Starr (Brandon) v. State
CourtNevada Supreme Court
Date FiledNovember 21, 2026
Docket91119
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA
BRANDON STARR, No. 91119
Appellant,
vs.
THE STATE OF NEVADA,
Respondent.
ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE
This is an appeal from a district court order denying a
postconviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Eighth Judicial District
Court, Clark County; Monica Trujillo, Judge.
Appellant Brandon Starr and codefendant Tony Hobson robbed 14
fast-food restaurants over a period of a month. Starr was convicted at a jury
trial of nearly 80 felony counts, including burglary, robbery, conspiracy,
second-degree kidnapping, and false imprisonment. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the judgment of conviction and sentence on direct appeal. Starr v.
State, 134 Nev. 741, 433 P.3d 301 (Ct. App. 2018). Starr filed a timely petition
for postconviction relief, which the district court denied after conducting an
evidentiary hearing. Starr raises eight issues on appeal, arguing the district
court erred in denying his claims of ineffective assistance of trial and appellate
counsel.
To prove ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner must
demonstrate that counsel’s performance was deficient in that it fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness, and resulting prejudice such that there
is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the outcome of the
proceedings would have been different. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668, 687-88 (1984); Warden v. Lyons, 100 Nev. 430, 432-33, 683 P.2d 504, 505
(1984) (adopting the Strickland test); Kirksey v. State, 112 Nev. 980, 923 P.2d
1102 (1996) (applying Strickland standard to appellate counsel). Both
components of the inquiry must be shown, Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697, and the
petitioner must demonstrate the underlying facts by a preponderance of the
evidence, Means v. State, 120 Nev. 1001, 1012, 103 P.3d 25, 33 (2004). We give
deference to the district court’s factual findings if supported by substantial
evidence and not clearly erroneous but review the court’s application of the law
to those facts de novo. Lader v. Warden, 121 Nev. 682, 686, 120 P.3d 1164,
1166 (2005).
Counsel was not ineffective for failing to secure the presence of an alibi witness
Starr argues counsel should have secured the testimony of an alibi
witness, Shana Kindle. According to Starr, Kindle would have testified that
Starr was with her in California during two of the robberies. Counsel gave
timely pretrial notice of Kindle as an alibi witness but ultimately did not call
her to testify. Instead, counsel presented testimony from an investigator and
a bus company employee, both of whom stated that Starr purchased a ticket to
California shortly before two of the robberies. Neither witness could confirm
Starr actually boarded the bus. The jury convicted Starr of the robberies that
occurred while Starr was purportedly in California.
At the postconviction evidentiary hearing, trial counsel, Kindle,
and Starr’s investigator testified about the efforts to secure Kindle’s testimony.
The investigator testified that he met with Kindle well before trial and
obtained her statement. The investigator then successfully served Kindle with
a subpoena to appear for trial. But when the investigator tried to follow up
with Kindle, he could not reach her. The investigator instead spoke to Kindle’s
mother, who stated Kindle refused to testify and would likely be untruthful if
she did testify. Based on the investigation, which indicated Kindle would be
uncooperative and potentially untruthful, counsel made no further effort to
bring Kindle to court. By contrast, Kindle testified at the evidentiary hearing
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that she would have appeared to testify had counsel followed up with her after
the subpoena, but that she received no further communication.
We conclude Starr has failed to demonstrate deficient
performance. Counsel investigated Kindle as an alibi witness and served
Kindle with a subpoena to secure her presence. See State v. Love, 109 Nev.
1136, 1138-39, 865 P.2d 322, 323-24 (1993) (finding deficient performance
where counsel failed to interview or subpoena alibi witnesses). Counsel further
attempted to follow up with Kindle, but was informed by Kindle’s mother that
Kindle would not appear and was likely to lie. Because counsel adequately
investigated Kindle and was presented with legitimate concerns about Kindle’s
cooperation and credibility, counsel was not deficient for deciding not to further
pursue efforts to secure Kindle’s attendance.
Starr has also failed to show prejudice. Kindle’s testimony may
have strengthened Starr’s alibi for two of the robberies. But Kindle’s potential
credibility issues, combined with video, testimony, and DNA evidence
supporting Starr’s participation in the robberies, mean Kindle’s testimony was
unlikely to affect the verdict. Thus, the district court did not err by denying
this ineffective-assistance claim.
