State v. Prestige
CourtNebraska Supreme Court
Date FiledNovember 20, 2026
DocketS-25-718
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
11/20/2026 09:02 AM CST
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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
322 Nebraska Reports
STATE v. PRESTIGE
Cite as 322 Neb. 831
State of Nebraska, appellee, v. Elluminati
Egoddess Enikko Prestige, formerly
known as Erica A. Jenkins, appellant.
___ N.W.3d ___
Filed November 20, 2026. No. S-25-718.
1. Effectiveness of Counsel: Appeal and Error. In reviewing claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal, an appellate court
decides only whether the undisputed facts contained within the record
are sufficient to conclusively determine whether counsel did or did
not provide effective assistance and whether the defendant was or was
not prejudiced by counsel’s alleged deficient performance.
2. Effectiveness of Counsel: Records: Appeal and Error. The record
on direct appeal is sufficient to conclusively determine a claim of inef-
fective assistance of counsel if it establishes either that trial counsel’s
performance was not deficient, that the appellant will not be able to
establish prejudice as a matter of law, or that trial counsel’s actions
could not be justified as a part of any plausible trial strategy.
3. Effectiveness of Counsel: Proof. To prevail on a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984), the defendant must show that
his or her counsel’s performance was deficient and that this deficient
performance actually prejudiced the defendant’s defense.
4. ____: ____. To show that counsel’s performance was deficient, a defend
ant must show that counsel’s performance did not equal that of a lawyer
with ordinary training and skill in criminal law.
5. ____: ____. To show prejudice in a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel, the defendant must demonstrate a reasonable probability that
but for counsel’s deficient performance, the result of the proceeding
would have been different.
6. Effectiveness of Counsel: Proof: Appeal and Error. When a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel is raised in a direct appeal, the appel-
lant is not required to allege prejudice; however, an appellant must make
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STATE v. PRESTIGE
Cite as 322 Neb. 831
specific allegations of the conduct that he or she claims constitutes defi-
cient performance by trial counsel.
7. Convictions: Confessions: Due Process. A defendant in a criminal case
is deprived of due process of law if his or her conviction is founded, in
whole or in part, upon an involuntary confession, without regard for the
truth or falsity of the confession.
8. Confessions. Under Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 84 S. Ct. 1774, 12
L. Ed. 2d 908 (1964), trial courts must institute fair procedures to deter-
mine whether a confession is voluntary, because involuntary or coerced
confessions cannot be introduced into evidence.
9. Effectiveness of Counsel: Records: Appeal and Error. The argument
section of the brief is to elaborate on the ineffective assistance of coun-
sel claims by discussing legal authority and its application to the trial
record, not to set forth, for the first time, the allegedly deficient act.
10. Effectiveness of Counsel: Appeal and Error. Claims of alleged fail-
ures by counsel respecting motions must set forth in the assignments of
error on what grounds a motion should have been made.
11. Appeal and Error. Absent plain error, an issue not raised to the trial
court will not be considered by the Nebraska Supreme Court on appeal.
12. Trial: Motions for Mistrial: Waiver: Appeal and Error. When a party
has knowledge during trial of irregularity or misconduct, the party must
timely assert his or her right to a mistrial. One may not waive an error,
gamble on a favorable result, and, upon obtaining an unfavorable result,
assert the previously waived error.
13. Motions for Mistrial: Proof. A defendant faces a higher threshold than
merely showing a possibility of prejudice when attempting to prove
error predicated on the failure to grant a mistrial. Instead, the defendant
must prove the alleged error actually prejudiced him or her, rather than
creating only the possibility of prejudice.
14. Jury Instructions: Appeal and Error. Whether jury instructions are
correct is a question of law, which an appellate court resolves indepen-
dently of the lower court’s decision.
