Full Opinion

RECORD IMPOUNDED NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-1572-25 STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION v. November 10, 2026 APPELLATE DIVISION G.A.,1 Defendant-Respondent. ________________________ Submitted October 20, 2026 – Decided November 10, 2026 Before Judges Rose, Natali and Bishop-Thompson. On appeal from an interlocutory order of the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Mercer County, Indictment No. 24-09-0553. Janetta D. Marbrey, Mercer County Prosecutor, attorney for appellant (Laura Sunyak, Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief). Robin Kay Lord, LLC, attorneys for respondent (Robin Kay Lord, of counsel and on the brief). The opinion of the court was delivered by ROSE, P.J.A.D. 1 We use initials to protect the privacy of the alleged victims. See R. 1:38- 3(c)(12). By leave granted, the State appeals from a November 17, 2025 Law Division order denying its motion to admit defendant G.A.'s post-arrest statements to police. After arresting defendant, but prior to issuing Miranda2 warnings, police advised defendant he was charged in complaint-warrants with multiple sexual assault and related offenses against four victims in the City of Trenton, Lawrence Township, and Jackson Township. Following an N.J.R.E. 104(c) hearing, the motion court determined defendant's waiver of rights was not knowing and voluntary because police failed to disclose the identities of the alleged victims and the time periods of the alleged assaults. On appeal, the State argues the court erroneously suppressed defendant's post-arrest statements by impermissibly expanding the scope of our State's pre-Miranda requirements. Persuaded by the State's contentions, we reverse and remand for further proceedings. I. We summarize the pertinent facts from the record provided on appeal.3 In May 2024, four females separately reported to police they were sexually 2 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 3 We glean from the motion court's decision, the complaint-warrants were not moved into evidence at the N.J.R.E. 104 hearing, but the court was provided A-1572-25 2 assaulted by defendant, who owned the various restaurants where they were employed or seeking work at the time of the alleged incidents. Following an investigation, defendant was charged as follows: • On June 18, 2024, "a complaint-warrant was issued out of Jackson Township charging defendant with two counts of second-degree sexual assault" against S.V.B.C. in July 2023; • On June 19, 2024, "a complaint[-]warrant was issued out of Lawrence Township charging defendant with one count of first-degree kidnapping and three counts of first-degree aggravated sexual assault" against M.G.C. on May 2, 2024; • On June 19, 2024, a complaint-warrant was issued out of the City of Trenton "charging defendant with one count of first-degree aggravated sexual assault and one count of second-degree sexual assault" against M.R. "on [sic] or about the summer months of 2021"; and • On June 19, 2024, a complaint-warrant was issued out of the City of Trenton "charging defendant with two counts of fourth-degree criminal sexual contact and one count of second- copies as it judicially noticed the facts stated therein under N.J.R.E. 201(b)(4). We set forth the charges as cited in the court's decision. In its decision, the court noted it also considered a supplemental police report annexed to the State's moving papers. The complaint-warrants and supplemental report were not provided on appeal; nor did the State provide defendant's video-recorded statement to police. See R. 2:6-1(a)(1). Because the parties do not dispute the court's factual and credibility findings, our review is not hampered by these deficiencies. A-1572-25 3 degree endangering the welfare of a child" against M.P., then seventeen years old, "on or about November 2021." On June 19, 2024, defendant was arrested on all charges and questioned by Detective Sergio Sanchez of the Mercer County Prosecutor's Office (MCPO), Detective Lizmary Rivera of the Trenton Police Department (TPD), and Detective Suzanne Girard of the Lawrence Township Police Department (LPD). The two-day N.J.R.E. 104(c) hearing commenced on March 20, 2025 and concluded on May 30, 2025. Rivera was the sole witness to testify at the hearing. The State also moved into evidence the English/Spanish transcript of defendant's statement to police (translation transcript), Mercer County Uniform Complaint/Arrest Warrant Notification Form listing the charges filed against defendant and signed by him (notification of charges form), and Uniform Mercer County Rights Form signed by defendant (Miranda form). Defendant did not testify or present any evidence on his behalf. During Rivera's direct examination, the State played defendant's video- recorded statement, stopping the recording at times to question Rivera. 