United States v. ADAME

This opinion is subject to administrative correction before final disposition. Before KORN, HARRELL, and STAMPFLI Appellate Military Judges _________________________ UNITED STATES Appellee v. Ian M. ADAME Lance Corporal (E-3), U.S. Marine Corps Appellant No. 202500102 _________________________ Decided: 2 September 2026 Appeal from the United States Navy-Marine Corps Trial Judiciary Military Judge: Ryan C. Lipton Sentence adjudged 21 October 2024 by a general court-martial tried at Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, consisting of officer and enlisted members. Sentence in the Entry of Judgment: reduction to E-1, confinement for five years, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and a dishonorable discharge. For Appellant: Mr. Kevin M. Courtney, Esq. Captain Katherine E. Malcolm, USMC For Appellee: Commander John T. Cole, JAGC, USN Lieutenant Erin H. Bourneuf, JAGC, USN  United States v. Adame, NMCCA No. 202500102 Opinion of the Court Senior Judge HARRELL delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Judge KORN and Judge STAMPFLI joined. _________________________ This opinion does not serve as binding precedent but may be cited as persuasive authority under NMCCA Rule of Appellate Procedure 30.2. _________________________ HARRELL, Senior Judge: A panel of officer and enlisted members convicted Appellant, contrary to his pleas, of one specification each of attempted rape by force, kidnapping, and aggravated assault by strangulation, in violation of Articles 80, 125, and 128, Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ).1 Appellant raises the following as- signments of error (AOE): I. Did the military judge err by admitting Lance Corporal (LCpl) Zulu’s2 written statement in violation of the holding in United States v. Finch?3 II. Was the finding of guilty to attempted rape by force legally and factually sufficient? III. Was the finding of guilty to kidnapping legally and factually sufficient? IV. Did the military judge err by denying the Defense challenge for cause of Major (Maj) Hotel?4 We find no prejudicial error, and we affirm the findings and sentence. 1 10 U.S.C. §§ 880, 925, 928. 2 All names in this opinion, other than those of Appellant, the judges, and counsel, are pseudonyms. 3 79 M.J. 389 (C.A.A.F. 2020). 4 Appellant raises a final AOE: Did the cumulative errors deny Appellant a fair trial? We have thoroughly considered this issue and find it to be without merit. See United States v. Matias, 25 M.J. 356, 363 (C.M.A. 1987) (“[W]e are aware of no require- ment of law that appellate courts in general or a court of military review in particular must articulate its reasoning on every issue raised by counsel.”). 2  United States v. Adame, NMCCA No. 202500102 Opinion of the Court I. BACKGROUND The relative post-curfew still of the student barracks was pierced by screams and cries for help. Marines and an Airman nearby assessed the situa- tion and mobilized. As LCpl Hall played a video game with a few others in his barracks room, he heard screaming coming from outside on the catwalk. He hushed the others in the room, Airman (AN) Papa and LCpl Lima, to listen intently. He heard more screaming, more distinctly this time, so he opened his door and saw a woman’s leg sticking out of the door of Appellant’s room, immediately next door to his. The leg kicked as it was pulled into the room, and the door slammed behind it. He told the others to go to the wall between the rooms to listen closely to figure out what was happening as he called LCpl Nunan, a Marine on duty at the barracks that evening. LCpl Nunan arrived in short order, and LCpl Hall told him to listen closely to the room next door. LCpl Nunan approached Appellant’s room, heard screaming from within, and knocked on the door, announcing himself as “Duty.”5 When he heard more screams and pleas for help from a familiar fe- male voice—that of LCpl November—he banged on the door with a closed fist and then tried to kick it open. He shook the door handle, felt someone on the other side doing the same, and he demanded, “Open up, open up.”6 LCpl No- vember responded, “I can’t. He won’t let me,”7 and “He’s not letting me open the door.”8 LCpl Nunan then ran off to retrieve a master key from the duty hut while LCpl Hall took over banging on Appellant’s door. The door eventually opened from the inside. It was dark, but LCpl Hall saw Appellant jumping into his bed and throwing the sheet over himself. He then looked down and saw LCpl November. She was naked, on her knees with her head down, and “she was very scared, hyperventilating.”9 He took off his shirt and helped her put it on as she was shaking and asking for help. He then helped her walk to her barracks room, five doors down the catwalk, by support- ing her weight as she cried, hyperventilated, and coughed. When they reached her room, she collapsed to the floor, crawled under her bed, and lay in the fetal position. As LCpl Hall was about to leave to see if more help was coming, 5 R. at 1595. 