Full Opinion

RECORD IMPOUNDED NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3. SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-1386-24 STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. ALEX RAMOS, Defendant-Appellant. ______________________ Submitted September 30, 2026 – Decided November 5, 2026 Before Judges Currier and Jacobs. On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Mercer County, Indictment No. 04-03-0202. Jennifer N. Sellitti, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Monique Moyse, Designated Counsel, on the briefs). Janetta D. Marbrey, Mercer County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Laura Sunyak, Assistant Prosecutor, on the brief). PER CURIAM Defendant Alexander Ramos appeals from a November 22, 2024 order denying his petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) without an evidentiary hearing. He argues the court erred in finding the petition time-barred and in rejecting his claim plea counsel misadvised him about the consequences of his plea, particularly the possibility of later civil commitment rather than immediate placement on community supervision for life (CSL). We affirm. I. In 2004, a grand jury returned a twelve-count indictment charging defendant with crimes associated with a home invasion and sexual assault. Defendant pled guilty to a single count of first-degree aggravated sexual assault. N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(a)(4). The plea agreement provided at sentencing the State would dismiss the remaining counts of the indictment and recommend a fifteen- year prison term subject to the No Early Release Act (NERA), N.J.S.A. 2C:43- 7.2, together with Megan's Law registration, an Avenel evaluation, and CSL.1 During the plea hearing, defense counsel stated she had reviewed the plea forms with defendant and believed he understood "all of his rights and responsibilities" pursuant to the terms. Under oath, defendant acknowledged to 1 N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.4 was amended by L. 2003, c. 267, effective January 14, 2004. The amendment included the name change from "Community Supervision for Life" to "Parole Supervision for Life." A-1386-24 2 the court he discussed the charges with counsel, she answered his questions, he reviewed the plea forms, understood their contents, and placed his initials and signatures on the individual plea form pages. The court then conducted a detailed review of the terms of the plea, confirming the aggravated sexual assault charge exposed defendant to twenty years in prison but the State would recommend fifteen years, eighty-five percent parole ineligibility under NERA, with dismissal of the remaining charges. The court stressed the "hard core sentence is 85 percent of 15 years in state prison" and asked defendant if he understood "[t]hat's at a minimum." Defendant answered "Yes." Next, the court addressed the collateral and supervisory consequences of the plea. The court asked defendant if he understood he would "have to undergo a five-year parole supervision at the completion of [his] term sentence . . . which is amplified by the fact that [he would] be under Megan's Law which will be basically lifetime supervision." Defendant answered "Yes." The court devoted specific attention to the Avenel evaluation and possible treatment consequences. THE COURT: Finally, with respect to the Diagnostic and Treatment Center assessment, by entering a plea of guilty to this charge, you are going to be required to submit to a physical and psychological examination at Avenel, the purpose of which is to determine if your conduct, in committing the offense, is characterized by A-1386-24 3 a pattern of repetitive and compulsive behavior; do you understand that? THE DEFENDANT: Yes. THE COURT: If the examination reveals that your conduct is characterized by a pattern of repetitive and compulsive behavior, I may sentence you to confinement at the Adult Diagnostic and Treatment Center for a program of specialized treatment for your mental condition. THE DEFENDANT: Yes. .... THE COURT: Finally, do you understand that if you are sentenced to the Adult Diagnostic and Treatment Center, that future parole guidelines are not guided by the normal guidelines. They're different guidelines that apply to you, and that you'll be eligible for release after receiving a recommendation from a special classification review board which must find that you are capable of making an acceptable social adjustment in the community. Do you understand that as well? THE DEFENDANT: Yes. THE COURT: Finally, as a result of this plea, you may spend more time in treatment than you would spend if you were sentenced to state prison as a result of the specialized assessment that must be made and your current sentence imposed; do you understand that as well? THE DEFENDANT: Yes. A-1386-24 4 The completed plea forms mirrored this colloquy. Defendant then provided a factual basis. He admitted that on the date in question he broke into an apartment intending to commit a burglary, found a female