State of New Jersey v. Chetan M. Soni
CourtNew Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division
Date FiledNovember 16, 2026
DocketA-0918-24
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-0918-24
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
CHETAN M. SONI,
Defendant-Appellant.
_______________________
Argued October 20, 2026 – Decided November 16, 2026
Before Judges Gooden Brown and Vanek.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Union County, Municipal Appeal No. 23-
6303.
Chetan M. Soni, appellant, argued the cause on
appellant's behalf.
Milton S. Leibowitz, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the
cause for respondent (William A. Daniel, Union County
Prosecutor, attorney; Milton S. Leibowitz, of counsel
and on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Following a trial de novo in the Law Division, defendant Chetan M. Soni
was found guilty of several traffic violations, specifically, driving while
intoxicated (DWI), N.J.S.A. 39:4-50; refusal to submit breath samples, N.J.S.A.
39:4-50.2; careless driving, N.J.S.A. 39:4-97; driving a vehicle in an unsafe
condition, N.J.S.A. 39:3-44; failing to produce an insurance card, N.J.S.A. 39:3-
29; and three separate violations for disregarding a stop sign, N.J.S.A. 39:4-144.
In addition to the imposition of the applicable fines, penalties, and fees,
defendant received twelve hours in the Intoxicated Driver Resource Center and
was required to install an ignition interlock device for a three-month period on
the DWI and a concurrent nine-month period on the refusal.
The violations stemmed from defendant driving his car with the front
bumper scraping on the ground and disregarding three separate stop signs. After
police conducted a motor vehicle stop, the officer noticed several visual cues,
including bloodshot eyes and slow movements, indicating defendant was
impaired. At the scene, once defendant exited his vehicle, there was an odor of
alcohol emanating from his body and when asked if "he had anything to drink,"
defendant responded, "not really." The officer conducted standard field sobriety
tests (SFST), including horizontal gaze nystagmus (HGN), which defendant
failed, leading to defendant's arrest and the issuance of the traffic summonses.
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On appeal, defendant raises the following points for our consideration:
POINT I
THE LAW DIVISION'S DE NOVO JUDGMENT
MUST BE VACATED BECAUSE THE COURT
FAILED TO IDENTIFY THE EVIDENTIARY BASIS
FOR ITS DECISION AFTER ACKNOWLEDGING
REVIEW OF MULTIPLE VIDEO RECORDINGS, IN
VIOLATION OF RULE 1:7-4(A) AND RULE 3:23-
8(A).
POINT II
THE CONVICTION RESTS ON A MATERIALLY
MISLEADING RECORD REGARDING THE
RECORDING OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
STANDARD STATEMENT, IN VIOLATION OF
DUE PROCESS UNDER NAPUE[1] AND GIGLIO.[2]
POINT III
MID-TRIAL DISCLOSURE OF SFST/HGN
CREDENTIALS AND THE DENIAL OF TIME TO
PREPARE CROSS-EXAMINATION DEPRIVED
DEFENDANT OF FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS
AND EFFECTIVE CONFRONTATION.
POINT IV
THE STATE'S BELATED JULY 16[, 2025]
PRODUCTION CONFIRMED THAT THE RECORD
WAS INCOMPLETE WHEN THE LAW DIVISION
1
Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959).
2
Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972).
A-0918-24
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ENTERED JUDGMENT AND THAT THE STATE
FAILED TO SATISFY ITS CONTINUING
DISCOVERY OBLIGATION.
POINT V
THE RECORD DOES NOT ESTABLISH A
KNOWING, INTELLIGENT, AND VOLUNTARY
MIRANDA[3] WAIVER; THE LAW DIVISION
ADDRESSED ONLY "UNDERSTANDING," NOT
WAIVER.
POINT VI
THE STATE FAILED TO ESTABLISH THAT THE
MOTOR VEHICLE STOP WAS SUPPORTED BY
REASONABLE AND ARTICULABLE SUSPICION.
POINT VII
THE CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF THE ERRORS IN
THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW DEPRIVED
DEFENDANT OF A FAIR TRIAL AND REQUIRES
REVERSAL.
Based on our review of the record and the applicable legal principles , we reject
defendant's arguments and affirm.
I.
During the one-day municipal court trial conducted on April 18, 2024,
Roselle Park Police Officer Brian Matthews was the sole testifying witness.
3
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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Matthews's body-worn camera footage, the Attorney General's standard
statement for motor vehicle operators, see N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.2(e), the Miranda
warning form, and Matthews's police report were admitted into evidence at trial.
After defendant was found guilty of the violations by the municipal court judge,
a de novo trial ensued before the Law Division judge.
