State v. Porter

Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/ 09/22/2026 08:08 AM CDT - 470 - Nebraska Court of Appeals Advance Sheets 34 Nebraska Appellate Reports STATE v. PORTER Cite as 34 Neb. App. 470 State of Nebraska, appellee, v. Mark M. Porter, Jr., appellant. ___ N.W.3d ___ Filed September 22, 2026. No. A-25-361. 1. Trial: Joinder: Proof: Appeal and Error. A denial of a motion to sever will be reversed only if an abuse of discretion is shown that caused the defendant substantial prejudice amounting to a miscarriage of justice. 2. Criminal Law: Joinder: Presumptions. A clear presumption exists in favor of a joinder of offenses and against severance. 3. Trial: Joinder: Appeal and Error. Whether offenses were properly joined involves a two-stage analysis: (1) whether the offenses were sufficiently related so as to be joinable and (2) whether the joinder was prejudicial to the defendant. 4. Constitutional Law: Criminal Law: Trial: Joinder. There is no con- stitutional right to a separate trial on different charges. 5. Joinder: Proof: Evidence. Prejudice from joinder generally cannot be shown if the evidence of one charge would have been admissible in a separate trial of another charge. 6. Joinder: Proof. A defendant opposing joinder must meet a high burden of proving prejudice therefrom by showing compelling, specific, and actual prejudice from the court’s refusal to grant a motion to sever. 7. Joinder: Evidence. Cross-admissibility of evidence pertaining to joined charges is only one consideration in determining prejudice. 8. Trial: Joinder: Juries: Evidence. Prejudice usually does not occur from joined charges if the evidence is sufficiently simple and dis- tinct for the jury to easily separate evidence of the charges during deliberations. 9. Verdicts: Juries: Jury Instructions: Presumptions. Absent evidence to the contrary, it is presumed that a jury followed the instructions given in arriving at its verdict.  - 471 - Nebraska Court of Appeals Advance Sheets 34 Nebraska Appellate Reports STATE v. PORTER Cite as 34 Neb. App. 470 10. Constitutional Law: Search and Seizure: Motions to Suppress: Appeal and Error. When reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress based on a claimed violation of the Fourth Amendment, an appellate court applies a two-part standard of review. Regarding historical facts, an appellate court reviews the trial court’s find- ings for clear error, but whether those facts trigger or violate Fourth Amendment protections is a question of law that is reviewed indepen- dently of the trial court’s determination. 11. Confessions: Police Officers and Sheriffs. The test of voluntari- ness is whether an examination of all the circumstances discloses that the conduct of law enforcement officials was such as to overbear the defendant’s will to resist and bring about confessions not freely self-determined. 12. Constitutional Law: Criminal Law: Confessions. The use in a state criminal trial of a defendant’s confession obtained by coercion— whether physical or mental—is forbidden by the 14th Amendment. 13. Confessions: Police Officers and Sheriffs. Courts examine police con- duct in light of the totality of the circumstances, including the tactics used by the police and the details of the interrogation. 14. Confessions: Proof. The State has the burden to prove that a defendant’s statement was voluntary and not coerced. 15. Confessions. Whether a defendant’s statement was voluntarily given depends on the totality of the circumstances. Factors to consider include the interrogator’s tactics, the details of the interrogation, and any characteristics of the accused that might cause his or her will to be easily overborne. 16. Evidence: Polygraph Tests. While the result of a polygraph examina- tion is not admissible at trial, statements made in response to question- ing during the course of a polygraph examination most usually are. 17. Polygraph Tests. It is not improper to inform an accused that the results of a polygraph test indicated deception by the accused. 18. Confessions: Police Officers and Sheriffs. Questioning tactics such as a raised voice, deception, or a sympathetic attitude on the part of the interrogator will not render a confession involuntary unless the overall impact of the interrogation caused the defendant’s will to be overborne. 19. Trial: Pretrial Procedure: Pleadings: Evidence: Juries: Appeal and Error. A motion in limine is a procedural step to prevent preju- dicial evidence from reaching the jury. It is not the office of a motion in limine to obtain a final ruling upon the ultimate admissibility of the evidence. Therefore, when a court overrules a motion in limine to exclude evidence, the movant must object when the particular  - 472 - Nebraska Court of Appeals Advance Sheets 34 Nebraska Appellate Reports STATE v. PORTER Cite as 34 Neb. App. 470 evidence is offered at trial in order to predicate error before an appel- late court. 