United States v. RHODE
CourtNavy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals
Date FiledNovember 16, 2026
Docket202500353
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
This opinion is subject to administrative correction before final disposition.
Before
KORN, FLINTOFT, and KISOR
Appellate Military Judges
_________________________
UNITED STATES
Appellee
v.
Nolan J. ROHDE
Machinist’s Mate Auxiliary First Class (E-6), U.S. Navy
Appellant
No. 202500353
_________________________
Decided: 16 November 2026
Appeal from the United States Navy-Marine Corps Trial Judiciary
Military Judges:
Phillip J. Hamon (arraignment)
Michael F. Whitican (motions and trial)
Sentence adjudged 4 April 2025 by a general court-martial tried at Na-
val Station Bremerton, Washington. Sentence in the Entry of Judg-
ment: confinement for three years and a dishonorable discharge.1
For Appellant:
Lieutenant Commander Benjamin M. Cook, JAGC, USN
Mr. Frank J. Spinner
1 Appellant was credited with two days of pretrial confinement.
United States v. Rohde, NMCCA No. 202500353
Opinion of the Court
For Appellee:
Lieutenant Michael G. Osborn, JAGC, USN
Commander John T. Cole, JAGC, USN
Chief Judge KORN delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Senior
Judges FLINTOFT and KISOR joined.
_________________________
This opinion does not serve as binding precedent but
may be cited as persuasive authority under
NMCCA Rule of Appellate Procedure 30.2.
_________________________
KORN, Chief Judge:
A panel of members convicted Appellant, contrary to his pleas, of one spec-
ification of possession of child pornography, in violation of 134, Uniform Code
of Military Justice (UCMJ).2 The members sentenced Appellant to confinement
for three years and a dishonorable discharge.
Appellant raises six assignments of error (AOE):
I. Whether the military judge erred in denying implied
bias member challenges for HMC Delta and LS1 Lima,
such that the findings and sentence must be set aside.
II. Whether the military judge erred in denying implied
bias member challenges for six members, such that the
sentence must be set aside and a sentence rehearing au-
thorized.
III. Whether the evidence for Specification 2 of the
Charge is legally insufficient because it fails to prove the
conduct was service discrediting.
2 10 U.S.C. § 934. The members found Appellant not guilty of another specification
of possession of child pornography.
2
United States v. Rohde, NMCCA No. 202500353
Opinion of the Court
IV. Whether the military judge’s restriction on Defense’s
closing argument about Article 134’s terminal element vi-
olated Appellant’s right to counsel.
V. Whether the Military Judge erred in overruling objec-
tions to sentencing argument about victim impact where
no victim impact was admitted under R.C.M. 1001 or oth-
erwise in evidence.
VI. Whether the military judge erred in denying a De-
fense objection to the members being provided with the
prosecution exhibits underlying Specification 1, of which
Appellant was acquitted, during sentencing delibera-
tions, and then instructing them that they must consider
them.
We find no prejudicial error and affirm the findings and sentence.
I. BACKGROUND
The Government charged Appellant with possessing child pornography on
both his cell phone and in cloud-based digital storage. Appellant pleaded not
guilty and elected to be tried by a panel of members with enlisted representa-
tion. The members convicted Appellant of possessing child pornography on his
cell phone and acquitted him of the specification relating to cloud-based stor-
age.
During voir dire, Appellant argued that Chief Hospital Corpsman (HMC)
Delta and Logistics Specialist First Class (LS1) Lima were impliedly biased
because they had young children. 3
HMC Delta
HMC Delta had a nine-year-old and a three-year-old child. During voir dire,
defense counsel and HMC Delta engaged in the following exchange:
Defense counsel (DC): Do you think that you would be thinking
of your own kids in any way as you were reviewing this evidence
or hearing this testimony?
HMC Delta: I mean, they’re going to come across. Yes, sir.
3 All names in this opinion, other than those of Appellant, the judges, and counsel,
are pseudonyms.
3
United States v. Rohde, NMCCA No. 202500353
Opinion of the Court
DC: Okay. And, being a--being a dad, I’m guessing it’s a big part
of your identity.
