Full Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3. SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-2778-24 STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. JAYKAREEM M. TYLER, a/k/a JAY M. TYLER, Defendant-Appellant. ________________________ Submitted October 15, 2026 – Decided October 26, 2026 Before Judges Marczyk and Jacobs. On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Salem County, Indictment No. 14-07-0408. Jennifer N. Sellitti, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Monique Moyse, Designated Counsel, on the brief). Kristin J. Telsey, Salem County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Matthew M. Bingham, Assistant Prosecutor, on the brief). PER CURIAM Defendant Jaykareem M. Tyler appeals from the court's April 14, 2025 order denying his petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) without an evidentiary hearing. The primary issues on appeal are whether defendant demonstrated excusable neglect sufficient to relax the time bar restriction under Rule 3:22-12 and if so, whether defendant's plea counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to inform him of the penal consequences of his plea. We affirm. I. Defendant was charged with first-degree aggravated manslaughter, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4(a)(1), for shooting and killing Jerry Seals on December 23, 2013. Defendant waived indictment, and in July 2014 pled guilty to an accusation for the manslaughter charge. 1 At the plea hearing, defendant testified counsel had reviewed the plea forms and the No Early Release Act (NERA) 2 forms with him. Notably, during the colloquy, defendant was asked by his attorney: And, you understand that the [p]lea that is being negotiated is a [p]lea to a . . . [s]entence of 22 years, 1 Defendant also pled guilty to second-degree possession of a weapon by a convicted felon that was charged in a separate indictment. He does not appeal from that conviction. 2 N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2. A-2778-24 2 where you'll have to serv[e] 85 percent of that 22 years for the aggravated manslaughter. Is that your understanding of the [p]lea and negotiated [s]entences? Defendant responded affirmatively. The court further questioned defendant's understanding of NERA by asking him, "[Y]ou understand that the NERA, or 85 percent, means that you will have to serve 18 years, 8 months, and 15 days, before you're eligible for parole?" Defendant stated he understood. Accordingly, defendant proceeded with the plea, and the court found it was entered knowingly and voluntarily, with defendant's full understanding of its ramifications. There are two plea forms in the record. On one form, in response to question 7b.—which asks whether defendant pled guilty to a charge carrying a mandatory period of parole ineligibility—the notation incorrectly states, "85% of 18 yrs under NERA." On the same form, under question 13—specifying the sentence recommended by the prosecutor—it reflects "18" was crossed out and appropriately replaced with "22." The other form properly indicates defendant is subject to a twenty-two-year sentence under both questions 7b. and 13 and further states he would serve eighty-five percent of that term. At the September 2014 sentencing, plea counsel indicated he reviewed the Pre-Sentence Report with defendant, which stated defendant would be sentenced A-2778-24 3 to twenty-two years. Counsel noted he had no proposed changes to the presentence report. At no point in the proceeding or in his comments to the court did defendant suggest he was supposed to have been sentenced to eighteen years as opposed to twenty-two years. The court subsequently sentenced defendant to twenty-two years of imprisonment in accordance with the plea agreement and noted he must serve eighty-five percent of the term before becoming eligible for parole under NERA. It further specified eighty-five percent of twenty-two years is eighteen years, eight months, and fifteen days. The court acknowledged defendant signed the appeal rights form and advised him he must submit an appeal within forty-five days of the date of sentencing, unless he obtained a thirty-day extension for good cause. Additionally, the court informed defendant of his right to file a PCR petition and advised any such petition must be filed within five years of the judgment or sentence that was challenged. Defendant appealed his sentence in April 2015, arguing the trial court did not consider all the mitigating factors or his ability to pay restitution. We affirmed. State v. Tyler, No. A-1827-14 (Apr. 24, 2025). In October 2020, defendant moved to vacate his fines and penalties. He attached a certification stating he had been sentenced to twenty-two years' imprisonment. Defendant A-2778-24 4 did not contend in either application that he was supposed to receive an eighteen- year sentence but rather acknowledged he was sentenced to twenty-two years. In November 2023, defendant filed a PCR petition in which he argued for the first time he was supposed to receive an eighteen-year sentence.3 The court heard oral argument, during which defendant requested an evidentiary hearing to determine why eighteen years was written on one of the copies of the plea form. In its written opinion on April 14, 2025, the court denied defendant PCR without an evidentiary hearing, finding defendant failed to establish a prima facie case of ineffective assistance of counsel. The court further found the application was untimely. This appeal ensued. II. Defendant argues the following point on appeal: [DEFENDANT] IS ENTITLED TO AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING ON HIS CLAIM THAT TRIAL COUNSEL RENDERED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE PRETRIAL BY FAILING TO INFORM HIM OF THE PENAL CONSEQUENCES OF HIS PLEA. In the absence of an evidentiary hearing, we review de novo "both the factual inferences drawn from the record" by the PCR court and the court's legal 3 Defendant submitted a pro se motion to correct an illegal sentence, which was deemed a PCR petition. A-2778-24 5 conclusions. State v. Balbosa, 481 N.J. Super. 