Full Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3. SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-2398-24 STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. KEVIN T. SADLER, Defendant-Appellant. _______________________ Submitted October 5, 2026 – Decided October 21, 2026 Before Judges Perez Friscia and Torregrossa-O'Connor. On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Cumberland County, Indictment No. 22-04- 0285. Jennifer N. Sellitti, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Monique Moyse, Designated Counsel, on the briefs). Jennifer Webb-McRae, Cumberland County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Robert A. Polis II, Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief). PER CURIAM Defendant Kevin T. Sadler appeals from the February 19, 2025 order denying his petition for post-conviction relief ("PCR") without an evidentiary hearing. Defendant contends he has demonstrated ineffective assistance of counsel ("IAC") warranting an evidentiary hearing based on trial counsel's failure to provide him with discovery, insufficient explanation of his jail and gap time credits, and lack of arguments at sentencing regarding the applicability of certain aggravating factors. Having reviewed the record, parties' arguments, and applicable law, we affirm. I. On September 29, 2019, defendant was in Vineland with a friend. After an interaction with a man on the street, defendant fired multiple shots from a handgun in the direction of the man, intending to cause serious bodily injury. The victim was not injured. In April 2022, a grand jury charged defendant with: first-degree attempted murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a) and 2C:5-l (count one); first-degree robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1(a)(l) (count two); second-degree conspiracy to commit robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-l(a)(l) and 2C:5-2, (count three); second-degree aggravated assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-l(b)(l) (count four); second-degree unlawful possession of a weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b)(1) (count five); second-degree A-2398-24 2 possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a)(l) (count six); fourth-degree aggravated assault, N.J.S.A. 2C: 12-1(b)(4) (count seven); and fourth-degree criminal mischief, N.J.S.A. 2C:17-3(a)(l) (count eight). On September 18, 2023, defendant appeared before the trial judge for a status conference with new trial counsel, who requested an extension of time to file additional motions. The judge granted defendant time and questioned him regarding his understanding of the State's plea offer. The State had extended a plea offer of an eleven-year term of imprisonment subject to a mandatory eighty- five percent period of parole ineligibility under the No Early Release Act ("NERA"), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2. The judge explained the offer would remain open as the plea cutoff date was extended. After the judge concluded the proceedings, the parties continued to discuss an alternative plea agreement. Later that day, defendant pleaded guilty to second-degree aggravated assault in accordance with the negotiated plea agreement of an eight-year term of imprisonment subject to NERA. Defendant executed a plea form with the State after discussing it with his trial counsel. In response to question twenty- four on the plea form, regarding whether he was satisfied with his trial counsel's advice, defendant answered, "Yes." He also responded, "Yes," to question twenty-five, which affirmed that he did not have any questions concerning his A-2398-24 3 plea. At the time of the plea, defendant was incarcerated and serving a five-year sentence with a forty-two-month period of parole ineligibility. During the plea hearing, the judge comprehensively questioned defendant, confirming he understood the pending charges, plea agreement terms, and his constitutional rights. The judge acknowledged defendant was represented by a new trial counsel, who was his third counsel, and explained that having "a fresh set of eyes [to review the] file" was beneficial. Defendant confirmed that he understood his right to proceed to trial, he had "a chance to read the facts and evidence with [his] attorney," there was enough time to discuss everything with new counsel, and he was satisfied with the representation he had received. On October 30, 2023, defendant appeared for sentencing. Prior to appearing, defendant had sent the judge a letter suggesting he wanted to withdraw his plea. The judge advised defendant he could withdraw his plea and explained he could not "accept [defendant's] guilty plea" if defendant was now claiming he was not guilty. Defendant expressed concerns over the strength of the State's evidence, having considered the State's video evidence and victim's purported statement identifying him. Defendant then confirmed with the judge he wished to proceed to sentencing and not withdraw his plea. Trial counsel A-2398-24 4 asked the judge to sentence defendant in accordance with the plea agreement and specifically repeated he had discussed the jail credit matter with defendant. After the judge provided defendant an opportunity to further address "anything" he wanted, defendant expressed dissatisfaction with not receiving sufficient jail credit toward his sentence based on the "four years" he "was detained," which included time served for a prior conviction. Trial counsel represented he had "fully addressed the issue of [defendant's] jail credit" with defendant before his plea. Trial counsel explained on the record defendant was not given credit toward the pending sentence for time served for prior convictions. After the judge asked if defendant had anything further to discuss on the issue, defendant responded, "Nothing else." Defendant then asserted his understanding and belief that the State's video evidence did not depict him. Acknowledging the assertion, the judge again advised he would permit defendant to withdraw his plea and proceed to a trial. After defendant reaffirmed that he wished to proceed, the