State v. Hefferon

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to motions for rehearing under Rule 22 as well as formal revision before publication in the New Hampshire Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter, Supreme Court of New Hampshire, One Charles Doe Drive, Concord, New Hampshire 03301, of any editorial errors in order that corrections may be made before the opinion goes to press. Errors may be reported by email at the following address: reporter@courts.state.nh.us. Opinions are available on the Internet by 9:00 a.m. on the morning of their release. The direct address of the court’s home page is: https://www.courts.nh.gov/our-courts/supreme-court. THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE ___________________________ Rockingham Case No. 2025-0167 Citation: State v. Hefferon, 2026 N.H. 39 THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE v. TIMOTHY J. HEFFERON Argued: March 19, 2026 Opinion Issued: October 22, 2026 John M. Formella, attorney general, and Anthony J. Galdieri, solicitor general (Sam M. Gonyea, assistant attorney general, and John A. Drennan, assistant attorney general, on the brief, and Sam M. Gonyea orally), for the State. Chelsea Serzan, staff attorney, New Hampshire Appellate Defender Program, of Concord, on the brief and orally, for the defendant. COUNTWAY, J. [¶1] The State appeals an order of the Superior Court (Ogden, J.) granting the defendant Timothy J. Hefferon’s motion to suppress evidence obtained during a traffic stop. On appeal, the State argues that the trial court erred when it concluded that the police did not have reasonable suspicion sufficient to conduct the traffic stop. We reverse and remand. [¶2] The following facts are taken from the trial court’s order granting the defendant’s motion to suppress or are undisputed. In June 2023, the Seabrook Police Department was investigating reports of drug sales occurring at a specific apartment complex in Seabrook (the Seabrook Apartments). Prior to that time, police had received several complaints or tips from residents of the Seabrook Apartments related to this investigation. One specific report stated that drug sales involving a red Chevrolet Cruze (the Cruze) and a silver Honda Civic would regularly occur at the Seabrook Apartments. This report provided the license plate numbers for both vehicles. Based on this information, police identified the registered owner of the Cruze as a woman residing at the Seabrook Apartments. Police had previously received reports that this individual was involved in the sale of drugs at the Seabrook Apartments. [¶3] On June 2, 2023, during the ongoing investigation into drug activity at the Seabrook Apartments, officers with the Seabrook Police Department observed the Cruze in the parking lot of a store in Seabrook. One officer1 observed two occupants in the Cruze: a male passenger, and a female driver, whom the officer presumed was the registered owner of the vehicle and the subject of the previous reports about drug dealing at the Seabrook Apartments. [¶4] The officer surveilled the Cruze and followed it from the parking lot in Seabrook to a specific apartment complex in Methuen, Massachusetts (the Methuen Apartments). The officer was aware of an ongoing investigation into drug activity at the Methuen Apartments. She was also aware that confidential informants had previously purchased drugs in Seabrook that originated from the Methuen Apartments. [¶5] The officer did not follow the Cruze into the parking lot at the Methuen Apartments because she could not do so covertly. Therefore, the officer did not observe what the Cruze or its occupants did while in the parking lot at the Methuen Apartments. The officer waited at a nearby location and, after approximately ten minutes, the officer observed the Cruze leaving the Methuen Apartments. [¶6] The officer then followed the Cruze to a nearby store parking lot in Methuen, where the vehicle parked for approximately twenty minutes. During this time, the occupants of the Cruze neither entered the store nor interacted with anyone else in the parking lot. The only movement the officer observed 1 Because the trial court’s factual findings regarding the events on June 2 were limited to the observations made by the one officer who testified at the suppression hearing, the following factual summary of the events of that day recounts only that officer’s conduct and observations. 2 was the occupants exiting the vehicle and switching seats, so that the male was driving and the female was in the passenger seat. [¶7] The officer then followed the Cruze as it drove back to Seabrook. The officer observed no erratic driving or traffic violations, although she testified that she noticed “excessive blinker usage” by the Cruze. The officer called other officers on patrol in Seabrook and requested that they pull the Cruze over for reasonable suspicion of drug possession. The officer then participated in the traffic stop after the other officers pulled over the Cruze. Police identified the male driver as the defendant, and the female passenger as the daughter of the registered owner of the vehicle. The defendant told officers he had purchased fentanyl, which officers located on the female passenger’s person. Officers also determined that the defendant was a certified habitual offender and subsequently arrested him. The defendant was later charged with one count of operating after certification as a habitual offender. [¶8] The defendant moved to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of the traffic stop, asserting that police lacked reasonable suspicion to justify the stop, and the court held a hearing. At the hearing, the State argued that, under the totality of the circumstances, the police had reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle. The court determined that the previous reports alleging drug activity, combined with the officer’s observations on the day of the stop, did not establish reasonable suspicion that the occupants of the Cruze had committed a drug offense. The court thus concluded that the stop violated the defendant’s state constitutional rights and accordingly granted the defendant’s motion. This appeal followed. [¶9] When reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, we accept the court’s factual findings unless they lack support in the record or are clearly erroneous, and we review its legal conclusions de novo. State v. Rodriguez, 177 N.H. 599, 603 (2025), 2025 N.H. 43, ¶12. Whether there existed reasonable suspicion to justify an investigatory stop is a determination which we review de novo. See State v. Richter, 145 N.H. 640, 641 (2000). [¶10] Part I, Article 19 of the New Hampshire Constitution protects all people, their papers, their possessions and their homes from unreasonable searches and seizures. Rodriguez, 177 N.H. at 603, 2025 N.H. 43, ¶13; see N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. 