asleep, woke her by putting his hand on her mouth, armed himself with a kitchen knife taken from the apartment, took her to the living room, ordered her to remove her clothes, and sexually assaulted her by penetrating her with his penis. At sentencing in 2005, counsel argued defendant suffered from "mental illness" and asked the court either to sentence him to Avenel when eligible or to require a reevaluation at the point he would have seven years of his sentence left to serve. Counsel disagreed with the Avenel report's conclusion that defendant's conduct was not compulsive and contended treatment would benefit both defendant and society. The court responded it would "invite a reassessment of [defendant]'s mental status as it relates to this offense and whatever might happen at the time that the Adult Diagnostic and Treatment Center is able to undertake that responsibility." The court then imposed the negotiated sentence of fifteen years' state prison, subject to NERA, Megan's Law, CSL, a five-year term of parole supervision, and mandatory fines and penalties. The judgment of conviction expressly stated defendant was "ordered to serve a 5-year term of A-1386-24 5 parole supervision[,] which term shall begin as soon as defendant completes the sentence of incarceration." At the close of sentencing, the court advised defendant he had forty-five days to appeal. Defendant responded "I believe I signed the appeal." Defense counsel then stated "He already requested appeal, your Honor. I will put that appeal through for him." Defendant appealed, arguing the sentencing court abused its discretion in weighing aggravating and mitigating factors and requested a remand on certain violation-of-probation sentences pursuant to State v. Natale, 184 N.J. 458 (2005). We considered the challenge on our excessive sentence calendar and affirmed. See State v. Ramos, No. A-4070-04 (App. Div. June 27, 2006). A record of the proceeding later produced at the limited PCR hearing also included a notice of appeal, a public defender certification to the Supreme Court, and a Supreme Court remand limited to a separate violation-of-probation issue. See State v. Ramos, 188 N.J. 488 (2006). Defendant completed his prison sentence and in May 2016, was civilly committed. In 2023, defendant filed a pro se PCR petition followed by counsel- assisted petition accompanied by a supplemental certification and merits briefs . A-1386-24 6 The petitions raised three points. First, defendant claimed plea counsel was ineffective because counsel told him he would be placed on CSL after prison but did not tell him he might instead be civilly committed. Second, he claimed counsel failed to file a direct appeal. Third, he asserted his sentence was illegal because CSL had not begun when he finished serving his custodial term. At the PCR hearing, counsel clarified defendant was not seeking to withdraw his guilty plea. The court asked, "are you . . . asking to withdraw the plea or . . . asking to enforce the [CSL]?" Counsel answered "the [CSL]. He never wanted to contest the plea." Later, counsel repeated the point: "He doesn't want to face the plea again, he just wants this to be enforced." Counsel also stated defendant believed that, if CSL were enforced as he understood it, he would be "off civil commitment because he has to be out in the community." The court granted a limited evidentiary hearing on the direct-appeal issue. At that hearing, the State introduced a notice of appeal, the appellate transcript, a public defender certification, and Supreme Court documents. Defense counsel did not dispute the genuineness of the appellate record. In a November 22, 2024 written ruling and accompanying order the court denied the PCR. It found the petition time-barred because defendant filed it eighteen years after the judgment of conviction, thirteen years after expiration A-1386-24 7 of the five-year PCR deadline, and seven years after his civil commitment. The court rejected defendant's claims of excusable neglect. Nonetheless, the court addressed the merits. It found defendant failed to establish ineffective assistance of plea counsel because he was not trying to withdraw the plea and had not shown a reasonable probability he would have rejected it. The court further found no merit to the claim counsel failed to file a direct appeal because the documentary record showed counsel did file one. Finally, the court rejected the claim of an illegal sentence because although CSL was not yet imposed, the sentence itself still included CSL and was authorized by law. The court denied a further evidentiary hearing. The PCR court's denial of a more extensive evidentiary hearing is defendant's focus on appeal, framed as follows: POINT ONE [DEFENDANT] IS ENTITLED TO AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING ON HIS CLAIM THAT HIS ATTORNEY RENDERED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL BY MISADVISING HIM ABOUT HIS SENTENCE, CAUSING HIM TO PLEAD GUILTY WHEN HE OTHERWISE WOULD HAVE GONE TO TRIAL. More specifically, defendant argues the PCR court denied him