6 R. at 1595. 7 R. at 1693. 8 R. at 1595. 9 R. at 1696. 3  United States v. Adame, NMCCA No. 202500102 Opinion of the Court she asked me, “Don’t” -- “Don’t leave.” Like, “come here, come here, come here.” And that’s when I came back and I was, like, “What do you need? What do you need? Are you okay?” And she said, “Keep him away from me.” And that’s when I asked, “Who?” And she said, “Adame.”10 LCpl Hall then helped her into the bathroom, ensured she was locked within, and he left. AN Papa stayed near Appellant’s room with LCpl Lima as the situation unfolded, and he captured some of the bedlam on video. Upon hearing screams that sounded “like something from a horror movie,”11 AN Papa knew “some- thing serious”12 was happening, so he began video recording on his phone. One video captured LCpl Hall yelling, “Open the door,” and loud cries from LCpl November.13 A second video captured the cries trailing off as LCpl Hall ushered LCpl November away, followed by LCpl Lima and AN Papa looking inside Ap- pellant’s room from the doorway, displaying disarray within.14 The two saw Appellant and his roommate, Private First Class (PFC) Golf, in their beds, mo- tionless. They closed the door after that brief inspection. LCpl Nunan returned along with Sergeant (Sgt) Rho, also on duty. They encountered a shirtless LCpl Hall on the catwalk after he had left LCpl No- vember in her room, and he updated them. They heard LCpl November crying in her room, decided to leave her alone for the moment, and went to Appellant’s room. They banged on Appellant’s door for two to three minutes with no answer until they saw LCpl November’s roommate, LCpl Smith, down the catwalk. LCpl Smith had been in a friend’s room, heard crying coming from her room, and went towards her room to investigate. The duty personnel shifted focus from Appellant’s room and enlisted LCpl Smith’s assistance in coaxing LCpl November out of her bathroom. LCpl Smith went inside and saw LCpl Novem- ber in the fetal position in the bathroom, wearing only a shirt, crying. LCpl Smith asked what happened, and LCpl November 10 R. at 1700. 11 R. at 1274. 12 R. at 1274. 13 Pros. Ex. 2. 14 Pros. Ex. 3. 4  United States v. Adame, NMCCA No. 202500102 Opinion of the Court just kept telling me to get him out of the room. And I was, like, confused because there was nobody in the room. So I kept asking her who, and she just kept screaming at me, like, “Get him out. Get him out.” And then that’s when she said, “Get Adame out.”15 LCpl Smith told LCpl November to get dressed because the duty personnel wanted to talk to her. LCpl November put on sweatpants and emerged from the bathroom holding onto LCpl Smith for comfort. She was reluctant to speak to the duty personnel; LCpl Nunan described her as “overwhelmed about the situation, very distraught,”16 and “traumatized.”17 Upon prodding from Sgt Rho, she finally said, “It’s just a friend, he received the wrong message”18 and that “nothing happened.”19 The duty personnel then went back to Appellant’s room. This time, PFC Golf opened the door, and he appeared “very confused” and “dazed”20—he tes- tified at trial that he drank around 17 shots of alcohol that night before falling asleep, he was awoken later by duty personnel banging on the door, and he had no independent knowledge of what happened in between. The duty personnel saw a mess in the room and Appellant in his bed. Sergeant Rho asked PFC Golf to awaken Appellant, and PFC Golf nudged him several times. Appellant sat up, and when told to get out of bed, brought his knees up and fidgeted under the blanket. He emerged wearing jeans, and not the gray sweatpants several witnesses observed him wearing earlier that evening.21 The duty personnel took Appellant and PFC Golf to the duty hut, and an investigation ensued. Two days after the incident, a Sexual Assault Forensic Nurse Examiner photographed abrasions and contusions on Appellant and LCpl November, and she took swabs from both. Subsequent analysis identified LCpl November’s DNA on a penile swab of Appellant. At the outset of her testimony at trial, LCpl November acknowledged hav- ing gaps in her memory of the night of the incident. She testified that as she lay in her bed, Appellant, her friend and classmate, knocked on her door and 15 R. at 1322. 