15. Jury Instructions: Proof: Appeal and Error. To establish reversible
error from a court’s refusal to give a requested instruction, an appel-
lant has the burden to show that (1) the tendered instruction is a correct
statement of the law, (2) the tendered instruction is warranted by the
evidence, and (3) the appellant was prejudiced by the court’s refusal to
give the tendered instruction.
16. Self-Defense: Jury Instructions. A trial court is required to give a self-
defense instruction where there is any evidence in support of a legally
cognizable theory of self-defense.
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STATE v. PRESTIGE
Cite as 322 Neb. 831
17. Self-Defense: Evidence. To determine whether the evidence supports
a legally cognizable claim of self-defense under Nebraska law, a trial
court assesses the evidence without deciding factual issues.
18. Self-Defense: Jury Instructions. A defendant who is the initial aggres-
sor is not entitled to a self-defense instruction.
19. Self-Defense. If a defendant has unjustifiably placed himself or herself
in harm’s way, a court may properly find that such facts do not support
a lawful claim of self-defense.
20. Evidence: Words and Phrases. Unfair prejudice means an undue tend
ency to suggest a decision based on an improper basis.
21. ____: ____. Unfair prejudice speaks to the capacity of some concededly
relevant evidence to lure the fact finder into declaring guilt on a ground
different from proof specific to the offense charged, commonly on an
emotional basis.
22. Effectiveness of Counsel: Appeal and Error. Any claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel alleging deficient conduct must be more specific
than generalities of inadequate preparation or failures to introduce ben-
eficial evidence.
23. Effectiveness of Counsel: Postconviction: Witnesses: Appeal and
Error. When the claim of ineffective assistance on direct appeal
involves uncalled witnesses, the defendant must give the names or
descriptions of any uncalled witnesses forming the basis of a claim of
ineffective assistance of trial counsel; what the witness would have said
may be part of the witness’ description when the name is unknown.
Appeal from the District Court for York County: James C.
Stecker, Judge. Affirmed.
Chad Wythers, of Wythers Law, for appellant.
Michael T. Hilgers, Attorney General, and Nathan A. Liss
for appellee.
Funke, C.J., Cassel, Stacy, Papik, Freudenberg, and
Vaughn, JJ.
Papik, J.
Elluminati Egoddess Enikko Prestige, formerly known as
Erica A. Jenkins, was serving prison sentences when she had
a physical confrontation with another inmate. Following a
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322 Nebraska Reports
STATE v. PRESTIGE
Cite as 322 Neb. 831
jury trial on the resulting criminal charges, Prestige was con-
victed of second degree assault and sentenced as a habitual
criminal. Now on appeal, Prestige contends that the district
court erroneously (1) failed to initiate a hearing on its own
motion regarding the voluntariness of her statements after
the incident, pursuant to Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 84
S. Ct. 1774, 12 L. Ed. 2d 908 (1964); (2) declined to give
a jury instruction on self-defense; and (3) failed to grant a
mistrial on its own motion due to technical difficulties that
Prestige—who appeared by video—now asserts prevented her
from seeing and hearing portions of the trial. Prestige also
raises several claims of ineffective assistance of counsel,
some of which are related to Prestige’s claims of district court
error. We determine Prestige has demonstrated no reversible
error and therefore affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
In December 2022, Prestige was serving sentences at the
Nebraska Correctional Center for Women (NCCW) for mul-
tiple offenses, including first degree murder, robbery, weapons
offenses, and assault by a confined person. See, e.g., State v.
Jenkins, 294 Neb. 475, 883 N.W.2d 351 (2016) (affirming
convictions for first degree murder and weapons offenses),
and State v. Jenkins, 294 Neb. 684, 884 N.W.2d 429 (2016),
overruled on other grounds, State v. Cox, 307 Neb. 762, 985
N.W.2d 395 (2020) (affirming robbery convictions). At that
time, Prestige was involved in an altercation with another
inmate. The State subsequently charged Prestige with sec-
ond degree assault, in violation of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-309
(Reissue 2016), and sought a habitual criminal enhancement
under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-2221 (Reissue 2016).
