Full Opinion

10/27/2026 DA 25-0460 Case Number: DA 25-0460 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 2026 MT 256N CITY OF GREAT FALLS, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. APRIL LEE ELLIS, Defendant and Appellant. APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eighth Judicial District, In and For the County of Cascade, Cause No. CDC-23-869 Honorable John A. Kutzman, Presiding Judge COUNSEL OF RECORD: For Appellant: April Ellis, Self-Represented, Belt, Montana For Appellee: Austin Knudsen, Montana Attorney General, Christine Hutchison, Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana Joshua Racki, Cascade County Attorney, Great Falls, Montana Submitted on Briefs: July 1, 2026 Decided: October 27, 2026 Filed: __________________________________________ Clerk Justice James Jeremiah Shea delivered the Opinion of the Court. ¶1 Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court Internal Operating Rules, this case is decided by memorandum opinion, shall not be cited and does not serve as precedent. Its case title, cause number, and disposition shall be included in this Court’s quarterly list of noncitable cases published in the Pacific Reporter and Montana Reports. ¶2 April Ellis (Ellis) appeals her conviction in Great Falls Municipal Court, affirmed by the Eighth Judicial District Court, Cascade County, on charges of obstructing a peace officer in violation of § 45-7-302, MCA. Ellis argues that the Municipal Court erred by denying her motion to suppress on the grounds that the police officer who stopped her lacked particularized suspicion; that the judge who presided over her trial was biased and should have disqualified herself; that the Municipal Court erred by denying her challenge of a prospective juror for cause; and that the Municipal Court’s cumulative errors require reversal. ¶3 On June 5, 2023, Officer Frank Torres (Torres) was driving east on 3rd Avenue South in Great Falls. Torres testified that as he approached the intersection of 3rd Avenue South and 7th Street South, Torres observed Ellis driving north on 7th Street South at a speed that did not appear to be slowing. Torres pressed on his brakes to avoid a potential crash. Ellis realized she did not have the right-of-way and came to a stop at the intersection, which is regulated by a yield sign. Ellis made an apologetic hand gesture towards Torres as he continued through the intersection. After he passed through the intersection, Ellis entered it and continued driving north. Torres made a turn, activated his lights, and initiated a traffic stop. When Torres approached Ellis’s vehicle, her window was rolled up and her 2 doors were locked. Ellis refused to identify herself and would not show any driver’s license or proof of insurance to Torres. Ellis then asked for Torres’s supervisor. When his supervisor arrived, Ellis was placed under arrest. According to her testimony, Ellis did not verbally identify herself but told the supervising officer that her “I.D.” was in the front seat of the vehicle. ¶4 Ellis was charged with careless driving and obstructing a peace officer.1 Ellis filed a pretrial motion she captioned “Motion to Suppress and Dismiss and Defendant’s Brief in Support.” The gravamen of Ellis’s motion was that Torres lacked “the requisite level of objective data necessary to effectuate an investigatory stop” because “Ellis lawfully yielded the right of way to Torres’s vehicle as required.” Ellis argued that “[a]ccordingly, the traffic stop of Ms. Ellis was unconstitutional, unlawful, and all evidence gathered therefrom should be suppressed as ‘fruit of the poisonous tree’ pursuant to federal law.” The Municipal Court denied Ellis’s motion. ¶5 Trial was held in Great Falls Municipal Court on October 26, 2023, with Pro Tempore Judge Ashley Wilkinson (Judge Wilkinson) presiding. At the October 23, 2023 jury confirmation hearing, Ellis’s attorneys learned that Judge Wilkinson would be presiding over the jury trial. Prior to the commencement of proceedings on the morning of trial, Ellis requested that Judge Wilkinson disqualify herself. The basis for Ellis’s request was a civil lawsuit that involved Judge Wilkinson’s mother2 in which the opposing 1 Ellis was originally cited for three additional offenses that the City dismissed before trial. 2 Judge Wilkinson was originally a party to the lawsuit as well but had been dismissed for lack of standing. 