16 R. at 1605. 17 R. at 1606. 18 R. at 1605. 19 R. at 1673. 20 R. at 1607. 21 A Naval Criminal Investigative Service special agent later seized Appellant’s gray sweatpants from LCpl November’s room. 5  United States v. Adame, NMCCA No. 202500102 Opinion of the Court invited her to his room to play a card game. She agreed and went to his room where she played cards with Appellant and PFC Golf while they all took shots of alcohol. She remembered taking around five shots. At some point, PFC Golf left, and she did not remember him ever returning. When LCpl November got up to leave, Appellant “began to wrestle” her.22 He pinned her to the floor, she struggled to get free, and then he strangled her with both hands. She had difficulty breathing, but she did not lose conscious- ness. She managed to free herself and went toward the door, but he dragged her into his closet, pinned her to the floor, and strangled her again. She pleaded with him to stop. Appellant took off her pants (she was not wearing underwear) as she told him “to stop and I didn’t want this.”23 She testified that she believes she lost consciousness at that point. Her shirt and bra came off too; she did not remember when or how. Although she did not remember Appellant taking off his pants, she felt his bare skin as she tried to push his pelvis away. He was positioned between her legs, and she felt “him pressed against my vagina and him trying to insert [his penis].”24 As she continued pleading with him to stop, “He kept telling me I wanted it. [He k]ept saying, ‘You want this. You want this [November].’ ”25 She did not remember if “he was able to fully insert his penis inside of [her] vagina,” though she remembered that he “kept telling me it felt good and I was tight and that I want this.”26 She testified, “I remember fighting, pushing him away from me, and just looking at the wall. And I just remember pressure -- it was a lot of pressure in my head. That whole duration in the closet is just, like, clips, like, bits and parts.”27 To escape, she told him, “I’ll do something you like, but you need to get off of me so I could do it for you.”28 He agreed and got off her. Then, I went for the closet door and I went to reach for it, but he man- aged to pull me back. I pushed him off again, and I ran out the closet door towards the front door. And I managed to unlock it, 22 R. at 1851–52. 23 R. at 1856. 24 R. at 1869. 25 R. at 1857. 26 R. at 1857–58. 27 R. at 1859. 28 R. at 1860. 6  United States v. Adame, NMCCA No. 202500102 Opinion of the Court but he came from behind me and locked it again and began drag- ging me back towards the closet.29 She screamed as Appellant dragged her back into the closet. She used the same ploy to escape again: I told him I was sorry and that I would actually do what I was talking about, that I’d make him feel good, and just to -- just to get off me. And he fell for it again. And then that’s when I, again, ran out the closet, and I managed to open the door before he pulled me back. .... . . . [A]s he was dragging me back, I began screaming and trying to bang on the walls, on the floor.30 Help arrived. She heard a bang and someone say, “Open the door.”31 She “responded saying, ‘I couldn’t open the door,’ and ‘He wouldn’t let me.’ ”32 Ap- pellant tried to pull her back as she was “struggling with him to keep speaking towards the door to let them know that I couldn’t, personally, open the door and that there was someone preventing me from opening the door.”33 The bang- ing continued, and Appellant eventually “let me go, and I managed to open the door, kind of, just leaped forward and open the door.”34 LCpl Hall was at the door, and he “picked me up and he took off his shirt to put on me, and I remem- ber pulling it down and he led me to my room.”35 When asked at trial, “Why didn’t you want to tell [the duty personnel] what happened?” she responded, I didn’t want to talk to anybody. I think, at that point, I was just in a lot of shock and I couldn’t really process what just happened. 29 R. at 1859. 30 R. at 1860–65. 31 R. at 1866. 32 R. at 1866. 33 R. at 1866. 34 R. at 1866–67. 35 R. at 1867. 