Following the trial, in a written decision dated October 22, 2024, 4 the Law
Division judge deferred to the municipal court judge's credibility findings and
made the following factual findings consistent with Matthews's testimony:
On December 22, 2023, at approximately 3:21
a.m., Roselle Park Police Officer Brian Matthews was
working patrol at 443 East Westfield Avenue when he
observed defendant. Specifically, Officer Matthews
heard scraping of a front bumper, and then observed a
vehicle with heavy front-end damage as well as the
bumper scraping on the ground passing his location.
The car was a silver Hyundai Elantra. Officer
Matthews then pulled out into the lane of travel and
began to follow the vehicle. While following the
vehicle, Officer Matthews observed that the vehicle did
not come to complete stops at the stop signs located at
Sheridan Avenue and Madison Avenue, Madison
Avenue and Magie Avenue, and Magie Avenue and
East Grant Avenue. As the vehicle continued
westbound on East Grant Avenue and approached the
intersection of East Grant and Dalton, the front bumper
came off the vehicle in the middle of the road. Once
Officer Matthews reached a safe location to conduct a
4
The Law Division judge also issued an oral decision on the record on October
18, 2024, consistent with his subsequent written decision.
A-0918-24
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motor vehicle stop on Chestnut Street, he activated his
lights and sirens. The vehicle came to a complete stop
after it made a partial left turn onto West Clay Avenue
off of Chestnut Street.
Officer Matthews approached the vehicle, which
was being operated by defendant. Defendant provided
an expired driver's license, and then began to try and
locate his registration and insurance. Defendant
eventually provided an expired insurance card and a
valid registration. During this interaction with
defendant, Officer Matthews observed that defendant's
eyes were red, bloodshot, watery and droopy. He
further observed that defendant's movements were very
slow and lethargic. Officer Matthews asked defendant
if he had anything to drink and defendant stated no. He
further asked defendant if he was under the influence of
any narcotics, and defendant stated no.
The airbag inside the vehicle was deployed from
the steering wheel, which includes powder and an odor,
and as a result Officer Matthews didn't smell alcohol
when defendant was sitting inside the vehicle.
However, Officer Matthews asked defendant to exit the
vehicle, and as soon as defendant stepped out of the
vehicle, Officer Matthews smelled the odor of an
alcoholic beverage emanating from . . . defendant.
Officer Matthews escorted defendant to a safe location
on the sidewalk and asked him again if he had anything
to drink. Defendant stated something along the lines of
"not really," and when asked to elaborate defendant did
not give a direct answer.
Officer Matthews then asked defendant if he'd be
willing to go through standard field sobriety tests to
make sure he was okay to drive, and defendant agreed.
Officer Matthews then proceeded to explain and
conduct the horizontal gaze nystagmus test, the walk
A-0918-24
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and turn test, and the one leg stand test. Defendant
indicated that he understood the instructions for these
tests, and he failed each one. Accordingly, he was
placed under arrest for the suspicion of being under the
influence. Defendant was then placed in handcuffs,
read his Miranda warnings, placed in a marked police
vehicle and transported to police headquarters. There
was an overwhelming odor of alcohol emanating from
the rear of the police vehicle where defendant was
seated.
Once at headquarters, Officer Matthews prepared
to administer the Alcotest, which requires a twenty-
minute observation period prior to administering the
test. After the observation period, Officer Matthews
read verbatim to defendant the New Jersey Attorney
General's Standard Statement Form. Officer Matthews
in fact read the form twice to defendant, and when
asked if he understood the form, defendant stated "sure"
and signed the form. However, once the Alcotest
machine was . . . prepared to conduct the test, defendant
refused to blow into the machine. Defendant was then
verbally advised that if he does not blow into the
Alcotest machine, it would be deemed a refusal.
Defendant again stated that he did not want to blow into
the machine and Officer Matthews entered into the
machine a refusal.
Defendant was then issued various summonses
....
[(Citations omitted).]