judge sentenced defendant. The judge found aggravating factor three, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(3) (risk that the defendant will commit another offense) applied with moderate weight, as defendant was in his twenties and had three prior indictable convictions. Based on defendant's criminal history, the judge also found aggravating factor A-2398-24 5 six, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(6) (the extent of defendant's prior criminal record and seriousness of the offenses of which defendant has been convicted), affording it moderate weight. The judge also determined aggravating factor nine, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(9) (the need for deterring the defendant and others), applied and gave it moderate weight. Based on defendant being twenty-two years of age, the judge applied mitigating factor fourteen, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(14) (defendant was under twenty-six years of age at the time of the commission of the offense), allocating it substantial weight. After weighing the factors, the judge sentenced defendant in accordance with the negotiated plea agreement to an eight-year term of imprisonment subject to NERA, which was to run concurrent to the sentence defendant was serving at the time. Defendant was also subject to a three-year period of parole supervision. The judge determined defendant was entitled to 469 days of jail time credit for the time he was detained between September 30, 2019 and January 10, 2021. Defendant received 1,022 days of gap-time credit for his time served from January 11, 2021 to October 29, 2023. The judge imposed the applicable fines and penalties and dismissed the remaining counts. In June 2024, defendant filed a timely self-represented PCR petition, which was supplemented by PCR counsel. Defendant argued a PCR evidentiary A-2398-24 6 hearing was mandated because his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to: provide defendant full discovery; give competent legal advice regarding the consequences of his plea and jail credit; and argue against the aggravating factors applied. Defendant also asserted the cumulative errors warranted relief. On February 19, 2025, a different judge ("PCR judge") heard argument and denied defendant's petition. The PCR judge found defendant had failed to submit sufficient support showing "what discovery was present or not present or what he had or did[ not] have." In addition to asserting what specific discovery was missing, the PCR judge highlighted that defendant failed to posit how the outcome would have changed. The PCR judge next determined that the sentencing transcript showed defendant was thoroughly advised by trial counsel as to the applicable jail credit. After noting that the issues were discussed on the record, the PCR judge highlighted that defendant had the opportunity to address his questions. Finally, as to defendant's assertion that his trial counsel failed to address the aggravating factors, the PCR judge found defendant provided no specific information supporting an error nor did he show the outcome would have been different. This appeal followed. A-2398-24 7 On appeal, defendant raises the following point for our consideration: POINT I [DEFENDANT] IS ENTITLED TO AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING ON HIS CLAIMS THAT TRIAL COUNSEL RENDERED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE BY FAILING TO PROVIDE AND REVIEW DISCOVERY PRETRIAL[,] EXPLAIN GAP AND JAIL TIME CREDITS PRETRIAL, AND ARGUE AGAINST THE COURT'S OVERVALUING OF AGGRAVATING FACTORS AT SENTENCING. ALL OF THESE DEFICIENCIES, ALONE OR IN THE AGGREGATE, LED TO A HIGHER SENTENCE THAN [DEFENDANT] OTHERWISE WOULD HAVE RECEIVED. II. In the absence of an evidentiary hearing, we review de novo the factual inferences drawn from the record by the PCR court. State v. Aburoumi, 464 N.J. Super. 326, 338 (App. Div. 2020). Further, we also "review a PCR court's legal conclusions de novo." State v. Hernandez-Peralta, 261 N.J. 231, 246 (2025) (citing State v. Harris, 181 N.J. 391, 419 (2004)). A petitioner is not automatically entitled to an evidentiary hearing by simply raising a PCR claim. State v. Cummings, 321 N.J. Super. 154, 170 (App. Div. 1999). When petitioning for PCR, the defendant must establish, "by a preponderance of the credible evidence," entitlement to the requested relief. State v. Nash, 212 N.J. 518, 541 (2013) (quoting State v. Preciose, 129 N.J. 451, A-2398-24 8 459 (1992)). An evidentiary hearing should only be conducted if "there are material issues of disputed fact" regarding entitlement to PCR "that cannot be resolved by reference to the existing record." State v. Porter, 216 N.J. 343, 354 (2013) (quoting R. 3:22-10(b)). "A prima facie case is established when a defendant demonstrates 'a reasonable likelihood that his or her claim, viewing the facts alleged in the light most favorable to the defendant, will ultimately succeed on the merits.'" Id. at 355 (quoting R. 3:22-10(b)). It is clear, to establish a prima facie IAC claim warranting an evidentiary hearing, "a petitioner must do more than make bald assertions that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel," but must instead "allege facts sufficient to demonstrate counsel's alleged substandard performance." Ibid. (quoting Cummings, 321 N.J. Super. at 170). To succeed on an IAC claim, a defendant must satisfy both prongs of the test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984), and adopted by our Supreme Court in State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 58 (1987). "First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. The PCR judge "must indulge a strong presumption that A-2398-24 9 counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance," and "the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action [by counsel] 'might be considered sound trial strategy.'" Id. at 689 (quoting Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101 (1955)). Under the second prong of the Strickland test, the defendant must show "the deficient performance prejudiced the defense." Id. at 