19. Warrantless seizures are per se unreasonable under Part I, Article 19 unless the State proves by a preponderance of the evidence that the seizure falls within the narrow confines of a judicially crafted exception. State v. Perez, 173 N.H. 251, 257 (2020). [¶11] An investigatory stop based on reasonable suspicion is such an exception. State v. Donovan, 175 N.H. 356, 360 (2022). “In order for a police officer to undertake an investigatory stop, the officer must have a reasonable suspicion, based upon specific, articulable facts taken together with rational 3 inferences from those facts, that the particular person stopped has been, is, or is about to be, engaged in criminal activity.” Id. (quotation omitted); see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1968). To determine the sufficiency of an officer’s suspicion, we consider the articulable facts in light of all surrounding circumstances, keeping in mind that a trained officer may make inferences and draw conclusions from conduct that may seem unremarkable to an untrained observer. Perez, 173 N.H. at 259. [¶12] Although we recognize that experienced officers’ perceptions are entitled to deference, this deference should not be blind. Id. A reasonable suspicion must be more than a hunch, and the suspicion must have a “particularized and objective basis.” Id. “The articulable facts must lead to something specific and not simply a general sense that this is probably a bad person who may have committed some kind of crime.” Id. However, reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause, and may be established with information that is less reliable, and different in quantity or content, than that required to show probable cause. See id. at 260. [¶13] The State argues that the trial court erred when it concluded that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to justify stopping the Cruze. Specifically, it contends that the court erred when it determined that it was possible that the officer observed only innocent activity, thereby discounting the significance of the officer’s observations. It also contends that the court did not consider the totality of the circumstances and instead viewed each of the events in isolation. The defendant counters that the court correctly determined that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to justify the stop. We conclude that, considering the totality of the circumstances, the facts found by the trial court establish that the officer had reasonable suspicion to justify the stop. [¶14] The officer’s observations on the day of the stop — viewed in the context of the ongoing drug investigations — linked the Cruze and its occupants to suspected drug activity. Specifically, the officer observed a vehicle, registered to a female resident of the Seabrook Apartments and suspected to be involved in drug sales in Seabrook, travel from Seabrook to the Methuen Apartments — a location which the officer knew to be connected with previous sales of drugs to confidential informants in Seabrook. The officer was also aware of separate reports that the Cruze’s registered owner was involved in drug activity at the Seabrook Apartments. She observed that a woman was the driver of the vehicle, and reasonably believed that the female driver was the owner of the vehicle. See Richter, 145 N.H. at 641-42 (explaining it was reasonable for officer to infer driver was owner of vehicle where officer “observed nothing that would indicate that the driver was not the owner”). The officer then observed the vehicle stay at a location, known to be connected with previous sales of drugs, for a short period of time which, based on her training and experience, appeared consistent with a drug transaction. An officer trained in drug investigations could reasonably infer that a short visit to a 4 location connected with drug sales may be associated with a drug transaction. See State v. Vadnais, 141 N.H. 68, 70-71 (1996). [¶15] Thereafter, the officer observed the vehicle’s occupants park for approximately twenty minutes in a store parking lot without entering the store. As described in the trial court’s order, the officer found the twenty-minute stop to be “abnormal” and “suspicious,” and she “suspected that the [Cruze’s] occupants were either concealing or using narcotics while in the . . . parking lot.” Contrary to the trial court’s view, we conclude, based on the officer’s training, experience, and previous observations, that she could reasonably infer under the circumstances that the occupants’ behavior was consistent with drug activity. See Perez, 173 N.H. at 259; see also State v. Roach, 141 N.H. 64, 65-66 (1996) (describing how area known for drug activity and early morning hour provided context for defendant’s “furtive behavior” and “cast a more suspicious light on his own actions”); State v. Hood, 141 N.H. 196, 198- 99 (1996) (noting that police observed “suspicious and incriminating behavior” when defendant entered a bar, exited with another individual, and took a short drive before returning to the bar, and concluding that “[i]n light of the surrounding circumstances, those actions were consistent with a drug purchase”). We further conclude that, taken together, the above facts amount to reasonable suspicion that the Cruze’s occupants were engaged in drug activity. [¶16] We are not persuaded by the defendant’s arguments to the contrary. First, the defendant argues that the tips alleging that the Cruze and the Methuen