4 At the 4 Although the interrogation was conducted in English with defendant's assent, at times he responded in Spanish. Rivera testified she and Sanchez understood Spanish. To assist the trial court, the State provided the translation transcript, which was included in the State's appellate appendix. The transcript of the A-1572-25 4 outset of the interrogation, Rivera advised defendant they were "here in reference to Trenton Police Case Number 24004784, 24005093, 24005304 ," "Lawrence Police Case Number 2413973, and [MCPO]'s Case Number SV- 00167." Defendant asked, "How many cases are those? Just one case?" Rivera responded, "We're going to explain, okay?" Sanchez then stated, "We'll go over some forms before we get there." On cross-examination, Rivera explained she "usually start[s] interviews" by asking suspects "if they have any idea" why they are there because "[she] like[s] to hear from them first." Immediately after police obtained pedigree information from defendant, he inquired about his phone and cash. Rivera responded, "Let me go through this first, and I'll answer whatever questions you have, okay?" Defendant agreed and Rivera then read aloud from the notification of charges form: [RIVERA:] The time is 5:37 p.m. Okay. Before we ask you any questions, you should be aware of the following: A criminal complaint and arrest warrant has been issued for you from the Mercer County Superior Court for the charges of the following: two counts of sexual assault coming from the [TPD], one count of endangering the welfare of a child coming from the [TPD], one count of aggravated sexual assault coming from the [TPD], one count of sexual assault coming from the [TPD], one count of kidnapping coming out N.J.R.E. 104(c) hearing includes a transcription of defendant's interview, but similar to the motion court, we use the State's translation transcript, noting any discrepancies between the transcripts. A-1572-25 5 from [LPD], four counts of aggravated sexual assault coming out of the [LPD] and two counts of sexual assault coming out of the [JPD]. These are just the charges that you're being charged with officially right now, okay? Do you have any questions of anything that I've just read to you? Do you have any questions of anything that I've just read to you? Sanchez added: "At this point, we're just advising you of the charges." The following exchange transpired: [DEFENDANT:] So, when you said . . . is that number two, two sexual content, is that . . . ? [5] [RIVERA:] Two counts of it. [DEFENDANT:] Is that two different persons or one person? [RIVERA:] I'll answer everything. [DEFENDANT:] [(Unintelligible)]. [RIVERA:] I know, but these are just . . . this is what the charges that have been filed against you right now. [DEFENDANT:] Mm-hmm. [RIVERA:] Okay? So, it's two of the sexual contact. One count of . . . [DEFENDANT:] Is that the same person? 5 According to the transcript of the hearing, defendant stated: "So, when you said sex, is that two sexual contact? Is that --" A-1572-25 6 [SANCHEZ:] We can't get into detail as to which person or which is what. We have to go over an additional form before we can get to that. So, this is just advising you of the actual charges that we have against you basically, but again, if you want to know specifically, we have to get to the other form before we can discuss anything, okay? [GIRARD:] So, this is just -- if you understand that this is what you're charged with, we just want you to sign acknowledging that you understand this. . . . [DEFENDANT:] Not that I am pleading guilty. [GIRARD:] We are not saying that you are guilty, we are not saying that you're innocent, this is just advising you that right now you have these charges against you and that is it. That is all what [sic] this [notification of charges] form is doing, you can reread it if you would like, but that's all that form is doing. We are not asking you how you plead to anything. [DEFENDANT:] Can I put that I'm not guilty to this? I just want to make sure? [SANCHEZ:] Listen, we can just put that you refused to sign [the notification of charges form] if you want to, but this is just acknowledging that we showed you, you know, the charges. . . . [DEFENDANT:] Jackson Township, I have no idea what that is. And endangering the welfare of a child? [RIVERA:] Yes. [DEFENDANT:] So, you're telling me that after I sign this, you're giving me details of everything? A-1572-25 7 [GIRARD:] We're gonna . . . we have one more form. [RIVERA:] Yeah, we have one more form, and depending on how that goes, we can talk, it all depends on you, okay? But let me just read off everything that I have to, and then if you have any questions after I read whatever I have to read to you, then we'll go from there. Defendant agreed and signed the notification of charges form. Rivera then advised defendant of his Miranda rights. Defendant confirmed he understood his rights, had