HMC Delta: Yes, sir,
DC: It’s who you are.
HMC Delta: Yeah. I’d like to think so, sir. I think.
DC: And do you feel, just like as a father, that you might be more
protective of kids?
HMC Delta: I am protective of kids in general, sir. I think--I
think, yeah.
DC: And do you think that, based off of being a dad and having
two young kids, it might be hard to actually, like, watch these
videos or review these images?
HMC Delta: No, sir. I don’t think so. I’ve seen some gory stuff in
my day, sir.
DC: Okay. So, you don’t think it would bother you?
HMC Delta: I don’t think so, sir.4
LS1 Lima
LS1 Lima had a three-year-old child. Defense counsel and LS1 Lima en-
gaged in the following dialogue:
DC: . . . if you’re involved in this case, you may end up seeing
images of what are allegedly minors being sexually abused.
Based off of, you know you being a parent. Do you think it’s pos-
sible you might be thinking about your own child when viewing
images like that?
LS1 Lima: I’ll be honest, you, after leaving earlier, I thought
about it, and I think so.
DC: Can you expand on that?
LS1 Lima: It’s just, from thinking about it--it’s just not neces-
sarily something that I would like to see in that sense, just be-
cause I do have a--my young son.
DC: Do you think you’d be thinking about your son when you
heard witness testimony or reviewed evidence in the case?
4 R. at 546-47.
4
United States v. Rohde, NMCCA No. 202500353
Opinion of the Court
LS1 Lima: Possibly when I view the evidence.
DC: Do you think that that might--that might kind of cast
[doubt] on your ability to be fair and impartial?
LS1 Lima: I don’t necessarily think it would cast [doubt] on the
ability to be fair, but it is just more of, like, something of, like,
my personal feelings that I would say.
DC: And, you know, being a father, that--is that a core part of
your identity?
LS1 Lima: Yes.
DC: And you said that this was something that you were kind of
thinking about after you had taken a break?
LS1 Lima: Yes.
DC: When you initially saw the charges in this case, did it have
any effect on you?
LS1 Lima: No.5
Trial counsel then followed up with LS1 Lima:
Trial counsel (TC): You--you talked a little bit about how this
might affect you and being a father, obviously seeing the images,
would you hold it against the government if you had to see the
images?
LS1 Lima: No.
TC: Would you hold it against the defense if you had to see the
images?
LS1 Lima: No.
TC: So, it’s just a hard thing to do, but you’re not saying it’s going
to bias you in one way or another towards any party?
LS1 Lima: Not necessarily, but it’s something that it would be
hard for me to see those, like, images and stuff like that. And if
possible, it’s something that I would like to, like, avoid.6
5 R. at 508-10.
6 R. at 510.
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Opinion of the Court
Appellant further argued that HMC Delta, LS1 Lima, Lieutenant (LT)
Bravo, Machinist’s Mate (Nuclear) First Class (MMN1) Hotel, Hospital Corps-
man First Class (HM1) Lane, and LT Golf had inelastic views on sentencing
and were therefore impliedly biased. All initially expressed beliefs that some-
one convicted of possession of child pornography should be discharged, and in
the cases of LT Bravo and LS1 Lima, confined. When asked additional ques-
tions during individual voir dire, however, all six stated that they could con-
sider the full range of punishments and would follow the instructions of the
military judge:
HMC Delta
TC: So, you and the other members may be called upon to give a
sentence.
HMC Delta: Yes, sir.
TC: If that were the case, the military judge is going to give you
some instructions on how to evaluate the evidence and what the
range of punishment should be.
HMC Delta: [Affirmative response.]
TC: If the judge gave you an instruction that the minimum pun-
ishment is no punishment, could you follow that instruction to
consider no punishment in your deliberations with the mem-
bers?
HMC Delta: Yes, sir. I can.
...
TC: Okay. And so, just want to make it very clear that--that I
understand where you’re coming from. If the judge were to in-
struct you, you should consider--you shall consider no punish-
ment, including no punitive discharge as a punishment.