Trial and appellate counsel were not ineffective for failing to address a jury
instruction to refrain from considering potential punishments
Starr asserts trial counsel was ineffective for failing to clarify the
district court’s instruction to the jury to refrain from considering “the subject
of punishment,” and appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge
this instruction. One of Starr’s accomplices, Donte Johns, pleaded guilty to
driving Starr and Hobson to several of the robberies. Johns testified against
Starr and Hobson at trial in exchange for potential leniency in sentencing.
According to Starr, the jury instruction not to consider punishment precluded
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the jury from considering whether the State’s promise to recommend a more
lenient sentence affected Johns’ credibility.
As to trial counsel, Starr contends counsel should have addressed
the jury instruction during closing arguments to clarify that the jury could
consider Johns’ likely punishment in determining his credibility. Trial counsel
successfully proposed two jury instructions that stated the jury could consider
the benefits Johns received for his testimony in weighing Johns’ credibility.
Trial counsel also argued during closing that Johns was lying in exchange for
leniency. Thus trial counsel clearly communicated the jury could consider
Johns’ potential motive to lie, and counsel’s performance was reasonable. Starr
also fails to demonstrate prejudice. Even if counsel had directly explained that
the jury could consider punishment as it related to Johns’ credibility, the
evidence against Starr was strong, comprised of video, testimony identifying
Starr as a participant, and forensic evidence. Starr has not shown that more
argument on Johns’ credibility would have resulted in acquittal of any offense.
Starr also contends appellate counsel should have challenged the
jury instruction as confusing. The instruction not to consider punishment,
which is legally correct, was not confusing, especially considering other
instructions which specifically allowed the jury to consider the State’s leniency
towards Johns in assessing Johns’ credibility. Thus Starr has demonstrated
neither deficient performance nor prejudice from appellate counsel’s omission
of this claim on appeal. Accordingly, the district court did not err by denying
this ineffective-assistance claim.
Counsel was not ineffective in not moving to sever Starr’s trial from his
codefendant’s
Starr asserts trial counsel should have attempted to sever his trial
from Hobson’s. Before trial, both Hobson and Starr moved to sever their trial
from Johns’, anticipating Johns would testify as a codefendant. Thereafter,
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Johns pleaded guilty. Starr contends counsel should have moved to sever
Starr’s trial from Hobson’s because Starr intended to present alibi witnesses.
The district court may sever a joint trial if it appears one or both defendants
will be prejudiced by joinder. NRS 174.165(1); see also Chartier v. State, 124
Nev. 760, 765, 191 P.3d 1182, 1185 (2008) (explaining that severance is
warranted “only if there is a serious risk that a joint trial would compromise a
specific trial right of one of the defendants, or prevent the jury from making a
reliable judgment about guilt or innocence” (citation modified)). An alibi
defense that does not implicate a codefendant is not conflicting or irreconcilable
so as to support severance. United States v. Strollar, 10 F.3d 1574, 1578 (11th
Cir. 1994); cf. Chartier v. State, 124 Nev. 760, 766, 191 P.3d 1182, 1186 (2008)
(describing an antagonistic defense as one where codefendants inculpate each
other). Here, Starr’s alibi defense did not implicate Hobson, nor was Starr
precluded from introducing alibi evidence due to the joinder. See Chartier, 124
Nev. at 767, 191 P.3d at 1186-87. Thus, after Johns pleaded guilty, there were
no grounds to argue for severance from Hobson, and counsel was not deficient
for failing to do so. See Ennis v. State, 122 Nev. 694, 706, 137 P.3d 1095, 1103
(2006) (stating counsel is not ineffective for failing to make futile objections).
Nor does Starr demonstrate prejudice. Even had Starr’s trial been
severed from Hobson’s, the evidence against Starr would have been the same
because Hobson did not testify, and no evidence was admitted against Hobson
that would have been inadmissible against Starr alone. Thus Starr has not
demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of a different verdict had Starr and
Hobson’s trial been severed. Therefore the district court did not err by denying
this ineffective assistance claim.
