United States v. VELA

This opinion is subject to administrative correction before final disposition. Before HARRELL, ATTANASIO, and THORNHILL Appellate Military Judges _________________________ UNITED STATES Appellee v. Ryan J. VELA Corporal (E-4), U.S. Marine Corps Appellant No. 202500303 _________________________ Decided: 30 October 2026 Appeal from the United States Navy-Marine Corps Trial Judiciary Military Judge: Matthew M. Harris Sentence adjudged 1 April 2025 by a special court-martial tried at Ma- rine Corps Air Station Miramar, San Diego, California, consisting of of- ficer and enlisted members. Sentence in the Entry of Judgment (EOJ): a bad-conduct discharge, reduction to E-1, and a reprimand. For Appellant: Major Theodore H. Massey III, USMC For Appellee: LT Erin H. Bourneuf, JAGC, USN LCDR Philip J. Corrigan, JAGC, USN  United States v. Vela, NMCCA No. 202500303 Opinion of the Court Senior Judge HARRELL delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Judge THORNHILL joined. Judge ATTANASIO filed a separate opin- ion concurring in part and in the judgment. _________________________ This opinion does not serve as binding precedent but may be cited as persuasive authority under NMCCA Rule of Appellate Procedure 30.2. _________________________ HARRELL, Senior Judge: A special court-martial consisting of members convicted Appellant of one specification of wrongful appropriation of a motor vehicle in violation of Article 121, Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), and one specification of drunken operation of the same in violation of Article 113, UCMJ. This case is before us without assignment of error.1 However, our review of the record prompts us to address issues regarding the adjudged reprimand—rarely a topic of discussion at this Court. We “may act only with respect to the . . . sentence as entered into the record under [Article 60c, UCMJ].”2 Though the EOJ notes that the sentence adjudged by the members included a reprimand, it does not “contain the reprimand is- sued by the convening authority” as required by Rule for Courts-Martial (R.C.M.) 1111(b)(3)(D). While we do not interpret that rule so rigidly to require the military judge to copy and paste the content of the letter of reprimand into the EOJ form,3 there is no mention of the letter of reprimand at all, much less any indication of attachment or incorporation. Although we have the authority under R.C.M. 1111(c)(2) to modify the EOJ, we decline to exercise it here since the errors involving the reprimand run deeper. 1 Appellant initially filed a brief raising two assignments of error but subsequently moved to withdraw the brief and assignments of error. We granted the motion on 25 June 2026. 2 Article 66(d)(1)(A), UCMJ; 10 U.S.C. § 866(d)(1)(A). 3 But see United States v. Finco, No. ACM S32603, 2020 CCA LEXIS 246, at *17 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. July 27, 2020) (unpublished) (“We disagree with the Government’s first assertion that the EoJ is complete because the convening authority’s decision memorandum [containing the reprimand] was attached to the EoJ.”). 2  United States v. Vela, NMCCA No. 202500303 Opinion of the Court “A reprimand, if approved, shall be issued, in writing, by the convening authority.”4 Further, “The convening authority will include in the action any reprimand that the convening authority has ordered executed,” and a copy of the letter will be “appended to the convening authority’s action.”5 And to elim- inate any risk of ambiguity, “The action should refer to the letter as follows: Pursuant to the sentence of the court, a punitive letter was served upon the accused on [date] and a copy is incorporated as part of this action.”6 Though a letter of reprimand signed by the convening authority appears in the record of trial (not immediately adjacent to the convening authority’s action), there is no mention of it specifically or the adjudged reprimand generally in the convening authority’s action. Instead, it says, “I take no action on the . . . sentence in this case.”7 The deficiency of the convening authority’s action with respect to the reprimand likely contributed to the same in the EOJ. The adrift letter of reprimand in the record is substantively flawed as well. In it, the convening authority incorrectly described Articles 113 and 121, which Appellant was convicted of violating, as “multiple lawful orders, which was your duty to obey” and incorrectly stated that Appellant was convicted by a military judge, when in fact he was convicted by court-martial members.8 Ad- ditionally, the letter omits language required by the Manual of the Judge Ad- vocate General. 9 4 R.C.M. 1003(b)(1) (emphasis added). 5 Dep’t of the Navy, Judge Advocate General Instr. 5800.7G, Manual of the Judge Advocate General paras. 0154b.(2), (4) (Ch. 2, Dec. 1, 2023) [JAGMAN]. 6 JAGMAN, para. 0154b(4). 7 Convening Authority’s Action. 8 Punitive Ltr of Reprimand (Apr. 2, 2025). 9 See JAGMAN, para. 0154b.(3) (“[The punitive letter] will also contain the follow- ing: A copy of this letter will be placed in your official record at [Navy Per- sonnel Command] [Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps]. You may for- ward within 15 days after receipt of this action a statement concerning this letter for inclusion in your record. If you elect not to submit a state- ment, you will so state officially in writing within the time prescribed. In connection with your statement, any statement submitted will be couched in temperate language and will be confined to pertinent facts. Opinions will not be expressed nor the motives of others impugned. Your statement will not contain countercharges.”). 