Apartments were involved in drug activity were not reliable. The State contends this argument is not preserved. We need not decide whether the issue is preserved because we conclude that the tips were sufficiently reliable to contribute to the officer’s reasonable suspicion to stop the Cruze. The trial court noted in its order that it “[did] not discount the validity of these tips,” but ultimately concluded that they were “too tenuously connected to the observations of otherwise exclusively innocent behavior to amount to reasonable suspicion in this case.” We interpret this language as finding that the tips provided to police concerning drug activity involving the Cruze and the Methuen Apartments were reliable. See State v. Surrell, 171 N.H. 82, 88 (2018) (“The interpretation of a trial court order presents a question of law for us to decide.”). To the extent the defendant challenges this finding, we conclude that it is supported by the record. See Rodriguez, 177 N.H. at 603, 2025 N.H. 43, ¶12 (stating that, when reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, we will uphold the court’s factual findings unless they lack record support or are clearly erroneous). [¶17] As to the Cruze and its owner, the record supports that the police received information from individuals — including confidential informants — naming the owner as involved in drug activity at the Seabrook Apartments. This information was consistent with the separate tip identifying the Cruze and 5 alleging its involvement in drug activity at the Seabrook Apartments, given that police were able to determine from the Cruze’s registration both the owner’s name and her address at the Seabrook Apartments. See State v. Melanson, 140 N.H. 199, 201-02 (1995) (noting that police “were able to corroborate certain details” provided in anonymous tip, including vehicle’s make, model, color, and license plate number, and that “this corroboration can be used to establish credibility and reliability”); cf. State v. Christy, 138 N.H. 352, 353-54, 359-60 (1994) (noting in probable cause analysis that, in addition to primary tip, police had “received several other tips,” some of which were anonymous, within narrow timeframe that alleged defendant was involved in drug activity). [¶18] As to the Methuen Apartments, the officer became aware of drug activity at that location through controlled purchases of drugs by confidential informants, not anonymous tips. See Melanson, 140 N.H. at 201 (“An informant who has personally observed incriminating behavior has a stronger basis of knowledge than does an informant who relates not what he knows personally, but what he has heard others say.” (quotation omitted)); see also State v. Hazen, 131 N.H. 196, 198, 202 (1988) (concluding that controlled purchase of drugs from defendant’s residence “substantiated the informant’s allegations” that he had purchased drugs from defendant). We therefore disagree with the defendant that the tips were insufficiently reliable to contribute to the officer’s reasonable suspicion that the Cruze’s occupants were engaged in drug activity. [¶19] The defendant further contends that there were innocent explanations for his activities and, absent concrete reasons for concluding otherwise, the officer’s observations of potentially innocent activity could not amount to reasonable suspicion. See State v. Blesdell-Moore, 166 N.H. 183, 189 (2014) (“We think it impossible for a combination of wholly innocent factors to combine into a suspicious conglomeration unless there are concrete reasons for such an interpretation.” (quotation and brackets omitted)). We disagree that the potentially innocent explanations for the defendant’s activities undermined reasonable suspicion in this case. [¶20] Reasonable suspicion “may be based upon activity that is consistent with both guilty and innocent behavior.” State v. McKinnon- Andrews, 151 N.H. 19, 26-27 (2004). “Although any one factor in the totality of circumstances may seem innocent or innocuous in isolation, we consider the [officer’s] observations together and in light of the reasonable inferences that an officer who is experienced in detecting and investigating drug trafficking may draw.” Perez, 173 N.H. at 262. As described above, even though the defendant’s activities may have appeared innocent when viewed in isolation, the context of the ongoing investigations into drug sales at both the Seabrook and the Methuen Apartments cast a more suspicious light on the defendant’s activities and the officer could draw reasonable inferences from that conduct based on her training and experience. See Roach, 141 N.H. at 65-66; State v. 6 Pellicci, 133 N.H. 523, 530 (1990) (noting that, although some of defendant’s activities may have appeared innocent in isolation, officers who were experienced in investigating drug transactions could reasonably infer under circumstances that defendant made multiple brief trips from club to parking lot in order to sell drugs). [¶21] Based on the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that the facts known to the officer, combined with her observations of the activities of the Cruze and its occupants on the day of the stop, were sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion that the occupants of the Cruze were engaged in illegal drug activity. In reaching the opposite conclusion, the trial court failed to adequately consider the totality of the circumstances, and in doing so, it effectively imposed a higher burden on the State than necessary to establish reasonable suspicion. See Perez, 173 N.H. at 260; United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989) (explaining that suspicion necessary for investigative detention “is considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence”). [¶22] We have considered the defendant’s remaining arguments and have concluded that they do not warrant further discussion. See Vogel v. Vogel, 137 N.H. 321, 322 (1993). We therefore reverse the trial court’s order granting the defendant’s motion to suppress and remand for further proceedings. Reversed and remanded. DONOVAN, GOULD, and WILL, JJ., concurred; MACDONALD, C.J., sat for oral argument but did not participate in the final vote. 7