive sentence on that count. 5 Defendants' parents were charged in the same indictment with endangering an injured person and other offenses. State v. Keogh, 481 N.J. Super. 67, 72 n.3 (App. Div. 2025). In February 2025, we affirmed an interlocutory order granting their motion to dismiss the endangering charge on other grounds. Id. at 85. A-1350-25 18 In reaching our decision, we are unpersuaded by defendant's argument that the consecutive sentencing provision under paragraph (d) was not triggered here because the underlying crime was a homicide and the medical testimony revealed Coulanges died within minutes of the shooting. As we recognized in our prior appeal, after shooting Coulanges, defendant failed to call for assistance, choosing instead to abandon the victim while defendant entered the cottage and watched a sports show. Keogh, slip op. at 38-39. Crucially, there was no evidence adduced at trial that defendant took any steps to render aid after the shooting. The trial judge's contrary conclusion on resentencing rested on the court's interpretation of the medical testimony and effectively revisited an issue we had resolved on direct appeal. The judge was not free to disregard our holding on remand. See Kosch, 454 N.J. Super. at 443-44. We therefore remand the matter to the trial court to impose a consecutive term on defendant's endangering conviction. C. Contrary to its argument during the resentencing hearing, the State now recognizes, because the PWUP conviction merged with the aggravated manslaughter conviction, the judge erroneously imposed a sentence on the A-1350-25 19 merged weapons offense. Quoting our decision in State v. Trotman, the State argues "a separate sentence should not be imposed on the count which must merge with another offense." 366 N.J. Super. 226, 237 (App. Div. 2004). Nonetheless, the State further challenges the judge's imposition of a time - served sentence on the merged count arguing, under N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(a)(2), the judge was required to impose a "fixed," "specific term of years" for the second-degree PWUP offense. Because we agree a separate sentence should not have been imposed on the merged count, we need not reach the merits of the State's challenge to the length of the sentence. Accordingly, on remand, the court shall remove from the JOC the time-served designation on the merged PWUP conviction. Further, as the State notes in its merits brief, 6 although the eighty-five- percent parole disqualifier under NERA subsumes a Graves Act parole disqualifier, see State v. Garron, 177 N.J. 147, 163 (2003), the JOC also shall reflect the Graves Act applied to defendant's aggravated manslaughter conviction to avoid confusion in the future if defendant commits an offense subjecting him the Graves Act repeat offender extended term, see State v. Cheung, 328 N.J. Super. 368, 371 (App. Div. 2000). 6 In his responding brief, defendant does not counter the State's contention. A-1350-25 20 D. Lastly, we consider the State's argument that the trial judge employed a sentencing analysis outside the Code's framework. Citing the post-plea email communications, the judge's refusal to resolve the State's motion to enforce the plea agreement prior to sentencing, the judge's rejection of the State's request to voir dire defendant regarding his sentencing expectations, and the material change in the judge's aggravating and mitigating factor analysis, the State argues the judge issued a predetermined ten-year sentence on defendant's aggravated manslaughter conviction. The State therefore argues "defendant's ten-year prison sentence was not issued in conformance with governing law." We disagree. The sentence imposed was within the statutory range for first-degree aggravated manslaughter and consistent with the terms of the plea agreement. On resentencing, the judge was permitted to reconsider the aggravating and mitigating factors; the shift in the judge's analysis does not render the sentence illegal. See State v. Acevedo, 205 N.J. 40, 45-46 (2011) (recognizing challenges to the application of aggravating and mitigating factors concern a sentence's excessiveness not its illegality); see also State v. Flores, 228 N.J. Super. 586, 595-95 (App. Div. 1988). A-1350-25 21 Nor are we persuaded the trial judge's alleged predetermination of defendant's aggregate sentence ran afoul of the Code. On the return date of the motion to enforce the plea agreement the State contended the judge made no promises about the ultimate sentence he would impose and the judge stated he had made no guarantees. We conclude the ten-year NERA sentence imposed on defendant's aggravated manslaughter conviction was authorized by law. See Hyland, 238 N.J. at 145. In summary, we affirm the ten-year sentence imposed on defendant's aggravated manslaughter conviction, and reverse the imposition of a concurrent three-year sentence on the endangering conviction and remand to impose a consecutive sentence. Accordingly, the JOC shall be corrected to reflect: • aggravated manslaughter is a NERA offense and was committed pursuant to the Graves Act; and • the endangering conviction is imposed consecutively to the aggravated manslaughter conviction. In addition, the JOC shall be amended to remove: • the time-served designation on the PWUP; and • the acquitted false swearing count, charged in count seven. A-1350-25 22 To the extent not addressed, the State's remaining arguments lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2). Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded to correct the JOC. Jurisdiction is not retained. A-1350-25 23