At trial, the jury heard evidence that Prestige was housed on
the first floor of NCCW, in the same housing unit as inmate
Ashley Wood. Wood’s cell was on the second floor. Wood
shared her cell with three other inmates, one of whom was
Kenisha Prentice.
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STATE v. PRESTIGE
Cite as 322 Neb. 831
The jury also heard evidence about the rules in the hous-
ing unit. According to that evidence, the inmates in the housing
unit had unlocked doors, unlimited access to central bath-
rooms, and “wide freedom of movement.” However, the jury
also heard evidence that the inmates were never permitted to
go into the cells of other inmates. And overnight, the inmates
were on “lockdown,” that is, limited to their cells except to use
the bathroom and in emergencies.
Corrections officer Robert Price testified that one day at
about 2:20 a.m., he was working in the housing unit when
he heard screaming. Price activated an alarm for assistance
from other guards and then ran to the location of the scream-
ing, which was Wood’s cell. There, he recalled, he discovered
Prestige punching Wood in the face. According to Price, he
grabbed Prestige by the back of her arms and pulled her out
of the cell. When Prestige tried to break free and return to
the cell, Price handcuffed her. Prestige was then escorted to a
holding cell.
Alyssa Sanchez, another corrections officer, was work-
ing in a different housing unit on the night of the incident.
She responded to Price’s alarm, and by the time she arrived
at Wood’s cell, the altercation was over and Prestige was
in handcuffs and being escorted out of the housing unit.
Sanchez testified that she spoke with Wood and Prentice
about the incident and that they told her Prestige came into
their cell and “assaulted” them. Sanchez observed that Wood
had red marks on her face, some scratch marks on her face
and ear, and a couple of “knots” on her head. Sanchez took
pictures of Wood’s injuries, copies of which were received
into evidence.
Sanchez testified that Prestige spoke to her “voluntarily”
following the incident. Sanchez did not recall whether Prestige
asked to speak to her, but testified that regardless, Sanchez
would have been required to interview Prestige in response to
the other inmates’ allegations. According to Sanchez, Prestige
admitted that she struck Wood.
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STATE v. PRESTIGE
Cite as 322 Neb. 831
Wood testified that on the night of the altercation, she was
asleep in her bed and woke up to screams from Prentice, who
was being attacked by Prestige. According to Wood, Prestige
next came over to her bed and punched her at least twice in
the head, “clawed [her] whole face,” and pulled out a “chunk
of” her hair. Wood testified that at that point, Price entered
the cell and removed Prestige. Wood recalled that Prestige
tried to return to the cell and yelled, “[N]ever sleep on a G.”
The jury heard testimony that this meant, “[N]ever sleep on
a gangster.”
There was also evidence that there was a history of ten-
sion between Prestige and Wood. According to Wood, there
had been “bad blood” between her and Prestige for some
time. Wood testified that she had filed incident reports days
before the altercation because Prestige had harassed her. Price
testified that other inmates had previously told him there was
“beef” between Prestige and Wood, but that he did not witness
conflict between them until the altercation.
Prestige opted to testify at trial. She acknowledged that
she went to the other inmates’ cell and got into a fight, but
she claimed that she did not initiate the fight. According to
Prestige, Wood and Prentice were part of a clique at NCCW
that bullied inmates and had threatened to “jump[]” her.
Prestige testified that on the night of the incident at issue,
Prentice “shoulder bumped” her in the bathroom and invited
her to “meet” in Prentice’s cell. Prestige agreed and went
to Prentice’s cell later that night to “hash this out” between
her and Prentice, because it was the custom in the prison
setting to mutually agree to “have confrontations” in other
inmates’ rooms, even though such meetings were violations
of prison rules.
