Full Opinion

11/10/2026 DA 24-0569 Case Number: DA 24-0569 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 2026 MT 273N STATE OF MONTANA, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. JUSTIN ALAN BOISCLAIRE, Defendant and Appellant. APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, In and For the County of Missoula, Cause No. DC-23-396 Honorable Robert L. Deschamps III, Presiding Judge COUNSEL OF RECORD: For Appellant: Penelope S. Strong, Attorney at Law, Billings, Montana For Appellee: Austin Knudsen, Montana Attorney General, Thad Tudor, Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana Matthew C. Jennings, Missoula County Attorney, Missoula, Montana Submitted on Briefs: April 29, 2026 Decided: November 10, 2026 Filed: __________________________________________ Clerk Justice Laurie McKinnon delivered the Opinion of the Court. ¶1 Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court Internal Operating Rules, this case is decided by memorandum opinion and shall not be cited and does not serve as precedent. Its case title, cause number, and disposition shall be included in this Court’s quarterly list of noncitable cases published in the Pacific Reporter and Montana Reports. Having reviewed the briefs and the record on appeal, we conclude that the Appellant has not met his burden of persuasion. ¶2 On July 5, 2023, the State charged Justin Boisclaire (Appellant) with one count of assault with a weapon and one count of partner or family member assault, 1st offense. The State amended the Information on March 21, 2024, to include a charge of violation of an order of protection. The State amended again, at trial, on March 28, 2024, to change the charge of violating an order of protection to a charge of violating a no contact order. ¶3 After voir dire, the District Court asked the clerk to administer the second oath. The clerk accidentally re-administered the oath for voir dire. The following was their verbatim exchange: Court: I’m gonna [sic] have all of you folks stand and raise your right hand. I’ll ask the clerk to administer the second oath. (Whereupon, the jury has been impaneled and sworn.) Court: That’s the wrong oath. Clerk: What’s that? Court: You read the one about the voir dire. They’re not answering any questions. She should be asking you— Clerk: I can do the other— 2 Court: —do swear that you’ll well and truly try the case and arrive at a verdict according to the evidence so help you God? Jurors: (Affirmative answer.) ¶4 Appellant did not object to the oath or ask that additional language be included to the oath. The jury returned guilty verdicts on all counts. ¶5 Appellant argues that the oath the District Court administered impaired his due process right to a jury trial because it was not a verbatim recitation of § 25-7-207, MCA, setting forth the oath requirement, and thus the fairness and impartiality of his trial was compromised. Appellant concedes that plain error review is the only standard of review available because he did not otherwise preserve the issue presented for appeal. ¶6 “The failure to preserve an assertion of error by contemporaneous objection generally waives the right to subsequent appellate review.” State v. Trujillo, 2020 MT 128, ¶ 6, 400 Mont. 124, 464 P.3d 72. “As a narrow exception to the waiver rule, we may, in our discretion, review an unpreserved objection if it implicates a fundamental constitutional right and plain error review is necessary to avoid a manifest miscarriage of justice, leaving an unsettled question regarding the fundamental fairness of the proceeding, or otherwise compromising the integrity of the judicial process.” Trujillo, ¶ 6 (internal citations omitted). “We thus exercise plain error review only under extraordinary circumstances.” Trujillo, ¶ 6 (internal citations omitted). ¶7 The right to a jury trial is fundamental and expressly provided for in our constitution. Mont. Const. art. II, § 26. Appellant properly enunciated the fundamental right he alleges is implicated in his appeal. However, Appellant failed to convince us that review is 3 “necessary to prevent a manifest miscarriage of justice or that failure to review the claim may leave unsettled the question of fundamental fairness of the proceedings or may compromise the integrity of the judicial process.” State v. George, 2020 MT 56, ¶ 5, 399 Mont. 173, 459 P.3d 854. Unlike the cases Appellant relies on—which involve an unsworn jury or improperly summoned jury—here, the jury was properly compiled, and they took an oath administered by the District Court. ¶8 Section 25-7-207, MCA, titled “Oath of the Jury,” does not require a verbatim oath. Instead, § 25-7-207, MCA, requires “an oath” which “in substance” communicates to the jury that they are swearing “that they and each of them will well and truly try the matter in issue between . . . , the plaintiff, and . . . , the defendant, and render a true verdict according to the evidence.” Section 25-7-207, MCA. Here, the jurors swore to “well and truly try the case and arrive at a verdict according to the evidence.” Considering the record before us, the oath substantively complied with the requirements of § 25-7-207, MCA. We therefore decline to exercise plain error review. ¶9 We have determined to decide this case pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c) of our Internal Operating Rules, which provides for memorandum opinions. In the opinion of the Court, the case presents a question controlled by settled law or by the clear application of applicable standards of review. ¶10 Affirmed. /S/ LAURIE McKINNON 4 We Concur: /S/ CORY J. SWANSON /S/ INGRID GUSTAFSON /S/ BETH BAKER /S/ KATHERINE M. BIDEGARAY 5