no questions about his rights, and signed the Miranda form. Defendant then inquired: "So, this is a situation where you just ask and I answer or I am not authorized . . . I need, I have a lot of questions to ask." Rivera responded, "Okay, what are your questions?" Defendant asked whether his daughter was arrested declaring, "she has nothing to do with this." When the detectives indicated they were aware his daughter was detained, but did not know whether she was arrested, defendant stated he understood. Defendant then asked about the whereabouts of "the car, the money, and [his] phone." Rivera advised police were "keeping" those items "because of the nature of this investigation." Noting he needed his phone for work, defendant volunteered he owned four restaurants in Trenton. 6 In response to his ensuing inquiry, police 6 In his statement, defendant specified the names of his restaurants, which matched the restaurants identified by the alleged victims. A-1572-25 8 advised he was detained without bail, at least until he appeared before a judge, in view of the charges. The detectives then answered several questions posed by defendant concerning his detention and inability to use his seized phone. After those exchanges, Sanchez stated: "[Defendant], so, tell us why you think you are here today." Defendant responded, "I don't know, you tell me." Following similar exchanges, defendant stated, "It sounds like it is my ex because it says Jackson, it sounds like that." Defendant described his "toxic" relationship with his former live-in girlfriend, S.V.B.C. Noting S.V.B.C. "has a kid," defendant believed the child endangerment charge concerned her child. Sanchez disclosed that charge related to "something else," but did not elaborate. Defendant confirmed he engaged in sexual intercourse with S.V.B.C., but claimed it was consensual. Thereafter, Sanchez asked defendant if he knew "[w]hich other reason[s]" police were questioning him. Defendant replied, "Don't, don't go around. Just tell me." Sanchez then asked about M.R. Defendant stated M.R. was a bartender at a restaurant he owned and they "hook[ed] up like one or twice" at the restaurant. Defendant claimed M.R. was lying about her accusations and wanted money from him. A-1572-25 9 Rivera then asked defendant if he had sexual encounters with anyone else in the same restaurant. Defendant replied: "I might have. I don't remember." In response to defendant's question, "Why are you guys not being transparent with me, and being a (unintelligible)," Rivera stated, "Because I'm giving you the opportunity to tell me . . . what is going on." Defendant replied, "If you have the charges against me, aren't you guys supposed to tell me what the charges are?" Sanchez replied, "We already told you." Defendant asked, "So there's only two girls or there's more girls that are saying things [sic]." Rivera then disclosed S.V.B.C. and M.R. were not his only accusers. Later during the interrogation, the detectives asked defendant about his relationship with M.G.C. Defendant acknowledged M.G.C. interviewed for a job at his bar, they drank together, and he took her to a hotel. When advised of M.P.'s allegations against him, defendant claimed he did not know her. At the conclusion of Rivera's testimony, the prosecutor argued defendant's waiver was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent, noting the absence of any authority requiring police to inform suspects which victim made the allegations against them. Defense counsel countered, because the detectives refused to disclose the identities of the accusers or the relevant time periods for the charged conduct prior to defendant's waiver of rights, the officers failed to comply with A-1572-25 10 the governing law. That law, defense counsel argued, required police to advise defendant of his "true status" and "the essence of the charges against him" before they issued Miranda warnings. Following arguments, the court reserved decision. On November 17, 2025, the motion court issued a written decision and memorializing order denying the State's motion. Noting the "detectives slowly disclos[ed] the identities of the alleged victims," the court framed the issue before it as whether "the controlling legal principles" required the detectives "to disclose the identities of the alleged victims and the relevant time periods of the alleged offenses to defendant before obtaining a waiver of his Miranda rights." In its decision, the motion court cited State v. A.G.D., 178 N.J. 56, 68-69 (2003), requiring "police officers to inform a suspect that a criminal complaint has been filed or an arrest warrant has been issued before interrogating him," and State v. Vincenty, 237 N.J. 122, 135 (2017), explaining A.G.D. requires police "to make a simple declaratory statement at the outset of the interrogation that informs a defendant of the essence of the charges filed