Full Opinion

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA BRANDON STARR, No. 91119 Appellant, vs. THE STATE OF NEVADA, Respondent. ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE This is an appeal from a district court order denying a postconviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; Monica Trujillo, Judge. Appellant Brandon Starr and codefendant Tony Hobson robbed 14 fast-food restaurants over a period of a month. Starr was convicted at a jury trial of nearly 80 felony counts, including burglary, robbery, conspiracy, second-degree kidnapping, and false imprisonment. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of conviction and sentence on direct appeal. Starr v. State, 134 Nev. 741, 433 P.3d 301 (Ct. App. 2018). Starr filed a timely petition for postconviction relief, which the district court denied after conducting an evidentiary hearing. Starr raises eight issues on appeal, arguing the district court erred in denying his claims of ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel. To prove ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner must demonstrate that counsel’s performance was deficient in that it fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and resulting prejudice such that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the outcome of the proceedings would have been different. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984); Warden v. Lyons, 100 Nev. 430, 432-33, 683 P.2d 504, 505 (1984) (adopting the Strickland test); Kirksey v. State, 112 Nev. 980, 923 P.2d 1102 (1996) (applying Strickland standard to appellate counsel). Both components of the inquiry must be shown, Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697, and the petitioner must demonstrate the underlying facts by a preponderance of the evidence, Means v. State, 120 Nev. 1001, 1012, 103 P.3d 25, 33 (2004). We give deference to the district court’s factual findings if supported by substantial evidence and not clearly erroneous but review the court’s application of the law to those facts de novo. Lader v. Warden, 121 Nev. 682, 686, 120 P.3d 1164, 1166 (2005). Counsel was not ineffective for failing to secure the presence of an alibi witness Starr argues counsel should have secured the testimony of an alibi witness, Shana Kindle. According to Starr, Kindle would have testified that Starr was with her in California during two of the robberies. Counsel gave timely pretrial notice of Kindle as an alibi witness but ultimately did not call her to testify. Instead, counsel presented testimony from an investigator and a bus company employee, both of whom stated that Starr purchased a ticket to California shortly before two of the robberies. Neither witness could confirm Starr actually boarded the bus. The jury convicted Starr of the robberies that occurred while Starr was purportedly in California. At the postconviction evidentiary hearing, trial counsel, Kindle, and Starr’s investigator testified about the efforts to secure Kindle’s testimony. The investigator testified that he met with Kindle well before trial and obtained her statement. The investigator then successfully served Kindle with a subpoena to appear for trial. But when the investigator tried to follow up with Kindle, he could not reach her. The investigator instead spoke to Kindle’s mother, who stated Kindle refused to testify and would likely be untruthful if she did testify. Based on the investigation, which indicated Kindle would be uncooperative and potentially untruthful, counsel made no further effort to bring Kindle to court. By contrast, Kindle testified at the evidentiary hearing 2 that she would have appeared to testify had counsel followed up with her after the subpoena, but that she received no further communication. We conclude Starr has failed to demonstrate deficient performance. Counsel investigated Kindle as an alibi witness and served Kindle with a subpoena to secure her presence. See State v. Love, 109 Nev. 1136, 1138-39, 865 P.2d 322, 323-24 (1993) (finding deficient performance where counsel failed to interview or subpoena alibi witnesses). Counsel further attempted to follow up with Kindle, but was informed by Kindle’s mother that Kindle would not appear and was likely to lie. Because counsel adequately investigated Kindle and was presented with legitimate concerns about Kindle’s cooperation and credibility, counsel was not deficient for deciding not to further pursue efforts to secure Kindle’s attendance. Starr has also failed to show prejudice. Kindle’s testimony may have strengthened Starr’s alibi for two of the robberies. But Kindle’s potential credibility issues, combined with video, testimony, and DNA evidence supporting Starr’s participation in the robberies, mean Kindle’s testimony was unlikely to affect the verdict. Thus, the district court did not err by denying this ineffective-assistance claim. Trial and appellate counsel were not ineffective for failing to address a jury