HMC Delta: [Affirmative response.]
TC: Can you consider that and follow that instruction?
HMC Delta: I can, sir. Yes.7
LS1 Lima
TC: And in this case specifically, if you’re called upon--if we get
to that point and you’re called upon to issue a sentence, are you
7 R. at 542-45.
6
United States v. Rohde, NMCCA No. 202500353
Opinion of the Court
willing to consider the full range of punishments that the mili-
tary judge instructs you on?
LS1 Lima: Yes.
TC: How are you able to separate your--that belief that you had
it with what the military judge might instruct you?
LS1 Lima: I would just have to see all the information that’s pro-
vided to me on the whole case and everything.
TC: Do you feel comfortable waiting until you get all that evi-
dence before you make a decision?
LS1 Lima: Yes.
TC: Do you feel comfortable waiting until you’re able to talk with
the other members about a sentence before making a decision?
LS1 Lima: Yes.
...
LS1 Lima: It’s more of, like, just to see all the evidences put out
stuff like that. You know, if we all come together to whatever
verdict it is, then that--that’ll be my standing on that. It’s not
necessarily that I believe that something should automatically
happen.
TC: Okay. So, you’re comfortable waiting until you get all that
evidence before making a decision?
LS1 Lima: Yes.8
LT Bravo
TC: In this case, specifically in the court-martial system, the mil-
itary judge will instruct you that you should consider the full
range of punishments because you’re going to be the one making
the decision.
LT Bravo: Okay.
TC: Including, considering no punishment at all. So, no jail time.
Can you follow that instruction from the military judge?
LT Bravo: Yes, sir.
8 R. at 506-11.
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United States v. Rohde, NMCCA No. 202500353
Opinion of the Court
TC: And so, your belief about jail time is that just your common
application of what you think happens in criminal matters, gen-
erally?
LT Bravo: Yes, sir.
TC: And if you were called upon in this case to sit in this trial,
could you in fact consider then no punishment for these offenses?
LT Bravo: Yes, sir. Based off of the rules of the court. Yes, sir.
TC: Okay. And I have a similar question, I think to the next one
that was asked about, punitively discharged from the Navy.
Similar question, could you follow the instruction and consider
no punishment, including no punitive discharge, if that were the
case?
LT Bravo: Yes, sir.9
MMN1 Hotel
TC: If that were to happen, if the judge were to instruct you that
you need to consider not--not give, but at least consider the full
range of punishment. Could you do that even if the full range of
punishment includes no punishment at all?
MMN1 Hotel: Absolutely.
TC: How do you reconcile that, you know, that belief you shared
with what I just told you about the judge’s instructions?
MMN1 Hotel: My belief is not the law, I guess. So I can have an
opinion on it, but that doesn’t make it true, I guess. So, if--if, like,
my--my general understanding is that that shouldn’t be a service
member, but if there’s no reason to actually have them expelled
by law from the military service, then there’s no reason to have
them expelled by law.10
HM1 Lane
TC: I understand that you’re not, in this case, you know, the
judge has already instructed you on some of the law. He’s going
to give you more instructions on the law, including the law under
the Uniform Code of Military Justice about sentencing. And if he
9 R. at 396-97.
10 R. at 419.
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United States v. Rohde, NMCCA No. 202500353
Opinion of the Court
were to instruct you that you have to consider the full range of
punishments, including no punishment at all, would you be able
to follow that instruction?
HM1 Lane: Yes.
TC: Okay. Why--how do you reconcile that with your personal
belief that you just talked about earlier?
HM1 Lane: Because it’s--it’s separate, like, as a medical person-
nel, too. Like, we have to kind of separate ourselves from, like,
our personal beliefs and then, like, what’s actually objectively
there, you know?
...
DC: And so, would you view it as unjust in any way if Petty Of-
ficer Rohde were convicted, but then stayed in the Navy or didn’t
receive prison time?