against him." The court found the detectives complied with A.G.D. because they "informed defendant that numerous complaint-warrants had been issued against him out of A-1572-25 11 three different jurisdictions." The court further found Rivera's testimony credible, noting she testified in "a forthright and candid manner." However, the motion court concluded the detectives "nevertheless failed to comply with the Vincenty rule by withholding the victims['] identities and the relevant time period[s] of the alleged assaults." Quoting Vincenty, the court was persuaded those facts were "objectively verifiable" as they "constituted 'critically important information' concerning 'the essence of the charges filed against' defendant." See A.G.D., 178 N.J. at 68; Vincenty, 237 N.J. at 133. The court found "[n]ot only was the withheld information factual, readily confirmable, and easy to convey, it was critical to defendant's understanding of his 'true status.'" Accordingly, the court determined the withheld information was "indispensable to [defendant's] ability to make a knowing and intelligent waiver of his constitutional rights." See A.G.D., 178 N.J. at 68. Noting its interpretation of A.G.D. and Vincenty was novel, the court recognized "the detectives [did not] intentionally disregard[] controlling law." The court further determined, even if the detectives complied with A.G.D. and Vincenty, defendant's Miranda waiver was not knowing and voluntary. In particular, the court found because defendant "was keenly interested in knowing the number of his accusers and how many cases he was being questioned about" A-1572-25 12 and the detectives did not immediately respond to his inquiry, he did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his Miranda rights. The court nonetheless recognized: Defendant was forty-four years old at the time of his interrogation. He was provided with water during questioning, which was not unduly long, during which he appeared relatively comfortable and showed no signs of mental or cognitive impairment. Although the questions were accusatory at times, defendant was never threatened physically or otherwise. And his answers were responsive, which demonstrated he understood the questions. Before us, the State maintains the detectives complied with the Court's mandates in A.G.D. and Vincenty, and the motion court therefore improperly expanded the notifications required before police issue Miranda warnings. The State asserts, by reading aloud from the notification of charges form, the detectives "advised defendant he was charged with multiple specific sexual offenses . . . out of Trenton, Lawrence, and Jackson," and the seriousness of the charges was self-evident from their titles. The State contends the court's decision seemingly requires a "complete recitation of the facts on which the charges in the complaint are based," which is "unwarranted and impractical." The State further contends defendant's Miranda waiver and custodial statements A-1572-25 13 were knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently made under the totality of the circumstances. II. Well-settled principles guide our review. As a general rule, we defer to a trial court's factual findings when the court conducts an evidentiary hearing based on the court's first-hand evaluation of the credibility of witnesses. See State v. Locurto, 157 N.J. 463, 470-71 (1999). Here, however, the motion court's critical finding on the waiver issue presented was not based on any disputed factual finding as the essential facts were uncontested. Accordingly, "we review de novo the suppression of an incriminating statement under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and this state's common law, now codified in a statute and evidence rule." State v. Tiwana, 256 N.J. 33, 40- 41 (2023) (citing U.S. Const. amend. V; N.J.S.A. 2A:84A-19; N.J.R.E. 503); see also State v. Bulock, 253 N.J. 512, 532 (2023) (recognizing appellate courts review de novo a trial judge's legal conclusions "and the consequences that flow from established facts") (quoting State v. Hubbard, 222 N.J. 249, 263 (2015)). When the State moves to admit a criminal defendant's post-arrest statements, it has a twofold burden. The State must demonstrate "the defendant was informed of his or her rights under Miranda." State v. L.H., 239 N.J. 22, 58 A-1572-25 14 (2019). Consistent with our Supreme Court's commitment to affording protections beyond those guaranteed under federal law, the State must further show the defendant's "[Miranda] waiver was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary in light of all the circumstances." State v. A.M., 237 N.J. 384, 397 (2019) (quoting State v. Presha, 163 N.J. 304, 313 (2000)). The State's burden is satisfied by "proving beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant's confession was actually volunteered and that the police