Prestige testified that she went into the other cell not expect-
ing to “get jumped” but instead she “felt that maybe if we’re
in a setting like that then maybe they wouldn’t be so—trying
to make it look like they’re really badass and maybe we could
have just resolved it verbally, possibly.” Prestige also testified
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STATE v. PRESTIGE
Cite as 322 Neb. 831
that she went to the other inmates’ cell and “[a] physical con-
frontation started, which is what we mutually agreed upon,”
and that she “was in there with the agreement of mutually con-
fronting and/or squashing it with Prentice.”
Prestige recounted that when she entered the cell, Wood
and Prentice ambushed her. Prestige testified that Prentice hit
and scratched her and Wood then hit Prestige in the forehead
with a hard object. Prestige testified that it was at this point
that she “exchanged blows” with Wood until Price broke up the
fight. She denied saying, “[N]ever sleep on a G.” Contrary to
Sanchez’ testimony, Prestige also denied speaking to Sanchez
and denied ever admitting to striking Wood.
The jury found Prestige guilty of second degree assault.
The district court accepted the verdict and convicted Prestige
accordingly. After an enhancement hearing, the district court
found Prestige to be a habitual criminal and sentenced her to
20 to 40 years’ imprisonment, to be served consecutively with
any other sentences currently being served.
Represented by new counsel, Prestige appeals. We set forth
additional relevant facts in the analysis section below.
II. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
Reordered and restated, Prestige assigns that the district
court erred in (1) allowing Prestige’s “custodial statement to
be presented to the jury without an independent judicial deter-
mination that the statement was freely and voluntarily made,”
(2) declining to give a self-defense instruction to the jury, and
(3) failing to grant a mistrial on its own motion when Prestige
was not able to see or hear parts of the trial.
Prestige further claims that her trial counsel rendered inef-
fective assistance in the following ways: (1) failing to “file a
motion to suppress/motion in limine regarding the statements
made by [Prestige] after she was handcuffed and placed in
a holding cell”; (2) failing to request a jury instruction on
self-defense; (3) failing to request that the record be recreated
or to request a mistrial when Prestige, appearing virtually,
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322 Nebraska Reports
STATE v. PRESTIGE
Cite as 322 Neb. 831
was not able to see or hear parts of the trial; (4) failing to
“adequately prepare a defense with [Prestige] and/or call
relevant witnesses (counsel even filed a motion stating the
same)”; (5) failing to object or file a pretrial motion “regard-
ing the violation of the prison rules as that is irrelevant and
unfairly prejudicial”; and (6) failing to object or file a pretrial
motion to prohibit the State from referring to Prestige by her
former name.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We provide the relevant standards of review in the sections
below.
IV. ANALYSIS
Prestige alleges multiple instances of district court error
and ineffective assistance of counsel. For each allegation of
district court error, Prestige makes related claims of ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel. She also makes several additional
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel unrelated to any
claimed district court error. We discuss Prestige’s claims of
district court error and ineffective assistance of counsel under
the applicable topic headings below. But first, we recite the
general principles that apply to Prestige’s ineffective assistance
of counsel claims.
[1,2] In reviewing claims of ineffective assistance of coun-
sel on direct appeal, an appellate court decides only whether
the undisputed facts contained within the record are sufficient
to conclusively determine whether counsel did or did not
provide effective assistance and whether the defendant was or
was not prejudiced by counsel’s alleged deficient performance.
State v. Wilson, 320 Neb. 728, 30 N.W.3d 165 (2026). The
record on direct appeal is sufficient to conclusively determine
a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel if it establishes
either that trial counsel’s performance was not deficient, that
the appellant will not be able to establish prejudice as a mat-
ter of law, or that trial counsel’s actions could not be justified
as a part of any plausible trial strategy. State v. Vazquez, 319
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STATE v. PRESTIGE
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Neb. 192, 21 N.W.3d 615 (2025). Conversely, an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim will not be addressed on direct
appeal if it requires examination of facts not contained in the
record. Id.
