Full Opinion

RECORD IMPOUNDED NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3. SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-2421-25 STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JIMMY NOEL, Defendant-Respondent. _________________________ Submitted September 29, 2026 – Decided November 12, 2026 Before Judges Gilson and Paganelli. On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Ocean County, Indictment No. 25-10-1805. Bradley D. Billhimer, Ocean County Prosecutor, attorney for appellant (William K. Meighan, Supervising Appellate Attorney, of counsel; Shiraz Deen, Senior Assistant Prosecutor, on the brief). Daniel E. Berger, attorney for respondent. PER CURIAM Pursuant to Rule 2:2-3(b)(1), the State appeals from a March 17, 2026 order admitting defendant into the pretrial intervention program (PTI) over its objection. Having reviewed the record and applicable law, we reverse and remand for further proceedings. The State alleges that on February 4, 2025, J.M.1 received a text message concerning an unauthorized purchase from his Truist Bank account. The text was followed by phone call from a purported representative of the bank's fraud department. The alleged representative convinced J.M. to withdraw $16,000 from the Truist Bank account and deposit that money into a Chase Bank account. J.M. was provided with the Chase Bank account number and a PIN number to complete the transaction. By the time J.M. discovered he was the victim of fraud, it was too late to cancel the transaction. After a law enforcement investigation, it was learned that defendant was the holder of the Chase Bank account. The bank records showed J.M.'s funds were deposited into defendant's account, and defendant made multiple withdrawals of funds from the account. On May 22, 2025, a complaint was issued charging defendant with third-degree theft by unlawful taking, N.J.S.A. 2C:20-3(a). Defendant applied 1 We use initials and fictitious names for the victim and witnesses to protect their privacy interests. R. 1:38-3(c). A-2421-25 2 for PTI and the State rejected his PTI application. Defendant moved to compel his admission into PTI over the State's objection. Thereafter, a grand jury indicted defendant for third-degree theft by deception, N.J.S.A. 2C:20-4(a). In January 2026, the court heard the parties' arguments concerning the State's rejection of PTI. In its rejection letter, the State had noted it engaged in a "qualitative" not "quantitative" analysis. In considering the seventeen factors pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:43-12(e), it contended nine factors weighed against PTI: (1) "the nature of [a third-degree] offense" (boldface omitted) was "of significant concern to the State"; (2) "the facts of the case" (boldface omitted); (4) J.M. wanted the charges pursued; (5) "[s]upervisory treatment through PTI [wa]s not enough to ensure that any future criminal behavior may be controlled" and "defendant not only received a large sum of money that he knew was not his . . . he took additional steps to withdraw the money"; (6) given the nature of the accusations, "[t]his type of conduct [wa]s not related to a particular condition that could be rehabilitated by participation in supervisory treatment, and supervisory treatment [wa]s unlikely to change any cause of the offense"; (7) "[t]he State and [J.M.] . . . ha[d] an interest in proceeding with the case in the ordinary criminal justice route, as there [wa]s a clear need to deter this type of conduct against citizens"; (11) there was no evidence that a "social problem" led A-2421-25 3 to defendant's actions or that prosecution would "exacerbate" any such problem; (14) "[t]he public need for prosecution outweigh[ed] the value of supervisory treatment[,]" there is a need for strong deterrence of "financial crimes and theft," and "supervisory treatment would be of little value" because defendant committed th[e] crime while living out of state; and (17) society would be harmed unless there was a full prosecution because "theft cases involving scams specifically [have] become more prevalent in society." The State acknowledged six of the N.J.S.A. 2C:43-12(e) factors weighed in favor of PTI: (3) defendant was "20 years old with no prior criminal history"; (8) this was defendant's first offense and "there [we]re no prior reports of anti-social behavior"; (9) "[d]efendant ha[d] no prior record"; (10) the alleged "offense was not of an assaultive nature"; (12) "defendant ha[d] no prior offenses involving violence"; and (13) "defendant [wa]s not part of an organized crime group." Ultimately, the State determined that the factors weighing against admission into PTI outweighed those favoring admission into PTI. Accordingly, the State rejected defendant's application for PTI. After hearing the parties' arguments, the court stated it had "concerns" regarding the State's analysis of the factors. The court did not "find that the A-2421-25 4 defense ha[d] met [its] burden by clear and convincing evidence that there's a pattern of [a] gross abuse of discretion." Nevertheless, the court stated it would "vacate the rejection and remand it to the prosecutor upon a showing that the prosecutor's decision was arbitrary, irrational[,] or otherwise an abuse of discretion." The court then directed the State to reconsider defendant's PTI application. On March 17, 2026, after considering additional submittals and hearing the parties' arguments, the court stated "I think the State is acknowledging that they believe the consequence of a criminal conviction for a 20-year-old youth is what is needed here. And I just don't find that . . . is appropriate in analyzing a PTI