20. Pretrial Procedure: Pleadings: Appeal and Error. To be consid- ered by an appellate court, an alleged error must be both specifically assigned and specifically argued in the brief of the party asserting the error. An appellant who has assigned only that the trial court erred in denying a motion in limine has not triggered appellate review of the evidentiary ruling at trial. 21. Constitutional Law: Rules of the Supreme Court: Statutes: Appeal and Error. The constitutionality of a statute for purposes of article V, § 2, of the Nebraska Constitution and Neb. Ct. R. App. P. § 2-109(E) (rev. 2024) includes both facial and as-applied challenges. 22. ____: ____: ____: ____. Strict compliance with Neb. Ct. R. App. P. § 2-109(E) (rev. 2024) is necessary whenever a litigant challenges the constitutionality of a statute, regardless of how that constitutional chal- lenge may be characterized. 23. ____: ____: ____: ____. Without strict compliance with Neb. Ct. R. App. P. § 2-109(E) (rev. 2024), an appellate court will not address a constitutional challenge to a statute. 24. Convictions: Evidence: Appeal and Error. In reviewing a criminal conviction for sufficiency of the evidence, whether the evidence is direct, circumstantial, or a combination thereof, the standard is the same: An appellate court does not resolve conflicts in the evidence, pass on the credibility of witnesses, or reweigh the evidence; such mat- ters are for the finder of fact. The relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. 25. Sexual Assault: Words and Phrases. Once the perpetrator’s lips or tongue touches any part of a female’s genitalia, the act of cunnilingus is complete, irrespective of any actual penetration of the genitalia. 26. Sexual Assault: Testimony. When a trier of fact observed the wit- nesses’ testimony, any observations of emotional trauma could validly be used in determining the extent of serious personal injury to victims of sexual assault. 27. Sexual Assault. One need not be specially trained in medicine or psy- chology to recognize and appreciate the injury from a forceful sexual intrusion into another’s body and invasion of the mind and very person- ality of another human being. 28. Motions for Mistrial: Appeal and Error. An appellate court will not disturb a trial court’s decision whether to grant a motion for mistrial unless the trial court has abused its discretion.  - 473 - Nebraska Court of Appeals Advance Sheets 34 Nebraska Appellate Reports STATE v. PORTER Cite as 34 Neb. App. 470 29. Judgments: Words and Phrases. An abuse of discretion occurs when a trial court’s decision is based upon reasons that are untenable or unreasonable or if its action is clearly against justice or conscience, reason, and evidence. 30. Criminal Law: Motions for Mistrial. A mistrial is properly granted in a criminal case where an event occurs during the course of trial which is of such a nature that its damaging effect cannot be removed by proper admonition or instruction to the jury and thus prevents a fair trial. 31. Motions for Mistrial: Proof: Appeal and Error. To prove error predi- cated on the failure to grant a mistrial, the defendant must prove the alleged error actually prejudiced him or her, rather than creating only the possibility of prejudice. 32. Motions for Mistrial: Appeal and Error. Error cannot ordinarily be predicated on the failure to grant a mistrial if an objection or motion to strike the improper material is sustained and the jury is admonished to disregard such material. 33. Trial. When there are outbursts of emotion in the courtroom, it is within the sound discretion of the trial court to deal with them in such a manner as to best preserve the judicial atmosphere and ensure a fair and impartial trial for the defendant. 34. Trial: Presumptions: Police Officers and Sheriffs. Reason, prin- ciple, and common human experience counsel against a presumption that any use of identifiable security guards in the courtroom is inher- ently prejudicial. 35. Motions for New Trial: Appeal and Error. The standard of review for a trial court’s denial of a motion for new trial after an evidentiary hearing is whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion. 36. Sentences: Appeal and Error. An appellate court will not disturb a sentence imposed within the statutory limits absent an abuse of discre- tion by the trial court. 37. ____: ____. Where a sentence imposed within the statutory limits is alleged on appeal to be excessive, the appellate court must determine whether a sentencing court abused its discretion in considering and applying the relevant factors and applicable legal principles. 38. Sentences. When imposing a sentence, a sentencing judge should con- sider the defendant’s (1) age, (2) mentality, (3) education and experi- ence, (4) social and cultural background, (5) past criminal record or record of law-abiding conduct, and (6) motivation for the offense, as well as (7) the nature of the offense and (8) the amount of violence involved in the commission of the crime.  - 474 - Nebraska Court of Appeals Advance Sheets 34 Nebraska Appellate Reports STATE v. PORTER Cite as 34 Neb. App. 470 39. ____. The appropriateness of a sentence is necessarily a subjective judg- ment that includes the sentencing judge’s observation of the defendant’s demeanor and attitude and of all the facts and circumstances surround- ing the defendant’s life. 40. ____. A sentencing court is not required to articulate on the record that it has considered each sentencing factor nor to make specific findings as to the facts pertaining to the factors or the weight given them. 41. Effectiveness of Counsel: Appeal and Error. Whether a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel may be determined on direct appeal is a question of law. In reviewing claims of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal, an appellate court decides only whether the undisputed facts contained within the record are sufficient to conclusively determine whether counsel did or did not provide effec- tive assistance. 42. Effectiveness of Counsel: Proof. Generally, to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel under the framework established by the U.S. Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984), the defendant must show that his or her counsel’s performance was deficient and that this deficient performance actually prejudiced the defendant’s defense. 43. ____: ____. To show that counsel’s performance was deficient, a defendant must show that counsel’s performance did not equal that of a lawyer with ordinary training and skill in criminal law. 44. Trial: Attorneys at Law: Effectiveness of Counsel: Presumptions: Appeal and Error. Trial counsel is afforded due deference to formu- late trial strategy and tactics and, in considering a claim of ineffec- tive assistance of counsel, there is a strong presumption that counsel acted reasonably. 45. Trial: Attorneys at Law: Effectiveness of Counsel: Appeal and Error. An appellate court will not second-guess the reasonable strategic decisions of trial counsel. 46. Effectiveness of Counsel: Proof. To show prejudice in a claim of inef- fective assistance of counsel, the defendant must demonstrate a reason- able probability that but for counsel’s deficient performance, the result of the proceeding would have been different. 47. Words and Phrases. A reasonable probability of prejudice is a prob- ability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. 48. Effectiveness of Counsel: Appeal and Error. In determining whether there is a reasonable probability that any deficient performance of trial counsel would have resulted in a different outcome in the proceeding, an appellate court may properly consider the strength of the admissible evidence relating to the controverted issues in the case.  - 475 - Nebraska Court of Appeals Advance Sheets 34 Nebraska Appellate Reports STATE v. PORTER Cite as 34 Neb. App. 470 49. ____: ____. When a defendant’s trial counsel is different from his or her counsel on direct appeal, the defendant must properly raise on direct appeal any issue of trial counsel’s deficient performance which is either known to the defendant or is apparent from the record. Any known or apparent issue of deficient performance not properly raised on direct appeal will be procedurally barred in a subsequent postcon- viction proceeding. 50. Appeal and Error. An alleged error must be both specifically assigned and specifically argued in the brief of the party asserting the error to be considered by an appellate court. 51. Effectiveness of Counsel: Appeal and Error. A defendant seeking to raise a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal is not required to make specific allegations of prejudice. However, anytime a defendant seeks to raise an ineffective assistance claim, whether on direct appeal or in a postconviction motion, the defendant must specifically assign and specifically argue the alleged deficient performance, and must do so with sufficient particularity. 52. ____: ____. To sufficiently allege deficient performance of counsel, the allegations must include a description of the specific conduct alleged to constitute deficient performance. 53. Effectiveness of Counsel: Records: Appeal and Error. The descrip- tion of deficient performance of counsel must be particular enough to (1) allow an appellate court to determine whether the claim can be decided upon the trial record and (2) allow a district court reviewing a later postconviction motion to recognize whether the claim was raised on direct appeal. 54. Effectiveness of Counsel: Appeal and Error. To allege deficient conduct of counsel with specificity requires more than generalities of inadequate preparation or failures to introduce beneficial evidence. An allegation will be sufficiently specific when it addresses a specific issue that does not require additional information to understand precisely what the assignment attacks. 55. Effectiveness of Counsel: Records: Appeal and Error. The fact that a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is properly raised on direct appeal does not mean it can be resolved on direct appeal. The determin- ing factor is whether all the facts necessary to the analysis are part of the appellate record. 