3 party was represented by The Practice of Law, P.L.L.C. (The Practice)—the same law firm that was now representing Ellis. Although the lawsuit had been settled, The Practice’s client in that case still owed some payments to Judge Wilkinson’s mother, pursuant to the settlement. Relying on M. C. Jud. Cond., Rule 2.12, Ellis argued that Judge Wilkinson should disqualify herself from cases involving The Practice’s clients. Ellis’s attorney conceded that none of the specific subsections of Rule 2.12 applied in this instance, but he argued that the request fell under the general “judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned” catchall provision. Judge Wilkinson denied the request that she disqualify herself. ¶6 Ellis’s attorneys did not seek Judge Wilkinson’s removal pursuant to the procedures set forth in §§ 3-1-803 or -805, MCA, even though fifteen months earlier in a case involving a different client—City of Great Falls v. Culver, TK-22-85—the same attorneys had attempted to get Judge Wilkinson to disqualify herself pursuant to Rule 2.12 on the same grounds. Judge Wilkinson advised them at that time that “the better course of action” would be for them to file a motion seeking her disqualification for cause in accordance with § 3-1-805, MCA. Judge Wilkinson stated that the motion would be handled by the district court and “that then will determine all future cases . . . [and] make[] this very clear going forward.” The Practice’s attorneys were granted a continuance in Culver to file a disqualification motion pursuant to § 3-1-805, MCA, but never did; therefore, the matter remained unresolved when they raised this issue again in Ellis’s case. ¶7 During voir dire, Ellis questioned a potential juror, Christopher McGregor, who stated that he knew Torres, and that they had been “acquaintances” for about eight years. 4 McGregor stated that he had been to a barbeque at Torres’s home, had been on river floats with Torres, had professional interactions with him through emergency work,3 and had a personal friendship with Torres’s former wife. Ellis asked McGregor if he was “likely to weigh [Torres’s] testimony as pretty credible,” to which McGregor responded, “I would like to think I can.” Ellis asked McGregor if “regardless of the law or facts, [he]’d give more credibility to Torres’s testimony,” to which McGregor responded that “[b]ecause I’ve known him and I know him as an individual, I would give him credibility, yes.” ¶8 After Ellis challenged McGregor for cause, the prosecution questioned him. The prosecutor asked McGregor whether he could “set the relationship aside and just listen to the facts as he testified,” to which McGregor responded, “Yes.” McGregor then clarified that, due to their familiarity, he was likely to find Torres to be truthful, but he would not be biased in weighing the credibility of all the evidence as a whole. The prosecutor then asked, “Do you feel that you’re biased because of you know him?” McGregor replied, “I don’t believe so, no.” ¶9 Ellis examined McGregor again, after which she repeated her challenge for cause, which Judge Wilkinson denied. Ellis used one of her peremptory challenges to excuse McGregor and exhausted her peremptory challenges. ¶10 The jury found Ellis guilty of obstructing a peace officer and not guilty of careless driving. The Eighth Judicial District Court affirmed Ellis’s conviction. 3 McGregor was an emergency department nurse. 5 ¶11 We review cases that originate in municipal court and have been appealed to district court “as if the appeal had originally been filed in this Court and apply the appropriate standard of review.” City of Billings v. Barth, 2017 MT 56, ¶ 7, 387 Mont. 32, 390 P.3d 951. ¶12 We review a trial court’s findings of fact on a motion to suppress to determine “whether the lower court’s findings of fact are clearly erroneous and whether [the lower court] correctly applied the controlling law to those facts.” State v. Harning, 2022 MT 61, ¶ 13, 408 Mont. 140, 507 P.3d 145 (citation omitted). “A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if it is not supported by substantial evidence, if the trial court misapprehended the effect of the evidence, or if this Court has a firm and definite conviction that the trial court committed a mistake.” Harning, ¶ 13 (citation omitted). ¶13 We review issues of judicial disqualification de novo, conducting an “objective examination of the circumstances surrounding” the request for judicial disqualification. In re Estate of Boland, 2019 MT 236, ¶ 19, 397 Mont. 319, 450 P.3d 849 (citations omitted). ¶14 We review the denial of a for-cause challenge for abuse of discretion. State v. Heath, 2004 MT 58, ¶ 7, 320 Mont. 211, 89 P.3d 947 (citation omitted). “[A] court abuses its discretion if it fails to excuse a prospective juror whose actual bias is discovered during voir dire.” Heath, ¶ 7 (citation omitted). ¶15 “We will reverse a conviction under the cumulative error doctrine only if the accumulated errors prejudiced the defendant’s right to a fair trial.” State v. Novak, 2005 MT 294, ¶ 15, 329 Mont. 309, 124 P.3d 182 (citation omitted). 