Full Opinion

11/17/2026 DA 25-0202 Case Number: DA 25-0202 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 2026 MT 276 STATE OF MONTANA, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. CARLOS QUINTANA CLOSE, Defendant and Appellant. APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, In and For the County of Mineral, Cause No. DC-2019-12 Honorable Jason Marks, Presiding Judge COUNSEL OF RECORD: For Appellant: Britt Cotter, Cotter Law Office, P.C., Polson, Montana For Appellee: Austin Knudsen, Montana Attorney General, Jeff Sealey, Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana Debra Ann Jackson, Mineral County Attorney, Superior, Montana Submitted on Briefs: September 16, 2026 Decided: November 17, 2026 Filed: __________________________________________ Clerk Justice Ingrid Gustafson delivered the Opinion of the Court. ¶1 Appellant Carlos Quintana Close (Close) appeals from the District Court’s Judgment on Revocation entered on January 15, 2025. We reverse and remand for dismissal without prejudice. ¶2 We restate the issue on appeal as follows: Whether the District Court correctly interpreted and applied § 46-18-203(4), MCA (2023),1 in denying Close’s Motion to Dismiss. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND ¶3 On September 25, 2019, Close plead guilty to a felony DUI, criminal endangerment, and theft, and misdemeanor assault for an incident occurring in Mineral County. He was sentenced as follows: 13 months Department of Corrections (DOC), followed by 3 years of probation on the DUI; 10 years DOC, with 5 of those years suspended, on the criminal endangerment; 3 years DOC on the felony theft; and 6 months jail on the misdemeanor assault, with all sentences running concurrent to each other. Close was first released on April 30, 2024, and directed to report to probation and parole in Billings. Thereafter, Close failed to contact his probation officer and to complete other conditions of his probation. He was taken into custody in relation to these asserted violations on May 6, 2024, but was released due to probation and parole failing to timely file the probation violation report. Thereafter, additional violations were asserted and Close was arrested in Great Falls on July 3, 2024, on adult probation and parole (APP) field warrants for both a case out of 1 The 2023 version of the statute applies to this case. Unless otherwise stated, all other references to § 46-18-203, MCA, in this opinion are to the 2023 version. 2 Butte-Silver Bow County—presumably erroneously, as that felony theft sentence had already been discharged in 2018—and the case out of Mineral County. ¶4 On July 5, 2024, Close made an appearance on the field warrants in both cases in Cascade County where he requested he be appointed a public defender and bail was set at $20,000. No additional charges were brought in Cascade County. Close did not post bail and remained in custody in Cascade County. On July 9, 2024, Close’s probation officer filed a report of the probation violations, which listed Close’s present address as Cascade County Detention Center. The Mineral County Attorney’s office filed a Petition to Revoke Suspended Sentence, together with the report of violation, in the Mineral County case on July 11, 2024, and the State issued an arrest warrant the same day. ¶5 The Cascade County Sheriff’s Office served the warrant on Close on October 28, 2024, at the jail in Cascade County where he was still in custody. The Office of the State Public Defender entered appearance on October 30, 2024, as counsel for Close. Close was then transported to Mineral County and made his initial appearance on the petition to revoke on November 6, 2024—127 days after his arrest on July 3, 2024. In that hearing, the District Court explained, “So this is your initial appearance on a Petition to Revoke[,]” advised Close of his rights on a petition to revoke, and formally appointed the Office of Public Defender to represent him. ¶6 On November 20, 2024, Close filed a Motion to Dismiss, asserting dismissal was required as he was not brought before a court on the petition for revocation within 60 days of arrest as required by § 46-18-203(4), MCA. The December 13, 2024 evidentiary hearing shows neither party could figure out what exactly happened in Cascade County to delay 3 service of the arrest warrant issued July 11, 2024, and Mineral County asserted they were not notified and therefore did not know Close was in custody in Cascade County. The District Court denied Close’s Motion to Dismiss in a subsequent December 24, 2024 evidentiary hearing. ¶7 At a hearing on January 8, 2025, Close admitted to the probation violations but objected to imposition of a disposition and maintained the revocation matter should be dismissed based on violation of § 46-18-203(4), MCA. The District Court did not revisit its denial of his motion to