Full Opinion

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to motions for rehearing under Rule 22 as well as formal revision before publication in the New Hampshire Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter, Supreme Court of New Hampshire, One Charles Doe Drive, Concord, New Hampshire 03301, of any editorial errors in order that corrections may be made before the opinion goes to press. Errors may be reported by email at the following address: reporter@courts.state.nh.us. Opinions are available on the Internet by 9:00 a.m. on the morning of their release. The direct address of the court’s home page is: https://www.courts.nh.gov/our-courts/supreme-court. THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE ___________________________ Hillsborough-northern judicial district Case No. 2025-0543 Citation: State v. Coffin, 2026 N.H. 41 STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE v. JASON COFFIN Submitted: September 22, 2026 Opinion Issued: October 28, 2026 John M. Formella, attorney general, and Anthony J. Galdieri, solicitor general (Samuel R.V. Garland, deputy solicitor general, on the brief), for the State. Joshua L. Gordon, of Concord, on the brief, for the defendant. DONOVAN, J. [¶1] The State appeals a ruling of the Superior Court (Delker, J.) that RSA 632-A:2, IV (2016), which makes certain sexual assaults against family members a felony, does not apply because the defendant, Jason Coffin, and the complainant are stepsiblings unrelated by blood. This interlocutory appeal presents the following question: “Whether RSA 632-A:2, IV applies to stepsiblings; specifically, whether it allows for the prosecution of one stepsibling for engaging in the sexual penetration of another stepsibling who was under 18 years of age at the time when the stepsiblings are not related by blood.” We conclude that the plain text of RSA 632-A:2, IV does not apply to stepsiblings who are not related by blood. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s ruling and remand. I. Facts [¶2] We accept the statement of the case and facts as presented in the interlocutory appeal statement and rely upon the record for additional facts as necessary. State v. Zarella, 177 N.H. 328, 332 (2025), 2025 N.H. 20, ¶3. The defendant and the complainant have no biological parent in common. The defendant’s biological father married the complainant’s biological mother. After their parents married, the defendant and the complainant saw each other on a number of weekends and during holidays and family events. The defendant allegedly assaulted the complainant several times over a span of approximately two years. [¶3] A grand jury indicted the defendant on five counts of aggravated felonious sexual assault (AFSA) under RSA 632-A:2, IV, and the State additionally charged him with six related counts of misdemeanor sexual assault. Pursuant to RSA 632-A:2, IV, in relevant part, “[a] person is guilty of [AFSA] when such person engages in sexual penetration . . . with another person under 18 years of age whom [the actor] knows to be his or her . . . brother or sister of the whole or half blood.” [¶4] At trial, the complainant testified about the structure of his family and how he was related to the defendant. Following a break in the complainant’s testimony, the defendant moved to dismiss all charges, arguing that the State could not prove that he and the complainant had a qualifying relationship under RSA 632-A:2, IV.1 The trial court agreed with the defendant’s interpretation of that statute and initially granted his motion to dismiss. At the State’s request, however, the trial court instead declared a mistrial without prejudice. The trial court allowed the State to file an interlocutory appeal of the court’s interpretation of RSA 632-A:2, IV and transferred its question to this court. See Sup. Ct. R. 8. II. Analysis [¶5] On appeal, the State argues that “[t]he text and structure of RSA 632-A:2, IV” signify that the statute applies to the relationship between the defendant and the complainant. (Bolding omitted.) The defendant counters 1 The record reflects that the misdemeanor sexual assault charges also required that the defendant and the complainant had a qualifying relationship under RSA 632-A:2, IV. See RSA 632-A:4, I(a) (2016). 2 that the plain meaning of the statute applies only to siblings who are related by blood. [¶6] Resolving this question requires that we engage in statutory interpretation. We review the trial court’s statutory interpretation de novo. State v. Cormiea, 177 N.H. 654, 656 (2025), 2025 N.H. 50, ¶7. We first look to the language of the statute itself, and, if possible, construe that language according to its plain and ordinary meaning. Id. We give effect to every word of a statute whenever possible and will not consider what the legislature might have said or add language that the legislature did not see fit to include. Id. We also construe all parts of a statute together to effectuate its overall purpose. Id. However, we do not construe statutes in isolation; instead, we attempt to construe them in harmony with the overall statutory scheme. Id. If a statute’s language is plain and unambiguous, then we need not look beyond it for further indication of legislative intent. State v. Hill, 172 N.H. 711, 714 (2019). [¶7] We begin our analysis by reviewing the statutory scheme at issue. RSA section 632-A:2 (2016 & Supp. 2025) defines a number of variants of AFSA, a crime which carries more significant penalties than other sexual offenses. See RSA 632-A:2-:4 (2016 & Supp. 2025); 632-A:10-a (2016). To qualify as AFSA, a crime must generally have some aggravating factor, such as a power imbalance between the actor and the victim, a pattern of abuse, physical force, verbal threats, or deception. See generally RSA 632-A:2. The aggravating factor in RSA 632-A:2, IV is the qualifying familial relationship between the actor and the victim. Specifically, RSA 632-A:2, IV provides: A person is guilty of [AFSA] when such person engages in sexual penetration as defined in RSA 632-A:1, V with another person under 18 years of age whom such person knows to be his or her ancestor, descendant, brother or sister of the whole or half blood, uncle, aunt, nephew, or niece. The relationships referred to herein include blood relationships without regard to legitimacy, stepchildren, and relationships of parent and child by adoption. [¶8] The parties agree that the defendant and the complainant, who share no biological parent, are not “brother[s] . . . of the whole or half blood.” RSA 632-A:2, IV. The State contends, however, that the statute’s second sentence — particularly the legislature’s use of the word “stepchildren” — brings stepsiblings within the statute’s ambit. We disagree. [¶9] The second sentence’s plain language expands the list of relationships in the first sentence, but it does not include stepsiblings unrelated by blood. For example, the phrase “blood relationships without regard to legitimacy” includes familial relationships involving illegitimate children. Similarly, the word “stepchildren” refers to children, as opposed to siblings. By its use of the word “stepchildren” the legislature signals its intent 3 to include parent-stepchild assaults, a less uncommon occurrence. See, e.g., State v. Munroe, 161 N.H. 618, 620-21 (2011); State v. Carter, 140 N.H. 1, 2, 5 (1995); State v. Oropallo, 128 N.H. 305, 306 (1986). Lastly, the phrase “relationships of parent and child by adoption” references parents and children. [¶10] The State’s argument that we should construe “stepchildren” broadly to include stepsiblings contradicts the plain meaning of the statute. The criminal code does not define the word “stepchildren.” When a term is not defined in a statute, we consider its common usage, using the dictionary for guidance. State v. Keenan, 171 N.H. 557, 563 (2018). The Oxford English Dictionary defines “stepchild” as “[a] child of a person’s spouse or partner by a previous marriage or relationship.” Oxford English Dictionary, https://www.oed.com/ dictionary/stepchild_n?tab=meaning_and_use (last visited Oct. 26, 2026). Notably, the dictionary does not define “stepchild” to include a stepsibling, stepbrother, or stepsister. Further, we do not read “stepchildren” in isolation, but in the context of the rest of the second sentence, which refers to parent-child relationships. See Cormiea, 177 N.H. at 656, 2025 N.H. 50, ¶7. Thus, the plain language of RSA 632-A:2, IV does not include the relationship between the defendant and the complainant. [¶11] In arguing that RSA 632-A:2, IV should apply despite the lack of a blood relationship between the defendant and the complainant, the State contends that one purpose of RSA 632-A:2 is to address sexual crimes where the defendant-victim relationship is one “of trust capable of being exploited.” The State also argues that “RSA 632-A:2, IV likewise seeks to protect persons . . . whose ability to consent . . . may be compromised by the inherent nature of the familial relationships listed in the statute.” We are not persuaded. [¶12] As noted above, RSA 632-A:2 sets forth sexual crimes which involve aggravating factors, including various circumstances in which an actor exploits a victim’s trust. See, e.g., RSA 632-A:2, I(g) (therapeutic relationship); RSA 632-A:2, I(h) (victim with disability); RSA 632-A:2, I(k)(2) (educational setting). In addition, other provisions involve household or familial connections between an actor and a victim. See RSA 632-A:2, I(j)(1) (victim aged thirteen to sixteen and in same household); RSA 632-A:2, I(j)(2) (victim aged thirteen to sixteen and related to actor by blood or affinity). But the statute does not make the relationship between the defendant and the complainant an aggravating factor. The relationship between the defendant and the complainant, while familial in nature, is not included in the plain text of RSA 632-A:2, IV. [¶13] Because the plain language of RSA 632-A:2, IV is clear, we need not address the State’s argument that the trial court erred by placing “significant weight” on the fact that the defendant and the complainant may have been permitted to receive a marriage license under RSA 5-C:46 (2020). See Hill, 172 N.H. at 714. Of course, if the legislature disagrees with our interpretation of 4 RSA 632-A:2, IV, it is free to amend the statute as it sees fit within constitutional bounds. State v. Levier, 177 N.H. 757, 769 (2026), 2026 N.H. 7, ¶30. III. Conclusion [¶14] We conclude that RSA 632-A:2, IV does not apply when the actor and the victim are stepsiblings not related by blood. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s ruling and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Affirmed and remanded. COUNTWAY and WILL, JJ., concurred. 5