HM1 Lane: Well, again, like if it’s all, this--this is pre-trial, so I
don’t know what’s been going on or if he used it in a wrong way
or he advertised the child pornography. I don’t--I still have to be
evidence-based. Like, it’s very objective.11
LT Golf
TC: In this case, if there is a conviction, and if there is sentencing
proceedings where you might be called on to issue a sentence,
the judge will give you instructions on how to evaluate a case,
how to evaluate the evidence. Are you able to follow those in-
structions that he gives you?
LT Golf: Yes, sir.
TC: And if those instructions include evidence or include instruc-
tions to say you have to consider a full range of punishment, in-
cluding no punishment, so no punitive discharge, could you fol-
low that instruction?
LT Golf: Yes, sir.
TC: Do you have any concerns about following that instruction
compared with your belief of what should happen generally in
cases?
11 R. at 437-44.
9
United States v. Rohde, NMCCA No. 202500353
Opinion of the Court
LT Golf: I do not, sir.12
The military judge denied the challenges to these six members and they were
impaneled.13
During defense counsel’s closing argument, he stated that the members
“need to consider whether or not the information, these images, was ever made
public by [Appellant].”14 Trial counsel objected, citing improper argument, and
the military judge sustained the objection. Defense counsel continued to argue
that the members should consider the non-public nature of Appellant’s actions,
and trial counsel objected again. The military judge overruled the objection and
permitted defense counsel to continue with his argument. Additionally, the
military judge instructed the members that they “must consider all the circum-
stances [of Appellant’s conduct].”15 He also instructed the members, “Whether
. . . conduct is of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces is a question
that depends on the facts and circumstances of the conduct, which includes
facts regarding the setting, as well as the extent to which the accused’s conduct
is known to others.”16
Appellant was convicted on one of the two charged specifications. During
the Government’s presentencing argument, defense counsel objected multiple
times to trial counsel referencing the impact suffered by the children depicted
in the videos and images Appellant possessed. The military judge overruled
some of defense counsel’s objections and sustained others. Before the members
deliberated on Appellant’s sentence, defense counsel asked that the exhibits
related to the specification for which Appellant was acquitted “not go back with
[the members].”17 The military judge overruled Appellant’s objection, stating
that he would not remove exhibits that were already in evidence, but that “Par-
ties can certainly make argument about the appropriate . . . consideration of
the exhibits based on the findings.”18 The members ultimately sentenced Ap-
pellant to confinement for three years and a dishonorable discharge.
12 R. at 524.
13 The military judge granted four Defense and five joint challenges for cause
against other members.
14 R. at 1466.
15 R. at 1490.
16 R. at 1490.
17 R. at 1545.
18 R. at 1545.
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United States v. Rohde, NMCCA No. 202500353
Opinion of the Court
II. DISCUSSION
A. The military judge properly denied challenges for implied bias
against HMC Delta and LS1 Lima.
1. Law/Standard of Review
A member shall be excused for cause whenever it appears that he or she
“[s]hould not sit as a member in the interest of having the court-martial free
from substantial doubt as to legality, fairness, and impartiality.”19 The Court
of Appeals for the Armed Forces (CAAF) has held that this rule encompasses
both actual and implied bias.20
Implied bias is “bias attributable in law to the prospective juror regardless
of actual partiality.”21 The test for implied bias is “whether the risk that the
public will perceive that the accused received something less than a court of
fair, impartial members is too high.”22 In applying that test, we consider “the
totality of the circumstances, and assume the public to be familiar with the
unique structure of the military justice system.”23
Military judges must err on the side of granting defense challenges for
cause.24 The CAAF has termed this the “liberal grant mandate,” which recog-
nizes that “the interests of justice are best served by addressing potential mem-
ber issues at the outset of judicial proceedings.”25 The CAAF has held that,
under the liberal grant mandate, if the military judge finds an implied bias
challenge to be a close question, the challenge should be granted.26
We review a military judge’s implied bias analysis under a standard of re-
view “that is less deferential than abuse of discretion, but more deferential
than de novo review.”27 While “it is not required for a military judge to place
his or her implied bias analysis on the record, doing so is highly favored and
19 R.C.M. 912(f)(1)(N).
20 United States v. Miles, 58 M.J. 192, 194 (C.A.A.F. 2003) (citing United States v.
Daulton, 45 M.J. 212, 217 (C.A.A.F. 1996)).