[3-5] To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104
S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984), the defendant must
show that his or her counsel’s performance was deficient and
that this deficient performance actually prejudiced the defend
ant’s defense. State v. Wilson, supra. To show that counsel’s
performance was deficient, a defendant must show that coun-
sel’s performance did not equal that of a lawyer with ordinary
training and skill in criminal law. Id. To show prejudice in a
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant must
demonstrate a reasonable probability that but for counsel’s
deficient performance, the result of the proceeding would have
been different. Id.
[6] When a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is
raised in a direct appeal, the appellant is not required to allege
prejudice; however, an appellant must make specific allega-
tions of the conduct that he or she claims constitutes deficient
performance by trial counsel. Id.
1. Prestige’s Statements
As summarized above, Sanchez testified, without objection,
that she spoke to Prestige after the incident and that Prestige
admitted to striking Wood; Prestige denied making the state-
ment, but she also testified that she “exchanged blows” with
Wood after being attacked. On appeal, Prestige assigns that
the district court erred in not initiating a hearing on its own
motion to determine the voluntariness of the “custodial state-
ment” Prestige made. Prestige also assigns that her counsel was
ineffective in “[f]ailing to file a motion to suppress/motion in
limine regarding the statements made by [Prestige] after she
was handcuffed and placed in a holding cell.” We find that
neither assignment of error merits reversal.
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STATE v. PRESTIGE
Cite as 322 Neb. 831
(a) Alleged District Court Error
Apparently targeting Sanchez’ testimony that Prestige admit-
ted to striking Wood, Prestige asserts that the district court
erred in not holding a hearing on its own motion to determine
whether her “custodial statement” was freely and voluntarily
made pursuant to Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 84 S. Ct.
1774, 12 L. Ed. 2d 908 (1964). We find no merit in Prestige’s
argument that the district court erred in not initiating a Jackson
v. Denno hearing on its own motion.
[7,8] A defendant in a criminal case is deprived of due pro-
cess of law if his or her conviction is founded, in whole or in
part, upon an involuntary confession, without regard for the
truth or falsity of the confession. State v. Miller, 312 Neb. 17,
978 N.W.2d 19 (2022). Under Jackson v. Denno, supra, trial
courts must institute fair procedures to determine whether a
confession is voluntary, because involuntary or coerced con-
fessions cannot be introduced into evidence. State v. Miller,
supra. Such a judicial determination is made after a Jackson
v. Denno hearing, where the State has the burden to prove
a defendant’s statement was voluntary and not coerced. See
State v. Miller, supra.
Our procedure to obtain a Jackson v. Denno hearing is long-
standing. A defendant who claims a statement was obtained
from him or her involuntarily may move to have the statement
suppressed by filing a motion under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-115
(Reissue 2016). See State v. Harris, 263 Neb. 331, 640 N.W.2d
24 (2002). That section provides that such motion to suppress
“must be filed at least ten days before trial”; otherwise, absent
certain exceptions set forth in that section, “all objections to
the use of such statements as evidence on these grounds shall
be deemed waived.”
Prestige freely grants that she did not file a timely motion
to suppress pursuant to § 29-115, and she does not claim
the benefit of any of its exceptions. She argues instead that
because the district court was required to institute fair proce-
dures to determine the voluntariness of her statement before
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STATE v. PRESTIGE
Cite as 322 Neb. 831
presenting it to the jury, it had a duty to initiate Jackson v.
Denno proceedings even if Prestige did not ask for them.
To the extent this argument suggests that § 29-115’s motion
requirement is unconstitutional, Prestige has not preserved
that issue for appellate review. See State v. Kalita, 317 Neb.
906, 12 N.W.3d 499 (2024) (issue of constitutionality must
be specifically called to trial court’s attention so that court
has opportunity to rule upon it; if not so raised, issue will
be considered to have been forfeited). See, also, State v.
Sutton, 319 Neb. 581, 24 N.W.3d 43 (2025) (party filing brief
explicitly or implicitly challenging constitutionality of statute
must strictly comply with Neb. Ct. R. App. P. § 2-109(E)
(rev. 2025) or else appellate court will not address constitu-
tional challenge).