6 ¶16 Ellis did not appeal the Municipal Court’s denial of her motion to suppress to the District Court.4 We do not address issues raised for the first time on appeal. State v. Taylor, 2010 MT 94, ¶ 12, 356 Mont. 167, 231 P.3d 79. “[T]he failure to raise an appealable issue, whether preserved in the trial court or not, on intermediate appeal from a lower court of record generally constitutes an implied waiver of the issue for ultimate appeal to this Court.” City of Bozeman v. McCarthy, 2019 MT 209, ¶ 32, 397 Mont. 134, 447 P.3d 1048 (citations omitted). Although waiver by failure to raise an issue on intermediate appeal does not preclude plain error review on ultimate appeal here, State v. Akers, 2017 MT 311, ¶ 20, 389 Mont. 531, 408 P.3d 142, we will exercise plain error review only “sparingly, on a case-by-case basis.” McCarthy, ¶ 32 (quoting State v. Earl, 2003 MT 158, ¶ 25, 316 Mont. 263, 71 P.3d 1201). Ellis has not requested plain error review of this issue and our review of the record does not indicate that plain error review is warranted. We therefore decline to consider Ellis’s argument that the Municipal Court erred by denying her motion to suppress. ¶17 Ellis argues that Judge Wilkinson erred by declining to disqualify herself after Ellis raised the issue of apparent bias on the morning of trial. Although Ellis’s attorney conceded there was no specific provision that required Judge Wilkinson to disqualify herself, he relied upon the general provision of M. C. Jud. Cond., Rule 2.12(A) that her “impartiality might be reasonably questioned” as the basis for the request. 4 Although Ellis’s Notice of Appeal to District Court, filed October 31, 2023, referenced the Order Denying the Defendant’s Motion to Suppress, her appellate brief to the District Court addressed only two issues: (1) Judge Wilkinson’s recusal, and (2) the denial of Ellis’s for-cause challenge of potential juror McGregor. 7 ¶18 In Estate of Boland, ¶¶ 35-36, we held: Section 3-1-805, MCA, . . . is the method by which a party may seek disqualification of a judge because of a belief by the party that the judge is biased and partial and the party will not have its case heard by a fair and impartial tribunal. The affidavit requirement serves the important purpose of ensuring that the party does, in fact, harbor a belief and reason which substantiates that the judge cannot be fair and impartial. Section 3-1-805, MCA, requires that the party “file an affidavit alleging facts . . . .” . . . [T]he procedure set forth in § 3-1-805, MCA, protects both significant and weighty interests by ensuring that a party’s belief the tribunal is biased is resolved before a different judge and, in the absence of disqualification, that the presiding judge continue with the proceeding. A court’s adherence to § 3-1-805, MCA, ensures there are no warrantless delays and that the issue of an impartial tribunal is clearly and effectively addressed. (Emphasis in original.) When The Practice’s attorneys raised the same issue of bias before Judge Wilkinson fifteen months earlier, she specifically advised them to file a motion seeking her disqualification for cause in accordance with § 3-1-805, MCA, so that the motion could be addressed by the district court and “that then will determine all future cases [and] make[] this very clear going forward.” For whatever reason, The Practice’s attorneys opted not to follow that course of action, but chose instead to request Judge Wilkinson to disqualify herself pursuant to Rule 2.12, just as they had done in the Culver case. Judge Wilkinson reviewed all the factual bases upon which Ellis asserted that her impartiality might reasonably be questioned and she determined that she was not required to disqualify herself. The crux of Ellis’s argument is that Judge Wilkinson’s impartiality may be reasonably questioned. However, as noted by the District Court, it is unclear exactly why Ellis believes Judge Wilkinson’s impartiality would be reasonably questioned 8 toward her. First, the alleged appearance of bias rests on a lawsuit that has been fully adjudicated and has no connection whatsoever to Ellis’s case. Second, while