21 United States v. Wood, 299 U.S. 123, 134 (1936).
22 United States v. Woods, 74 M.J. 238, 243-44 (C.A.A.F. 2015) (cleaned up).
23 Id. at 244.
24 United States v. Peters, 74 M.J. 31, 34 (C.A.A.F. 2015).
25 United States v. Clay, 64 M.J. 274, 277 (C.A.A.F. 2007).
26 Id.
27 Peters, 74 M.J. at 33 (citations omitted).
11
United States v. Rohde, NMCCA No. 202500353
Opinion of the Court
warrants increased deference from appellate courts.”28 When a military judge
fails to conduct an implied bias analysis, the standard of review shifts toward
de novo.29 Accordingly, the more reasoning military judges provide, the more
deference they will receive.30 Military judges retain their discretion to deter-
mine whether a challenge for cause constitutes a “close case” of bias.31 How-
ever, when a case is close, the liberal grant mandate requires military judges
to grant the challenge.32
2. Analysis
When resolving an issue of implied bias, we first determine where to fix our
view along “a sliding standard of appellate review . . . based on the specific
facts of the case.”33 Here, the military judge correctly cited the law and pro-
vided a detailed explanation of his implied bias analysis. Regarding HMC
Delta, the military judge said:
He specifically said that he wouldn’t think about his kids. And
frankly, that might be, not what a person would expect to hear
from a member. And yet this member said that he’s seen some
pretty gory stuff, and he’s in the medical field. I’m sure that he
has seen some pretty intense and graphic things that many
other people wouldn’t be able to look at without having a--an
emotional response to some kind.
And so, I took that answer again to be forthright and honest.
And because it drew from his experience, it gave it more credi-
bility than a blanket, “No’ I won’t be impacted,” sort of answer.
And that’s the basis that I got from him describing it here in
court, being able to observe that answer.
So . . . even considering the liberal grant mandate, I do not be-
lieve that a fully informed member of the public being able to
28 United States v. Dockery, 76 M.J. 91, 96 (C.A.A.F. 2017).
29 United States v. Rogers, 75 M.J. 270, 273 (C.A.A.F. 2016).
30 Id.
31 United States v. Keago, 84 M.J. 367, 373 (C.A.A.F. 2024).
32 Id.
33 Id.
12
United States v. Rohde, NMCCA No. 202500353
Opinion of the Court
observe this member and hear his responses and knowing eve-
rything about the facts and circumstances of this case would har-
bor a significant doubt about this member.34
Regarding LS1 Lima, the military judge said:
[A]s to having a child, I think it’s completely normal. I think a
fully informed member of the public would expect a parent to say
that viewing material of this nature would be hard, and frankly,
even not being a parent. Hearing a member say that if they had
a choice, they’d prefer not to see this sort of material is a com-
pletely rational thought. It doesn’t mean the person would be
unfair or partial or have a bias that can’t be overcome through
the judge’s instructions or the fair consideration of evidence.
The way that this member described that inclination, in that,
even, you know, seeing this evidence may cause him to think of
his own child, I don’t think is an unreasonable thought for a
member to have. But the way he answered the questions, not
only in the language he used, but also his behavior, and deport-
ment, seems to indicate that he knows what his role here is. He’s
able to push—put feelings or concerns about his side, if that even
were an issue aside, and focus on the evidence and the instruc-
tions on the law.
The member seemed thoughtful in his answers, indicated by the
fact that he pushed back on maybe an interpretation of his an-
swer, and he indicated a clear ability to follow the military
judge’s instructions. And his concern about thinking about his
son didn’t seem to be, in fact, he specifically said it would not
cause him to be unfair or impartial. It’s just that it might, you
know, the fact that he may see children in these images, and the
fact that he has a child. It’s a completely fair thing to think
about.