did not overbear the will of the defendant." L.H., 239 N.J. at 58 (quoting State v. Hreha, 217 N.J. 368, 383 (2014)). Conversely, "Under federal Fifth Amendment law, the government must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the suspect's waiver was made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently." State v. Tillery, 238 N.J. 293, 315-16 (2019) (citing Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 608 n.1 (2004)). We evaluate whether the State has satisfied its burden of proof by considering the "totality of the circumstances." Tillery, 238 N.J. at 316 (quoting A.M., 237 N.J. at 398). According to the Court: In the totality of the circumstances inquiry, the court considers all the facts surrounding the interrogation, including "the defendant's age, education and intelligence, advice as to constitutional rights, length of [the] detention, whether the questioning was repeated and prolonged in nature and whether physical punishment or mental exhaustion was involved." State v. Nyhammer, 197 N.J. 383, 402 (2009) (quoting A-1572-25 15 Presha, 163 N.J. at 313). Courts will also consider a defendant's prior experience (or lack thereof) with the criminal justice system. L.H., 239 N.J. at 47. Those factors are assessed "qualitatively, not quantitatively." Hreha, 217 N.J. at 384. The inquiry also considers statements and behaviors by the police which tend to contradict the Miranda warnings, or otherwise render them ineffective. See, e.g., L.H., 239 N.J. at 43-44. [State v. Erazo, 254 N.J. 277, 301 (2023) (alteration in original) (citations reformatted).] Notwithstanding the decision to admit a Mirandized statement requires a totality-of-the-circumstances evaluation, the Supreme Court has recognized narrow situations rendering a confession per se involuntary and inadmissible. In A.G.D., the Court held "[t]he government's failure to inform a suspect that a criminal complaint or arrest warrant has been filed or issued deprives that person of information indispensable to a knowing and intelligent waiver of rights." 178 N.J. at 68. The Court reasoned: [A] criminal complaint and arrest warrant signify that a veil of suspicion is about to be draped on the person, heightening his [or her] risk of criminal liability. Without advising the suspect of his [or her] true status when he does not otherwise know it, the State cannot sustain its burden to the Court's satisfaction that the suspect has exercised an informed waiver of rights, regardless of other factors that might support his [or her] confession's admission. [Ibid.] A-1572-25 16 Although the A.G.D. Court held the defendant's confession should have been suppressed because the detectives failed to inform him an arrest warrant had been issued, the Court stressed its holding was "not to be construed as altering existing case law in respect of the manner in which the police conduct interrogations other than imposing the basic requirement to inform an interrogatee that a criminal complaint . . . has been filed or issued." Id. at 68- 69. Thereafter, in Nyhammer, 197 N.J. at 405, the Court considered "whether the failure to advise an individual that he [or she] is a suspect" when Miranda warnings are issued "should be a factor in the totality-of-the-circumstances test." In Nyhammer, the defendant willingly spoke with police about his uncle's role in alleged child molestation. Id. at 389-90. Before they issued the Miranda warnings, however, police did not disclose the defendant also was a suspect. Id. at 408-09. The Court upheld the trial court's decision that the defendant knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his Miranda rights based on the totality of the circumstances. Id. at 409-10. The Court explained "a valid waiver does not require that an individual be informed of all information 'useful' in making his decision." Id. at 407 (quoting Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 576 (1987)). Further, "the failure to be told of one's suspect status still would be A-1572-25 17 only one of many factors to be considered in the totality of the circumstances." Ibid. Citing A.G.D., the Nyhammer Court stated: This case also is easily distinguishable from A.G.D. The issuance of a criminal complaint and arrest warrant by a judge is an objectively verifiable and distinctive step, a bright line, when the forces of the state stand arrayed against the individual. The defendant in A.G.D. was purposely kept in the dark by his interlocutors of this indispensable information. Unlike the issuance of a criminal complaint or arrest warrant, suspect status is not an objectively verifiable and discrete fact, but rather an elusive concept that will vary depending on subjective considerations of different police officers. A suspect to one police officer may be a person of interest to another officer. [Nyhammer, 197 N.J. at 404-05.] Accordingly, "[i]n Nyhammer, our Supreme Court firmly embraced the principle that police are not required to 'supply a suspect with a flow of information to help him [or her] calibrate his [or her] self-interest in deciding whether to speak or stand by his [or her] rights' because 'the additional information could affect only the wisdom of a Miranda waiver, not its essentially voluntary and knowing nature.'" State v. Cotto, 471 N.J. Super. 