Full Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3. SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-2151-23 STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. DONOVAN G. HOLLINGSWORTH, Defendant-Appellant. Argued October 27, 2026 – Decided November 20, 2026 Before Judges Firko and Bergman. On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Burlington County, Indictment No. 22-04- 0735. Zachary G. Markarian, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant (Jennifer N. Sellitti, Public Defender, attorney; Zachary G. Markarian, of counsel and on the brief). Alexis R. Agre, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for respondent (LaChia L. Bradshaw, Burlington County Prosecutor, attorney; Alexis R. Agre, of counsel and on the brief). PER CURIAM Defendant Donovan G. Hollingsworth appeals from the March 1, 2024 amended judgment of conviction entered after a jury found him guilty of first - degree murder; first-degree felony murder, first-degree robbery, third-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, fourth-degree unlawful possession of a weapon, and third-degree cruelty to animals. Having considered defendant's arguments in light of the record and applicable legal principles, we affirm the convictions and custodial sentence. However, we remand for the limited purpose of reconsidering restitution and to enter fact findings regarding defendant's ability to pay as required by N.J.S.A. 2C:44-2(c). I. On April 29, 2022, a Burlington County grand jury returned an indictment charging defendant with: first-degree murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1) and (2) (count one); first-degree felony murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(3) (count two); first-degree robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1(a)(1) (count three); third-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(d) (count four); fourth-degree unlawful possession of a weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(d) (count five); and third-degree cruelty to animals, N.J.S.A. 4:22-17(c)(1) (count six). A-2151-23 2 We glean the following facts from the record. On the morning of February 5, 2022, defendant went to the apartment of Thomas Pierson, with whom defendant was friendly and with whom he previously spent time smoking marijuana and discussing shared interests. At approximately 8:35 a.m., before arriving, defendant texted he and Pierson's mutual friend, Nick Daraio: "I'm about to go rob Tom [Pierson]." He then drove to Pierson's apartment with a fixed-blade knife. Security footage from a nearby Sunoco showed defendant arriving at 9:09 a.m., entering at 9:10 a.m., leaving at 9:12 a.m., reentering at 9:13 a.m., and leaving again at 9:14 a.m. Pierson's upstairs neighbor, Darian Latney, testified he awoke to loud banging, heard a male voice he believed was Pierson yelling "help me" and "Django, stop," then saw Pierson injured and called 911. Officers found Pierson on the living room floor with extensive blood spread throughout the apartment. Django, Pierson's Cane Corso dog, was found injured in the common area and died shortly thereafter. The record reflects defendant did not call 9-1-1. Instead, after leaving the apartment, he called Daraio, received another call, then called his father at 9:37 a.m. While on the phone with his father, defendant texted that Pierson had attacked him, that Pierson's dog bit him, and that he used his knife to defend A-2151-23 3 himself. Defendant's father called 911 at 10:03 a.m. and reported defendant had been involved in a fight with Pierson. Police later located defendant at urgent care and then at Virtua Hospital. Officers seized defendant's clothing and recovered an unsheathed fixed-blade knife from his vehicle. Forensic testing identified Pierson as the source of DNA from a swab taken from a dresser in the bedroom and from a stain on defendant's sneaker. Dr. Ian Hood, the medical examiner, concluded Pierson died from multiple stab and slash wounds and Django died from a stab wound. At trial, defendant testified in his own defense, asserting he acted in self- defense. He maintained he went to Pierson's apartment to get marijuana, Pierson unexpectedly grabbed and punched him, and Django then joined the altercation and bit him, causing him to stab both Pierson and the dog in an effort to escape. At trial, defendant presented witnesses who described Pierson as aggressive or volatile and defendant as nonviolent. The jury nevertheless found defendant guilty on all counts. Defendant moved for a new trial, principally arguing the court improperly limited his testimony concerning Pierson's prior violent acts. The court denied the motion. On February 9, 2024, defendant was sentenced to thirty years subject to thirty years of parole ineligibility on the murder conviction; merged A-2151-23 4 felony murder; imposed concurrent terms on the robbery and weapons offenses; imposed a consecutive four-year term on the animal-cruelty conviction; and ordered restitution of $7,903.62. The amended judgment of conviction added a five-year term of parole supervision under the No Early Release Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2. On appeal, defendant raises the following points for our consideration: POINT I THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATED [DEFENDANT]'S RIGHT TO PRESENT A COMPLETE DEFENSE BY PROHIBITING HIM FROM TESTIFYING ABOUT WHAT PIERSON AND OTHERS HAD TOLD HIM ABOUT PIERSON'S PAST VIOLENT ACTS. POINT II THE PROSECUTOR COMMITTED PERVASIVE MISCONDUCT BY DENIGRATING THE DEFENSE THROUGHOUT SUMMATION AS "NONSENSE" AND "A FICTION," AND IMPROPERLY EXPLOITED THE TRIAL COURT'S ERRONEOUS LIMITATION ON [DEFENDANT]'S TESTIMONY ABOUT PIERSON'S PAST VIOLENCE. POINT III THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO CHARGE THE JURY THAT SELF-DEFENSE APPLIED TO THE ANIMAL CRUELTY CHARGE EVEN THOUGH THE NEED FOR THE CHARGE WAS CLEARLY INDICATED. A-2151-23 5 POINT IV THE CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF THE LEGAL ERRORS DENIED [DEFENDANT] OF A FAIR TRIAL. POINT V THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO MAKE FINDINGS REGARDING [DEFENDANT]'S ABILITY TO PAY WHEN IT IMPOSED $7,903.62 IN RESTITUTION. II. We review a trial court's evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion. State v. Cole, 229 N.J. 430, 449 (2017). An evidentiary ruling will not be disturbed unless it was made without a rational explanation, departed from established principles, or rested on an impermissible basis. State v. R.Y., 242 N.J. 48, 65 (2020). Unpreserved claims, including alleged summation error and jury- instruction error, are reviewed for plain error. R. 2:10-2. Reversal is warranted only if the claimed error was "clearly capable of producing an unjust result." Ibid. When self-defense is raised, evidence of a victim's violent character may be admissible for limited purposes. State v. Jenewicz, 193 N.J. 440, 457-63 (2008). But the defendant must demonstrate knowledge of the victim's violent A-2151-23 6 character or acts for such evidence to bear on the reasonableness of the asserted belief in the need to use force. State v. Gartland, 149 N.J. 456, 473-76 (1997); Jenewicz, 193 N.J. at 462-63. A prosecutor is afforded broad latitude in summation but may not misstate the evidence or so denigrate the defense as to deprive a defendant of a fair trial. State v. Frost, 158 N.J. 76, 82-83 (1999); State v. Garcia, 245 N.J. 412, 436-37 (2021). Finally, when imposing restitution, the court must take into account the defendant's financial resources, and the burden payment will impose. N.J.S.A. 2C:44-2(c). A factual basis must exist, and there must be explicit consideration of the defendant's ability to pay. State v. Scribner, 298 N.J. Super. 366, 372 (App. Div. 1997). A. We first address defendant's contention the trial court erred by limiting defendant's testimony about Pierson's alleged prior violent acts. We are unpersuaded. During defendant's direct examination, defense counsel asked whether Pierson had made defendant aware of Pierson "being violent towards people" and then asked, "what did he tell you?" The State objected on hearsay and personal knowledge grounds. Defense counsel argued the testimony was A-2151-23 7 offered for its effect on defendant and his "thought process" during the alleged attack. Counsel proffered that defendant would testify Pierson had told him about two prior violent incidents. After recessing to review the applicable legal principles, the court ruled defendant could testify concerning Pierson's reputation based on defendant's own actual knowledge, but not to specific incidents learned only through hearsay and through Pierson himself. We conclude this ruling was not an abuse of discretion. The record shows when defense counsel argued for admission of this testimony, counsel told the court he wanted defendant to testify about "different things [Pierson] told him," including "the issue with his father" and "running over his cousin with his car." The court ruled defendant could not testify to hearsay statements, allegedly made by Pierson, and could testify only to "his own actual knowledge" not "acquired . . . through hearsay." N.J.S.A. 2C:3-4(b)(2) justifies the use of deadly force only when the actor reasonably believes that such force is necessary to protect the actor against death or serious bodily injury. N.J.R.E. 404(b) permits defendants alleging self- defense to produce prior-acts evidence that speaks to the issue of the reasonableness of the defendant's belief that deadly force was necessary. N.J.R.E. 404(b) states that such evidence may be admitted for other purposes, A-2151-23 8 such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity or absence of mistake or accident when such matters are relevant to a material issue in dispute. "Only when the defendant has actual knowledge of the specific acts to which a witness testifies is specific-acts testimony probative of the defendant's reasonable belief." Jenewicz, 193 N.J. at 446 (citations omitted). Here, the court aptly identified the governing principles recognized in Jenewicz, and concluded the proposed testimony, as framed, would elicit inadmissible hearsay because defendant sought to recount specific violent acts not personally known to him, but communicated by Pierson to him. In this instance, defendant did not have personal knowledge of the incidents involving Pierson's father or cousin. Instead, he sought to repeat Pierson's out-of-court descriptions of those events. On this record, the court reasonably limited the proposed testimony to defendant's own personal knowledge, not