7  United States v. Adame, NMCCA No. 202500102 Opinion of the Court And I just wanted to be alone and I don’t want to talk about an- ything that happened. I didn’t want to be touched. I didn’t want to be questioned. I just wanted to be left alone.36 Members acquitted Appellant of forcibly raping LCpl November but con- victed him of attempting to do so. Members also convicted Appellant of kidnap- ping LCpl November and strangling her by placing his hands around her neck and squeezing.37 II. DISCUSSION A. Admission of LCpl Zulu’s prior consistent statement did not sub- stantially influence the findings. 1. Additional Background LCpl Zulu, with whom LCpl November was in a sexual relationship at the time of the incident, testified at trial, describing events from earlier in the evening. During his direct examination, he testified that he accepted Appel- lant’s invitation to play cards in Appellant’s room with Appellant, PFC Golf, and LCpl Smith. He did so for a while, but he left when he became uncomfort- able with Appellant continuing to pressure him to take shots of alcohol. Later that evening, after watching a show and playing video games in another room, he walked by LCpl November’s room and heard her scream, “No, get off of me,” and, “Adame, stop.”38 The door was closed, but not latched, so he pushed it open and saw Appellant on top of LCpl November in “a bear-crawl position.”39 They were perpendicular on LCpl November’s bed, both fully clothed. Then: A: I asked what was going on and if everything was okay. Q: And did Adame get off of [LCpl November]? A: He did not, sir. Q: What did you do then? A: I grabbed him by, like, his waist, rib-cage area, and pulled him off. 36 R. at 1863. 37 Members acquitted Appellant of one specification of sexual assault and a second specification of aggravated assault by strangulation. 38 R. at 1399. 39 R. at 1400. 8  United States v. Adame, NMCCA No. 202500102 Opinion of the Court Q: What happened next? A: Then, I asked what was going on. He said, “Every- thing’s all right.” So then, I basically just pushed him and told him to get out. Q: And when you pushed him and told him to get out, what did you do next? A: I closed the door behind him, sir. Q: Okay. So he left? A: Yes, sir. .... Q: When you closed the door, did you lock it? A: Yes, sir. I did. Q: What . . . happened next? A: I asked her if she was okay. And she was, kind of, shook up. Then, after a short period of time, I left. Q: Okay. When you say “shook up,” what do you mean? Can you . . . describe that? A: She was in shock. She had her hands on top of her head. Just basically being, like, “I don’t know what just hap- pened.” .... Q: What did she tell you? A: She was just shook up, her voice was, like, very shaky. She’s -- she’s just, like, I don’t know, like, Adame’s being aggressive and weird, sir. Q: Okay. And then, you stated that after a few minutes, you left the room? A: Yes, sir. .... Q: When you left the room after you had spoken to [LCpl November], is there any way for you to lock it from the outside when you close the door? 9  United States v. Adame, NMCCA No. 202500102 Opinion of the Court A: Unless I have a key, no. Which I didn’t at the time. 40 On cross-examination, defense counsel impeached LCpl Zulu with various prior inconsistent statements, highlighted his sexual relationship with LCpl November, and elicited the fact that he lied in his first interview with Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS) special agents, falsely claiming that he did not drink alcohol that evening. During redirect examination, the Government offered a handwritten and signed statement by LCpl Zulu as a prior consistent statement pursuant to Military Rule of Evidence (Mil. R. Evid.) 801(d)(1)(B)(ii). LCpl Zulu identified it as his written statement provided to NCIS special agents during his second interview. The military judge reviewed the statement, overruled a Defense ob- jection on hearsay grounds, admitted the entire statement into evidence, and permitted the Government to publish copies of it to the members. The statement, just over one page in length, leads off: I was in Adames room after he invited me to go play cards that’s when I saw the bottles of alcohol and made it aware that I did not want to drink and if I did it would be minimal and he said “Okay”. Then as the games continued . . . you could tell Adame was getting intoxicated and he was starting to get aggressive due to us not wanting to take shots with him because he was filling them to the rim. I got uncomfortable and left . . . .41 Later that night, as he walked toward his room, I heard roughhousing and [LCpl November] saying “Adame stop” and “get off of me” so I peeked my head into [LCpl Novem- ber]’s room . . . and saw Adame on top of her while she was strug- gling and I told him to get off but he didn’t listen so I pulled him off and started to push and shove him and he said “Relax man, lets just go play cards” and I agreed in order to get him out so when he was at the doorway I pushed him and locked the door and asked if she was alright and she said “Yeah but Adames be- ing weird and aggressive” so I stayed in her room for about 5 minutes total before leaving . . . .42 40 R. at 1401–08. 