Prestige’s express position—that the district court was
required to hold Jackson v. Denno proceedings on its own
motion—also runs counter to our prior holdings. The proce-
dure codified in § 29-115 “generally reflects the holdings of
this court that ‘[t]he defendant may request a hearing on and
a determination of voluntariness, but in the absence of such
request, [the] defendant cannot complain of the failure of the
court to hold such a hearing and make such determination.’”
State v. Warren, 227 Neb. 160, 162-63, 416 N.W.2d 249, 251
(1987), quoting State v. Oliva, 183 Neb. 620, 163 N.W.2d
112 (1968), citing United States v. Frazier, 385 F.2d 901 (6th
Cir. 1967), and Woody v. United States, 379 F.2d 130 (D.C.
Cir. 1967). See, also, State v. Escamilla, 195 Neb. 558, 239
N.W.2d 270 (1976).
Despite all this, Prestige asserts that her position is sup-
ported by a federal case, Lufkins v. Solem, 716 F.2d 532
(8th Cir. 1983). In Lufkins, the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit affirmed a writ of habeas corpus granted
by the federal district court, finding a violation of Jackson
v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 84 S. Ct. 1774, 12 L. Ed. 2d 908
(1964). There, a criminal defendant challenged the voluntari-
ness of a confession he signed in the presence of a sheriff by
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Cite as 322 Neb. 831
offering a handwritten objection to the trial court prior to trial,
but his trial counsel made no pretrial motion to suppress. The
sheriff later testified at trial, and the defendant’s trial counsel
objected to the admission of the defendant’s incriminating
statements on the ground that they were involuntary. The trial
court overruled the objection. The Eighth Circuit found that
the trial court had not made a distinct finding on the voluntari-
ness of the confession before it was admitted at trial and that
this violated Jackson v. Denno, supra.
Prestige urges us to follow Lufkins and to conclude that
she was entitled to a judicial determination of voluntariness
pursuant to Jackson v. Denno, supra, “regardless of whether
her attorney filed a motion to suppress.” Brief for appellant
at 17. But the facts in this case do not map onto Lufkins like
Prestige suggests. Unlike the defendant in Lufkins, Prestige
made no objection or motion, before trial or during trial,
claiming that her statements were not voluntary. And indeed,
in Patterson v. U.S., 133 F.3d 645, 648 (8th Cir. 1998), the
Eighth Circuit rejected the argument that Lufkins offers “legal
support for the idea that a district court must hold a hearing
on voluntariness without an objection by the defendant.”
Finally, we note that in State v. Crouse, No. A-25-213,
2026 WL 1393320 (Neb. App. May 19, 2026) (selected for
posting to court website), the Nebraska Court of Appeals
recently rejected the very same argument Prestige makes in
this appeal. Our reasoning in this case aligns with the Court
of Appeals’ reasoning in Crouse. The district court did not err
in allowing Prestige’s statement to Sanchez to be presented
to the jury without a sua sponte judicial determination of the
statement’s voluntariness.
(b) Ineffective Assistance Claim
Prestige also argues that she received ineffective assistance
because her trial counsel did not make efforts to prevent the
admission of statements she made. Her argument specifically
identifies Sanchez’ testimony that Prestige admitted that she
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struck or hit Wood. This evidence appears to be cumula-
tive of Prestige’s own testimony that she “exchanged blows”
with Wood. See State v. Sawyer, 319 Neb. 435, 22 N.W.3d
650 (2025) (even if trial counsel performed deficiently in not
objecting to witness’ testimony, defendant was not prejudiced
because witness’ testimony was cumulative of other evidence).
But a closer look at Prestige’s assignment of error reveals a
more basic problem.