. . . I did not hear indications that it would cloud his judgment
in such a way that he’d be unable to fulfill his duties as a court-
martial. And even considering the liberal grant mandate, I don’t
believe that a fully informed member of the public, having heard
and seen this member provide the answers that he did and
34 R. at 566-68.
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United States v. Rohde, NMCCA No. 202500353
Opinion of the Court
knowing the facts and the circumstances of this case, would har-
bor substantial doubt about this member participating in this
court-martial panel.35
The military judge denied the challenges to both members. Based on these
comprehensive rulings and the military judge’s correct application of the law,
our standard of review affords the military judge increased deference, closer to
an abuse of discretion standard.
Appellant further argues that the military judge incorrectly stated that
HMC Delta was rehabilitated on the issue related to his children, when in fact
he was not.36 Specifically, Appellant states that the military judge “erroneously
found that HMC Delta ‘specifically said he wouldn’t think about his kids.’ But
that is the opposite of what [HMC Delta] said.”37 While it is true that HMC
Delta never specifically stated that he would not think about his children, we
disagree with Appellant’s contention that he actually said the opposite of that.
HMC Delta responded that “they’re going to come across,” when asked whether
he would “be thinking of your own kids in any way as you were reviewing this
evidence or hearing this testimony?”38 However, the vital exchange that HMC
Delta engaged in with defense counsel was the following—which likely led to
the military judge’s inaccurate statement that HMC Delta said he would not
think about his kids:
DC: And do you think that, based off of being a dad and having
two young kids, it might be hard to actually, like, watch these
videos or review these images?
HMC DELTA: No, sir. I don’t think so. I’ve seen some gory stuff
in my day, sir.
DC: Okay. So, you don’t think it would bother you?
HMC DELTA: I don’t think so, sir.39
This exchange demonstrated that the military judge’s misstatement re-
garding HMC Delta’s answer was immaterial. No rehabilitation was required,
as HMC Delta’s responses regarding his children did not raise substantial
doubts as to his legality, fairness, and impartiality. We agree with the military
35 R. at 515-17.
36 Appellant’s Brief at 23.
37 Appellant’s Brief at 23.
38 R. at 546.
39 R. at 547.
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United States v. Rohde, NMCCA No. 202500353
Opinion of the Court
judge that the fact that HMC Delta and LS1 Lima had young children did not
create a risk that the public would perceive that Appellant received something
less than a court of fair, impartial members. We afford deference to the military
judge’s assessment, and we see nothing in the record that would create doubt
whether HMC Delta or LS1 Lima could sit as fair and impartial members, and
they were thus not impliedly biased.
B. The military judge properly denied challenges for cause against six
members who initially expressed beliefs that a particular punishment
was appropriate for a conviction for possession of child pornography.
1. Law/Standard of Review
An accused has a constitutional and a regulatory right to a fair and impar-
tial panel.40 A member may be removed for cause when removal serves the
interest of keeping the court-martial free from substantial doubt concerning
legality, fairness, and impartiality, and an inelastic opinion about an appropri-
ate sentence for the charged offenses may support such a challenge.41
An “unfavorable inclination” toward an offense or a predisposition to im-
pose some punishment does not by itself disqualify a court-martial member.42
The controlling inquiry is whether the member’s attitude is so inelastic that it
will not yield to the evidence and the military judge’s instructions.43 A rigid
predisposition to impose a punitive discharge solely because of the crime there-
fore requires sustaining a challenge for cause.44 By contrast, a mere predispo-
sition to adjudge some punishment following conviction, standing alone, is in-
sufficient.45 In reviewing whether members had inelastic attitudes towards
sentencing, we apply the same standard of review from section II. A.
2. Analysis
All the challenged members initially expressed beliefs that a sentence of a
punitive discharge (and for two of the members—confinement) was appropri-
ate for a conviction for possession of child pornography. However, following
40 United States v. James, 61 M.J. 132, 138 (C.A.A.F. 2005).
41 Id; R.C.M. 912(f).
42 James, 61 M.J. at 138; United States v. McGowan, 7 M.J. 205, 206 (C.M.A. 1979).
43 James, 61 M.J. at 138.
44 See, e.g., United States v. Giles, 48 M.J. 60 (C.A.A.F. 1998); United States v.
Karnes, 1 M.J. 92, 94 (C.M.A. 1975); United States v. Cosgrove, 1 M.J. 199, 200 (C.M.A.