his knowledge acquired through hearsay. We further conclude under the weighing test of N.J.R.E. 403(a), the probative value of the hearsay statements was substantially outweighed by the risk of undue prejudice, confusion of issues, or misleading the jury, under these circumstances. "In deciding whether to exclude evidence based on its potential for prejudice, 'a A-2151-23 9 court must consider the availability of other evidence that can be used to prove the same point.'" State v. Long, 173 N.J. 138, 164 (2002) (quoting State v. Covell, 157 N.J. 554, 569 (1999)). We conclude the court's ruling did not prevent defendant from presenting other evidence of his self-defense theory. Defendant testified at length about his friendship with Pierson, his reputation for "getting over on people," "being violent to people," and being "erratic," and the events defendant claimed occurred inside the apartment. Other defense witnesses also testified that Pierson had a reputation for aggression or bullying. Thus, the jury heard the essence of the defense position that Pierson could be violent and defendant 's claims he acted in response to an attack. The jury, however, did not accept that defense theory. We therefore discern no abuse of discretion in the court's evidentiary ruling and conclude there was no violation of defendant's right to present a complete defense. B. We next turn to defendant's contention the court erred by permitting the prosecutor's summation, including repeated references to defendant's account of the events, as "nonsense" or "fiction." We note defendant did not object to the bulk of the prosecutor's challenged remarks, and we therefore review this issue A-2151-23 10 under the plain error standard wherein defendant must show such comments were clearly capable of producing an unjust result. R. 2:10-2. We conclude defendant has not met this heightened burden. It is axiomatic that a "prosecutor's comments must be confined to the evidence and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence," State v. W.L., 292 N.J. Super. 100, 111 (App. Div. 1996) (citations omitted), and "[a] prosecutor is permitted to respond to an argument raised by the defense so long as it does not constitute a foray beyond the evidence adduced at trial." State v. Munoz, 340 N.J. Super. 204, 216 (App. Div. 2001) (citing State v. Wilson, 128 N.J. 233, 241-42 (1992)). Prosecutorial misconduct is not grounds for reversal of a criminal conviction unless "the prosecutorial misconduct is clear and unmistakable and substantially prejudices a defendant's fundamental right to have a jury fairly evaluate the merits of the case." W.L., 292 N.J. Super. at 111. Thus, "even when a prosecutor's remarks stray over the line of permissible commentary, our inquiry does not end." State v. McNeil-Thomas, 238 N.J. 256, 275 (2019) (quoting State v. Wakefield, 190 N.J. 397, 437 (2007). Rather, we must weigh "the severity of the misconduct and its prejudicial effect on the defendant's right to a fair trial," State v. Wakefield, 190 N.J. 397, 437 (2007), and reverse a conviction on the basis of prosecutorial misconduct only if "the conduct was so egregious as to A-2151-23 11 deprive defendant of a fair trial," ibid. (quoting State v. Papasavvas, 163 N.J. 565, 625 (2000)). In deciding whether prosecutorial conduct deprived a defendant of a fair trial, "an appellate court must take into account the tenor of the trial and the degree of responsiveness of both counsel and the court to improprieties when they occurred." [State v. Frost, 158 N.J. 76, 83 (1999)] (quoting State v. Marshall, 123 N.J. 1, 153 (1991)). Factors to be considered in making that decision include, "(1) whether defense counsel made timely and proper objections to the improper remarks; (2) whether the remarks were withdrawn promptly; and (3) whether the court ordered the remarks stricken from the record and instructed the jury to disregard them." Ibid. [State v. Williams, 244 N.J. 592, 608 (2021).] "In general, when counsel does not make a timely objection at trial, it is a sign 'that defense counsel did not believe the remarks were prejudicial' when they were made." State v. Pressley, 232 N.J. 587, 594 (2018) (quoting State v. Echols, 199 N.J. 344, 360 (2009)). Although we do not endorse the repeated use of the rhetoric utilized by the prosecutor, we note the prosecutor's summation was largely responsive to the defense summation, which itself repeatedly urged jurors to apply "common sense," asked whether defendant's testimony seemed "made up," and argued the State's robbery theory "doesn't make sense." Although the prosecutor's comments were somewhat assertive in nature, we conclude the prosecutor was A-2151-23 12 entitled to argue defendant's testimony was not credible and the evidence did not support defendant's version of events. Additionally, there was no contemporaneous objection to the challenged remarks, suggesting trial counsel did not view them as so prejudicial as to require immediate intervention. Where counsel fails to object, offending remarks are less likely to be deemed reversible. Frost, 158 N.J. at 83. We also note counsel did object to a separate portion of the State's argument related to this issue, and the court provided the jury with a cautionary instruction. This confirms the court was altered to concerns about the