the opportunity to demonstrate how plea counsel misadvised him about a material A-1386-24 8 consequence of the plea by purportedly telling him he would be placed on CSL after prison and by failing to advise him he could instead be civilly committed. He asserts had he known of this possibility, he would not have pled guilty and instead gone to trial. In reply to the State's opposition on grounds of untimeliness, he argues his petition should not have been dismissed as untimely because his delay resulted from excusable neglect, including a lack of awareness of the claim until his civil commitment, and his lack of law library access during the COVID-19 pandemic. II. We review de novo the PCR court's legal conclusion a petition is time- barred. State v. Harris, 181 N.J. 391, 419 (2004). When the court denies PCR without an evidentiary hearing, we review the existing record to determine whether defendant established a prima facie claim for relief. State v. Preciose, 129 N.J. 451, 462-63 (1992); State v. Jones, 219 N.J. 298, 311 (2014). A defendant is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing merely by filing a PCR petition. Preciose, 129 N.J. at 462. The court should grant a hearing only if the defendant presents a prima facie claim, the facts outside the record are material, and a hearing will aid the court's analysis. State v. Porter, 216 N.J. 343, 355 (2013). A-1386-24 9 To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must satisfy the two-part test in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984), adopted in State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 58 (1987), which requires defendant to show: (1) counsel's performance was deficient; and (2) the deficiency prejudiced the defense. In the context of a guilty plea, the prejudice prong requires a defendant to show "a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial." Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985). Rule 3:22-12(a)(1) requires a first PCR petition to be filed within five years after entry of the judgment of conviction unless the defendant alleges facts showing excusable neglect and a reasonable probability that enforcement of the time bar would result in a fundamental injustice. State v. Goodwin, 173 N.J. 583, 594 (2002). The burden grows with the length of the delay. State v. Mitchell, 126 N.J. 565, 580 (1992). We first address timeliness. The PCR court correctly found this petition untimely. The judgment of conviction was entered in 2005. Defendant filed this PCR petition in 2023. Thus, the filing came more than eighteen years after the judgment and more than thirteen years after the five-year deadline expired. Even if we measured from May 2016, when defendant was civilly committed A-1386-24 10 and says he first realized CSL would not begin upon release, the petition still came seven years later. That delay remains substantial. Defendant's explanations do not establish excusable neglect. His COVID- 19 argument does not account for the many years that passed before the pandemic began or the years that passed after restrictions eased. The PCR court recognized that gap, as do we. The pandemic began in 2020. Defendant certifies he realized the practical problem in 2016 yet he did not file until 2023. The pandemic does not excuse that full period. His claim of not knowing about the availability of post-conviction relief because counsel failed to file a direct appeal fares no better. The limited hearing conducted by the PCR court conclusively disproved the premise. The State produced the notice of appeal, the 2006 excessive sentence oral argument transcript, and related appellate filings. Defense counsel did not dispute their accuracy. The 2005 sentencing transcript signals the same result. When the court advised defendant of his right to appeal, he responded, "I believe I signed the appeal." Counsel answered, "He already requested appeal, your Honor. I will put that appeal through for him." Based on this exchange, defendant cannot rely on the supposed absence of right to appeal or appellate review to explain his delay. A-1386-24 11 Nor has defendant shown a fundamental injustice sufficient to relax the time bar. The record does not reveal a hidden defect that denied him fair proceedings or affected the determination of guilt. See Mitchell, 126 N.J. at 587; Goodwin, 173 N.J. at 594. The plea record is detailed, if not meticulous. The court explained the direct penal consequences and the possible treatment consequences in plain terms. Defendant repeatedly said he understood. His current claim does not expose a fundamental defect in the plea process. It instead conflicts with the record. Based on this record, the petition is time-barred, and the PCR court properly denied it on that basis. Even if we reached the merits, defendant would not prevail. The plea record defeats the claim that counsel misadvised him about the possibility of later specialized confinement or extended supervision. The court did not leave that subject vague. The court told defendant he would be required to undergo an