application." The court noted the State was "not looking for a jail term" and had acknowledged there would be "a probationary term." The court found "[t]here[ was] no explanation or a valid reason [regarding] . . . the supervision afforded in PTI versus probation." The court found the "only factor is . . . a conviction" because the consequence of a conviction "is warranted to protect the community and deter future criminal activity." However, the court found "PTI is certainly an appropriate program to do that." In a written decision accompanying the order, the court found "the State relie[d] on factors one, two, five, six, and eleven in their analysis." However, it A-2421-25 5 reasoned "[t]he State fail[ed] to meaningfully address why . . . [d]efendant, who is twenty years old, first[-]time[] offender, and who remain[ed] offense free for a year later, does not meet the criteria to be entered into PTI or why a greed-based offense is not best addressed through PTI." In addition, the court determined the State ignored the purpose of PTI and found "[t]he harm by the imposition of a criminal sanction of a twenty-year-old offender is great" "despite [him] not receiving any jail sentence for this conviction." The court concluded defendant had met his burden, "the State's rejection of [d]efendant from PTI amounted to a clear patent and gross abuse of discretion." The court's March 17, 2026 order allowed defendant's admission into PTI. On appeal, the State argues the court misapplied the controlling standard by substituting its own judgment, rather than considering whether the State's rejection constituted a clear error in judgment. The State further contends the court, omitted from its review, factors four, seven, fourteen, and seventeen, all of which the State had considered and found weighed against admission into PTI. We review the court's reversal of the State's decision de novo, applying the same standard as the trial court. State v. Waters, 439 N.J. Super. 215, 226 (App. Div. 2015). Judicial review of a prosecutor's denial of PTI is "severely A-2421-25 6 limited" and "serves to check only the 'most egregious examples of injustice and unfairness.'" State v. Negran, 178 N.J. 73, 82 (2003) (quoting State v. Leonardis, 73 N.J. 360, 384 (1977)). Deciding whether to permit diversion to PTI "is a quintessentially prosecutorial function." State v. Wallace, 146 N.J. 576, 582 (1996). "Prosecutorial discretion in this context is critical for two reasons. First, because it is the fundamental responsibility of the prosecutor to decide whom to prosecute, and second, because it is a primary purpose of PTI to augment, not diminish, a prosecutor's options." State v. Nwobu, 139 N.J. 236, 246 (1995) (quoting State v. Kraft, 265 N.J. Super. 106, 111-12 (App. Div. 1993)). Accordingly, "[i]n considering and evaluating information bearing upon a defendant's admission into [PTI], prosecutors are granted broad discretion" in making their determinations. State v. K.S., 220 N.J. 190, 199 (2015). Indeed, "a prosecutor's decision to reject a PTI applicant 'will rarely be overturned.'" Wallace, 146 N.J. at 585 (quoting Leonardis, 73 N.J. at 380 n.10). "In order to overturn a prosecutor's rejection, a defendant must clearly and convincingly establish that the prosecutor's decision constitutes a patent and gross abuse of discretion." State v. Nicholson, 451 N.J. Super. 534, 553 (App. Div. 2017) (quoting Waters, 436 N.J. Super. at 226) (internal quotation marks A-2421-25 7 omitted). "A patent and gross abuse of discretion is defined as a decision that 'has gone so wide of the mark sought to be accomplished by PTI that fundamental fairness and justice require judicial intervention.'" State v. Watkins, 193 N.J. 507, 520 (2008) (quoting Wallace, 146 N.J. at 583). Judicial intervention is warranted only where it can be proven "that the [PTI] denial '(a) was not premised upon a consideration of all relevant factors, (b) was based upon a consideration of irrelevant or inappropriate factors, or (c) amounted to a clear error in judgment.'" State v. Lee, 437 N.J. Super. 555, 563 (App. Div. 2014) (quoting State v. Bender, 80 N.J. 84, 93 (1979)). The court must "presume that a prosecutor considered all relevant factors, absent a demonstration by the defendant to the contrary." Wallace, 146 N.J. at 584. A court is not to assess the case "as if it stood in the shoes of the prosecutor." Id. at 589. "Judicial disagreement with a prosecutor's reasons for rejection does not equate to prosecutorial abuse of discretion so as to merit judicial override." State v. Motley, 369 N.J. Super. 314, 323 (App. Div. 2004) (citing State v. DeMarco, 107 N.J. 562, 566-67 (1987)). Based on our de novo review, we are convinced the State's decision did not amount to a clear patent and gross abuse of discretion. The State evaluated all the relevant factors and provided an explanation for the weight assigned to A-2421-25 8 them. There is no evidence the State considered "irrelevant or inappropriate factors" or that the State's rejection of PTI here was "a clear error in judgment." Lee, 437 N.J. Super. at 563. Thus, there is no basis to conclude the State's decision was "so wide of the mark sought to be accomplished by PTI that fundamental fairness and justice require judicial intervention." Watkins, 193 N.J. at 520 (quoting Wallace, 146 N.J. at 583). We are satisfied the State appropriately exercised its broad discretion to reject defendant's PTI application, and there is no reason to disturb that decision. Therefore, we reverse the trial court's March 17, 2026 order admitting defendant into PTI. Reversed and remanded for further proceedings. We do not retain jurisdiction. A-2421-25 9