1975).
45 McGowan, 7 M.J. at 206.
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United States v. Rohde, NMCCA No. 202500353
Opinion of the Court
additional questioning by trial counsel, defense counsel, and the military
judge, they all expressed a willingness to base the adjudged sentence off of the
evidence presented and to follow the military judge’s instructions, as detailed
in the background section above.
At most, these members expressed a predisposition to impose some punish-
ment, but none held an attitude so inelastic that it would not yield to the evi-
dence and the military judge’s instructions. The military judge applied the cor-
rect law in detailed rulings denying the challenge to each of these members,46
and our standard of review therefore affords the military judge increased def-
erence, closer to an abuse of discretion standard. Because these members’
views on sentencing were not rigid, unyielding, or inflexible, and affording def-
erence to the military judge’s assessments, we see nothing in the record that
would cause the public to doubt whether any of these members could sit fairly
and impartially. They were therefore not impliedly biased.
C. Appellant’s conviction is legally sufficient, as the evidence proved
the conduct was of a service discrediting nature.
1. Standard of Review/Law
To determine legal sufficiency, we ask whether, “considering the evidence
in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a reasonable factfinder could
have found all the essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt.”47 The stand-
ard for legal sufficiency therefore involves a very low threshold to sustain a
conviction.48 We review questions of legal sufficiency de novo.49
For an offense charged as “conduct of a nature to bring discredit upon the
armed forces” under Article 134, the Government must prove the “terminal
element”—that, under the circumstances, the accused’s conduct was of a na-
ture to bring discredit upon the armed forces.50 The terminal element is a dis-
crete element that the factfinder must determine beyond a reasonable doubt,
rather than infer automatically merely because the predicate act occurred. 51
Evidence of the predicate conduct may itself permit a rational factfinder to
46 R. at 408-10, 431-36, 454-57, 514-17, 534-35, 564-68.
47 United States v. Turner, 25 M.J. 324, 325 (C.M.A. 1987) (citing Jackson v. Vir-
ginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)).
48 United States v. Smith, 83 M.J. 350, 359 (C.A.A.F. 2023).
49 United States v. Kearns, 73 M.J. 177, 180 (C.A.A.F. 2014).
50 See United States v. Shafran, 85 M.J. 420, 423-24 (C.A.A.F. 2025).
51 United States v. Gaskins, 72 M.J. 225, 233 (C.A.A.F. 2013).
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Opinion of the Court
conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the conduct was service discrediting,
but that conclusion is not automatic and must be assessed under all the cir-
cumstances.52 Actual public awareness of the underlying conduct is not re-
quired.53 The relevant question is whether the conduct would be service dis-
crediting had the public known of it, evaluated according to the particular facts
and circumstances.54 Thus, the government must place sufficient evidence in
the record to prove service-discrediting character beyond a reasonable doubt,
but it need not offer separate evidence of actual reputational injury or public
awareness when the evidence of the conduct itself, viewed in context, supports
that finding.
2. Analysis
Appellant argues that his conviction is legally insufficient, because the ev-
idence demonstrated that “no one knew about the conduct or Appellant’s con-
nection to the military, and there was no evidence of any involvement by any
other person in the case whatsoever.”55 Appellant argues that this lack of
awareness means that the Government failed to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that Appellant’s conduct was of a nature to bring discredit upon the
armed forces. We disagree.