56. ____: ____: ____. An ineffective assistance of counsel claim will not be addressed on direct appeal if it requires examination of facts not contained in the record. 57. Trial: Attorneys at Law: Effectiveness of Counsel: Records: Appeal and Error. If the record on direct appeal conclusively establishes  - 476 - Nebraska Court of Appeals Advance Sheets 34 Nebraska Appellate Reports STATE v. PORTER Cite as 34 Neb. App. 470 both that trial counsel’s performance was deficient and that the defi- cient performance prejudiced the defendant’s defense, an appellate court can determine trial counsel was ineffective. Conversely, if the record on direct appeal conclusively establishes either that trial coun- sel’s performance was not deficient or that any deficient performance did not prejudice the defendant’s defense, an appellate court can deter- mine trial counsel was not ineffective. 58. Effectiveness of Counsel: Records: Appeal and Error. If the record on direct appeal does not conclusively establish or refute a claim of ineffective assistance, then the issue cannot be resolved on direct appeal and must be properly raised in a subsequent postconvic- tion proceeding. 59. Trial: Attorneys at Law. Trial counsel is afforded due deference to formulate trial strategy and tactics. 60. Effectiveness of Counsel: Trial: Appeal and Error. Appellate courts do not use perfect hindsight to criticize unsuccessful trial strategies. Rather, they must assess trial counsel’s performance from counsel’s perspective when counsel provided the assistance. 61. Effectiveness of Counsel: Presumptions: Appeal and Error. There is a strong presumption that counsel acted reasonably, and an appellate court will not second-guess counsel’s reasonable strategic decisions. 62. Effectiveness of Counsel: Trial: Appeal and Error. It is more the exception than the rule that defense counsel’s strategy can be reason- ably inferred from the trial record on direct appeal. 63. Effectiveness of Counsel. As a matter of law, counsel cannot be inef- fective for failing to raise a meritless argument to the trial court. 64. Trial: Constitutional Law: Testimony: Attorney and Client: Waiver. A defendant has a fundamental constitutional right to testify, and the right to testify is personal to the defendant and cannot be waived by defense counsel’s acting alone. 65. Trial: Attorney and Client: Testimony. Defense counsel bears the primary responsibility for advising a defendant of his or her right to testify or not to testify, of the strategic implications of each choice, and that the choice is ultimately for the defendant to make. 66. Trial: Attorney and Client: Effectiveness of Counsel: Testimony: Waiver. Defense counsel’s advice to waive the right to testify can present a valid claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in two instances: (1) if the defendant shows that counsel interfered with his or her freedom to decide to testify or (2) if counsel’s tactical advice to waive the right was unreasonable. 67. Effectiveness of Counsel: Postconviction: Witnesses: Appeal and Error. When the claim of ineffective assistance on direct appeal  - 477 - Nebraska Court of Appeals Advance Sheets 34 Nebraska Appellate Reports STATE v. PORTER Cite as 34 Neb. App. 470 involves uncalled witnesses, the defendant must give the names or descriptions of any uncalled witnesses forming the basis of a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel; what the witness would have said may be part of the witness’ description when the name is unknown. Appeal from the District Court for Lancaster County: Andrew R. Jacobsen, Judge. Affirmed. Mona Burton, of Anderson, Creager & Wittstruck, P.C., L.L.O., for appellant. Michael T. Hilgers, Attorney General, and P. Christian Adamski for appellee. Moore, Pirtle, and Welch, Judges. Welch, Judge. I. INTRODUCTION Mark M. Porter, Jr., appeals from his jury convictions and sentences in the Lancaster County District Court for two counts of first degree sexual assault of a child and two counts of second degree sexual assault of a child. Porter asserts that the district court erred in overruling various pretrial motions, finding that the evidence was sufficient to support his convic- tions, overruling his motions for a mistrial and his motion for a new trial, and imposing excessive sentences and that he was denied effective assistance of counsel during the trial. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm. II. STATEMENT OF FACTS 1. Background (a) Initial Report of Sexual Abuse by Porter In early December 2022, 14-year-old A.M. disclosed to her mother that Porter, the man who had effectively acted as her stepfather since she was 4 years old, had been sexually abusing her for nearly a decade. After law enforcement inves- tigated A.M.’s allegations, including a forensic interview of  - 478 - Nebraska Court of Appeals Advance Sheets 34 Nebraska Appellate Reports STATE v. PORTER Cite as 34 Neb. App. 470 A.M. at a child advocacy center and two separate interviews of Porter over the course of 2 days, Porter was arrested and was initially charged with first degree sexual assault of a child and felony child abuse. (b) Additional Reports of Abuse by Porter After Porter’s arrest, three other victims came forward to report sexual abuse by Porter—one of the victims had been one of A.M.’s best friends, and two of the victims were A.M.’s cousins. A.E., who was one of A.M.’s best friends when A.E. was approximately 6 to 8 years old, reported that during some of her frequent visits to A.M.’s house during that time period, Porter would push her up against a beam, pull down her pants, and use his tongue to touch her vagina. A.M.’s cousin, S.B., reported that sometimes when she was at A.M.’s house, Porter would place S.B.’s hand on Porter’s penis, sometimes over his clothes and sometimes under his clothes, and that Porter would make her “[m]ove [her hand] up and down.” S.B. also alleged that, within a year before Porter’s arrest, she was 12 years old and was at A.M.’s house trying to take a nap in A.M.’s room when Porter came into the room and put his hand under her underwear and rubbed her bare vagina. A.M.’s younger cousin, K.B., reported that when she was 5 or 6 years old and was visiting A.M.’s house, Porter would pull down his pants, place K.B. on his lap, and pick her up and put her down on his lap. K.B. stated that she could feel Porter’s “private spot” underneath of her, which she described felt “[l]ike a rock.” During these incidents, which K.B. reported happened five or six times, Porter used his fin- ger to touch K.B.’s vagina over her clothes. 2. Operative Information Following an investigation into the additional reports of alleged sexual abuse by Porter, Porter was charged, in the  - 479 - Nebraska Court of Appeals Advance Sheets 34 Nebraska Appellate Reports STATE v. PORTER Cite as 34 Neb. App. 470 operative information, with two counts of first degree sexual assault of a child under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-319.01(1) (Reissue 2016) and two counts of second degree sexual assault of a child under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-320.01(2) (Reissue 2016). Count 1 alleged that, between approximately January 1, 2013, and April 8, 2021, Porter (who was at least 19 years of age) subjected A.M. (a person under 12 years of age) to sexual penetration, or Porter (who was at least 25 years of age) sub- jected A.M. (a person who was at least 12 years of age but less than 16 years of age) to sexual penetration. Count 2 alleged that, between February 7, 2013, and February 7, 2017, Porter (a person at least 19 years of age) subjected A.E. (a person under 12 years of age) to sexual pen- etration, or Porter (who was at least 25 years of age) subjected A.E. (a person at least 12 years of age but less than 16 years of age) to sexual penetration. Count 3 alleged that, between December 13, 2021, and December 13, 2022, Porter (who was at least 19 years of age) subjected S.B. (who was a person 14 years of age or younger) to sexual contact causing serious personal injury to S.B. Count 4 alleged that, between May 22, 2019, and December 13, 2022, Porter (who was at least 19 years of age) subjected K.B. (who was a person 14 years of age or younger) to sexual contact causing serious personal injury to K.B. 3. Pretrial Motions (a) Motion to Suppress In November 2023, Porter filed a motion to suppress requesting that the court suppress all pretrial admissions or statements made by Porter to any law enforcement person- nel, because the statements were not made knowingly, intel- ligently, and voluntarily; were obtained in violation of his con- stitutional rights; and were obtained in violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966). Porter alleged that the statements were obtained “only following repeated denials and [Porter’s] participation in a  - 480 - Nebraska Court of Appeals Advance Sheets 34 Nebraska Appellate Reports STATE v. PORTER Cite as 34 Neb. App. 470 polygraph interview, the results of which are inadmissible.” Porter further asserted that “the use and results of the . . . polygraph examination [were] inextricably intertwined with [his] subsequent admissions, and that the use of such inadmis- sible tactics and stratagems in order to obtain alleged admis- sions and confessions violate[d] his rights” under the U.S. and Nebraska Constitutions. Following the hearing thereon, the district court entered an order finding that Porter agreed to an interview to be held at the police station and that early in the interview, an officer informed Porter he was not under arrest and advised Porter of his Miranda rights, which Porter waived both verbally and in writing. Later, Porter agreed to voluntarily return the following day to take a polygraph examination. Prior to the polygraph test, Porter was once again advised that he was not under arrest and was advised of his Miranda rights, which he again waived in writing. After the polygraph exam- ination was conducted, Investigator Michael Barry informed Porter that Porter failed the examination. Although Porter initially continued to deny allegations made against him, he eventually