41 Pros. Ex. 19 at 1. 42 Pros. Ex. 19 at 1. 10  United States v. Adame, NMCCA No. 202500102 Opinion of the Court 2. Analysis Out-of-court statements offered to prove the truth of the matters asserted are generally inadmissible as hearsay.43 Prior consistent statements that meet certain requirements, however, are not hearsay: Statements that Are Not Hearsay. A statement that meets the following conditions is not hearsay: (1) A Declarant-Witness’ Prior Statement. The declarant tes- tifies and is subject to cross-examination about a prior state- ment, and the statement: .... (B) is consistent with the declarant’s testimony and is of- fered: (i) to rebut an express or implied charge that the de- clarant recently fabricated it or acted from a recent improper influence or motive in so testifying; or (ii) to rehabilitate the declarant’s credibility as a wit- ness when attacked on another ground[.]44 Although the military judge initially admitted LCpl Zulu’s written state- ment pursuant to Mil. R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(B)(i) and (ii), he later, upon reconsid- eration, limited it to (ii). Appellant argues that the military judge abused his discretion since admission of the statement did not fully comply with the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces’ (CAAF) five-part test in United States v. Finch.45 43 Mil. R. Evid. 801(c), 802. 44 Mil. R. Evid. 801(d). 45 79 M.J. at 396 (“[F]or a prior consistent statement to be admissible under M.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B)(ii), it must satisfy the following: (1) the declarant of the out-of-court state- ment must testify, (2) the declarant must be subject to cross-examination about the prior statement, (3) the statement must be consistent with the declarant’s testimony, (4) the declarant’s credibility as a witness must have been “attacked on another ground” other than the ones listed in M.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B)(i), and (5) the prior consistent statement must actually be relevant to rehabilitate the witness’s credibility on the ba- sis on which he or she was attacked. The proponent of the evidence bears the burden of articulating the relevancy link between the prior consistent statement and how it will rehabilitate the witness with respect to the particular type of impeachment that has occurred.”). Appellant concedes the first four and contests only the fifth. 11  United States v. Adame, NMCCA No. 202500102 Opinion of the Court “We review a military judge’s decision to admit evidence for an abuse of discretion.”46 However, just as in United States v. Ayala, “[b]ased on the record before us, it is not necessary to decide whether or not the military [judge] erred in admitting the exhibit[] at issue. Even if there was error, we conclude there is no prejudice.”47 We apply the following test: For preserved nonconstitutional evidentiary errors, the test for prejudice is whether the error had a substantial influence on the findings. . . . [I]n conducting its prejudice analysis, this Court weighs: (1) the strength of the Government’s case, (2) the strength of the defense case, (3) the materiality of the evidence in question, and (4) the quality of the evidence in question.48 The Government’s case was strong, consisting of probative and largely cor- roborative witness testimony and photographic, video, and forensic evidence. Though trial defense counsel provided effective, zealous representation, the Defense’s case was weak by comparison, focused principally on sowing doubt by raising specters of bias, witness collusion, and compromised forensic evi- dence, while promoting a narrative, less supported by the evidence, of LCpl November coming to her senses after succumbing to the effects of alcohol, re- alizing she was naked with someone other than her