Full Opinion

11/04/2026 DA 24-0059 Case Number: DA 24-0059 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 2026 MT 263 STATE OF MONTANA, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. VIDAL X NOTAFRAID, JR., Defendant and Appellant. APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District, In and For the County of Yellowstone, Cause No. DC 21-0418 Honorable Jessica T. Fehr, Presiding Judge COUNSEL OF RECORD: For Appellant: Nicholas T. Hine, Hine Law PLLC, Brooklyn, New York For Appellee: Austin Knudsen, Montana Attorney General, Selene Koepke, Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana Scott D. Twito, Yellowstone County Attorney, Billings, Montana Submitted on Briefs: May 27, 2026 Decided: November 4, 2026 Filed: __________________________________________ Clerk Justice Laurie McKinnon delivered the Opinion of the Court. ¶1 Defendant and Appellant Vidal X. Notafraid, Jr. (Notafraid) appeals from the July 28, 2023 Order Denying Defendant’s Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea issued by the Thirteenth Judicial District Court, Yellowstone County. ¶2 We decide here whether the District Court erred in finding that Notafraid lacked good cause to withdraw his guilty plea. On appeal, Notafraid contends there was good cause for him to withdraw his plea because his plea was not made knowingly, voluntarily, or intelligently; he has a credible claim of innocence; and the district court judge who took his plea failed to disqualify himself after serving as an attorney for the State earlier in the proceedings. Because the disqualification issue is dispositive, we do not address Notafraid’s other arguments. ¶3 We reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND ¶4 On March 24, 2021, Notafraid was arrested for deliberate homicide and charged two days later. Notafraid was released on bond but failed to attend a hearing requiring his appearance and was taken into custody. A hearing was held on May 3, 2021, to determine whether his pretrial release should be revoked. At the hearing, then-Deputy County Attorney Brett Linneweber appeared on the State’s behalf for the revocation/release hearing. Notafraid’s counsel requested a continuance, and the State had no objection. The sitting judge agreed and the hearing was rescheduled. ¶5 After Notafraid’s private counsel withdrew from his case, he was assigned contract counsel through the Office of State Public Defender. Notafraid apparently exhibited a 2 pattern of distrust and noncommunication with his attorneys, with whom he disagreed about case strategy. Despite his insistence that he would not accept a plea agreement, Notafraid’s attorneys continued to negotiate one with the State. Eventually, they would reach a global plea agreement in which Notafraid would plead guilty to mitigated deliberate homicide in exchange for a binding sentence recommendation and the dismissal of other, unrelated charges. Notafraid remained adamant that he would not accept the plea agreement. However, the night before the final pretrial conference, he called his attorney and stated that he would now accept it. A change of plea hearing was set for July 13, 2022. ¶6 On December 31, 2021, the Honorable Gregory Todd, who had been presiding over Notafraid’s cases, retired. Judge Linneweber was appointed to the bench and assigned Notafraid’s cases. Notafraid’s counsel had previously raised with the District Court the issue of a possible conflict of interest due to Judge Linneweber’s earlier role in the case as deputy county attorney. However, at the change of plea hearing, after researching the matter and consulting with colleagues, Judge Linneweber determined he was involved in the case only minimally, could not recall any details of the case, and that the matter that was in controversy was a revocation which did not go to the substance of the case. Thus, he decided not to recuse. Notafraid indicated that he did not have further concerns at that time, and Judge Linneweber subsequently accepted Notafraid’s guilty plea. ¶7 While Notafraid did not challenge Judge Linneweber’s failure to recuse himself further at the July 2022 change of plea hearing, he did not drop the issue. On February 3, 2023, Notafraid moved for the disqualification of Judge Linneweber or, in the alternative, for the issue to be referred to this Court. The District Court ordered the issue referred to 3 this Court; however, shortly after referring the matter, Judge Linneweber recused himself and the case was assigned to a different judge. This Court then denied the motion for disqualification as moot. ¶8 On April 10, 2023, Notafraid filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea on the asserted grounds that his initial plea was not made knowingly and voluntarily and that additional exculpatory evidence had been discovered. Among other arguments, Notafraid claimed that the colloquy was insufficient, that previous counsel had failed to sufficiently investigate his justified use of force defense, and that he was pressured into accepting the plea agreement. Notafraid did not raise the disqualification issue as a basis for withdrawing his plea. The District Court denied the motion, finding that nothing in the record indicated Notafraid had difficulty understanding the conditions of the plea agreement or what he was doing, and that the