3  United States v. Vela, NMCCA No. 202500303 Opinion of the Court The cascade of procedural errors has resulted in no reprimand issued by the convening authority within the sentence entered into the record that we may affirm.10 Given that Appellant requested speedy post-trial processing in his submission of matters to the convening authority,11 we will set aside the No further criticism of the letter’s substance is warranted. We specifically reject the nitpicking by our esteemed colleague in his concurrence regarding the convening authority’s benign mention of preferral of charges. The convening authority’s practical assessment that the severity of Appellant’s misconduct led to initiating action under the UCMJ by preferring charges, vice some lesser initial disposition, is intuitive from the record (Appellant took a fellow Marine’s car without permission and drunkenly totaled it after all), and it is nowise improper for him to say as much in this context. See United States v. Wolcott, No. ACM 39639, 2020 CCA LEXIS 234, at *21 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. July 15, 2020) (unpublished) (“We find the law provided the convening au- thority significant discretion to punitively censure. This reprimand’s wording should be interpreted through the lens of a . . . commander, and a . . . court-martial convening authority with a responsibility to preserve good order and discipline . . . . We decline to interpret the words [of the reprimand] in a hyper-technical or overly legalistic man- ner.”); R.C.M. 306(b) (“Allegations of offenses should be disposed of in a timely manner at the lowest appropriate level of disposition . . . .”); Manual for Courts-Martial, United States (2024 ed.), app. 2.1, Non-Binding Disposition Guidance, para. 2.1 at A2.1-2 (“In determining whether the interests of justice and good order and discipline are served by trial by court-martial or other disposition in a case, the factors listed below should be considered. . . . b. The nature, seriousness, and circumstances of the alleged offense and the accused’s culpability in connection with the alleged offense.”). 10 See Article 66(d)(1)(A), UCMJ; 10 U.S.C. § 866(d)(1)(A) (Supp. II 2020) (“The Court may affirm only the sentence, or such part or amount of the sentence, as the Court finds correct in law and fact and determines, on the basis of the entire record, should be approved.”); see also United States v. Menard, No. ACM 40496, 2025 CCA LEXIS 137, at *2 n.4 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. Mar. 28, 2025) (unpublished) (“Because we may only affirm the portions of a sentence codified in the entry of judgment, we do not affirm the reprimand [omitted from the entry of judgment].”); United States v. Hansen, No. ARMY 20250265, 2026 CCA LEXIS 436, at *1–2 (Army Ct. Crim. App. Sep. 29, 2026) (“Since the convening authority failed to act on the reprimand, neither issuing it nor providing clemency, before the military judge entered judgment and this court received appellant’s record of trial, we will set aside that portion of the sentence and affirm the findings and remainder of the sentence.”). See generally United States v. McAlhaney, 83 M.J. 164, 167–68 (C.A.A.F. 2023) (“Because a reprimand is a component of an adjudged sentence, Appellant’s challenge to the reprimand, both generally and as written, implicated sentence appropriateness which is reviewed de novo. The lower court failed to analyze whether the reprimand was appropriate, as written, under the proper de novo standard of review.” (citation omitted)). 11 Appellant made no similar request or motion to us, though his request to the convening authority is part of “the entire record” upon which we base our consideration of the sentence. Article 66(d)(1)(A), UCMJ; 10 U.S.C. § 866(d)(1)(A) (Supp. II 2020). 4  United States v. Vela, NMCCA No. 202500303 Opinion of the Court adjudged reprimand rather than remanding and allowing the convening au- thority another opportunity to properly execute it and for the military judge to enter it into judgment, thereby causing significant delay. After careful consideration of the record, we have determined that the find- ings are correct in law, so much of the sentence as provides for reduction to E- 1 and a bad-conduct discharge is correct in law and fact, and no error materi- ally prejudicial to Appellant’s substantial rights occurred. The reprimand is SET ASIDE. The findings and the sentence as modified are AFFIRMED. 5  United States v. Vela, NMCCA No. 202500303 ATTANASIO, Judge (concurring in part and in the judgment) ATTANASIO, Judge (concurring in part and in the judgment): I join the Court’s opinion but part company with the majority in one re- spect. I would recognize a further defect in the written reprimand—the con- vening authority’s improper reference to the preferral of charges. A reprimand is a component of the adjudged sentence and serves as puni- tive censure for the misconduct established at trial.1 Preferral, by contrast, merely initiates a formal criminal accusation.2 It establishes neither guilt nor the seriousness of the alleged misconduct, and is not itself misconduct for which an accused may be punished. In describing Appellant’s misconduct, the convening authority wrote: I thoroughly reviewed the [Statement of Trial Results and the Manual for Courts-Martial], and the facts and circumstances surrounding this incident, and determined that you, did, at or near San Diego, California, on or about 22 December 2023, vio- late multiple