dismiss, accepted his admissions, revoked his prior suspended sentence in the Mineral County cause, and imposed a 5-year DOC commitment in disposition of the revocation petition. STANDARD OF REVIEW ¶8 Interpretation and construction of a statute is a matter of law. “We review de novo whether the district court interpreted and applied the statute correctly.” State v. West, 2008 MT 338, ¶ 13, 346 Mont. 244, 194 P.3d 683. Mixed questions of fact and law are reviewed de novo, as while factual conclusions are reviewed for clear error, whether factual circumstances satisfy the applicable legal standard is reviewed de novo. A.C.I. Constr., LLC v. Elevated Prop. Invs., LLC, 2021 MT 246, ¶ 11, 405 Mont. 456, 495 P.3d 1054. Whether an initial appearance is sufficient to satisfy the requirements of § 46-18-203(4), MCA, is a question of statutory construction reviewed for correctness. State v. Larson, 2023 MT 236, ¶ 7, 414 Mont. 200, 539 P.3d 655. “A court’s ruling on a motion to dismiss in a criminal case also presents a question of law that we review to determine if the district court’s conclusion of law is correct.” Larson, ¶ 7. 4 DISCUSSION ¶9 Whether the District Court correctly interpreted and applied § 46-18-203(4), MCA (2023), in denying Close’s Motion to Dismiss. ¶10 Close argues the 127-day delay between his arrest and his initial appearance on the petition to revoke on November 6, 2024, violated his statutory rights set forth in § 46-18-203(4), MCA, and also deprived him of his due process rights. The State argues that the July 5, 2024 and November 6, 2024 hearings together satisfied the requirements of § 46-18-203(4), MCA, on its face, and, in the alternative under Larson, the July 5, 2024 hearing satisfied the due process requirements of an initial appearance for a probation violation. We hold the 127-day delay between Close’s arrest and his initial appearance on the Petition for Revocation on November 6, 2025, violated § 46-18-203(4), MCA, requiring dismissal of the revocation petition without prejudice, and therefore we do not need to address Close’s due process claim. ¶11 A probation officer who suspects a probationer has violated his probation may arrest the probationer without a warrant and authorize a detention facility to hold the probationer without bail for up to 72 hours. Section 46-23-1012(2)-(3), MCA. Within those 72 hours of detention, the probation officer must either authorize the probationer’s release, hold an intervention hearing, or “arrange for the probationer to appear before a magistrate to set bail.” Section 46-23-1012(3), MCA. If the probationer is detained and bond is set, the probation officer has 10 days to file a report of violation, and then the court may proceed with probation revocation under § 46-18-203, MCA. Section 46-23-1012(4)-(5), MCA. 5 ¶12 Section 46-18-203, MCA, in pertinent part, states, (4) Without unnecessary delay and no more than 60 days after arrest, the offender must be brought before the judge, and at least 10 days prior to the hearing the offender must be advised of: (a) the allegations of the petition; (b) the opportunity to appear and to present evidence in the offender’s own behalf; (c) the opportunity to question adverse witnesses; and (d) the right to be represented by counsel at the revocation hearing pursuant to Title 46, chapter 8, part 1. Section 46-18-203(4), MCA (2023). ¶13 The record reflects Close’s July 5, 2024 appearance was on the APP field warrants and the November 6, 2024 hearing was Close’s initial appearance on the actual petition to revoke. Close’s probation officer had evidence of multiple probation violations between May 1 and late June 2024; Close was arrested on July 3, 2024, on the APP field warrants; and then a hearing was held within 72 hours where bail was set—the July 5, 2024 hearing. The orders issued upon that appearance indicate it was for the APP hold. In the Order Upon Initial Appearance dated July 5, 2024, the District Court Judge checked the box for initial appearance, crossed out “Warrant,” and instead wrote beside it, “APP Order,” and described the hearing as being for “Probation Violation.”2 ¶14 In its December 24, 2024 update, the State contends that because the Order reflects that both the probation officer and the court were aware of Close’s alleged probation violations, Close necessarily was informed on July 5 of the allegations later included in the 2 Close technically appeared in both the Butte-Silver Bow and Mineral County cases—although erroneously for the Butte-Silver Bow case as that sentence had expired—and the District Court Judge did this on the order forms for both cases. 