Full Opinion

10/27/2026 DA 24-0072 Case Number: DA 24-0072 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 2026 MT 253 STATE OF MONTANA, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. TYLER FREDERICK ERICKSON, Defendant and Appellant. APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Twentieth Judicial District, In and For the County of Lake, Cause No. DC 21-335 Honorable Deborah Kim Christopher, Presiding Judge COUNSEL OF RECORD: For Appellant: Tammy A. Hinderman, Appellate Defender Division Administrator, Jeavon C. Lang, Assistant Appellate Defender, Helena, Montana For Appellee: Austin Knudsen, Montana Attorney General, Thad Tudor, Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana James Lapotka, Lake County Attorney, Benjamin R. Anciaux, Deputy County Attorney, Polson, Montana Submitted on Briefs: August 19, 2026 Decided: October 27, 2026 Filed: __________________________________________ Clerk Justice Beth Baker delivered the Opinion of the Court. ¶1 Tyler Frederick Erickson appeals his Lake County convictions of Criminal Mischief and Threats and Other Improper Influence in Official and Political Matters. He argues that he is entitled to enforcement by specific performance of an amended plea agreement and that he was denied due process because the Twentieth Judicial District Court did not preserve a recording of his sentencing hearing. We restate the issues on appeal: 1. Did Erickson waive his right to appeal adverse pre-plea rulings by entering into an open guilty plea? 2. Was Erickson denied due process because the District Court did not preserve a recording of his sentencing hearing? We affirm in part and remand for resentencing. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND ¶2 As discussed more fully below, the record in this case is incomplete. After Erickson filed his notice of appeal, it was discovered that the audio transcript files from six hearings before the District Court are missing or indiscernible. The available portion of the District Court record contains the following facts. On December 1, 2021, Erickson appeared in the Lake County Courthouse in a matter predating the present case. During that proceeding, he flipped over a table, damaged a speaker, and broke the screen of a television. Officers removed Erickson from the courtroom and placed him in a holding cell at the Lake County Jail. Erickson freed himself of his “belly chain” and used it to shatter a glass panel in the cell door. He also struck two security cameras, breaking one, and threatened to harm detention officers. On December 10, 2021, Erickson was charged with one count of 2 Criminal Mischief and one count of Threats and Other Improper Influence in Official and Political Matters. ¶3 On March 6, 2023, Erickson and the State negotiated a plea agreement and presented it to the District Court. The District Court rejected the agreement after it found an insufficient factual basis for the plea. The parties renegotiated and amended the agreement and presented it to the District Court later that same day. The agreement called for Erickson to plead to an amended count of Intimidation and for the State to make a non-binding recommendation for a ten-year sentence. The court rejected the amended plea agreement after the State indicated the agreement inadvertently misrepresented Erickson’s status as a repeat Persistent Felony Offender (PFO). The State withdrew its objection to the amended plea agreement on April 3, 2023. The minute entry from an omnibus hearing on April 27, 2023, states that the District Court indicated that the parties had not reached a plea agreement. No transcript is available from this hearing. A minute entry from the May 4, 2023 omnibus hearing indicates that the parties discussed with the District Court an amended plea agreement and that the court rejected the agreement. No transcript is available from this hearing. On June 8, 2023, Erickson entered an open plea of guilty to both offenses as charged.1 ¶4 In its written judgment, the District Court sentenced Erickson to a total of sixty years at the Montana State Prison: two consecutive sentences of thirty years with no time 1 An open plea means “there [is] no plea agreement between the parties and the State [makes] no promises to [a defendant] regarding sentencing recommendations.” State v. Killam, 2005 MT 255, ¶ 5, 329 Mont. 5, 122 P.3d 439. 