687. This means "counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable." Ibid. It is insufficient for the defendant to show the errors "had some conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceeding." Id. at 693. Moreover, courts must "make 'every effort . . . to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the time.'" Hernandez-Peralta, 261 N.J. at 251 (quoting State v. Pierre, 223 N.J. 560, 579 (2015)). III. Defendant first argues that he established an evidentiary hearing was warranted based on trial counsel's failure to "sen[d him] any discovery at all" prior to negotiating a plea bargain. Specifically, he alleges the video footage of A-2398-24 10 the robbery, which purportedly did not completely depict his face, was not provided. Defendant allegedly made numerous requests of his trial counsel for the discovery and felt "compelled to plead guilty" despite not having the information. Based on our review of the record, we are unconvinced. During the plea hearing, defendant's trial counsel represented to the judge that he had discussed and reviewed the case with defendant. Thereafter, defendant acknowledged he was satisfied with his trial counsel's representation and had no questions. The plea hearing transcript demonstrates that defendant's new trial counsel had filed additional motions after reviewing the case with defendant, and as noted by the judge, had also provided a fresh review of the case. Defendant's trial counsel acknowledged having video footage and making sure no "footage [wa]s . . . outstanding." Defendant represented they had discussed taking "the case to trial." Defendant neither contested receiving the discovery nor questioned trial counsel's assertions to the judge about the discovery or their discussion about the case. Defendant's contention that trial counsel failed to "provide and review discovery" is further contradicted by the sentencing transcript, which shows the judge extensively discussed defendant's concerns regarding the record. Thus, we agree with the PCR judge that defendant has only posited bare assertions and failed to demonstrate prejudice. A-2398-24 11 We next turn to defendant's contention that he has demonstrated trial counsel "failed to explain . . . his jail and gap time credits," resulting in him receiving a longer term of incarceration than the "lower sentence" he had believed he "was [going to] actually receiv[e]." While defendant acknowledges his trial counsel "discuss[ed]" the credits with him, he maintains there was no confirmation of his "understand[ing of] the credits." Defendant's contentions are belied by the record. "In a challenge to a conviction arising from a guilty plea, the petitioner may satisfy the prejudice prong by showing 'a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.'" State v. O'Donnell, 435 N.J. Super. 351, 369-70 (App. Div. 2014) (quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985)). "In the PCR context, to obtain relief from a conviction following a plea, 'a petitioner must convince the court that a decision to reject the plea bargain would have been rational under the circumstances.'" Id. at 371 (quoting Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 372 (2010)). "Generally, representations made by a defendant at plea hearings concerning the voluntariness of the decision to plead, as well as any findings made by the trial court when accepting the plea, constitute a 'formidable barrier' which defendant must overcome." State v. Simon, 161 N.J. 416, 444 (1999) A-2398-24 12 (quoting Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 74 (1977)). This is because "[s]olemn declarations in open court carry a strong presumption of verity." Ibid. (alteration in original) (quoting Blackledge, 431 U.S. at 74). In the present case, defendant's trial counsel twice represented to the judge that discussions occurred with defendant regarding his entitlement to jail time credits. Further, at sentencing, the judge addressed with defendant the jail credits and defendant affirmatively advised the judge he wished to proceed to sentencing. Defendant's argument that the PCR judge erred in finding "he understood th[e] issue" is unsupported. As the PCR judge correctly found, the sentencing transcript illustrates defendant was questioned after the jail time credit discussion and he verified there were no further questions on the issue. Again, the judge at sentencing made it clear to defendant multiple times he could seek to withdraw his plea, but defendant declined. Thus, defendant has failed to make a prima facie showing that his trial counsel's performance regarding the jail credits constituted IAC and that he would not have accepted the plea. Finally, defendant contends he made the requisite initial showing that counsel committed IAC "at sentencing by failing to argue against certain aggravating factors found by the sentencing court." Defendant maintains that at sentencing, trial counsel "said nothing in support of [him,] . . . contrary to [trial A-2398-24 13 counsel's] constitutional duty." However, defendant offers no material facts to support his argument that trial counsel was ineffective for "failing to argue against certain aggravating factors found." Stated another way, defendant posits no substantive points that should have been argued by trial counsel after requesting the judge abide by the negotiated plea agreement. As the PCR judge correctly noted, the judge at sentencing afforded substantial weight to mitigating factor fourteen and made supported findings on the aggravating factors. Defendant's bare assertions fall short of articulating a prima facie claim and are insufficient to support entitlement to an evidentiary hearing. For these reasons, we discern no error in the court's denial of defendant's PCR petition, finding he failed under Strickland to make a prima facie showing that (1) counsel's performance was deficient and (2) the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. 466 U.S. at 687; Fritz, 105 N.J. at 58. To the extent not addressed, defendant's remaining contentions lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2). Affirmed. A-2398-24 14