boyfriend, and “freak[ing] out.”49 “In examining [the materiality and quality of the evidence in question], we essentially are assessing how much the erroneously admitted evidence may have affected the court-martial.”50 We “consider[] the particular factual circum- stances of each case,” such as the extent to which the evidence contributed to the government’s case; the extent to which instructions to the panel may have mit- igated the error; the extent to which the government referred to the evidence in argument; and the extent to which the members could weigh the evidence using their own layperson knowledge.51 46 United States v. Norwood, 81 M.J. 12, 17 (C.A.A.F. 2021) (citing Finch, 79 M.J. at 394). 47 81 M.J. 25, 29 (C.A.A.F. 2021). 48 Finch, 79 M.J. at 398–99 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citations omitted). 49 R. at 1270, 2579. 50 United States v. Washington, 80 M.J. 106, 111 (C.A.A.F. 2020). 51 Id. (citations omitted). 12  United States v. Adame, NMCCA No. 202500102 Opinion of the Court LCpl Zulu’s prior statement “contributed little to the Government’s case.”52 This is evident primarily because its material substance—LCpl Zulu interven- ing and removing Appellant from LCpl November’s room after hearing her pro- tests—was already before the members. “The statement[], being consistent with trial testimony, [was] largely cumulative.”53 Since it “did not add substan- tially to what was already before the panel, it seems unlikely the evidence was significant in the minds of the members.”54 As in Ayala, LCpl Zulu’s prior state- ment was “not significant evidence” since it “repeated evidence that had come in through [LCpl Zulu]’s testimony and therefore would already have been con- sidered by the [members]. We do not consider that mere repetition of [his] story would color the [members’] decision and therefore have any substantial influ- ence on the findings.”55 Further, while the Government made a few references to the evidence provided by LCpl Zulu during its lengthy closing argument, it made no specific reference to anything provided only within his written state- ment. Accordingly, any error in admitting LCpl Zulu’s written statement as a prior inconsistent statement did not have a substantial influence on the find- ings. B. Appellant’s conviction for attempted rape by force is legally and factually sufficient. 1. Legal Sufficiency We consider the legal sufficiency of Appellant’s conviction for attempted rape by force according to the following framework: We review questions of legal sufficiency de novo. The test for le- gal sufficiency is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reason- able doubt. This legal sufficiency assessment draws every rea- 52 Id. 53 United States v. Brown, ___ M.J. ___, No. 25-0181, 2026 CAAF LEXIS 418, at *35 (C.A.A.F. May 12, 2026) (Ohlson, C.J., concurring in the judgment). 54 Id. 55 81 M.J. at 30. See also Finch, 79 M.J. at 400 (“[P]erhaps most importantly, inde- pendent evidence in the same vein as AH’s statement about sleepovers in the vide- otaped interview was admitted at the court-martial without defense objection.”). 13  United States v. Adame, NMCCA No. 202500102 Opinion of the Court sonable inference from the evidence of record in favor of the pros- ecution. As such, the standard for legal sufficiency involves a very low threshold to sustain a conviction.56 The Government charged Appellant with forcibly raping LCpl November in violation of Article 120, UCMJ, by “commit[ing] a sexual act upon [LCpl No- vember] by penetrating [LCpl November]’s vulva with Lance Corporal Adame’s penis, by using unlawful force.”57 The military judge instructed the members that if they acquitted Appellant of that offense, they should then consider the lesser offense of attempted forcible rape. Pursuant to Article 79, UCMJ, “An accused may be found guilty of . . . [a]n attempt to commit the offense charged.”58 Article 80, in turn provides, “An act, done with specific intent to commit an offense under [the UCMJ], amounting to more than mere preparation and tending, even though failing, to effect its commission, is an attempt to commit that offense.”59 The elements of an at- tempt in violation of Article 80 are: (1) That the accused did a certain overt act; (2) That the act was done with the specific intent to commit a certain offense under the UCMJ; (3) That the act amounted to more than mere preparation; and (4) That the act apparently tended to effect the commission of the intended