After applying the governing legal principles, the Law Division judge
concluded the State had proven defendant committed the infractions "beyond a
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reasonable doubt" and found defendant guilty. Defendant argued he was not
intoxicated on the night in question and requested the court to "reverse the
conviction and remand the case for a new trial, or alternatively, dismiss the
charges with prejudice." In support, defendant raised the following twenty-three
points: (1) Matthews's testimony regarding the initial traffic stop was
inconsistent; (2) lack of evidence regarding the stop sign violations; (3)
misleading testimony regarding the detection of alcohol; (4) omission of inquiry
regarding over-the-counter medications; (5) judicial oversight in the handling of
Matthews's credentials; (6) inadequate consideration of environmental
conditions during the field sobriety tests; (7) Matthews's improper
administration of defendant's Miranda rights and the standard statement; (8)
improper judicial handling of procedural issues; (9) "[p]otential [i]mpact on the
[o]utcome"; (10) improper judicial conduct during Matthews's cross-
examination; (11) inconsistency between the HGN test results and the standard
statement; (12) inconsistencies in test administration and environmental factors;
(13) procedural violations during the one-leg stand test; (14) "[s]tandardized
[f]ield [s]obriety [t]esting"; (15) "[a]nalysis of . . . Matthew[s]'s [o]bservations
in [r]elation to [National Highway Traffic Safety Administration's] DWI
[d]etection [c]lues"; (16) judicial errors and inadequate consideration of
A-0918-24
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defendant's rights at trial; (17) issues with Miranda rights; (18) issues with the
DWI questionnaire; (19) "[r]efusal [c]harge and [s]ubsequent [a]ctions"; (20)
expedited trial process denied defendant the right to a complete and fair defense;
(21) "[e]xplanation [r]egarding [l]icense, [i]nsurance, and [v]ehicle
[d]ocumentation"; (22) "[i]nsurance and [v]ehicle [d]ocumentation"; and (23)
misinformation provided by law enforcement.
In his oral and written decisions, the Law Division judge addressed each
of defendant's points and determined they were "without merit." Pertinent to
this appeal, the judge explicitly stated he had "reviewed the trial record,"
"considered all the defenses raised and reviewed all the exhibits de novo," and
"independently" found "the State ha[d] proven all of the charges against . . .
defendant well beyond a reasonable doubt." The judge stated he "watched the
videos" of the interaction between Matthews and defendant on the night in
question and found "no reason to disrupt the rulings of the [municipal] court ." 5
The judge noted "[n]othing new has been provided to this [c]ourt for its
consideration to rule differently than the municipal court." Additionally, the
5
At the municipal court trial, defense counsel acknowledged he was provided
all the videos in the case. Although this court previously granted defendant's
motion to supplement the record, all items introduced at trial were considered
by the Law Division judge during the trial de novo.
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judge conducted a detailed analysis of all the elements of the charged violations
before arriving at the same conclusion as the municipal court judge. The judge
imposed the same sentence as the municipal judge and this appeal followed.
II.
Our scope of review is limited. A defendant must first appeal a municipal
court conviction to the Law Division. State v. Kuropchak, 221 N.J. 368, 382
(2015). On appeal from a municipal court to the Law Division, the review is de
novo on the record. R. 3:23-8(a)(2). 6 The Law Division judge must make
independent findings of fact and conclusions of law but defers to the municipal
court's credibility findings. State v. Robertson, 228 N.J. 138, 147 (2017).
We, however, do not independently assess the evidence on an appeal from
the Law Division's de novo review of the municipal court conviction. State v.
Locurto, 157 N.J. 463, 471-72 (1999). Instead, our "standard of review of a de
6
Rule 3:23-8(a)(2) provides:
The court to which the appeal has been taken may
reverse and remand for a new trial or may conduct a
trial de novo on the record below. The court shall
provide the municipal court and the parties with reasons
for a reversal and remand. If the court to which the
appeal is taken decides the matter de novo on the
record, the court may permit the record to be
supplemented for the limited purpose of correcting a
legal error in the proceedings below.
A-0918-24
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novo verdict after a municipal court trial is to determine whether the findings
made could reasonably have been reached on sufficient credible evidence
present in the record, considering the proofs as a whole." State v. Ebert, 377
N.J. Super. 1, 8 (App. Div. 2005) (internal quotations marks and citation
omitted).
Accordingly, our review "is limited to 'the action of the Law Division and
not that of the municipal court,'" State v. Hannah, 448 N.J. Super. 78, 94 (App.
Div. 2016) (quoting State v. Palma, 219 N.J. 584, 591-92 (2014)). Stated
differently, on an appeal taken from the Law Division's final decision, our
review "is limited to determining whether there is sufficient credible evidence
present in the record to support the findings of the Law Division judge, not the
municipal court." State v. Clarksburg Inn, 375 N.J. Super. 624, 639 (App. Div.
2005) (citing State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 161-62 (1964)).
