Full Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3. SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-3760-24 STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. CLIFFORD JEFFERSON, Defendant-Appellant. _______________________ Argued October 1, 2026 – Decided October 29, 2026 Before Judges Chase and Augostini. On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Middlesex County, Indictment No. 24-10- 1096. Clifford Jefferson, appellant, argued the cause on appellant's behalf. Hudson E. Knight, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for respondent (Linda Estremera, Middlesex County Prosecutor, attorney; Hudson E. Knight, on the brief). PER CURIAM Defendant Clifford Jefferson appeals from a May 20, 2025 order denying his motion to dismiss the indictment, and from his June 16, 2025 judgment of conviction. He primarily contends the State improperly used his New Jersey driver's license to identify and prosecute him, and the initial criminal complaint against him was legally insufficient because it failed to allege "knowing falsity" or "intent to defraud." Having reviewed the record and governing legal principles, we affirm. I. We glean the following undisputed facts from the record. On February 20, 2024, defendant went into the Middlesex County Clerk's office in New Brunswick attempting to transfer the deed to a property in Milltown into his name without proper documentation. The next day, he returned to the clerk's office and presented a self-generated deed for the same property claiming ownership. According to the clerk's office, the property was legally being sold by an estate to another individual. On February 21, defendant was charged in a complaint-warrant with second-degree possession of a false government document, N.J.S.A. 2C:21-2.1(a), and disorderly persons offering a false instrument for filing, N.J.S.A. 2C:21-3(b), alleging he possessed a self- A-3760-24 2 generated property deed claiming ownership of the Milltown property and attempted to submit this deed to the clerk's office. On October 10, 2024, a Middlesex County grand jury indicted defendant, charging him with second-degree attempted theft, N.J.S.A. 2C:5-1(a)(3) and 2C:20-3(b) (count one); and third-degree forgery, N.J.S.A. 2C:21-1(a)(2) (count two). On May 20, 2025, defendant, although represented by counsel, filed a self-represented motion to dismiss the indictment, arguing his driver's license could not be used to prosecute him because it did not properly identify him. He further asserted the State could not establish the deed as fraudulent according to the Statute of Frauds, N.J.S.A. 25-1 to -16. In response to the judge's question regarding defendant's claim to the property, he asserted it was not him but rather his corporation that he contends is entitled to the property. The judge summarized defendant's argument, "So your position is that by virtue of being . . . the corporation that . . . you've created, that you're entitled to this land because of the laws that predated our Constitution." According to defendant, those laws remain applicable today. The judge denied defendant's motion, explaining: [THE COURT]: . . . your primary argument regarding the Real ID and the driver's license as an improper way of identifying you is not enough to overturn this indictment. A-3760-24 3 And to the extent that there are references in our 1776 constitution and subsequent laws, that does not mean that those methods of conveyance and that the English crown and the king owns all of the property in this country. There was the Revolutionary War where .... [W]e gained our independence and while many of the customs and laws as well were carried over from England to the United States, that they have been molded and sculpted by legislators, by executive branch actions and so we are bound by the laws that exist today. And your arguments regarding the claimed defect in the grand jury finding of probable cause are not sufficient to overturn that indictment. On June 16, 2025, defendant pled guilty to count two of the indictment as amended to the disorderly persons offense of offering a false instrument for filing, N.J.S.A. 2C:21-3(b), and, "in exchange for [defendant's] plea, the State [agreed to] recommend that the balance of the indictment . . . be dismissed and that [defendant] receive fines only." In response to the judge's questions, defendant stated under oath that he was freely and voluntarily pleading guilty, and that he was doing so because he was indeed guilty. Defendant admitted that on February 21, 2024, he went to the County Clerk in New Brunswick, provided a staff member with an instrument (i.e. a deed), knowing that it was presumed A-3760-24 4 to be false for the purpose of filing it as a public record. Following his plea, the judge sentenced defendant in accordance with the agreement. On appeal, defendant raises these points for our consideration: POINT I- THE COURT ORDERS WERE BIAS INTIMIDATION NJ. Rev Stat§ 2C:16-1(3) (2025) A PERSON IS GUILTY OF BIAS INTIMIDATION IF VICTIMS REASONABLY BELIVED VICTIM'S PROPERTY WAS SELECTED AND IT WAS COMMITED BECAUSE OF RACE, RELIGION, NATIONAL ORIGIN OR ETHNICITY. POINT II- THE CRIMINAL ORDER, ATTACK THE LEGAL CAPACITY OF THE LEGAL ENTITY, MISCHARACTERIZATION OF APPELLANT. POINT III- THE CRIMINAL ORDER, ATTACK THE LEGAL CAPACITY OF THE NATURAL PERSON, MISCHARACREREZATION [(SIC)] OF APPELLANT. POINT IV- THE CRIMINAL ORDER VIOLATES THE 1947 CONSTITUTION ARTICLE IV SECTION I, SECTION VI PARA.3,4 SECTION VII PARA. 3 AND 9 (1)(2). In his reply, however, he clarifies "the narrow legal issues," and "two discrete questions of law" he presents on appeal: POINT I- Use of a Standard Identification Card in Violation of N.J.S.A. 39:3-29.3 POINT II- Failure to Allege Knowing Falsity and Intent to Defraud A-3760-24 5 II. We review a trial court's denial of a motion to dismiss an indictment for abuse of discretion. State v. Bell, 241 N.J. 552, 561 (2020) (quoting State v. Twiggs, 233 N.J. 513, 544 (2018)). An abuse of discretion exists where a "decision is made without a rational explanation, inexplicably departed from established policies, or rested on an impermissible basis." State v. Reyes- Rodriguez, 480 N.J. Super. 