The CAAF explicitly concluded that for a charge under Article 134, “evi-
dence that the public was actually aware of the conduct is not necessarily re-
quired. . . . proof of the conduct itself may be sufficient for a rational trier of
fact to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that, under all the circumstances,
it was of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces.”56 Appellant’s case
is precisely that situation. Appellant possessed thousands of photos and videos
on his phone showing the explicit rape and sexual abuse of children. Consider-
ing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a reasonable
factfinder could have found that Appellant’s conduct—assessed under all the
circumstances—was of a nature to bring discredit on the armed forces, despite
any evidence that the public was actually aware of that conduct. His conviction
is therefore legally sufficient.
52 United States v. Phillips, 70 M.J. 161, 168 (C.A.A.F. 2011).
53 Id. at 163.
54 United States v. Wells, 85 M.J. 154, 157 (C.A.A.F. 2024).
55 Appellant’s Brief at 32 (emphasis in original).
56 Phillips, 70 M.J. at 163.
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Opinion of the Court
D. The military judge did not violate Appellant’s right to counsel by
limiting defense counsel’s closing argument.
1. Standard of Review
We review a military judge’s decision to sustain a Government objection to
a portion of defense counsel’s closing argument for an abuse of discretion.57
2. Analysis
The military judge sustained an objection to defense counsel’s closing argu-
ment that the members “need to consider whether or not the information, these
images, was ever made public by [Appellant].”58 Defense counsel continued to
argue that the members should consider the non-public nature of Appellant’s
actions, and the military judge overruled a subsequent Government objection
and permitted defense counsel to proceed with his argument.59 The military
judge later instructed the members that “Whether [] conduct is of a nature to
bring discredit upon the armed forces is a question that depends on the facts
and circumstances of the conduct, which includes the facts regarding the set-
ting, as well as the extent to which the accused’s conduct is known to others.”60
Appellant takes no issue with the content of that instruction before this
Court.61
Appellant argues that we should review the military judge’s decision to sus-
tain the initial objection to defense counsel’s closing argument “under the same
standard of review that [we review] other Sixth Amendment counsel issues.”62
We disagree. The military judge sustained a single objection to defense coun-
sel’s closing argument. He did not deny Appellant the right to make a closing
argument. He did not require defense counsel to conclude his closing argument
prematurely. And despite the sustained objection, the military judge did not
preclude Appellant from later arguing that the members should consider
whether anyone was aware of his conduct.
57 See United States v. Michaud, 48 C.M.R. 379, 397 (N.C.M.R. 1973); United States
v. Palmer, 55 M.J. 205, 208 (C.A.A.F. 2001).
58 R. at 1466.
59 R. at 1471.
60 R. at 1490.
61 Appellant’s Brief at 36.
62 Appellant’s Brief at 33.
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Opinion of the Court
Even assuming that the military judge wrongly sustained the initial objec-
tion to the portion of the closing argument relating to the public nature of Ap-
pellant’s conduct, he eliminated any prejudice Appellant may have suffered by
subsequently overruling a Government objection and allowing defense counsel
to make that precise argument. Additionally, he instructed the members that
they must consider all the circumstances surrounding Appellant’s conduct.63
We presume that members follow the military judge’s instructions absent evi-
dence to the contrary.64 Therefore, any error in the single sustained objection
was harmless, as it did not materially prejudice Appellant’s substantial
rights.65
E. The military judge did not err in overruling Appellant’s objections
to trial counsel’s sentencing argument.
a. Standard of Review
When an appellant objected to an improper argument during his court-
martial, we review the issue de novo.66 In that de novo review, we determine
whether any error materially prejudiced the appellant’s substantial rights un-
der Article 59, UCMJ.67
b. Analysis
During presentencing argument, trial counsel stated that the children who
were raped and sexually abused in the videos and images Appellant possessed
are continuing victims of [Appellant’s] possession of child por-
nography. . . . And [Appellant’s] continual actions to actively
seek [child pornography] creates that signal for more and more
of these images to be perpetrated. More and more of those im-
ages to be captured, more of that abuse to be suffered.68
63 R. at 1490.
64 United States v. Short, 77 M.J. 148, 151 (C.A.A.F. 2018).
65 Even if Appellant were correct that the sustained objection amounted to a denial
of Appellant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel, we would find the error was harm-
less beyond a reasonable doubt, since defense counsel