there may have been unfavorable rulings to Ellis, Judge Wilkinson’s rulings do not constitute impartiality or the appearance thereof.5 Having reviewed the record,6 we determine Judge Wilkinson did not err be refusing to disqualify herself. ¶19 Ellis argues that the Municipal Court abused its discretion when it rejected her for-cause challenge to potential juror McGregor. Section 46-16-115(2)(j), MCA, provides that a party may bring a for-cause challenge against a juror if he has “a state of mind in reference to the case or to either of the parties that would prevent the juror from acting with impartiality and without prejudice to the substantial rights of either party.” Section 46-16-115(2)(j), MCA. Courts should “err on the side of caution” when determining whether to remove a juror for cause, but a court is “not required to remove a juror who ‘expresses concern about impartiality but believes he can fairly weigh the evidence.’” Anderson, ¶ 15 (quoting State v. Normandy, 2008 MT 437, ¶ 22, 347 Mont. 505, 198 P.3d 396). ¶20 Ellis cites to State v. Block, which states that “[i]f a defendant subsequently uses a peremptory challenge to strike a prospective juror who was challenged for cause, and 5 When asserting a challenge against a judge’s impartiality, a defendant cannot base their claim purely on a judge’s adverse ruling. State v. Strang, 2017 MT 217, 388 Mont. 428, 401 P.3d 690 (citing Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555, 114 S. Ct. 1147, 1157 (1994) (“[J]udicial rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias or partiality motion.”)). 6 Ellis also argues that there are certain statements that Judge Wilkinson made which evince a bias against her attorneys. Our review of the record includes those statements. 9 ultimately exhausts all afforded peremptory challenges, ‘the erroneous denial of a challenge of a prospective juror for cause is a structural error requiring automatic reversal.’” State v. Block, 2019 MT 180, ¶ 7, 396 Mont. 478, 448 P.3d 505 (quoting State v. Johnson, 2019 MT 68, ¶ 7, 395 Mont. 169, 437 P.3d 147). Ellis argues that she is entitled to reversal because her for-cause challenge was denied, she was required to use a peremptory challenge to remove McGregor, and she exhausted all three peremptory challenges. ¶21 Ellis’s for-cause challenge against McGregor was based on: (1) McGregor’s recreational outings with Torres; (2) McGregor’s professional interactions with Torres through McGregor’s work as an emergency department nurse; (3) McGregor’s personal friendship with Torres’s former wife; and (4) McGregor’s and Torres’ eight-year acquaintance. It is understandable that Ellis was wary of McGregor’s familiarity with Torres, and it is entirely possible that another judge, acting in his or her discretion, may have granted Ellis’s challenge for cause. But we cannot conclude that Judge Wilkinson abused her discretion by denying Ellis’s challenge to McGregor when Torres candidly and forthrightly addressed his personal interactions with Torres but ultimately asserted that he could remain impartial and weigh the evidence fairly, despite these personal interactions. ¶22 Finally, Ellis asserts that she is entitled to reversal under the cumulative error doctrine. “The cumulative error doctrine mandates reversal of a conviction where multiple errors, when taken together, have prejudiced the defendant’s right to a fair trial.” State v. Smith, 2020 MT 304, ¶ 16, 402 Mont. 206, 476 P.3d 1178 (internal citations omitted). It is the burden of the defendant to establish that “multiple errors [] collectively prejudice[d] 10 his due process rights.” State v. Marfuta, 2024 MT 245, ¶ 21, 418 Mont. 353, 557 P.3d 1260 (citation omitted). In order to reverse under the cumulative error doctrine, the accumulated errors must have prejudiced the defendant’s right to a fair trial. State v. Novak, 2005 MT 294, ¶ 15, 329 Mont. 309, 124 P.3d 182 (citation omitted). Having rejected Ellis’s individual assignments of error, they cannot collectively form a basis for reversal under the cumulative error doctrine. ¶23 We have determined to decide this case pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c) of our Internal Operating Rules, which provides for memorandum opinions. This appeal presents no constitutional issues, no issues of first impression, and does not establish new precedent or modify existing precedent. Ellis’s conviction of obstructing a peace officer is affirmed. /S/ JAMES JEREMIAH SHEA We Concur: /S/ LAURIE McKINNON /S/ KATHERINE M. BIDEGARAY /S/ BETH BAKER /S/ JIM RICE 11