[9,10] Prestige assigns that her trial counsel was ineffec-
tive in “[f]ailing to file a motion to suppress/motion in limine
regarding the statements made by [Prestige] after she was
handcuffed and placed in a holding cell.” Before Prestige filed
her brief, we emphasized that an assignment of error must,
standing alone, permit an appellate court to determine if the
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel can be decided upon
the trial record and also permit a district court to later recog-
nize that the claim was raised on the direct appeal. See State
v. Rupp, 320 Neb. 502, 28 N.W.3d 74 (2025). The argument
section of the brief is to elaborate on the ineffective assistance
of counsel claims by discussing legal authority and its appli-
cation to the trial record, not to set forth, for the first time,
the allegedly deficient act. Id. Claims of alleged failures by
counsel respecting motions must set forth in the assignment of
error on what grounds a motion should have been made. See
id. Prestige’s assignment of error did not state those grounds.
Therefore, her claim is insufficiently alleged and we need not
consider it. See id.
2. Technical Difficulties
Two of Prestige’s assignments of error pertain to technical
difficulties that occurred during trial. She alleges both district
court error and ineffective assistance of counsel arising from
these technical difficulties. As we will explain, we discern no
district court error, and we cannot resolve Prestige’s ineffective
assistance of counsel claim on the record before us.
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(a) Additional Facts
At a pretrial hearing, Prestige informed the district court
that she wished to participate in the proceedings remotely,
rather than in person. After Prestige affirmed that her request
was not a result of threats, promises, or force, the district court
found that she had elected to participate by video. Accordingly,
Prestige appeared via two-way interactive video.
At trial, there were some technical difficulties. For instance,
during the State’s direct examination of Sanchez, the State
elicited testimony about whether and where recordings of sur-
veillance footage were stored. At that point, the bailiff stated,
“We lost the inmate.” The district court noted that “the connec-
tion was dropped” and took a recess to resolve the issue. The
record reflects that after a 2-minute recess, the connection was
restored and the jury trial resumed. The State recommenced
questioning Sanchez, stating, “I believe when we left off we
were talking about the recording equipment for the cameras.”
The State again elicited testimony about whether and where
recordings of surveillance footage were stored.
Later, after a short recess, the district court stated, outside
the presence of the jury, “We’re back on the record with par-
ties and counsel. We don’t have . . . I’m not sure that we have
Prestige on at the moment.” The record shows that the bai-
liff and Prestige’s counsel worked to remedy the technology
issues. The district court then confirmed that Prestige could
hear and see the proceedings and that Prestige could be seen
and heard in the courtroom. The district court also confirmed
that Prestige wanted to appear by video at trial that day. The
jury then returned to the courtroom, and examination of wit-
nesses resumed.
Finally, during the State’s closing argument, the prosecutor
described to the jury video footage of Prestige’s entrance to
the other inmates’ cell. The prosecutor referred to footage of
Price’s reaction to the sound of screaming and then requiring
several seconds to locate the source of the screaming. The bail
iff interjected, “She can’t hear. I think the mic went dead. She
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can’t hear.” The prosecutor then said, “Can you turn it down?
It’s very loud. All right. So, like we were saying, it takes . . .
Price a little bit of time to realize where the screams that he
is hearing are coming from . . . .” The prosecutor went on to
describe to the jury what Price observed in the cell. The video
footage was then published to the jury.
(b) Alleged District Court Error
Prestige asserts that the district court erred by not order-
ing a mistrial on its own motion when, according to Prestige,
she could not see or hear the proceedings, in violation of her
right to be present at every stage of trial. See State v. Fox,
282 Neb. 957, 806 N.W.2d 883 (2011) (explaining confronta-
tion rights). We have long held that the right to be present
at trial can be waived so long as that waiver was voluntary
and knowing. See id., citing Scott v. State, 113 Neb. 657, 204
N.W. 381 (1925). Acknowledging that she waived her right to
appear at trial in person, Prestige contends that she retained
her right to see and hear the trial when she accepted the
option of appearing by video. And Prestige claims that when
technical issues interfered with her ability to see and hear at
trial, she was entitled to a mistrial. We are unpersuaded.