offense.60 Appellant points to the laundry list of overt acts that the military judge identified from the testimony at trial and decided to include within his instruc- tions to the members, contesting that the Government proved them beyond a reasonable doubt. The military judge instructed the members that the first el- ement of the offense of attempted forcible rape is on board Marine Corps Air Station New River, on or about 26 November 2023, the accused did certain overt acts, that is, the accused forcibly held down [LCpl November] against her will, removed [LCpl November]’s pants, removed his own sweatpants, 56 United States v. King, 78 M.J. 218, 221 (C.A.A.F. 2019) (citation modified). 57 Charge Sheet. 58 Article 79(a), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 879(a). 59 Article 80(a), UCMJ. 60 Manual for Courts-Martial, United States (2023 ed.) [MCM (2023)], pt. IV, para. 4.b. at IV-4. 14  United States v. Adame, NMCCA No. 202500102 Opinion of the Court pressed his penis against [LCpl November]’s vagina without ac- tually penetrating [LCpl November]’s vagina, and physically tried to insert his penis inside of [LCpl November]’s vagina[.]61 Appellant goes through these overt acts one by one, arguing that the Gov- ernment failed to prove any of them, primarily due to LCpl November’s incon- clusive testimony. We disagree; viewing the evidence in the light most favora- ble to the prosecution, we conclude that a rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant committed these overt acts. Granted, LCpl November did not provide an entirely coherent narrative from start to finish of the ordeal that accounts in whole for other witnesses’ observations and physical evidence collected during the investigation. For ex- ample, based on other evidence presented at trial, her memory of where certain events took place—Appellant’s room or hers—may not have been accurate. The Government accounted for this in the presentation of its case, calling an expert in forensic neuropsychology,62 who, when asked, “In your opinion, would you expect to see an impact on someone’s memory if they consumed alcohol, lost consciousness repeatedly, and underwent a traumatic event?” responded, “Yes. I would expect to see some impact to their recall.”63 Even so, LCpl November testified with clarity and certainty on the crucial matters that the military judge identified as overt acts. She testified that Ap- pellant pinned her down as she struggled to get away. She testified that he removed her pants. She testified that, although she did not specifically remem- ber him removing his pants, she knew that he did because she felt the bare skin of his pelvis as she tried to push him away. And she testified that as he kneeled between her legs, “I could feel him pressed against my vagina and him trying to insert him”—a clear reference to his penis. This testimony, coupled with the DNA evidence, was sufficient evidence from which a rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant committed the overt acts. Appellant next argues that evidence of his specific intent to commit the offense of forcible rape was lacking. Again, we disagree. Most compelling in 61 R. at 2506. 62 The expert witness described neuropsychology as a “specialization area of clini- cal psychology that . . . provides additional specialized training in the brain, neuroan- atomy, and . . . the result of impacts and insults to the brain, cognitive functioning, things like attention, memory, and how to diagnose and treat those conditions.” R. at 2007–08. 63 R. at 2020. 15  United States v. Adame, NMCCA No. 202500102 Opinion of the Court this respect is LCpl November’s testimony that after Appellant removed her pants and as she struggled and pleaded, “He kept telling me I wanted it. [He k]ept saying, ‘You want this. You want this [November].’ . . . [He j]ust kept telling me it felt good and I was tight and that I want this.”64 The Government also introduced circumstantial evidence of Appellant’s sexual intent. When the chaos of the evening subdued, LCpl Smith discovered on her phone—which she had left charging in her room most of the evening while she was elsewhere—photographs taken by Appellant of him holding his exposed erect penis. The military judge admitted the photographs over Defense objection, ruling, [T]he evidence tends to support the narrative that the accused, while alone with the victim, pulled down his pants, exposed his penis, and photographed his penis, all mere moments before the alleged sexual act with the victim began. This is highly probative because it makes it more likely that the accused had sexual de- sires involving the victim in the moments leading up to [the] al- leged sexual acts.65 A rational trier of fact could have viewed the evidence in precisely that manner, and when viewed in conjunction with other evidence, such as LCpl Zulu’s testimony that he forcibly removed Appellant from LCpl November’s room upon hearing her protests, it paints a scene that Appellant was deter- mined to act upon that sexual desire over any obstacle. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we conclude that a rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant specifically intended to forcibly rape LCpl November. Concluding the same for the remain- ing elements, Appellant’s conviction for attempted forcible rape is legally suf- ficient. 2. Factual Sufficiency We “may consider whether [a finding of guilty] is correct in fact upon re- quest of the accused if the accused makes a specific showing of a deficiency in proof.”66 “After an accused has made such a showing, [we] may weigh the evi- dence and determine controverted questions of fact subject to . . . appropriate deference to the fact that the trial court saw and heard the witnesses and other 64 R. at 1857–58. 65 App. Ex. LXI at 4. 66 Article 66(d)(1)(B)(i), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 866(d)(1)(B)(i). 16  United States v. Adame, NMCCA No. 202500102 Opinion of the Court evidence.”67 “If, as a result of [such] review . . ., [we are] clearly convinced that the finding of guilty was against the weight of the evidence, [we] may dismiss, set aside, or modify the finding, or affirm a lesser finding.”68 Appellant has made a specific showing of a deficiency in proof regarding “(1) the absence of competent proof of specific intent to commit rape by force; and (2) the lack of credible evidence that the alleged overt acts—particularly removal of clothing and attempted insertion of his penis into her vulva—oc- curred as charged.”69 We have accordingly weighed the evidence subject to ap- propriate deference to the fact that the trial court saw and heard the witnesses and other evidence, and we are not clearly convinced that the finding of guilty was against the weight of the evidence. C. Appellant’s conviction for kidnapping is legally and factually suffi- cient. Article 125, Kidnapping, provides, “Any person subject to this chapter who wrongfully—(1) seizes, confines, inveigles, decoys, or carries away another per- son; and (2) holds the other person against that person’s will; shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.”70 The Government charged Appellant with vio- lating this punitive article in the following manner: In that Lance Corporal Ian M. Adame, U.S. Marine Corps, on Active Duty, did, on board Marine Corps Air Station New River, on or about 26 November 2023, wrongfully seize and hold [LCpl November], a person not a minor, against her will.71 As charged, the elements of this offense are: (1) That on or about 26 November 2023, on board Marine Corps Air Station New River, Appellant seized LCpl November, a per- son not a minor; (2) That Appellant then held LCpl November against her will; and (3) That Appellant did so wrongfully.72 67 Article 66(d)(1)(B)(ii), UCMJ. 68 Article 66(d)(1)(B)(iii), UCMJ. 69 Appellant’s Brief at 18. 70 10 U.S.C. § 925. 71 Charge sheet. 72 MCM (2023), pt. IV, para. 74.b. at IV-115. 17  United States v. Adame, NMCCA No. 202500102 Opinion of the Court The President has defined most of the relevant terms for this offense. “ ‘Held’ means detained. The holding must be more than a momentary or inci- dental detention.”73 “ ‘Against that person’s will’ means that the victim was held involuntarily. The involuntary nature of the detention may result from force . . . .”74 And, “ ‘Wrongfully’ means without justification or excuse.”75 “Seize,” in the context of kidnapping, is undefined in the statute or Manual for Courts-Martial, so we arrive upon the ordinary meaning,76 “To forcibly take possession (of a person or property).”77 Other than generally disputing the sufficiency of the evidence for the kid- napping conviction, Appellant contends that the Government argued an un- charged “carry away” theory of kidnapping at trial. True, the Government’s view of the evidence included movement of LCpl November by Appellant be- tween seizing and holding her,78 but the Government nevertheless proved what it charged: A