Full Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3. SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-0918-24 STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. CHETAN M. SONI, Defendant-Appellant. _______________________ Argued October 20, 2026 – Decided November 16, 2026 Before Judges Gooden Brown and Vanek. On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Union County, Municipal Appeal No. 23- 6303. Chetan M. Soni, appellant, argued the cause on appellant's behalf. Milton S. Leibowitz, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for respondent (William A. Daniel, Union County Prosecutor, attorney; Milton S. Leibowitz, of counsel and on the brief). PER CURIAM Following a trial de novo in the Law Division, defendant Chetan M. Soni was found guilty of several traffic violations, specifically, driving while intoxicated (DWI), N.J.S.A. 39:4-50; refusal to submit breath samples, N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.2; careless driving, N.J.S.A. 39:4-97; driving a vehicle in an unsafe condition, N.J.S.A. 39:3-44; failing to produce an insurance card, N.J.S.A. 39:3- 29; and three separate violations for disregarding a stop sign, N.J.S.A. 39:4-144. In addition to the imposition of the applicable fines, penalties, and fees, defendant received twelve hours in the Intoxicated Driver Resource Center and was required to install an ignition interlock device for a three-month period on the DWI and a concurrent nine-month period on the refusal. The violations stemmed from defendant driving his car with the front bumper scraping on the ground and disregarding three separate stop signs. After police conducted a motor vehicle stop, the officer noticed several visual cues, including bloodshot eyes and slow movements, indicating defendant was impaired. At the scene, once defendant exited his vehicle, there was an odor of alcohol emanating from his body and when asked if "he had anything to drink," defendant responded, "not really." The officer conducted standard field sobriety tests (SFST), including horizontal gaze nystagmus (HGN), which defendant failed, leading to defendant's arrest and the issuance of the traffic summonses. A-0918-24 2 On appeal, defendant raises the following points for our consideration: POINT I THE LAW DIVISION'S DE NOVO JUDGMENT MUST BE VACATED BECAUSE THE COURT FAILED TO IDENTIFY THE EVIDENTIARY BASIS FOR ITS DECISION AFTER ACKNOWLEDGING REVIEW OF MULTIPLE VIDEO RECORDINGS, IN VIOLATION OF RULE 1:7-4(A) AND RULE 3:23- 8(A). POINT II THE CONVICTION RESTS ON A MATERIALLY MISLEADING RECORD REGARDING THE RECORDING OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL STANDARD STATEMENT, IN VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS UNDER NAPUE[1] AND GIGLIO.[2] POINT III MID-TRIAL DISCLOSURE OF SFST/HGN CREDENTIALS AND THE DENIAL OF TIME TO PREPARE CROSS-EXAMINATION DEPRIVED DEFENDANT OF FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS AND EFFECTIVE CONFRONTATION. POINT IV THE STATE'S BELATED JULY 16[, 2025] PRODUCTION CONFIRMED THAT THE RECORD WAS INCOMPLETE WHEN THE LAW DIVISION 1 Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959). 2 Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972). A-0918-24 3 ENTERED JUDGMENT AND THAT THE STATE FAILED TO SATISFY ITS CONTINUING DISCOVERY OBLIGATION. POINT V THE RECORD DOES NOT ESTABLISH A KNOWING, INTELLIGENT, AND VOLUNTARY MIRANDA[3] WAIVER; THE LAW DIVISION ADDRESSED ONLY "UNDERSTANDING," NOT WAIVER. POINT VI THE STATE FAILED TO ESTABLISH THAT THE MOTOR VEHICLE STOP WAS SUPPORTED BY REASONABLE AND ARTICULABLE SUSPICION. POINT VII THE CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF THE ERRORS IN THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW DEPRIVED DEFENDANT OF A FAIR TRIAL AND REQUIRES REVERSAL. Based on our review of the record and the applicable legal principles , we reject defendant's arguments and affirm. I. During the one-day municipal court trial conducted on April 18, 2024, Roselle Park Police Officer Brian Matthews was the sole testifying witness. 3 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). A-0918-24 4 Matthews's body-worn camera footage, the Attorney General's standard statement for motor vehicle operators, see N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.2(e), the Miranda warning form, and Matthews's police report were admitted into evidence at trial. After defendant was found guilty of the violations by the municipal court judge, a de novo trial ensued before the Law Division judge. Following the trial, in a written decision dated October 22, 2024, 4 the Law Division judge deferred to the municipal court judge's credibility findings and made the following factual findings consistent with Matthews's testimony: On December 22, 2023, at approximately 3:21 a.m., Roselle Park Police Officer Brian Matthews was working patrol at 443 East Westfield Avenue when he observed defendant. Specifically, Officer Matthews heard scraping of a front bumper, and then observed a vehicle with heavy front-end damage as well