Where, as here, the municipal and Law Division judges make concurrent
findings, "[u]nder the two-court rule, appellate courts ordinarily should not
undertake to alter concurrent findings of facts and credibility determinations
made by two lower courts absent a very obvious and exceptional showing of
error." Locurto, 157 N.J. at 474. "Therefore, appellate review of the factual and
credibility findings of the municipal court and the Law Division 'is exceedingly
A-0918-24
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narrow.'" State v. Reece, 222 N.J. 154, 167 (2015) (quoting Locurto, 157 N.J.
at 470). But, "[a] trial court's interpretation of the law and the legal
consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled to any special
deference." Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Twp. of Manalapan, 140
N.J. 366, 378 (1995).
Applying these principles, we are satisfied defendant received a fair trial.
The Law Division judge found defendant guilty after conducting a thorough de
novo review of the complete record. Considering the proofs as a whole, the
judge's independent findings of fact are supported by sufficient credible
evidence in the record and the judge's legal conclusions are sound. We conclude
defendant's arguments are uniformly without merit, and therefore we affirm
substantially for the reasons stated in the Law Division judge's opinions. R.
2:11-3(e)(2). We provide the following comments to explain our rejection of
defendant's constitutional challenges.
We reject defendant's claim his Fifth Amendment right was violated
because there was no knowing, intelligent, and voluntary Miranda waiver. "The
right against self-incrimination is guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment to the
United States Constitution and this state's common law, now embodied in
statute, N.J.S.A. 2A:84A-19, and evidence rule, N.J.R.E. 503." State v. S.S.,
A-0918-24
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229 N.J. 360, 381-82 (2017) (quoting State v. Nyhammer, 197 N.J. 383, 399
(2009)). In Miranda, the United States Supreme Court "determined that a
custodial interrogation by law enforcement officers is inherently coercive,
automatically triggering the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination." State v. P.Z., 152 N.J. 86, 101-02 (1997) (citing Miranda, 384
U.S. 436).
As a result, the Court created procedural safeguards, commonly referred
to as "Miranda warnings," id. at 102, intended "to secure the privilege against
self-incrimination" and required to be administered whenever custodial
interrogation occurs, Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444. Once the defendant is subjected
to custodial interrogation requiring the administration of Miranda warnings,
"[t]he defendant may waive effectuation of [those] rights, provided the waiver
is made voluntarily, knowingly[,] and intelligently." Ibid. Under New Jersey
law, "the State must 'prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the suspect's waiver
was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary in light of all the circumstances.'" State
v. Tillery, 238 N.J. 293, 316 (2019) (quoting State v. Presha, 163 N.J. 304, 313
(2000)).
On the other hand, "roadside questioning of a motorist detained pursuant
to a routine traffic stop does not constitute 'custodial interrogation' that must be
A-0918-24
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preceded by Miranda warnings." State v. Hickman, 335 N.J. Super. 623, 630
(App. Div. 2000) (quoting Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 435-42 (1984)).
Although "a traffic stop significantly curtails the 'freedom of action' of the driver
and the passengers," it "does not 'exert[] upon a detained person pressures that
sufficiently impair his free exercise of his privilege against self-incrimination to
require that he be warned of his constitutional rights. '" Ibid. (alteration in
original) (quoting Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 437). Moreover, "[r]oadside
questioning of a motorist is not transformed into 'custodial interrogation' that
must be preceded by Miranda warnings simply because a police officer's
questioning is accusatory in nature or designed to elicit incriminating evidence. "
Id. at 631. See Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 423 (holding a police officer was not
required to give Miranda warnings to a suspected drunk driver before asking
him whether "he had been using intoxicants").
Here, the only statements introduced at trial were defendant's responses
to Matthews's roadside questioning during the traffic stop. Specifically,
defendant stated his driver's license had expired in response to Matthews's
request for defendant's driving credentials. Defendant initially stated he had not
had anything to drink and was not under the influence of any narcotics when
Matthews asked whether he was, but later stated, "Not really" when Matthews
A-0918-24
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again asked whether he had had anything to drink. Defendant also said he was
coming from "[his] friend's house" in response to Matthews' inquiry. Further,
defendant replied, "I don't know, man," when Matthews asked if he had hit
something with his car. Additionally, defendant said, "No. I never smoke,"
when Matthews asked if he had smoked anything. Because defendant was not
subjected to custodial interrogation, Matthews was not required to give
defendant Miranda warnings and defendant's statements were the product of
lawful roadside questioning.
Likewise, we reject defendant's claim his Fourth Amendment right was
violated because the motor vehicle stop was not supported by a reasonable and
articulable suspicion.
The Fourth Amendment of the Federal Constitution and
Article I, Paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution
guarantee the right to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV; N.J.
Const. art. I, ¶ 7. "Those provisions impose a standard
of reasonableness on the exercise of discretion by
government officials to protect persons against
arbitrary invasions." State v. Maristany, 133 N.J. 299,
304 (1993).