instruction to refrain from considering potential punishments Starr asserts trial counsel was ineffective for failing to clarify the district court’s instruction to the jury to refrain from considering “the subject of punishment,” and appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge this instruction. One of Starr’s accomplices, Donte Johns, pleaded guilty to driving Starr and Hobson to several of the robberies. Johns testified against Starr and Hobson at trial in exchange for potential leniency in sentencing. According to Starr, the jury instruction not to consider punishment precluded 3 the jury from considering whether the State’s promise to recommend a more lenient sentence affected Johns’ credibility. As to trial counsel, Starr contends counsel should have addressed the jury instruction during closing arguments to clarify that the jury could consider Johns’ likely punishment in determining his credibility. Trial counsel successfully proposed two jury instructions that stated the jury could consider the benefits Johns received for his testimony in weighing Johns’ credibility. Trial counsel also argued during closing that Johns was lying in exchange for leniency. Thus trial counsel clearly communicated the jury could consider Johns’ potential motive to lie, and counsel’s performance was reasonable. Starr also fails to demonstrate prejudice. Even if counsel had directly explained that the jury could consider punishment as it related to Johns’ credibility, the evidence against Starr was strong, comprised of video, testimony identifying Starr as a participant, and forensic evidence. Starr has not shown that more argument on Johns’ credibility would have resulted in acquittal of any offense. Starr also contends appellate counsel should have challenged the jury instruction as confusing. The instruction not to consider punishment, which is legally correct, was not confusing, especially considering other instructions which specifically allowed the jury to consider the State’s leniency towards Johns in assessing Johns’ credibility. Thus Starr has demonstrated neither deficient performance nor prejudice from appellate counsel’s omission of this claim on appeal. Accordingly, the district court did not err by denying this ineffective-assistance claim. Counsel was not ineffective in not moving to sever Starr’s trial from his codefendant’s Starr asserts trial counsel should have attempted to sever his trial from Hobson’s. Before trial, both Hobson and Starr moved to sever their trial from Johns’, anticipating Johns would testify as a codefendant. Thereafter, 4 Johns pleaded guilty. Starr contends counsel should have moved to sever Starr’s trial from Hobson’s because Starr intended to present alibi witnesses. The district court may sever a joint trial if it appears one or both defendants will be prejudiced by joinder. NRS 174.165(1); see also Chartier v. State, 124 Nev. 760, 765, 191 P.3d 1182, 1185 (2008) (explaining that severance is warranted “only if there is a serious risk that a joint trial would compromise a specific trial right of one of the defendants, or prevent the jury from making a reliable judgment about guilt or innocence” (citation modified)). An alibi defense that does not implicate a codefendant is not conflicting or irreconcilable so as to support severance. United States v. Strollar, 10 F.3d 1574, 1578 (11th Cir. 1994); cf. Chartier v. State, 124 Nev. 760, 766, 191 P.3d 1182, 1186 (2008) (describing an antagonistic defense as one where codefendants inculpate each other). Here, Starr’s alibi defense did not implicate Hobson, nor was Starr precluded from introducing alibi evidence due to the joinder. See Chartier, 124 Nev. at 767, 191 P.3d at 1186-87. Thus, after Johns pleaded guilty, there were no grounds to argue for severance from Hobson, and counsel was not deficient for failing to do so. See Ennis v. State, 122 Nev. 694, 706, 137 P.3d 1095, 1103 (2006) (stating counsel is not ineffective for failing to make futile objections). Nor does Starr demonstrate prejudice. Even had Starr’s trial been severed from Hobson’s, the evidence against Starr would have been the same because Hobson did not testify, and no evidence was admitted against Hobson that would have been inadmissible against Starr alone. Thus Starr has not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of a different verdict had Starr and Hobson’s trial been severed. Therefore the district court did not err by denying this ineffective assistance claim. 