additional evidence would have been known to Notafraid’s attorneys prior to the guilty plea if Notafraid had cooperated and shared the information fully and timely. Notafraid now appeals the denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. STANDARD OF REVIEW ¶9 Under plain error review, this Court may review errors not objected to at trial. State v. George, 2020 MT 56, ¶ 4, 399 Mont. 173, 459 P.3d 854. Plain error review may occur under § 46-20-701(2), MCA, or as a matter of discretion under this Court’s inherent common law powers. State v. Finley, 276 Mont. 126, 133-34, 915 P.2d 208, 212-13 (1995). Plain error review is used sparingly and only in situations that implicate a manifest miscarriage of justice, leave unsettled the question of the fundamental fairness of the proceedings, or compromise the integrity of the judicial process. State v. Main, 2011 MT 4 123, ¶ 53, 360 Mont. 470, 255 P.3d 1240. The initial burden on a defendant seeking plain error review is to demonstrate that there was an error at trial. State v. Mitchell, 2012 MT 227, ¶ 13, 366 Mont. 379, 286 P.3d 1196. ¶10 When reviewing a District Court’s denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea, “we will review the findings of fact of the trial court to determine if they are clearly erroneous, and conclusions of law to determine if they are correct.” State v. Warclub, 2005 MT 149, ¶24, 327 Mont. 352, 114 P.3d 254. When the question of appropriateness of a judge’s failure to recuse themselves comes before this Court, we review a judge’s disqualification decision de novo, determining whether the lower court’s decision not to recuse was correct as a matter of law. State v. Dunsmore, 2015 MT 108, ¶ 10, 378 Mont. 514, 347 P.3d 1220. DISCUSSION ¶11 Preliminarily, we must address whether the issue of Judge Linneweber’s recusal is properly before us. “A party may not raise new arguments or change its legal theory on appeal, because it is fundamentally unfair to fault the trial court for failing to rule on an issue it was never given the opportunity to consider.” State v. Adgerson, 2003 MT 284, ¶ 12, 318 Mont. 22, 78 P.3d 850. The State argues that Notafraid failed to preserve the issue of recusal for appeal, both generally and on the more specific grounds that Notafraid “did not raise Judge Linneweber’s position on the bench as good cause for his plea to be withdrawn.” Furthermore, the State contends that the issue of recusal must have been specifically raised in the context of good cause to withdraw a plea for it to have been properly preserved. 5 ¶12 Our review of the record demonstrates Notafraid raised the issue prior to his appeal, both before the July 2022 hearing at which he changed his plea to guilty, and in the February 2023 motion to disqualify Judge Linneweber. Thus, Notafraid brought the issue to the District Court’s attention, and the court considered and made clear its position on the issue. Further, Judge Linneweber raised his potential conflict before any other proceedings took place and explained his rationale for not recusing from the case. However, Notafraid did not later raise the disqualification issue as a basis for establishing good cause to withdraw his guilty plea. He argued that his plea was not voluntary and that he was actually innocent, but he neglected to argue that Judge Linneweber’s failure to recuse himself established good cause to withdraw his plea. Accordingly, the disqualification issue was not preserved as a basis for the court to find good cause for Notafraid to withdraw his plea, and review of the disqualification issue is therefore only appropriate under the plain error doctrine. ¶13 The purpose of the plain error doctrine is to correct an error not objected to at trial that affects the “fairness, integrity, and public reputation of judicial proceedings.” State v. Lawrence, 2016 MT 346, ¶ 9, 386 Mont. 86, 358 P.3d 968 (quoting Finley, 276 Mont. at 134, 915 P.2d at 213). The plain error doctrine may be used “in situations that implicate a defendant’s fundamental constitutional rights,” and where “failing to review the alleged error may result in a manifest miscarriage of justice, leave unsettled the question of the fundamental fairness of the proceedings, or compromise the integrity of the judicial process.” State v. McDonald, 2013 MT 97, ¶ 8, 369 Mont. 483, 299 P.3d 799. 6 ¶14 We first must determine whether Notafraid’s fundamental constitutional rights were implicated when Judge Linneweber presided over these proceedings and accepted his guilty plea. The United States and Montana constitutions provide that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. U.S. Const. amend. XIV; Mont. Const. art. II, § 4. Because a defendant who enters a guilty plea waives several of his constitutional rights, that plea becomes void if it is made in violation of due process. McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466, 89 S. Ct. 1166, 1171 (1969); Bullman v. State, 2014 MT 78, ¶ 14, 374 Mont. 323, 321 P.3d 121; Dunsmore, ¶ 11. “A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process. Fairness of course requires an absence of actual bias in the trial of cases.” In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136, 75 S. Ct. 623, 625 (1955); Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co, Inc., 556 U.S. 868, 876, 