"A lawful roadside stop by a police officer constitutes
a seizure under both the Federal and New Jersey
Constitutions." [State v. Dunbar, 229 N.J. 521, 532
(2017)]. "To be lawful, an automobile stop 'must be
based on reasonable and articulable suspicion that an
offense, including a minor traffic offense, has been or
A-0918-24
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is being committed.'" State v. Bacome, 228 N.J. 94,
103 (2017) (quoting State v. Carty, 170 N.J. 632, 639-
40, modified on other grounds, 174 N.J. 351 (2002)).
[State v. Nelson, 237 N.J. 540, 552 (2019) (citations
reformatted).]
See also State v. Bernokeits, 423 N.J. Super. 365, 370 (App. Div. 2011) ("A
motor vehic[le] violation, no matter how minor, justifies a stop without any
reasonable suspicion that the motorist has committed a crime or other unlawful
act.").
The reasonable suspicion standard requires "some minimal level of
objective justification for making the stop." State v. Nishina, 175 N.J. 502, 511
(2003) (quoting United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989)). "[R]aw,
inchoate suspicion grounded in speculation cannot be the basis for a valid stop."
State v. Scriven, 226 N.J. 20, 34 (2016). "Although reasonable suspicion is a
less demanding standard than probable cause, '[n]either "inarticulate hunches"
nor an arresting officer's subjective good faith can justify infringement of a
citizen's constitutionally guaranteed rights.'" State v. Nyema, 249 N.J. 509, 527-
28 (2022) (alterations in original) (quoting State v. Stovall, 170 N.J. 346, 372
(2002) (Coleman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
"Determining whether reasonable and articulable suspicion exists . . . is a
highly fact-intensive inquiry that demands evaluation of 'the totality of
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circumstances surrounding the police-citizen encounter, balancing the State's
interest in effective law enforcement against the individual's right to be
protected from unwarranted and/or overbearing police intrusions.'" Id. at 528
(quoting State v. Privott, 203 N.J. 16, 25-26 (2010)). "It is fundamental to a
totality of the circumstances analysis of whether reasonable suspicion exists that
courts may consider the experience and knowledge of law enforcement officers."
Stovall, 170 N.J. at 363.
Here, we are satisfied the motor vehicle stop was lawful. Matthews's
credible testimony provided not only reasonable and articulable suspicion that
defendant committed several motor vehicle infractions but ultimately proof
beyond a reasonable doubt that they occurred. See Locurto, 157 N.J. at 470
(noting State is not required to prove motor vehicle violation occurred in order
to meet standard of reasonable suspicion). Contrary to defendant's contention,
body-worn camera footage of Matthews's pre-stop observations was
unnecessary in light of Matthews's credible testimony of his observations.
Equally unavailing is defendant's claim he was deprived of his Sixth
Amendment right to "effective cross-examination" by withholding Matthews's
SFST/HGN credentials until mid-trial. At the municipal court trial, during direct
examination, defense counsel objected to the prosecutor questioning Matthews
A-0918-24
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on defendant's performance on the SFST because defense counsel had not been
provided with Matthews's SFST/HGN certification in discovery. After a ten-
minute break, during which Matthews retrieved his certification from his locker
and defense counsel confirmed that the certification was "up to date," direct
examination resumed.
When defense counsel requested another break before cross-examination
commenced to "research" SFST and HGN, the judge denied the request,
explaining breaking for legal research was unwarranted given the certification
issue was not novel. Contrary to defendant's argument, there was no Sixth
Amendment violation as defense counsel did not object to Matthews's
certification and only requested a break to conduct legal research, not to examine
the credentials.
Even if the judge erred in denying the request, the error was harmless.
See State v. J.L.G., 234 N.J. 265, 306 (2018) ("An error is harmless unless, in
light of the record as a whole, there is a 'possibility that it led to an unjust
verdict[.]'" (quoting State v. Macon, 57 N.J. 325, 335-36 (1971))). There was
ample evidence to support probable cause to arrest defendant for DWI and to
sustain the DWI conviction without evidence of defendant's performance on the
SFST and the HGN test. See State v. Cryan, 363 N.J. Super. 442, 454-56 (App.
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Div. 2003) (sustaining DWI conviction based on proofs of the defendant's
bloodshot eyes, hostility, and strong odor of alcohol); State v. Morris, 262 N.J.
Super. 413, 421 (App. Div. 1993) (finding evidence of slurred speech, abrasive
demeanor, disheveled appearance, bloodshot eyes, and alcoholic odor on the
defendant's breath sufficient to sustain a DWI conviction).
Affirmed.
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