made admissions that led to his arrest. The court found that the investigators’ references to the polygraph results were not so coercive as to deem Porter’s statements involuntary and that Porter’s statements to law enforcement were made freely, voluntarily, and knowingly. It overruled Porter’s motion to suppress. (b) Motion in Limine Porter also filed a motion in limine requesting that the court prohibit the State from introducing at trial “any testi- mony, any audio/video recordings or other evidence, or argu- ment with respect to or relating to any requests by officers to have [Porter] submit to a polygraph, [Porter’s] submitting to a polygraph and/or any results or interpretations of results of any such polygraph administered to [Porter] by [law enforcement]” because the Nebraska appellate courts have  - 481 - Nebraska Court of Appeals Advance Sheets 34 Nebraska Appellate Reports STATE v. PORTER Cite as 34 Neb. App. 470 consistently held that results obtained from polygraph tests are inadmissible. The district court held the matter of Porter’s motion in limine in abeyance while the parties conferred in an attempt to reach an agreement regarding the statements and possible redactions. (c) Motion to Quash In September 2024, Porter filed a motion to quash counts 3 and 4 of the operative information charging him with two counts of second degree sexual assault of a child, in viola- tion of § 28-320.01(2), because there was “a defect appar- ent on the face of the record, to wit: . . . § 28-320.01(2) and the applicable statutory definitions contained therein are unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.” Porter specifically alleged that “the definition of ‘serious personal injury,’ as set forth in § 28-320.01(2) and § 28-318[,] is unconstitutionally vague for the reason that ‘extreme mental anguish and mental trauma’ is not defined in statute or any applicable caselaw.” He further alleged: [T]he definition of serious personal injury and ‘extreme mental anguish and mental trauma[’] is ‘so vague and standardless that it leaves the public uncertain as to the conduct it prohibits or leaves judges and jurors free to decide, without any legally fixed standards, what is pro- hibited and what is not in each particular case . . . . Following a hearing, the district court overruled the motion to quash on the following basis: Under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-320.01(2) both anguish and trauma are common vernacular terms and whether anguish and trauma are “extreme” is up to the trier of fact. See State v. Martin, 232 Neb. 385 (1989)[,] and State v[.]Bunner, 234 Neb[.] 879 (1990). As the Nebraska Supreme Court demonstrated in Martin and Bunner, the phrases, “serious personal injury” and “extreme mental anguish or trauma” as used in Neb.  - 482 - Nebraska Court of Appeals Advance Sheets 34 Nebraska Appellate Reports STATE v. PORTER Cite as 34 Neb. App. 470 Re[v]. Stat. [§§] 28-318(4) and 28-320.01(2), provide reasonably clear guidelines to give defendants fair notice and warning of what conduct is prohibited. (d) Motion to Sever Charged Offenses In January 2025, Porter filed a motion to sever the four counts contained in the operative information, alleging that failing to sever the charges “would unfairly prejudice” Porter and “permit the introduction of otherwise inadmissible evi- dence” during the trial that “is not relevant . . . , [is] unfairly prejudicial, [is] confusing, [is] misleading . . . , and constitutes inadmissible evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts.” Porter further alleged that a joint trial was not warranted because the alleged offenses were different in character, were not part of the same act or transaction, and did not constitute part of a common scheme or plan. The district court denied Porter’s motion to sever, finding as follows: The four charges contained in the [operative] Information allege sexual assault on a child, either in the 1st [or] 2nd degree. Therefore, the charges are of the same or similar character. The evidence presented shows that all of the alleged offenses involved pubescent or prepubescent girls. The majority of the events are alleged to have taken place in the same location, and three of the four girls have a parent that are related. The time frames of the alleged incidents are in close relation to each other and all of the allega- tions involved illegal sexual contact. .... . . . In this matter, evidence of each offense would be admissible in the trial of the other offenses to establish the intent, plan, or method of operation of [Porter]. Additionally, the evidence supporting each of the charges in the [operative] Information are relatively straight forward and distinct from each other.  - 483 - Nebraska Court of Appeals Advance Sheets 34 Nebraska Appellate Reports STATE v. PORTER Cite as 34 Neb. App. 470 (e) Motion to Redact Video or Motion in Limine Porter also filed a “Motion to Redact Video/Motion in Limine” “redacting certain pretrial statements made by Investigator . . . Barry on or about December 13, 2022[,] and preserved in video recordings,” claiming said statements should be redacted and excluded from use during Porter’s trial. Porter specifically objected to the following three state- ments made by Investigator Barry that were preserved in video recordings: (1) “That’s because it did happen. That’s the prob- lem, I believe [A.M.]”; (2) “I wanna be able to tell her that it’s okay to be believed”; and (3) “What do you want me to tell her because, I believe her.” Porter also moved that “any and all other evidence or testimony, including video evidence or tran- scripts, in which law enforcement or other witnesses express a belief in the veracity of allegations by any witness against . . . Porter, be excluded from the trial.” The court denied the motion to redact or motion in limine. However, the court found that providing the jury with a limit- ing instruction was proper and stated that it would “coordinate with counsel as to the specifics of that instruction.” 4. Trial A 5-day jury trial was held in March 2025. The evidence established that A.M. was born in April 2008, A.E. was born in February 2008, S.B. was born in June 2010, and K.B. was born in May 2013. Porter was born in October 1986. In addition to the facts set forth in this section, more facts will be set forth as necessary in the analysis section of this opinion. (a) A.M.’s Testimony A.M., who was 16 years old at the time of the trial, testi- fied that Porter was her “brother and sisters’ dad” and that he lived with her family for a period of time. She testified that Porter first touched her inappropriately when she was in kindergarten. She stated that, when she was in her room,  - 484 - Nebraska Court of Appeals Advance Sheets 34 Nebraska Appellate Reports STATE v. PORTER Cite as 34 Neb. App. 470 Porter touched her vagina “[u]nder [her] underwear” with his fingers for about 3 seconds. On another occasion, while A.M. was still in kindergarten, Porter was drying A.M. off with a towel after she had showered. While A.M. was lying down and unclothed, Porter opened A.M.’s legs and “licked” her vagina. Then, when A.M. was 7 years old, Porter put A.M.’s mouth on his penis for approximately 1 minute. And on another occasion, while she and Porter were watching a movie, Porter touched A.M.’s vagina with his fingers. A.M. also testified that, when she was approximately 8 years old, Porter moved A.M.’s hand to touch his penis. According to A.M., the last time that Porter touched her inappropriately, she was around 12 years old. During that inci- dent, Porter entered A.M.’s room when she was on her bed. Porter “licked” A.M.’s vagina. A.M. stated that, even though she was scratching him, hitting him, and pulling his hair, Porter continued for approximately 10 minutes. A.M. confirmed that, on each of these occasions, she was referring to “the lips” of her vagina. However, she admitted that, during her deposition, when she was asked whether any part of Porter’s body had ever gone inside of her, including his fingers, his tongue, or his lips, she responded, “I don’t know.” (b) A.E.’s Testimony A.E., who was 17 years old at the time of the trial, testified that between first and second grade, she was approximately 6 to 8 years old. During that time period, A.M. was one of her best friends. She explained that her and A.M.’s mothers were close friends and that she would frequently go to A.M.’s house. A.E. testified that, during some of the times that she was at A.M.’s house, Porter touched her inappropriately. She stated that in the downstairs of the house, Porter would put her up against a beam, pull down her pants, and use his tongue to touch her vagina. A.E. switched schools in fourth grade, and at that time, she stopped seeing A.M. On cross-examination, A.E. testified that Porter’s tongue did not go inside of her body.  - 485 - Nebraska Court of Appeals Advance Sheets 34 Nebraska Appellate Reports STATE v. PORTER Cite as 34 Neb. App. 470 (c) S.B.’s Testimony S.B., who was 14 years old at the time of trial, testified that she and A.M. are cousins. She testified that she often went to A.M.’s home to “play games and just hang out.” On several occasions, Porter placed S.B.’s hand on his penis, sometimes over his clothes and sometimes under his clothes. She also explained that Porter would “[m]ove [her hand] up and down.” S.B. testified that within the year prior to Porter’s arrest, she was at A.M.’s house trying to take a nap in A.M.’s room and Porter came into the room and used his hand to touch her bare vagina. She further testified that Porter warned her that “if [she] told anyone [then her] cousins would hate [her] for . . . having their dad go away.” S.B. testified that she still has nightmares about Porter’s being out of jail and coming to get her, that she had used a blade to cut her wrist, and that she was placed on proba- tion because she stopped attending school because she was “scared” to attend. (d) K.B.’s Testimony K.B., who was 11 years old at the time of the trial, testified that she was A.M.’s cousin. During her testimony, K.B. held a stuffed animal, “Mr. Cuddles,” a