as the bumper scraping on the ground passing his location. The car was a silver Hyundai Elantra. Officer Matthews then pulled out into the lane of travel and began to follow the vehicle. While following the vehicle, Officer Matthews observed that the vehicle did not come to complete stops at the stop signs located at Sheridan Avenue and Madison Avenue, Madison Avenue and Magie Avenue, and Magie Avenue and East Grant Avenue. As the vehicle continued westbound on East Grant Avenue and approached the intersection of East Grant and Dalton, the front bumper came off the vehicle in the middle of the road. Once Officer Matthews reached a safe location to conduct a 4 The Law Division judge also issued an oral decision on the record on October 18, 2024, consistent with his subsequent written decision. A-0918-24 5 motor vehicle stop on Chestnut Street, he activated his lights and sirens. The vehicle came to a complete stop after it made a partial left turn onto West Clay Avenue off of Chestnut Street. Officer Matthews approached the vehicle, which was being operated by defendant. Defendant provided an expired driver's license, and then began to try and locate his registration and insurance. Defendant eventually provided an expired insurance card and a valid registration. During this interaction with defendant, Officer Matthews observed that defendant's eyes were red, bloodshot, watery and droopy. He further observed that defendant's movements were very slow and lethargic. Officer Matthews asked defendant if he had anything to drink and defendant stated no. He further asked defendant if he was under the influence of any narcotics, and defendant stated no. The airbag inside the vehicle was deployed from the steering wheel, which includes powder and an odor, and as a result Officer Matthews didn't smell alcohol when defendant was sitting inside the vehicle. However, Officer Matthews asked defendant to exit the vehicle, and as soon as defendant stepped out of the vehicle, Officer Matthews smelled the odor of an alcoholic beverage emanating from . . . defendant. Officer Matthews escorted defendant to a safe location on the sidewalk and asked him again if he had anything to drink. Defendant stated something along the lines of "not really," and when asked to elaborate defendant did not give a direct answer. Officer Matthews then asked defendant if he'd be willing to go through standard field sobriety tests to make sure he was okay to drive, and defendant agreed. Officer Matthews then proceeded to explain and conduct the horizontal gaze nystagmus test, the walk A-0918-24 6 and turn test, and the one leg stand test. Defendant indicated that he understood the instructions for these tests, and he failed each one. Accordingly, he was placed under arrest for the suspicion of being under the influence. Defendant was then placed in handcuffs, read his Miranda warnings, placed in a marked police vehicle and transported to police headquarters. There was an overwhelming odor of alcohol emanating from the rear of the police vehicle where defendant was seated. Once at headquarters, Officer Matthews prepared to administer the Alcotest, which requires a twenty- minute observation period prior to administering the test. After the observation period, Officer Matthews read verbatim to defendant the New Jersey Attorney General's Standard Statement Form. Officer Matthews in fact read the form twice to defendant, and when asked if he understood the form, defendant stated "sure" and signed the form. However, once the Alcotest machine was . . . prepared to conduct the test, defendant refused to blow into the machine. Defendant was then verbally advised that if he does not blow into the Alcotest machine, it would be deemed a refusal. Defendant again stated that he did not want to blow into the machine and Officer Matthews entered into the machine a refusal. Defendant was then issued various summonses .... [(Citations omitted).] After applying the governing legal principles, the Law Division judge concluded the State had proven defendant committed the infractions "beyond a A-0918-24 7 reasonable doubt" and found defendant guilty. Defendant argued he was not intoxicated on the night in question and requested the court to "reverse the conviction and remand the case for a new trial, or alternatively, dismiss the charges with prejudice." In support, defendant raised the following twenty-three points: (1) Matthews's testimony regarding the initial traffic stop was inconsistent; (2) lack of evidence regarding the stop sign violations; (3) misleading testimony regarding the detection of alcohol; (4) omission of inquiry regarding over-the-counter medications; (5) judicial oversight in the handling of Matthews's credentials; (6) inadequate consideration of environmental conditions during the field sobriety tests; (7) Matthews's improper administration of defendant's Miranda rights and the standard statement; (8) improper judicial handling of procedural issues; (9) "[p]otential [i]mpact on the [o]utcome"; (10) improper judicial conduct