5 Counsel was not ineffective for failing to move to sever counts relating to two robberies Starr also asserts counsel should have moved to sever the charges related to the two robberies for which Starr had an alibi. Starr does not contend the robberies were improperly joined, but rather that joining the offenses for which Starr had no alibi was so prejudicial as to the robberies for which Starr had an alibi that severance was compelled. Severance is not required simply because a defendant wishes to present evidence against some of the charges but not others. Honeycutt v. State, 118 Nev. 660, 669, 56 P.3d 362, 368 (2002), overruled on other grounds by Carter v. State, 121 Nev. 759, 765, 121 P.3d 592, 596 (2005). Rather, a defendant must demonstrate that simultaneous trial of the offenses would render the trial fundamentally unfair, resulting in a violation of due process. Id. at 667-68, 56 P.3d at 367. Starr has made no such showing here because Starr was able to present his alibi defense for the applicable robberies. Thus Starr has failed to demonstrate that counsel would have succeeded in moving to sever the charges, and counsel is not deficient for failing to raise futile arguments. See Ennis, 122 Nev. at 706, 137 P.3d at 1103. Further, significant evidence showed Starr participated in the two robberies for which he presented alibi evidence. Testimony and video demonstrated someone matching Starr’s build committed the robberies, and Starr’s DNA was found on clothing and a firearm matching those used during the robberies. On this evidence, the jury rejected Starr’s alibi. Starr has failed to show a reasonable likelihood of acquittal had the charges been severed, and has thus failed to demonstrate prejudice. Therefore the district court did not err by denying this claim. 6 Counsel was not ineffective for failing to call expert witnesses Starr alleges trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call expert witnesses to rebut the State’s experts. The State called a DNA analyst who testified that Starr’s DNA was found on clothing and weapons used in the robberies. The State also called a latent footprint analyst who testified that footprints found on countertops at two of the robbery locations could have been created by Starr’s boots. Starr has not presented any evidence on what experts he would have called, how those experts would have testified, or how that would have affected the verdict. Thus Starr failed to allege specific facts which would entitle him to relief, and the district court did not err by denying this claim. Hargrove, 100 Nev. at 502, 686 P.2d at 225. Starr also appears to contend trial counsel should have objected to some of the State’s DNA expert’s testimony. In between DNA testing and trial, the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department’s crime lab changed protocol, only allowing for analysts to assert that a contributor of DNA could be identified under more conservative conditions. Starr does not identify on what grounds trial counsel should have objected, and trial counsel is not deficient for failing to make futile objections. Starr also fails to demonstrate prejudice from counsel’s failure to object to the State’s expert’s testimony. The State’s DNA expert testified that, even under the new, more conservative protocols, Starr’s DNA could be identified on a glove and firearm used during the robberies. That the new protocols would have precluded the DNA expert from identifying Starr’s DNA on a matching glove and a mask was unlikely to change the result, especially given that all the physical evidence was found together in the trunk of a car Starr occupied. Because Starr failed to show deficient performance or prejudice, the district court did not err by denying this claim. 7 Counsel was not ineffective for failing to present mitigating evidence at sentencing Starr claims counsel should have presented mitigating evidence beyond what was contained in Starr’s presentence investigation report. But Starr did not offer what evidence counsel should have discovered and presented, nor how that evidence would have ultimately affected the sentence. Thus Starr failed to allege specific facts demonstrating deficient performance or prejudice, and the district court did not err by denying this claim. See Hargrove, 100 Nev. at 502, 686 P.2d at 225. Cumulative error does not warrant relief, nor is a new evidentiary hearing warranted Lastly, Starr argues the cumulative prejudice of counsel’s deficiencies warrants reversal, even if no single deficiency was so prejudicial as to compel a new trial. Even were we to assume deficiencies could be cumulated, there are no deficiencies to cumulate. See McConnell v. State, 125 Nev. 243, 259 n.17, 212 P.3d 307, 318 n.17 (2009) (acknowledging that some courts will cumulate multiple deficiencies of counsel to find prejudice). Starr also contends a new evidentiary hearing is warranted. Other than a bare allegation that Starr has made a colorable claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Starr provides no argument to suggest that an expanded record is necessary to resolve his claims, especially because Starr already received an evidentiary hearing. Accordingly, we ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED. Bell, J. Stiglich, J. Cadish, J. 8 cc: Hon. Monica Trujillo, District Judge Attorney General/Carson City Clark County District Attorney Law Office of Christopher R. Oram Eighth District Court Clerk 9