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2259 (2009); Bullman, ¶ 14; Dunsmore, ¶ 11. “[A]n unconstitutional potential for bias exists when the same person serves as both accuser and adjudicator in a case.” Williams v. Pennsylvania, 579 U.S. 1, 8, 136 S. Ct. 1899, 1905 (2016). We conclude that Notafraid’s fundamental right to due process was implicated by the disqualification issue. ¶15 We next consider whether there was error. Section 3-1-803(3), MCA, provides that a judge “must not sit or act in any action or proceeding . . . [w]hen he has been attorney or counsel in the action or proceeding for any party[.]” Although § 3-1-803(3), MCA, is a codified Court rule rather than a legislatively-initiated statute, the first step is to examine the plain language of the writing and, if the language is clear and unambiguous, we may not proceed to apply any other means of interpretation. In re Marriage of Markegard, 2006 MT 111, ¶ 18, 322 Mont. 187, 136 P.3d 532. The plain language of § 3-1-803(3), 7 MCA, is mandatory––a judge “must” not preside in an action in which he was counsel for any party. ¶16 Rule 2.12(A)(5)(a) of the Code of Judicial Conduct follows § 3-1-803(3), MCA. It provides that a judge “shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including but not limited to the following circumstances . . . [t]he judge served as a lawyer in the matter in controversy[.]” “Controversy” does not refer to an issue of substance within the proceeding; rather, it refers to the case or proceeding itself. The principle underlying both Rule 2.12(A)(5)(a) and § 3-1-803(3), MCA, is that the integrity of the trial and due process is undermined when the same person serves as both an accuser and an adjudicator in the same case. The principle is not conditioned upon what issue is being considered. Here, we must conclude Notafraid’s due process rights were violated when Judge Linneweber failed to recuse himself from the case. It is “axiomatic that a fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process.” Dunsmore, ¶ 11. We turn now to the issue of good cause. ¶17 Notafraid asserts on appeal that the failure of Judge Linneweber to recuse himself establishes good cause for him to withdraw his plea. Section 46-16-105(2), MCA, provides that “the court may, for good cause shown, permit the plea of guilty or nolo contendere to be withdrawn and a plea of not guilty substituted.” Good cause must include the minimum constitutional standard of voluntariness, but may include other factors beyond this. State v. Lone Elk, 2005 MT 56, ¶¶ 17, 19, 326 Mont. 214, 108 P.3d 500. When examining “whether the district court erred in denying a defendant’s motion to withdraw a plea, we may examine ‘case-specific considerations’” to determine the existence of good cause. 8 State v. Muhammad, 2005 MT 234, ¶ 14, 328 Mont. 397, 121 P.3d 521. Rule 2.12(A)(5)(a) and § 3-1-803(3), MCA, mandate that the orders of a judge who is disqualified from hearing or deciding the matter must not be upheld. Here, the failure of Judge Linneweber to recuse himself resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice, left unsettled the question of the fundamental fairness of the proceedings, and compromised the integrity of the judicial process. Accordingly, we invoke the plain error doctrine and conclude good cause exists for Notafraid to withdraw his plea. Although Judge Linneweber may not have represented the State in each case that was part of the plea, the plea represented a global resolution which included the case Judge Linneweber appeared in on behalf of the State. ¶18 The State argues harmless error because Notafraid “admits that the change of plea colloquy was ‘comprehensive’ and concedes that Judge Linneweber adequately advised Notafraid of his rights,” and “the ultimate decision of whether Notafraid could withdraw his guilty plea was left to a different judge[.]” This Court, however, has previously reversed the orders of judges on the sole grounds that the judge that issued the order was required by the Code of Judicial Conduct to recuse themselves. Bullman, ¶ 17; In re B.W.S., 2014 MT 198, ¶¶ 17, 19, 376 Mont. 43, 330 P.3d 467; Draggin’ Y Cattle Company, Inc. v. Junkermier, 2017 MT 125, ¶¶ 37-40, 387 Mont. 430, 395 P.3d 497. We conclude good cause exists for Notafraid to withdraw his guilty plea where the judge taking the plea was disqualified by statute and rules of judicial conduct. CONCLUSION ¶19 Pursuant to plain error review, we conclude that it was error effecting Notafraid’s fundamental right to due process for Judge Linneweber not to recuse himself from these 9 proceedings. The instant due process violation, although unrelated to the voluntariness of his plea, constitutes good cause for Notafraid to withdraw his plea. We emphasize that there is absolutely nothing in the record to indicate any wrongdoing or unethical conduct on the part of Judge Linneweber and that his appearance on behalf of the State was brief. However, the statute and principles of due process mandate disqualification; they are not conditional in any of their requirements. The integrity of judicial proceedings mandates that the same person cannot both accuse and judge in the same case. ¶20 Reversed and remanded. /S/ LAURIE McKINNON We Concur: /S/ CORY J. SWANSON /S/ JAMES JEREMIAH SHEA /S/ INGRID GUSTAFSON /S/ JIM RICE 10