3 suspended. It restricted Erickson’s eligibility for parole on each count for twenty years. No transcript of the sentencing hearing is available. An unofficial, partial transcript of what may have been the sentencing hearing was attached to the back of the presentence investigation report (PSI), but the origin and accuracy of this document are unknown. STANDARD OF REVIEW ¶5 “Whether a defendant has waived a claim by pleading guilty is a legal determination which this Court reviews for correctness.” State v. Westfall, 2024 MT 99, ¶ 13, 416 Mont. 366, 548 P.3d 400. “Alleged violations of due process also involve questions of constitutional law over which we exercise plenary review.” State v. Charlie, 2010 MT 195, ¶ 21, 357 Mont. 355, 239 P.3d 934. ¶6 “[O]missions from the verbatim transcript do not mandate a reversal if a suitable alternative method of reporting trial proceedings is provided . . . .” State v. Deschon, 2004 MT 32, ¶ 16, 320 Mont. 1, 85 P.3d 756 (Deschon II). This Court determines de novo as a matter of law whether such reporting “is of sufficient completeness to accord effective appellate review . . . .” State v. Caswell, 2013 MT 39, ¶ 13, 369 Mont. 70, 295 P.3d 1063. We also review de novo whether the failure to record a proceeding amounts to a substantial and significant omission warranting reversal. Caswell, ¶ 13. DISCUSSION ¶7 Issue 1: Did Erickson waive his right to appeal adverse pre-plea rulings by entering into an open guilty plea? ¶8 Erickson argues that the State breached the amended plea agreement when it objected to the clause mischaracterizing Erickson as a repeat PFO, leading to the District 4 Court’s rejection of the plea. He requests that this Court remand for specific performance of the amended plea agreement. The State responds that Erickson waived this argument because he entered into an open guilty plea before the District Court without reserving the right to appeal any adverse pretrial rulings. The transcript from the June 8, 2023 hearing at which Erickson pleaded guilty is available, and this issue is therefore unaffected by the incomplete record. ¶9 “Montana’s long standing jurisprudence holds that where a defendant voluntarily and knowingly pleads guilty to an offense, the plea constitutes a waiver of all non-jurisdictional defects, including claims of constitutional rights violations which occurred prior to the plea.” State v. Carnes, 2024 MT 101, ¶ 10, 416 Mont. 389, 548 P.3d 415 (internal quotation marks omitted; citations omitted). A defendant may, however, “[w]ith the approval of the court and the consent of the prosecutor,” reserve the right to appeal the “adverse determination of any specified pretrial motion.” Section 46-12-204(3), MCA. As a result, a defendant who pleads guilty may attack only whether the plea was voluntary and intelligent and any adverse pretrial rulings that the defendant specifically reserved the right to appeal. Carnes, ¶ 10. ¶10 Here, nothing in the record indicates that Erickson specifically reserved the right to appeal any adverse pre-plea rulings. Rather, Erickson pleaded “open”—he had no agreement with the State regarding the terms of the plea or the forthcoming sentencing. The June 8, 2023 hearing initially was scheduled to address a motion Erickson filed before requesting legal representation. At the commencement of the hearing, Erickson’s counsel indicated that instead of addressing his motion, Erickson wished to enter into an open guilty 5 plea. The District Court stressed that it would not accept a plea unless it was an open plea and the court retained discretion over sentencing. Erickson’s counsel responded that Erickson’s decision to plead guilty: has been fully vetted and fully discussed over and over again with Tyler, and myself, and [Erickson’s counsel in another matter] . . . [W]e have totally gone over this matter and Tyler understands his rights . . . Tyler knows what he’s doing. He also realizes that the maximum penalty that can be applied to him because of this open plea is as a Persistent Felony Offender. During the ensuing plea colloquy, the District Court misstated the mandatory minimum for the offenses charged, and Erickson interrupted the court to—correctly—clarify the mandatory minimum and confirm that it depended on whether the incidents in the courtroom and the jail were considered part of the same transaction. ¶11 The record of Erickson’s plea hearing demonstrates that he proceeded with no plea agreement, the State never consented to a reservation of rights in connection with the plea, the District Court never approved such a reservation, and Erickson made the voluntary2 choice to plead guilty to the originally charged offenses without either raising the claim he makes now about prosecutorial breach or specifically reserving his right to appeal adverse pre-plea rulings for this Court’s review. 2 The District Court found that Erickson entered voluntarily into the open guilty plea. Erickson briefly argues on appeal that his plea was involuntary to the extent it was made without reservation—not because he was coerced or influenced—but because he did not expressly state his intent to waive his right to appeal the pre-plea rulings related to the amended plea agreement. “The right to appeal from an adverse pre-plea ruling is waived unless it is specifically reserved.” State v. Spreadbury, 2011 MT 176, ¶ 11, 361 Mont. 253, 257 P.3d 392. 