497, 519 (App. Div. 2025), certif. denied, 262 N.J. 410 (2026). We review a PCR judge's decision to deny a defendant's request for an evidentiary hearing under an abuse-of-discretion standard. State v. Vanness, 474 N.J. Super. 609, 623 (App. Div. 2023). We review de novo the trial court's legal conclusion that defendant's PCR petition is procedurally barred. State v. Harris, 181 N.J. 391, 419 (2004); see also Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995) ("[a] trial court's interpretations of the law and the legal consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled to any special deference"). If a PCR petition is timely filed, procedurally sound, and denied without an evidentiary hearing, we review the order de novo. Harris, 181 N.J. at 421. We first address whether defendant established excusable neglect sufficient to relax the time bar under Rule 3:22-12. Defendant acknowledges his petition was untimely filed, but contends the delay resulted from excusable neglect, and enforcing the time bar would result in a fundamental injustice. He asserts he suffers from mental health issues that affected his ability to understand the consequences of the plea agreement. Defendant contends he raised a colorable constitutional claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, which should not be "short-circuited" by the application of the time bar. A-2778-24 6 "[PCR] is neither a substitute for direct appeal . . . nor an opportunity to relitigate cases already decided on the merits." State v. Preciose, 129 N.J. 451, 459 (1992). "Consequently, petitioners may be procedurally barred from [PCR] under Rule 3:22-4 if they could have, but did not, raise the claim in a prior proceeding." Ibid. Rule 3:22-4(a)(l) provides: Any ground for relief not raised in the proceedings resulting in the conviction, or in a post-conviction proceeding brought and decided prior to the adoption of this rule, or in any appeal taken in any such proceedings is barred from assertion in a proceeding under this rule unless the court on motion or at the hearing finds . . . that the ground for relief not previously asserted could not reasonably have been raised in any prior proceeding. As the rule indicates, this procedural bar may be relaxed if the ground for relief not previously asserted "could not reasonably have been raised in any prior proceeding." The test under this exception is objective; it must be shown a reasonable attorney, aware of the pertinent facts and law, could not reasonably have raised the ineffective assistance claim in a prior proceeding. See State v. Mitchell, 126 N.J. 565, 584-85 (1992). The rule expressly provides in this regard that a defendant must show the factual predicate for a newly minted claim A-2778-24 7 could not have been discovered earlier through the exercise of reasonable diligence. See R. 3:22-4(a). The time in which a PCR petition must be filed is governed by Rule 3:22- 12, which states, in relevant part: [N]o petition shall be filed pursuant to this rule more than [five] years after the date of entry pursuant to Rule 3:21-5 of the judgment of conviction that is being challenged unless: (A) it alleges facts showing that the delay beyond said time was due to defendant's excusable neglect and that there is a reasonable probability that if the defendant's factual assertions were found to be true enforcement of the time bar would result in a fundamental injustice[.] [State v. Walker, 478 N.J. Super. 553, 560 (App. Div. 2024) (citing R. 3:22-12(a)(1)(A)).] Excusable neglect requires a showing of "compelling, extenuating circumstances," State v. Milne, 178 N.J. 486, 492 (2004) (quoting State v. Afanador, 151 N.J. 41, 52 (1997)), or alternatively, "exceptional circumstances." State v. Murray, 162 N.J. 240, 246 (2000) (citing Mitchell, 126 N.J. at 580). "Absent compelling, extenuating circumstances, the burden to justify filing a [PCR] petition after the five-year period will increase with the extent of the delay" because "[a]s time passes, justice becomes more elusive and the A-2778-24 8 necessity for preserving finality and certainty of judgments increases." Afanador, 151 N.J. at 52. Because these court rules exist to uphold the integrity of the PCR process, continually relaxing them defeats their purpose. See State v. McIlhenny, 357 N.J. Super. 380, 386-87 (App. Div. 2003) (recognizing that "[t]o consider legal arguments available to a defendant on direct appeal years after conviction and sentence does not serve justice" and instead "mocks the reasonable time limits of the Rules of Criminal Practice and insults the laudatory purpose of [PCR]"). Here, defendant's claims are both procedurally barred and untimely. Although defendant was aware the eighteen-year term was crossed out and replaced with twenty-two years on the plea form, he did not argue on direct appeal his sentence was incorrect. PCR is not a substitute for a direct appeal, and defendant therefore may not use this petition to raise an argument that was available on direct appeal from his sentence. Preciose, 129 N.J. at 459. Instead, defendant attempts to shoehorn his claim into the standard for relaxing the time bar for PCR petitions by relying solely on the assertion his mental health issues prevented him from understanding his sentence. Defendant was sentenced in 2014, and Rule 3:22-12 required him to file his first PCR petition within five years of entry of the judgment of conviction. He did not file A-2778-24 9 this petition until nearly nine years after sentencing. Despite successfully submitting his pro se motion and brief in 2020, which references his twenty - two-year sentence, he offers no evidence—other than his own self-serving statement—to support his claim his mental health issues impaired his ability to file a petition sooner. We conclude this unsupported bald assertion is insufficient to establish excusable neglect under Rule 3:22-12 and does not warrant relaxation of the time bar. For the sake of completeness, we further consider defendant's substantive argument regarding ineffective assistance of counsel. Defendant contends his plea counsel failed to adequately advise him of the penal consequences of his plea. He maintains he established a prima facie case of ineffective assistance of counsel, and an evidentiary hearing is necessary to address the discrepancies in the plea forms. He asserts he believed he was to receive an eighteen-year sentence subject to NERA. According to defendant, he suffered from "several mental health issues" that impaired his ability to understand the consequences of the plea agreement. Defendant claims the inconsistency establishes a prima facie case of ineffective assistance of counsel and further contends an evidentiary hearing is necessary. A-2778-24 10 To succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must meet the two-part test established by Strickland and adopted by our Supreme Court in Fritz. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984); State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 58 (1987). Under Strickland, a defendant first must show that his or her attorney made errors "so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment." 466 U.S. at 687. Counsel's performance is deficient if it "[falls] below an objective standard of reasonableness." Id. at 688. A defendant also must show that counsel's "deficient performance prejudiced the defense[,]" id. at 687, because "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Id. at 694. The right to the effective assistance of counsel extends to legal assistance related to the entry of a guilty plea. State v. Gaitan, 209 N.J. 339, 350-51 (2012). To establish the prejudice prong in the context of a guilty plea, a defendant must show "that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, [the defendant] would not have pled guilty and would have insisted on going to trial." State v. DiFrisco, 137 N.J. 434, 457 (1994) (alteration in original) (quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985)). To that end, "a [defendant] must convince the court that a decision to reject the plea bargain" and "insist on going to trial" A-2778-24 11 would have been "rational under the circumstances." State v. Maldon, 422 N.J. Super. 475, 486 (App. Div. 2011) (quoting Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 372 (2010)). Short of establishing entitlement to a new trial or to vacate a guilty plea, a PCR petitioner may demonstrate that an evidentiary hearing is warranted to develop the factual record in connection with an ineffective assistance claim. Preciose, 129 N.J. at 462-63. As a general matter, a defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel "is more likely to require an evidentiary hearing because the facts often lie outside the trial record and because the attorney's testimony may be required." Id. at 462. However, a PCR petitioner is not automatically entitled to an evidentiary hearing. State v. Cummings, 321 N.J. Super. 154, 170 (App. Div. 1999). Rule 3:22-10(b) provides in pertinent part: [a] defendant shall be entitled to an evidentiary hearing only upon the establishment of a prima facie case in support of [PCR], a determination by the court that there are material issues of disputed fact that cannot be resolved by reference to the existing record, and a determination that an evidentiary hearing is necessary to resolve the claims for relief. Defendant did not sufficiently demonstrate his attorney's performance was deficient nor that the purported deficiency prejudiced him. Although defendant identifies an inconsistency on the plea form regarding the number of years of A-2778-24 12 imprisonment, that inconsistency alone does not sufficiently demonstrate defendant believed he would be sentenced to an eighteen-year term of imprisonment. Rather, the record unequivocally indicates defendant understood he would receive a twenty-two-year term of imprisonment, subject to NERA. At the plea hearing, defendant responded affirmatively to the court's inquiries and appeared to understand the terms of the plea agreement. Importantly, when the court asked defendant whether he understood the negotiated plea would run concurrently with a twenty-two-year sentence for aggravated manslaughter, subject to NERA, defendant responded affirmatively. Furthermore, the court clearly explained a twenty-two-year term of imprisonment subject to NERA meant defendant would be ineligible for parole until he had served eighteen years, eight months, and fifteen days. In response, defendant stated he understood the terms of the plea, acknowledged counsel had reviewed the plea forms with him, and all parties proceeded with the understanding defendant was pleading to a twenty-two-year term of imprisonment subject to NERA. These facts do not suggest defendant failed to understand he was pleading to a twenty-two-year term of imprisonment, nor do they indicate counsel's performance was deficient. A-2778-24 13 Additionally, at sentencing, all parties proceeded with the understanding defendant would be sentenced to twenty-two years in accordance with the plea agreement. Plea counsel stated he reviewed the presentence report with defendant and certified there were no additions, deletions, or corrections to the report. After the court imposed defendant's sentence and advised him of his rights to appeal, defendant stated he had no questions concerning those rights, and he neither expressed confusion nor questioned the sentence imposed. Defendant's bald assertions he suffers from mental health issues, which allegedly prevented him from understanding the consequences of the plea agreement, does not support a prima facie showing required under Rule 3:22- 10(b). Apart from his self-serving assertion, defendant offers no supporting expert submissions to substantiate his claim he did not know he was pleading to a twenty-two-year sentence of imprisonment. The record, instead, suggests defendant understood the plea agreement. Because there are no material factual disputes, no evidentiary hearing was warranted. In sum, defendant was duly apprised of the direct, penal consequences of the negotiated plea he entered, including the NERA parole supervision term. He was specifically advised on the record—under oath during the plea colloquy— of the precise prison term and the applicable NERA parole ineligibility period. A-2778-24 14 The inconsistency or scrivener's error in the written plea forms does not constitute a basis for PCR as defendant acknowledged he understood the actual sentence imposed. Affirmed . A-2778-24 15