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Counsel was not ineffective for failing to move to sever counts relating to two
robberies
Starr also asserts counsel should have moved to sever the charges
related to the two robberies for which Starr had an alibi. Starr does not
contend the robberies were improperly joined, but rather that joining the
offenses for which Starr had no alibi was so prejudicial as to the robberies for
which Starr had an alibi that severance was compelled. Severance is not
required simply because a defendant wishes to present evidence against some
of the charges but not others. Honeycutt v. State, 118 Nev. 660, 669, 56 P.3d
362, 368 (2002), overruled on other grounds by Carter v. State, 121 Nev. 759,
765, 121 P.3d 592, 596 (2005). Rather, a defendant must demonstrate that
simultaneous trial of the offenses would render the trial fundamentally unfair,
resulting in a violation of due process. Id. at 667-68, 56 P.3d at 367. Starr has
made no such showing here because Starr was able to present his alibi defense
for the applicable robberies. Thus Starr has failed to demonstrate that counsel
would have succeeded in moving to sever the charges, and counsel is not
deficient for failing to raise futile arguments. See Ennis, 122 Nev. at 706, 137
P.3d at 1103.
Further, significant evidence showed Starr participated in the two
robberies for which he presented alibi evidence. Testimony and video
demonstrated someone matching Starr’s build committed the robberies, and
Starr’s DNA was found on clothing and a firearm matching those used during
the robberies. On this evidence, the jury rejected Starr’s alibi. Starr has failed
to show a reasonable likelihood of acquittal had the charges been severed, and
has thus failed to demonstrate prejudice. Therefore the district court did not
err by denying this claim.
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Counsel was not ineffective for failing to call expert witnesses
Starr alleges trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call expert
witnesses to rebut the State’s experts. The State called a DNA analyst who
testified that Starr’s DNA was found on clothing and weapons used in the
robberies. The State also called a latent footprint analyst who testified that
footprints found on countertops at two of the robbery locations could have been
created by Starr’s boots. Starr has not presented any evidence on what experts
he would have called, how those experts would have testified, or how that
would have affected the verdict. Thus Starr failed to allege specific facts which
would entitle him to relief, and the district court did not err by denying this
claim. Hargrove, 100 Nev. at 502, 686 P.2d at 225.
Starr also appears to contend trial counsel should have objected to
some of the State’s DNA expert’s testimony. In between DNA testing and trial,
the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department’s crime lab changed protocol,
only allowing for analysts to assert that a contributor of DNA could be
identified under more conservative conditions. Starr does not identify on what
grounds trial counsel should have objected, and trial counsel is not deficient
for failing to make futile objections.
Starr also fails to demonstrate prejudice from counsel’s failure to
object to the State’s expert’s testimony. The State’s DNA expert testified that,
even under the new, more conservative protocols, Starr’s DNA could be
identified on a glove and firearm used during the robberies. That the new
protocols would have precluded the DNA expert from identifying Starr’s DNA
on a matching glove and a mask was unlikely to change the result, especially
given that all the physical evidence was found together in the trunk of a car
Starr occupied. Because Starr failed to show deficient performance or
prejudice, the district court did not err by denying this claim.
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Counsel was not ineffective for failing to present mitigating evidence at
sentencing
Starr claims counsel should have presented mitigating evidence
beyond what was contained in Starr’s presentence investigation report. But
Starr did not offer what evidence counsel should have discovered and
presented, nor how that evidence would have ultimately affected the sentence.
Thus Starr failed to allege specific facts demonstrating deficient performance
or prejudice, and the district court did not err by denying this claim. See
Hargrove, 100 Nev. at 502, 686 P.2d at 225.
Cumulative error does not warrant relief, nor is a new evidentiary hearing
warranted
Lastly, Starr argues the cumulative prejudice of counsel’s
deficiencies warrants reversal, even if no single deficiency was so prejudicial
as to compel a new trial. Even were we to assume deficiencies could be
cumulated, there are no deficiencies to cumulate. See McConnell v. State, 125
Nev. 243, 259 n.17, 212 P.3d 307, 318 n.17 (2009) (acknowledging that some
courts will cumulate multiple deficiencies of counsel to find prejudice).
Starr also contends a new evidentiary hearing is warranted. Other
than a bare allegation that Starr has made a colorable claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel, Starr provides no argument to suggest that an expanded
record is necessary to resolve his claims, especially because Starr already
received an evidentiary hearing. Accordingly, we
ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.
Bell, J.
Stiglich, J. Cadish, J.
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cc: Hon. Monica Trujillo, District Judge
Attorney General/Carson City
Clark County District Attorney
Law Office of Christopher R. Oram
Eighth District Court Clerk
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