6 ¶12 Issue 2: Was Erickson denied due process because the District Court did not preserve a recording of his sentencing hearing? ¶13 Erickson next argues that his due process rights were violated because the District Court did not preserve a transcript of his sentencing hearing. In doing so, he advances six theories of why the missing transcript causes prejudice and amounts to a due process violation. The State responds that Erickson’s theories about the missing transcript are not tenable. ¶14 This Court uses the two-pronged test from Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226, 227, 92 S. Ct. 431, 434 (1971), to determine whether a district court’s failure to record a portion of a criminal proceeding amounts to a violation of the defendant’s due process rights. Caswell, ¶ 18. We consider: “‘(1) the value of the transcript to the defendant in connection with the appeal or trial for which it is sought, and (2) the availability of alternative devices that would fulfill the same functions as a transcript.’” Caswell, ¶ 18 (quoting State v. Deschon, 2002 MT 16, ¶ 26, 308 Mont. 175, 40 P.3d 391 (Deschon I) (quoting Britt, 404 U.S. at 227, 92 S. Ct. at 434)). Although this Court’s prior cases involve primarily the lack of trial transcripts rather than sentencing hearing transcripts, “[d]ue process rights under the Montana and United States Constitutions apply at sentencing hearings.” State v. McCoy, 2021 MT 303, ¶ 39, 406 Mont. 375, 498 P.3d 1266. We therefore apply the Britt test to the present case. ¶15 Under the first prong, a defendant must show prejudice by “identify[ing] a ‘tenable theory as to what the recording error might have involved.’” Caswell, ¶ 19 (quoting Deschon I, ¶ 28). In Caswell, fifteen to twenty minutes of the trial transcript containing a 7 portion of the State’s case-in-chief was not recorded.3 Caswell, ¶ 11. Caswell appealed the trial court’s admission of statements made during the unrecorded portion of the trial. Caswell, ¶ 20. This Court held that Caswell presented a tenable theory of prejudice because the unrecorded portion was directly related to the issue on appeal. Caswell, ¶ 20; see also Madera v. Risley, 885 F.2d 646, 648 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that a tenable theory exists when a defendant requires a transcript to determine whether there exists an appealable issue). ¶16 Erickson presents six theories of prejudice from the missing sentencing hearing transcript. One of these theories is that he requires the transcript to ensure that the written judgment conforms with the oral pronouncement of sentence. Because we find this theory dispositive, we do not reach Erickson’s other theories. ¶17 “[T]he sentence orally pronounced from the bench in the presence of the defendant is the legally effective sentence and valid, final judgment.” State v. Lane, 1998 MT 76, ¶ 40, 288 Mont. 286, 957 P.2d 9. “[T]he written judgment and commitment will serve as evidence of the sentence orally pronounced.” Lane, ¶ 40. Reversible error exists where a district court enters a written judgment that does not conform with the oral pronouncement of sentence. See State v. Arvidson, 2025 MT 200, ¶ 27, 424 Mont. 46, 575 P.3d 949. 3 In this case, the sentencing hearing initially was recorded, but the court reporter who prepared the transcripts for appeal certified that the audio file contained “no discernable audio,” preventing her from transcribing it. Many of this Court’s prior applications of the Britt test involved situations where no recording was ever created. See Deschon I, ¶ 11; Caswell, ¶ 11. This circumstantial distinction is immaterial, as the record is unavailable for review in either case. 8 ¶18 The State points to a document attached to the PSI that it purports appears to be a partial, unofficial version of a transcript from the sentencing hearing. It uses this document to argue that the oral pronouncement of sentence is consistent with the written judgment. We cannot rely on this document. This Court may rely only on official transcripts certified by the court reporter and complying with M. R. App. P. 8(4)4—and this document does not. Further, the origin, accuracy, and reliability of this document are particularly unclear given that no discernible recording of the sentencing hearing existed to create a transcript for this appeal. ¶19 The State also points to the minute entry from the sentencing hearing and the written judgment, arguing that these documents together show that the written judgment is consistent with the oral pronouncement. Erickson argues that the minute entry supports his theory that the transcript is required to determine whether the