lawful orders, which was your duty to obey to wit: violation of UCMJ articles 113 and 121, by misappropriating a privately owned vehicle and operating it while intoxicated, which was dangerous and severe enough for a criminal charge to be preferred against you and for a military judge to find you guilty of a criminal offense in accordance with [the Manual for Courts-Martial]. This single sentence—the reprimand’s entire middle paragraph—forms its substantive heart and furnishes its only specific factual account of Appellant’s misconduct (albeit one marred by error). The opening paragraph merely recites the date and type of the court-martial along with the offenses. The concluding paragraph, meanwhile, does little more than reprove Appellant in general terms before declaring: “Accordingly . . . you are hereby reprimanded for your misconduct as previously described.”3 1 See R.C.M. 1003(b)(1); 1003(b)(1) Discussion. 2 Article 30, UCMJ; R.C.M. 307. 3 See JAGMAN, para. 0154b(1) (making JAGMAN, para. 0114d applicable to pu- nitive letters issued in execution of court-martial sentences); JAGMAN, para. 0114d(1) (“The letter should contain sufficient specific facts, without reference to other docu- ments, to apprise a reader of all relevant facts and circumstances of the offense. Gen- eral conclusions . . . are valueless unless accompanied by specific facts upon which they are based.”). The reprimand states: “Your conduct is inexcusable. Your actions are  United States v. Vela, NMCCA No. 202500303 ATTANASIO, Judge (concurring in part and in the judgment) The convening authority characterized Appellant’s misconduct as “danger- ous and severe enough” to warrant preferral of charges. He then expressly rep- rimanded Appellant for the misconduct “as previously described.” Read natu- rally and in context, those words make preferral part of the convening author- ity’s stated rationale for punitive censure, not merely an incidental reference to procedural history. That distinction matters. The seriousness of misconduct may warrant the preferral of charges, but preferral itself adds nothing to the punishment that misconduct deserves. Preferral is an accusation, not an aggravating circum- stance. The convening authority was entitled to condemn the misconduct es- tablished at trial, including its dangerousness and severity. But the decision to initiate criminal proceedings supplies no independent measure of Appel- lant’s culpability and furnishes no legitimate basis for punitive censure. The majority characterizes this interpretation as “nitpicking.”4 I respect- fully disagree. The reference to preferral appears in the same sentence that materially misstates the offenses of conviction and misidentifies the factfinder. These are elementary facts of the proceedings; the reprimand nonetheless gets both wrong. Against that backdrop, the reference to preferral cannot simply be dismissed as an innocuous recitation of procedural history. Nor does reading the reprimand as written, in light of these errors and the other defects in its issuance, require any strained construction. Neither does the non-binding disposition guidance cited by the majority an- swer the objection. By its express terms, the guidance addresses specified de- cisions concerning the initiation and disposition of charges.5 It does not address the issuance of punitive reprimands following conviction. The seriousness of alleged misconduct is unquestionably relevant to disposition decisions. But that does not make the decision to prefer charges a legitimate basis for punitive censure following conviction. highly concerning and service discrediting. Your criminal behavior tarnished our Ma- rines’ ability to serve the public and the trust the public has in the Marine Corps. You were given a great honor and privilege to serve when you were granted the title of United States Marine, and you have soiled our image and honor. Accordingly, pursuant to the sentence awarded in [the Statement of Trial Results], you are hereby repri- manded for your misconduct as previously described.” 4 See ante, slip op. at 4 n.9 (quoting United States v. Wolcott, No. ACM 39639, 2020 CCA LEXIS 234, at *21 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. July 15, 2020)) (declining to interpret the language of a reprimand in a “hyper-technical or overly legalistic manner”). 5 Manual for Courts-Martial, United States (2024 ed.), app. 2.1, Non-Binding Dis- position Guidance, para. 1.3 at A2.1-2. 2  United States v. Vela, NMCCA No. 202500303 ATTANASIO, Judge (concurring in part and in the judgment) I do not suggest that a convening authority may never mention preferral in a reprimand. A neutral reference to procedural history would ordinarily pre- sent no concern. But this reprimand does something different. The convening authority placed the reference to preferral in the reprimand’s only specific de- scription of Appellant’s misconduct. He then expressly reprimanded Appellant for that misconduct “as previously described.” The concern is not one of tech- nical precision, but of the stated basis upon which punishment was imposed. The requirements governing a punitive reprimand are not optional, nor is their observance a mere formality. The improper reference to preferral, consid- ered alongside the defects identified by the Court, reinforces the decision not to modify the entry of judgment or remand for further proceedings. Accord- ingly, I concur in affirming the findings and only so much of the sentence as provides for a bad-conduct discharge and reduction to E-1. FOR THE COURT: MARK K. JAMISON Clerk of Court 3