Avenel evaluation. The plea court advised defendant that if the examination showed repetitive and compulsive conduct, the court could sentence him to confinement at the Adult Diagnostic and Treatment Center for specialized treatment. The court further advised that if he were sentenced there, ordinary parole guidelines would not control and release would depend on a recommendation from a special board and a finding he could make A-1386-24 12 an acceptable social adjustment in the community. Most critically, the court told him "as a result of this plea, you may spend more time in treatment than you would spend if you were sentenced to state prison." Defendant answered "Yes" each time the court asked whether he understood. This colloquy squarely addressed the very subject defendant now says counsel omitted. The court warned the plea could expose him to treatment-based confinement that extended beyond ordinary prison. The plea forms repeated the same information, and defendant initialed and signed them. A defendant cannot establish deficient advice on a point the court itself fully explained and defendant acknowledged he understood. The sentencing record points the same way. Defense counsel did not speak as though Avenel-type confinement or treatment consequences were foreign to the plea. She argued vigorously about them. She challenged the Avenel report's conclusion that defendant was not compulsive and asked the court to send him to Avenel when eligible or reevaluate him later so he could receive treatment there. As referenced, the court agreed to request a reassessment before release. That exchange does not support a claim defendant entered the plea on the belief that only ordinary parole-type supervision could follow his prison term. A-1386-24 13 Defendant also fails on prejudice. The Hill standard required him to show a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's alleged error, he would not have pled guilty and would have insisted on trial. 474 U.S. at 59. Defendant did not make that showing. Pointedly, he did not seek to withdraw his guilty plea by way of his PCR petition. The court asked whether defendant wanted "to withdraw the plea" or "to enforce the [CSL]." Counsel answered, "the [CSL]. He never wanted to contest the plea." Elaborating, counsel told the court, "He doesn't want to face the plea again, he just wants this to be enforced." That position directly undercuts the present claim he would have rejected the plea and gone to trial. The strength of the State's case and defendant's exposure reinforce the PCR court's conclusion. Defendant admitted he broke into the apartment, armed himself with a kitchen knife, and sexually assaulted the victim. He faced numerous additional charges, including first-degree robbery and other serious offenses. The negotiated plea dismissed all counts except the aggravated sexual assault charge and capped the prison recommendation at fifteen years subject to NERA. Nothing in this record suggests it would have been rational for defendant to reject that bargain based on the alleged misunderstanding he now A-1386-24 14 advances, especially after the court expressly warned he could spend more time in treatment than in ordinary prison. Defendant's showing therefore falls well short of a prima facie claim under Strickland and Hill. At most, he offers a bald assertion that contradicts the plea colloquy and his later position before the PCR court. Such an assertion does not meet the prima facie standard. Cummings, 321 N.J. Super. at 170. The PCR court also correctly rejected the "illegal sentence" claim. The judgment of conviction expressly imposed CSL. It also imposed the five-year parole supervision term that accompanies the sentence. The sentence therefore included CSL. Defendant's complaint concerns when and how CSL would operate after he completed his custodial term in light of his later civil commitment. However, defendant's complaint does not transform the sentence into one "not authorized by law." R. 3:21-10(b)(5). The sentence, as entered, was authorized. Defendant sought to use PCR to secure a declaration that CSL, rather than civil commitment, should have commenced. The PCR court correctly concluded the argument did not establish an illegal sentence. We agree. For the same reasons, the court properly denied a further evidentiary hearing. A hearing would not have aided the analysis. The decisive facts A-1386-24 15 already appear in the existing record. The plea court informed defendant he could be subject to specialized treatment confinement and could spend more time in treatment than in ordinary prison. Defendant stated under oath he understood. The sentencing and PCR transcripts likewise show defendant did not seek to withdraw the plea. The documentary record established a direct appeal was filed. No material factual dispute remained that required live testimony. The PCR court therefore acted correctly in denying a hearing under Rule 3:22-10. Defendant did not present a prima facie claim; he presented a theory refuted by the record. Affirmed. A-1386-24 16