written judgment conforms to the oral pronouncement of sentence.5 ¶20 Although the written judgment acts as evidence of the oral pronouncement, the oral pronouncement is the legally effective sentence and final judgement, and the written judgment cannot, therefore, replace the oral pronouncement where, as here, no recording exists. The minute entry also is not a replacement for the recording and transcript. Here, 4 “A transcript shall contain a title page, index pages listing witnesses and exhibits, as applicable, the body of the transcript, and a page certifying in writing–and executed by the court reporter–that the transcript is a true and correct verbatim record of the proceeding transcribed. . . .” M. R. App. P. 8(4)(a). 5 This Court has in the past considered district court minutes to determine what occurred in a hearing. See Puccinelli v. Puccinelli, 2012 MT 46, ¶ 7 n.1, 364 Mont. 235, 272 P.3d 117. But the minutes are not an official record of proceedings and do not substitute for the official record. See Griz One Firefighting v. State, 2020 MT 285, ¶ 9 n.2, 402 Mont. 115, 475 P.3d 739. 9 the minute entry does raise questions regarding what occurred in the sentencing hearing when examined alongside the written judgment. The written judgment imposes parole restrictions on Erickson that are not reflected in the minute entry. Because no transcript of the oral pronouncement exists, Erickson cannot compare the transcript with the written judgment to determine whether this potential inconsistency presents a meritorious appealable issue. Like in Caswell and Madera, Erickson’s ability to meaningfully determine whether appealable issues exist, as well as his right to bring such an appeal, if warranted, is thwarted by the missing transcript. Based on the foregoing, we conclude that Erickson has presented a tenable theory under Britt. ¶21 Under the second prong of the Britt test, we consider “the availability of alternative devices that would fulfill the same functions as a transcript.” Caswell, ¶ 18. The device need not be “a verbatim account” of a proceeding. Deschon II, ¶ 29. But it must present “a ‘fair and accurate picture’ of what occurred,” and it must be “of sufficient completeness to afford effective appellate review.” Caswell, ¶ 23 (quoting Deschon II, ¶ 29). ¶22 Under M. R. App. P. 8(7), a reconstructed record agreed upon by the parties and adopted by the district court may function as an adequate alternative device when a transcript of a proceeding is not available. See Caswell, ¶ 22. No reconstructed record exists in this case. As explained above, the written judgment cannot alone stand in the place of an oral pronouncement of sentence where no recording of the oral pronouncement exists. The minute entry and written judgment, read together, do not offer a “fair and accurate picture” of what occurred in the sentencing hearing—if anything, they raise questions about what occurred. Nor do these documents afford effective appellate review. 10 The missing transcript essentially prevents Erickson from determining the existence of appealable issues related to sentencing. It also prevents this Court from reviewing his sentence. See State v. Pehringer, 2026 MT 115, ¶ 8, 428 Mont. 230, 590 P.3d 424 (“We review criminal sentences for legality.”). We therefore hold that Erickson has satisfied the second prong of the Britt test. The court’s failure to preserve a recording of his sentencing hearing denied Erickson due process of law. ¶23 The absence of a verbatim transcript mandates reversal where no “suitable alternative method” is available. Deschon II, ¶ 16; see also Kills On Top v. State, 2000 MT 340, ¶ 67, 303 Mont. 164, 15 P.3d 422 (It may be appropriate to remand for resentencing when a defendant’s due process rights were violated during sentencing). We also have remanded for resentencing when it is necessary to comply with notions of fundamental fairness. See Bauer v. State, 1999 MT 185, ¶ 30, 295 Mont. 306, 983 P.2d 955. Here, the absence of a recording and certified transcript from the sentencing hearing, alongside the lack of a suitable alternative device, is a substantial and significant omission. As explained under Issue One, Erickson entered into an open guilty plea without reserving his right to appeal any adverse pre-plea rulings. We do not disturb that plea. Due process and fundamental fairness, however, require that we remand for resentencing.6 CONCLUSION ¶24 Based on the foregoing, we affirm the District Court’s acceptance of Erickson’s guilty plea and remand for resentencing. 6 The District Judge originally presiding over this case is no longer in office. As such, a new District Court judge will preside over Erickson’s resentencing. 11 /S/ BETH BAKER We Concur: /S/ CORY J. SWANSON /S/ LAURIE McKINNON /S/ INGRID GUSTAFSON /S/ JIM RICE 12