489, 514-15 (App. Div. 2022) (quoting Nyhammer, 197 N.J. at 407). A-1572-25 18 Later, in Vincenty, 237 N.J. at 122, the Court reiterated its ruling in A.G.D. In Vincenty, before commencing their custodial interrogation, the detectives issued Miranda rights to the defendant, who signed the waiver form. Id. at 127. The detectives then informed the defendant: "the judge already charged [him]"; "they obtained [his] DNA from the mask recovered at the scene"; and therefore they "ha[d] the charges." Ibid. (first alteration in original). The detectives also "told Vincenty that they 'presented the evidence to the judge,' who 'put the charges in.'" Id. at 128. Eventually, the detectives showed the defendant a list of charges, explaining he had been accused of attempted homicide, robbery, and conspiracy to commit murder. Ibid. At that point, the defendant expressed his desire to speak with an attorney. Ibid. Nonetheless, questioning continued until the defendant again invoked his right to speak with counsel. Id. at 129. The trial court denied the defendant's suppression motion; we affirmed; and the Court reversed. Id. at 134. The Court held "Vincenty's interrogation illustrates that suspects cannot knowingly and intelligently determine whether to waive their right against self-incrimination if, when making that determination, they have not been informed of the charges filed against them." Ibid. A-1572-25 19 The Vincenty Court reasoned, A.G.D. thus calls for law enforcement officials to make a simple declaratory statement at the outset of an interrogation that informs a defendant of the essence of the charges filed against him [or her]. That information should not be woven into accusatory questions posed during the interview. The State may choose to notify defendants immediately before or after administering Miranda warnings, so long as defendants are aware of the charges pending against them before they are asked to waive the right to self-incrimination. [Ibid.] Three years later, we issued our opinion in State v. Diaz, 470 N.J. Super. 495 (App. Div. 2022). There, the defendant was arrested for a drug-induced death, but police only informed him they were conducting a narcotics investigation. Id. at 506. We affirmed the trial court's suppression of the defendant's statements, concluding police "affirmatively misled [the] defendant as to his 'true status'" "by providing a deliberately vague and incomplete answer to his question as to the reason why he was taken into custody." Id. at 518. We stated, under those circumstances, a reasonable person would believe he "had been taken into custody for possessing and distributing drugs, not for committing homicide." Id. at 519. We explained: "It is one thing for police to withhold information. It is another thing entirely for them to provide an A-1572-25 20 explanation that creates or reinforces a false impression as to the seriousness of the sentence that a defendant is facing." Ibid. One month later, in March 2022, the Supreme Court issued its decision in State v. Sims, 250 N.J. 189, 217 (2022), declining to extend Vincenty to those situations in which an interrogee has been arrested, but a complaint-warrant or arrest warrant has not yet been issued. In so holding, the Court explained the officers lacked the ability to inform or predict the specific charges for which the defendant would eventually face. Id. at 215. Thus, before formal charges have been filed, police cannot inform an interrogee of his [or her] "true status" because the officers have "insufficient information about the victim's injuries, the arrestee's mental state, and other key issues to enable an officer to accurately identify the charges." Ibid. However, the Sims Court determined, if a complaint-warrant or arrest warrant has been issued, "[t]he rule of A.G.D. mandates disclosure of the factual information about pending charges that the officer can readily confirm and clearly convey." Id. at 214. The Court further stated: A complaint issued by either a judge or another judicial officer authorized by N.J.S.A. 2B:12-21, based on a finding of probable cause, is "a written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charged." R. 3:2-1(a)(1); see also R. 3:2-3(a), (b) (addressing the contents of arrest warrants, which include the "initial A-1572-25 21 charge" against the defendant). A complaint-warrant or arrest warrant notifies an interrogating police officer that a judge, or other judicial officer, has found probable cause with respect to one or more charges, and enables a police officer to make the "simple declaratory statement" that A.G.D. requires. Vincenty, 237 N.J. at 134. So informed, the arrestee knows his [or her] "true status" before waiving his [or her] Miranda rights, and may knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive those rights. A.G.D., 178 N.J. at 68. [Id. at 214-15.] The following month, in Cotto, we upheld the denial of a defendant's suppression motion where the defendant was arrested on open traffic warrants, but suspected of committing arson and questioned only regarding potential arson charges. 