during Matthews's cross- examination; (11) inconsistency between the HGN test results and the standard statement; (12) inconsistencies in test administration and environmental factors; (13) procedural violations during the one-leg stand test; (14) "[s]tandardized [f]ield [s]obriety [t]esting"; (15) "[a]nalysis of . . . Matthew[s]'s [o]bservations in [r]elation to [National Highway Traffic Safety Administration's] DWI [d]etection [c]lues"; (16) judicial errors and inadequate consideration of A-0918-24 8 defendant's rights at trial; (17) issues with Miranda rights; (18) issues with the DWI questionnaire; (19) "[r]efusal [c]harge and [s]ubsequent [a]ctions"; (20) expedited trial process denied defendant the right to a complete and fair defense; (21) "[e]xplanation [r]egarding [l]icense, [i]nsurance, and [v]ehicle [d]ocumentation"; (22) "[i]nsurance and [v]ehicle [d]ocumentation"; and (23) misinformation provided by law enforcement. In his oral and written decisions, the Law Division judge addressed each of defendant's points and determined they were "without merit." Pertinent to this appeal, the judge explicitly stated he had "reviewed the trial record," "considered all the defenses raised and reviewed all the exhibits de novo," and "independently" found "the State ha[d] proven all of the charges against . . . defendant well beyond a reasonable doubt." The judge stated he "watched the videos" of the interaction between Matthews and defendant on the night in question and found "no reason to disrupt the rulings of the [municipal] court ." 5 The judge noted "[n]othing new has been provided to this [c]ourt for its consideration to rule differently than the municipal court." Additionally, the 5 At the municipal court trial, defense counsel acknowledged he was provided all the videos in the case. Although this court previously granted defendant's motion to supplement the record, all items introduced at trial were considered by the Law Division judge during the trial de novo. A-0918-24 9 judge conducted a detailed analysis of all the elements of the charged violations before arriving at the same conclusion as the municipal court judge. The judge imposed the same sentence as the municipal judge and this appeal followed. II. Our scope of review is limited. A defendant must first appeal a municipal court conviction to the Law Division. State v. Kuropchak, 221 N.J. 368, 382 (2015). On appeal from a municipal court to the Law Division, the review is de novo on the record. R. 3:23-8(a)(2). 6 The Law Division judge must make independent findings of fact and conclusions of law but defers to the municipal court's credibility findings. State v. Robertson, 228 N.J. 138, 147 (2017). We, however, do not independently assess the evidence on an appeal from the Law Division's de novo review of the municipal court conviction. State v. Locurto, 157 N.J. 463, 471-72 (1999). Instead, our "standard of review of a de 6 Rule 3:23-8(a)(2) provides: The court to which the appeal has been taken may reverse and remand for a new trial or may conduct a trial de novo on the record below. The court shall provide the municipal court and the parties with reasons for a reversal and remand. If the court to which the appeal is taken decides the matter de novo on the record, the court may permit the record to be supplemented for the limited purpose of correcting a legal error in the proceedings below. A-0918-24 10 novo verdict after a municipal court trial is to determine whether the findings made could reasonably have been reached on sufficient credible evidence present in the record, considering the proofs as a whole." State v. Ebert, 377 N.J. Super. 1, 8 (App. Div. 2005) (internal quotations marks and citation omitted). Accordingly, our review "is limited to 'the action of the Law Division and not that of the municipal court,'" State v. Hannah, 448 N.J. Super. 78, 94 (App. Div. 2016) (quoting State v. Palma, 219 N.J. 584, 591-92 (2014)). Stated differently, on an appeal taken from the Law Division's final decision, our review "is limited to determining whether there is sufficient credible evidence present in the record to support the findings of the Law Division judge, not the municipal court." State v. Clarksburg Inn, 375 N.J. Super. 624, 639 (App. Div. 2005) (citing State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 161-62 (1964)). Where, as here, the municipal and Law Division judges make concurrent findings, "[u]nder the two-court rule, appellate courts ordinarily should not undertake to alter concurrent findings of facts and credibility determinations made by two lower courts absent a very obvious and exceptional showing of error." Locurto, 157 N.J. at 474. "Therefore, appellate review of the factual and credibility findings of the municipal court and the Law Division 'is exceedingly A-0918-24 11 narrow.'" State v. Reece, 222 N.J. 154, 167 (2015) (quoting Locurto, 157 N.J. at 470). But, "[a] trial court's interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled to any special deference." Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Twp. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995). Applying these principles, we are satisfied defendant received a fair trial. The Law Division judge found defendant guilty after conducting a thorough de novo review of the complete record. Considering the proofs as a whole, the judge's independent findings of fact are supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record and the judge's legal conclusions are sound. We conclude defendant's arguments are uniformly without merit, and therefore we affirm substantially for the reasons stated in the Law Division judge's opinions. R. 2:11-3(e)(2). We provide the following comments to explain our rejection of defendant's constitutional challenges. We reject defendant's claim his Fifth Amendment right was violated because there was no knowing, intelligent, and voluntary Miranda waiver. "The right against self-incrimination is guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and this state's common law, now embodied in statute, N.J.S.A. 2A:84A-19, and evidence rule, N.J.R.E. 503." State v. S.S., A-0918-24 12 229 N.J. 360, 381-82 (2017) (quoting State v. Nyhammer, 197 N.J. 383, 399 (2009)). In Miranda, the United States Supreme Court "determined that a custodial interrogation by law enforcement officers is inherently coercive, automatically triggering the Fifth Amendment privilege against self- incrimination." State v. P.Z., 152 N.J. 86, 101-02 (1997) (citing Miranda, 384 U.S. 436). As a result, the Court created procedural safeguards, commonly referred to as "Miranda warnings," id. at 102, intended "to secure the privilege against self-incrimination" and required to be administered whenever custodial interrogation occurs, Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444. Once the defendant is subjected to custodial interrogation requiring the administration of Miranda warnings, "[t]he defendant may waive effectuation of [those] rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly[,] and intelligently." Ibid. Under New Jersey law, "the State must 'prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the suspect's waiver was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary in light of all the circumstances.'" State v. Tillery, 238 N.J. 293, 316 (2019) (quoting State v. Presha, 163 N.J. 304, 313 (2000)). On the other hand, "roadside questioning of a motorist detained pursuant to a routine traffic stop does not constitute 'custodial interrogation' that must be A-0918-24 13 preceded by Miranda warnings." State v. Hickman, 335 N.J. Super. 623, 630 (App. Div. 2000) (quoting Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 435-42 (1984)). Although "a traffic stop significantly curtails the 'freedom of action' of the driver and the passengers," it "does not 'exert[] upon a detained person pressures that sufficiently impair his free exercise of his privilege against self-incrimination to require that he be warned of his constitutional rights. '" Ibid. (alteration in original) (quoting Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 437). Moreover, "[r]oadside questioning of a motorist is not transformed into 'custodial interrogation' that must be preceded by Miranda warnings simply because a police officer's questioning is accusatory in nature or designed to elicit incriminating evidence. " Id. at 631. See Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 423 (holding a police officer was not required to give Miranda warnings to a suspected drunk driver before asking him whether "he had been using intoxicants"). Here, the only statements introduced at trial were defendant's responses to Matthews's roadside questioning during the traffic stop. Specifically, defendant stated his driver's license had expired in response to Matthews's request for defendant's driving credentials. Defendant initially stated he had not had anything to drink and was not under the influence of any narcotics when Matthews asked whether he was, but later stated, "Not really" when Matthews A-0918-24 14 again asked whether he had had anything to drink. Defendant also said he was coming from "[his] friend's house" in response to Matthews' inquiry. Further, defendant replied, "I don't know, man," when Matthews asked if he had hit something with his car. Additionally, defendant said, "No. I never smoke," when Matthews asked if he had smoked anything. Because defendant was not subjected to custodial interrogation, Matthews was not required to give defendant Miranda warnings and defendant's statements were the product of lawful roadside questioning. Likewise, we reject defendant's claim his Fourth Amendment right was violated because the motor vehicle stop was not supported by a reasonable and articulable suspicion. The Fourth Amendment of the Federal Constitution and Article I, Paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution guarantee the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV; N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 7. "Those provisions impose a standard