prosecutor's rhetoric and acted when asked to do so. We further conclude the facts of this case are distinguishable from Garcia, where the prosecutor exploited an evidentiary ruling to create a false narrative from a complete absence of defense evidence. Here, even with the court's limitation on defendant's testimony about specific incidents, the jury still heard evidence that Pierson had a reputation for violence and that Django could be aggressive. Thus, the State was not arguing in a factual vacuum created by total exclusion of the defense theories asserted. Finally, the record contained substantial evidence supporting the verdicts, including defendant's text stating he was "about to go rob Tom," his arrival A-2151-23 13 armed with a knife, the physical evidence in the apartment, his failure to call 9- 1-1, and his return to the apartment after leaving. On this record, defendant has not shown the prosecutor's summation statements were clearly capable of producing an unjust result. C. We next turn to defendant's contention the trial court erred by not including a self-defense instruction specific to the animal-cruelty count. It is undisputed defendant did not request a separate self-defense instruction as to this count and therefore, we again review for plain error. R. 2:10-2. The court charged justification/self-defense in connection with the homicide allegations and instructed the jury on the use of force "upon or toward another person." The record reflects the separate animal-cruelty instruction tracked the elements contained in N.J.S.A. 4:22-17(c)(1). Based on the court providing this form of instruction, we conclude defendant has not shown plain error. Defendant cites no New Jersey authority requiring a trial court, sua sponte, to extend the statutory self-defense charge under N.J.S.A. 2C:3-4 to a separate animal-cruelty count. The self-defense statute, by its terms, addresses force used against "another person," and the cruelty statute contains no express justification defense in its text. On this A-2151-23 14 record, we determine the court did not commit plain error by failing to craft an unrequested extension of the charge to include specific instructions concerning self-defense from an animal attack. Nor can we conclude there is a real possibility this omission produced an unjust result. Defendant's theory was that Pierson and Django attacked him as part of the same fast-moving confrontation. The jury rejected defendant's account and found him guilty of murder, robbery, and the weapons offenses, necessarily rejecting the premise that he acted lawfully in defending himself. In the circumstances of this case, where the alleged dog attack and the stabbing of Pierson were presented as part of the same continuous confrontation, the absence of a separate instruction on the animal-cruelty count was not clearly capable of producing an unjust result. Because we find no reversible error as to the trial court's evidentiary rulings, summation, or jury charge related to the animal-cruelty count, defendant's cumulative-error argument fails. See State v. Sanchez-Medina, 231 N.J. 452, 469 (2018). We further conclude, even considered together, the challenged rulings and remarks did not deprive defendant of a fair trial on this record. A-2151-23 15 D. Finally, we turn to defendant's contention the court erred by entering a restitution order without holding an "ability to pay" hearing. At sentencing, the court ordered defendant to pay restitution of $7,903.62. The court did so without making findings concerning defendant's ability to pay, therefore we are constrained to order a limited remand. N.J.S.A. 2C:44-2(c) requires the court, in imposing restitution, to "take into account the financial resources of the defendant and the nature of the burden that its payment will impose." A factual basis must exist, and there must be explicit consideration of the defendant's ability to pay. Scribner, 298 N.J. Super. at 372. Here, the pre-sentence report (PSR) divulged defendant had no current monthly income, no assets, no cash, no checking or savings balances, and no other listed resources. The PSR's financial comments further stated: "The defendant is incarcerated and has no means to make payments towards any restitution or assessments associated with the resolution of this matter." Although the PSR also reflected defendant had prior work experience and some vocational training, the sentencing court did not address the above information in relation to the statutory ability-to-pay factors when imposing restitution. A-2151-23 16 We conclude the failure to enter the required findings does not affect the validity of the jury's verdicts or the custodial terms, but it does, however, require reconsideration of the restitution component of the sentence. Accordingly, we remand for the limited purpose of reconsidering restitution and entering findings regarding defendant's ability to pay. The court, in its discretion, may conduct such further proceedings as it deems appropriate to address this issue. We express no opinion as to the outcome. To the extent we have not specifically addressed any of defendant 's remaining arguments, we conclude they lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2). Affirmed in part and remanded in part. We do not retain jurisdiction. A-2151-23 17