471 N.J. Super. at 522. After police informed the defendant he was arrested on the warrants, the defendant waived his Miranda rights and the detectives immediately stated they wished to question him about a nightclub fire. Id. at 506-07. Noting the detectives complied with A.G.D.'s per se rule by informing the defendant he was arrested for the traffic warrants, we found under Sims, police were not required to inform the defendant of his suspect status for the arson investigation. Id. at 519-20. Under the totality of the circumstances, we held the detectives did not violate the defendant's constitutional rights, because he "was told not only the lawful basis for his arrest when he was first taken into custody—valid A-1572-25 22 outstanding traffic warrants—but also informed quickly as to the true reason why detectives wanted to question him." Id. at 522-23. Distinguishing the circumstances in Cotto from those in Diaz, we noted the officers did not "affirmatively mislead the defendant into believing he had been arrested for a less serious crime." Id. at 521. Rather, the officers "made clear that they wanted to talk to [the] defendant about" the nightclub fire which "apprised him of the true reason for the interrogation" and the defendant did not subsequently invoke his Miranda rights. Id. at 522. With these governing principles in view, we consider the propriety of the motion court's decision expanding the Court's mandates in A.G.D. and Vincenty. As a threshold matter, the parties do not contest defendant was in custody at the time of police questioning. Nor is there any dispute the detectives read to defendant the charges set forth in the notification of charges form advising he was under arrest for various sexual assault and related charges. As the court correctly determined, in doing so, the detectives complied with A.G.D. Whether the court correctly suppressed defendant's statements turns on the sufficiency of the officers' "simple declaratory statement at the outset of [the] interrogation that inform[ed] . . . defendant of the essence of the charges filed against him." Vincenty, 237 N.J. at 134. Unlike the circumstances in A-1572-25 23 Vincenty, 237 N.J. at 135, where the officers vaguely informed the defendant "some type of charges" were filed against him, the detectives in the present matter clearly informed defendant of his true status as an arrestee, and specifically advised he was charged with multiple sexual assault and related offenses, including kidnapping and child endangerment. As the motion court noted, prior to its decision in the present matter, "[n]either A.G.D. [n]or Vincenty had been read to require law enforcement officers to disclose anything more than the existence of a filed complaint or arrest warrant and the specific charges contained therein prior to an interrogation – both of which were done here." We therefore part company with the motion court's expansion of the governing law by requiring police to disclose the identities of the alleged victims and the time periods of the alleged assaults. Because the detectives complied with the Court's mandates by advising defendant of his "true status" as an arrestee charged with multiple sexual assault and related charges, we conclude they advised defendant of the "essential facts" necessary to make an informed decision on his waiver of rights. We therefore hold the detectives were not required to disclose the underlying factual details of the charged conduct, that A-1572-25 24 is, "the names or initials of the four alleged victims, along with the time period[s] corresponding to their alleged assaults," as the court found here. We turn to the State's argument that defendant's waiver and ensuing statements were made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently under the totality of the circumstances. The motion court's conclusion to the contrary was tethered, in large part, to its findings that police failed to answer "defendant's pre-waiver questions" about "the number of accusers and how many cases he was being questioned about." Here, unlike in Diaz, defendant knew, before he waived his Miranda rights, he was arrested pursuant to complaint-warrants charging him with multiple specific offenses in three separate jurisdictions. Defendant nev