526, 548 (App. Div. 2025) (quoting State v. Chavies, 247 N.J. 245, 257 (2021)). We review a trial court's legal determinations de novo, without deference to the court's interpretation. Twiggs, 233 N.J. at 532 (citing State v. S.B., 230 N.J. 62, 67 (2017)). We apply a similar standard of review to a trial court's findings when a defendant pleads guilty. We "consider[] 'whether the findings made could reasonably have been reached on sufficient credible evidence present in the record.'" State v. Campfield, 213 N.J. 218, 229 (2013) (quoting State v. Locurto, 157 N.J. 463, 471 (1999)). We defer to the trial court's factual findings, id. at 229-30 (quoting Locurto, 157 N.J. at 471), while our review of "determinations of law . . . are plenary." Id. at 230 (citing State v. Handy, 206 N.J. 39, 45 (2011)). A-3760-24 6 Defendant raises various arguments, most of which are without merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2). We address, however, his principal arguments regarding the use of his driver's license in this criminal prosecution and the sufficiency of the complaint. Defendant contends the judge erred in not dismissing the criminal complaint and indictment because "the instrument used to identify [him]" violated N.J.S.A. 39:3-29.3(a)(1)(b), which provides in relevant part: Possession of a standard identification card issued pursuant to this section shall not be considered evidence of an individual's citizenship or immigration status and shall not be used as a basis for an investigation, arrest, citation, prosecution, or detention. The motion judge properly rejected the argument that defendant's driver's license was an improper way of identifying him. The State did not rely on defendant's driver's license to investigate, arrest, or prosecute him for these charges. Rather, the State relied on the county clerk's office employee's eyewitness identification of defendant in the investigation of this matter. The employee advised law enforcement defendant attempted initially to "transfer the deed for [the property] into his name without any of the appropriate documents[,]" and then "submitted false deed documentation" the following day. At that time, the property "was currently legally being sold by an estate to A-3760-24 7 another individual." These facts support the grand jury's probable cause determination. To the extent defendant challenges the court's jurisdiction over him, this argument has no merit. On one hand, defendant contends English common law governs the case, and because he formed a corporation sole in 2022, he should be regarded as a "king" and therefore as a separate entity. He further argues that the Milltown property escheated to the king at the time of the prior owner's death and therefore belongs to the corporation in its sovereign capacity. However, during oral argument on his motion to dismiss, defendant clarified he was not claiming he was "not subject to the laws of the State of New Jersey." He asserted, instead, he "obey[s] the laws of New Jersey." "Under the New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice, as well as the common law, the State is vested with the power to prosecute and punish crimes that occur only within its territorial borders." State v. Denofa, 187 N.J. 24, 36 (2006) (citing N.J.S.A. 2C:1-3(a)(1), which states that "a person may be convicted under the law of this State of an offense committed by his own condu ct . . . if [] if [e]ither the conduct which is an element of the offense or the result which is [ such an element occurs within this State[.]"). During the plea allocution, defendant did not challenge or raise an exception to territorial jurisdiction. At A-3760-24 8 oral argument of the motion to dismiss, the judge rejected defendant's jurisdictional claim noting "we are bound by the laws that exist today." Defendant next contends the complaint-warrant was legally insufficient because it "does not allege facts establishing knowing falsity or intent to defraud[] as required under N.J.S.A. 2C:21-4." He asserts the complaint failed to allege the requisite mens rea required for this offense. The complaint charged defendant with second-degree possession of a false government document, N.J.S.A. 2C:21-2.1(a), and disorderly persons offering a false instrument for filing, N.J.S.A. 2C:21-3(b). N.J.S.A. 2C:21-2.1(a) in relevant part provides: A person who knowingly sells, offers or exposes for sale, or otherwise transfers, or possesses with the intent to sell, offer or expose for sale, or otherwise transfer, a document, printed form or other writing which falsely purports to be a driver's license, birth certificate or other document issued by a governmental agency and which could be used as a means of verifying a person’s identity or age or any other personal identifying information is guilty of a crime of the second degree. N.J.S.A. 2C:21-3(b) provides: Offering a false instrument for filing. A person is guilty of a disorderly persons offense when, knowing that a written instrument contains a false statement or false information, he offers or presents it to a public office or public servant with knowledge or belief that it will be filed with, registered or recorded in or otherwise A-3760-24 9 become a part of the records of such public office or public servant. The plain language of both statutes requires knowledge and not "intent to defraud." The complaint alleged sufficient facts to establish the elements of each offense, including that the conduct be committed "knowingly." Defendant subsequently pled guilty to disorderly persons offering a false instrument for filing, and the judge was satisfied he provided a sufficient factual basis for this offense. The initial complaint, and later defendant's admissions, established the sufficiency of this disorderly person's offense. We are satisfied the judge correctly rejected this challenge to the indictment as well. "[B]efore accepting a guilty plea, the trial court must be satisfied that (1) there is a factual basis for the plea, (2) the plea is made voluntarily , and (3) defendant understands the nature of the charge and the consequences of the plea." State v. Bellamy, 178 N.J. 127, 134 (2003) (citing State ex rel. T.M., 166 N.J. 319, 325 (2001)). Rule 3:9-2 codifies these requirements. Ibid. In this case, the judge meticulously addressed these requirements with defendant under oath and concluded he knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his rights and entered a plea of guilty. The judge was also satisfied defendant provided an adequate factual basis including facts sufficient to establish the A-3760-24 10 knowing mens rea of N.J.S.A. 2C:21-3(b). We discern no basis to vacate defendant's plea or sentence. We conclude there is sufficient credible evidence in the record to support the findings of the judge denying defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment, accepting his guilty plea, and imposing sentence in accordance with the plea agreement. We affirm defendant's conviction and the judge's ruling denying the motion to dismiss. Affirmed. A-3760-24 11