[11,12] Despite her argument on appeal that mistrial was
warranted, at no point before the district court did Prestige
move for mistrial. Absent plain error, an issue not raised to the
trial court will not be considered by this court on appeal. State
v. Sellers, 279 Neb. 220, 777 N.W.2d 779 (2010). Furthermore,
when a party has knowledge during trial of irregularity or
misconduct, the party must timely assert his or her right to a
mistrial. Id. One may not waive an error, gamble on a favor-
able result, and, upon obtaining an unfavorable result, assert
the previously waived error. Id.
Perhaps realizing this, we understand Prestige to assert
that the district court committed plain error in not declar-
ing a mistrial on its own motion when technical difficulties
arose. However, Prestige has not provided us with authority
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to support her position that a trial court in these circumstances
would be required to declare a mistrial sua sponte. And even
if she could, her claim would fail.
[13] A defendant faces a higher threshold than merely show-
ing a possibility of prejudice when attempting to prove error
predicated on the failure to grant a mistrial. State v. Dixon,
286 Neb. 334, 837 N.W.2d 496 (2013). Instead, the defendant
must prove the alleged error actually prejudiced him or her,
rather than creating only the possibility of prejudice. Id. See,
also, State v. Price, 320 Neb. 1, 26 N.W.3d 70 (2025). Prestige
cannot show on this record that the technical difficulties actu-
ally prejudiced her. Indeed, the record does not illustrate what
Prestige did or did not hear and see during the proceedings.
It shows, at most, the possibility of prejudice, and that falls
far short of proving the district court committed plain error
in not granting a mistrial. See State v. Nickels, ante p. 1, 38
N.W.3d 544 (2026) (plain error may be found on appeal when
error unasserted or uncomplained of at trial, but plainly evi-
dent from record, prejudicially affects litigant’s substantial
right and, if uncorrected, would result in damage to integrity,
reputation, and fairness of judicial process). This assignment
of error lacks merit.
(c) Ineffective Assistance Claim
Relatedly, Prestige claims that her trial counsel was inef-
fective in failing “to ask the record be recreated or ask for
a mistrial when [Prestige] was not able to see or hear parts
of the trial.” As we noted above, when a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel is raised on direct appeal, the appellate
court is tasked with deciding whether the undisputed facts
contained within the record are sufficient to conclusively
determine whether counsel did or did not provide effective
assistance and whether the defendant was or was not preju-
diced by counsel’s alleged deficient performance. See State
v. Wilson, 320 Neb. 728, 30 N.W.3d 165 (2026). Because it
is not apparent from the record what, if anything, Prestige
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did not see or hear at trial due to technical difficulties, we
cannot resolve this ineffective assistance of counsel claim on
direct appeal.
3. Self-Defense Instruction
After the parties presented their evidence, the district court
conducted a jury instruction conference on the record. The
parties disagreed about whether the evidence warranted a
self-defense instruction. After a colloquy with the parties
regarding the evidence and relevant case law, the district court
declined to give a self-defense instruction, and the jury was
instructed on the elements of second degree assault without
reference to self-defense. Now on appeal, Prestige assigns
both district court error and ineffective assistance of counsel
related to the absence of a self-defense instruction. But we see
no basis for reversal.
(a) Alleged District Court Error
[14,15] Prestige asserts that the district court erred in not
including a jury instruction on self-defense. Whether jury
instructions are correct is a question of law, which an appel-
late court resolves independently of the lower court’s deci-
sion. State v. Reeves, 321 Neb. 427, 35 N.W.3d 46 (2026).
To establish reversible error from a court’s refusal to give
a requested instruction, an appellant has the burden to show
that (1) the tendered instruction is a correct statement of the
law, (2) the tendered instruction is warranted by the evidence,
and (3) the appellant was prejudiced by the court’s refusal
to give the tendered instruction. State v. Case, 304 Neb.
829,