of reasonableness on the exercise of discretion by government officials to protect persons against arbitrary invasions." State v. Maristany, 133 N.J. 299, 304 (1993). "A lawful roadside stop by a police officer constitutes a seizure under both the Federal and New Jersey Constitutions." [State v. Dunbar, 229 N.J. 521, 532 (2017)]. "To be lawful, an automobile stop 'must be based on reasonable and articulable suspicion that an offense, including a minor traffic offense, has been or A-0918-24 15 is being committed.'" State v. Bacome, 228 N.J. 94, 103 (2017) (quoting State v. Carty, 170 N.J. 632, 639- 40, modified on other grounds, 174 N.J. 351 (2002)). [State v. Nelson, 237 N.J. 540, 552 (2019) (citations reformatted).] See also State v. Bernokeits, 423 N.J. Super. 365, 370 (App. Div. 2011) ("A motor vehic[le] violation, no matter how minor, justifies a stop without any reasonable suspicion that the motorist has committed a crime or other unlawful act."). The reasonable suspicion standard requires "some minimal level of objective justification for making the stop." State v. Nishina, 175 N.J. 502, 511 (2003) (quoting United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989)). "[R]aw, inchoate suspicion grounded in speculation cannot be the basis for a valid stop." State v. Scriven, 226 N.J. 20, 34 (2016). "Although reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause, '[n]either "inarticulate hunches" nor an arresting officer's subjective good faith can justify infringement of a citizen's constitutionally guaranteed rights.'" State v. Nyema, 249 N.J. 509, 527- 28 (2022) (alterations in original) (quoting State v. Stovall, 170 N.J. 346, 372 (2002) (Coleman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)). "Determining whether reasonable and articulable suspicion exists . . . is a highly fact-intensive inquiry that demands evaluation of 'the totality of A-0918-24 16 circumstances surrounding the police-citizen encounter, balancing the State's interest in effective law enforcement against the individual's right to be protected from unwarranted and/or overbearing police intrusions.'" Id. at 528 (quoting State v. Privott, 203 N.J. 16, 25-26 (2010)). "It is fundamental to a totality of the circumstances analysis of whether reasonable suspicion exists that courts may consider the experience and knowledge of law enforcement officers." Stovall, 170 N.J. at 363. Here, we are satisfied the motor vehicle stop was lawful. Matthews's credible testimony provided not only reasonable and articulable suspicion that defendant committed several motor vehicle infractions but ultimately proof beyond a reasonable doubt that they occurred. See Locurto, 157 N.J. at 470 (noting State is not required to prove motor vehicle violation occurred in order to meet standard of reasonable suspicion). Contrary to defendant's contention, body-worn camera footage of Matthews's pre-stop observations was unnecessary in light of Matthews's credible testimony of his observations. Equally unavailing is defendant's claim he was deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to "effective cross-examination" by withholding Matthews's SFST/HGN credentials until mid-trial. At the municipal court trial, during direct examination, defense counsel objected to the prosecutor questioning Matthews A-0918-24 17 on defendant's performance on the SFST because defense counsel had not been provided with Matthews's SFST/HGN certification in discovery. After a ten- minute break, during which Matthews retrieved his certification from his locker and defense counsel confirmed that the certification was "up to date," direct examination resumed. When defense counsel requested another break before cross-examination commenced to "research" SFST and HGN, the judge denied the request, explaining breaking for legal research was unwarranted given the certification issue was not novel. Contrary to defendant's argument, there was no Sixth Amendment violation as defense counsel did not object to Matthews's certification and only requested a break to conduct legal research, not to examine the credentials. Even if the judge erred in denying the request, the error was harmless. See State v. J.L.G., 234 N.J. 265, 306 (2018) ("An error is harmless unless, in light of the record as a whole, there is a 'possibility that it led to an unjust verdict[.]'" (quoting State v. Macon, 57 N.J. 325, 335-36 (1971))). There was ample evidence to support probable cause to arrest defendant for DWI and to sustain the DWI conviction without evidence of defendant's performance on the SFST and the HGN test. See State v. Cryan, 363 N.J. Super. 442, 454-56 (App. A-0918-24 18 Div. 2003) (sustaining DWI conviction based on proofs of the defendant's bloodshot eyes, hostility, and strong odor of alcohol); State v. Morris, 262 N.J. Super. 413, 421 (App. Div. 1993) (finding evidence of slurred speech, abrasive demeanor, disheveled appearance, bloodshot eyes, and alcoholic odor on the defendant's breath sufficient to sustain a DWI conviction). Affirmed. A-0918-24 19