6 revocation petition and of the rights associated with those allegations, despite the fact that no revocation petition had yet been filed. This assumes facts not in evidence. While the July 5 Order reflects some rights were read to Close and he requested an attorney, it does not reflect whether Close was appointed an attorney, and the record does not contain a transcript of the hearing, minute entry for it, nor the “back page” to the Order that contained the rights purportedly read to Close that day. This Court can only determine on this record that on July 5, 2024, Close appeared to set bail on the APP hold. ¶15 Over the following week, Close’s probation officer filed his report of probation violations, the Mineral County Attorney’s office filed the petition to revoke, and the State issued an arrest warrant, thus moving the case into the proceeding requirements contained in § 46-18-203(4), MCA. The District Court reasoned in the December 13, 2024 hearing that the petition to revoke need not be filed for the initial appearance within 60 days under § 46-18-203(4), MCA, to be satisfied. This is an incorrect interpretation and application of the statute. Close could not have initially appeared on the petition to revoke before it was filed. The language of § 46-23-1012(5), MCA—“[a]fter the probation and parole officer files a report of violation, the court may proceed with revocation of probation in the manner provided in 46-18-203”—establishes Close could not have satisfied the purposes behind a prompt initial appearance required by § 46-18-203(4), MCA, before the report of violation and petition were filed. The report of violation was not filed until July 9, 2024, and the petition to revoke was not filed until July 11, 2024—six days after the July 5, 2024 hearing that the State argues and the District Court found served as an initial appearance on the revocation petition. Close could not have made an initial appearance prior to 7 July 11, 2024, when the petition to revoke was filed. The first time Close appeared in front of a judge after the petition to revoke was filed was on November 6, 2024—well past 60 days after his arrest. November 6, 2024, was the first date on which Close was advised of the filed petition to revoke, he was advised of his rights under the petition, the public defender’s office was formally appointed to represent him with regard to the petition, and a hearing on the petition was scheduled for 12 days later. ¶16 The District Court in the December 13, 2024 hearing was originally concerned with identifying if due process requirements under Larson were satisfied in the July 5, 2024 hearing and therefore requested the State file a transcript of the July 5 hearing, amongst other potentially important parts of the record. The State filed an update the morning of the following hearing on December 24, 2024, which did not include a transcript of the July 5, 2024 hearing but offered an incorrect3 explanation for the delay in service of Close’s arrest warrant. The court began the December 24 hearing by reading the State’s explanation aloud. Without making further inquiry as to why no transcript of the July 5, 2024 hearing was provided as previously ordered, the District Court accepted the State’s erroneous factual explanation as sufficient without further inquiry and denied Close’s motion to dismiss. 3 The State asserted Butte-Silver Bow County “likely had the Defendant in custody first on the [Butte-]Silver Bow violation, which delayed the service of Mineral County’s warrant.” However, Close discharged his sentence in the Butte-Silver Bow County matter in 2018—well before the alleged probation violations occurred in this cause. The report of violation lists Close as being in custody in Cascade County—not Butte-Silver Bow County—on July 9, 2024, only 6 days after he was arrested, and Close was served months later on October 28, 2024, while still in custody in Cascade County. 8 ¶17 Regardless of the District Court’s acceptance of erroneous facts, the court also misapplied the statute. The fact remains that since no report of violation or revocation petition was filed before his July 5, 2024 appearance, that appearance does not satisfy the prompt initial appearance provided for in § 46-18-203(4), MCA. Nor does Close’s November 6, 2024 initial appearance on the revocation petition satisfy the prompt initial appearance guaranteed in § 46-18-203(4), MCA, because it was more than 60 days after his arrest. As Close’s statutory right to a prompt initial appearance on a revocation petition provided in § 46-18-203(4), MCA, was violated, it is appropriate to vacate the revocation disposition and dismiss the petition to revoke. ¶18 Typically, dismissal for unnecessary delay in providing an initial appearance on a criminal charge is without prejudice, although dismissal with prejudice may be warranted in certain circumstances. State v. Cameron, 2021 MT 198, ¶ 28, 405 Mont. 160, 494 P.3d 314. In State v. Cameron, this Court chose to dismiss a petition to revoke with prejudice where the State had no justification for delay and the delay between arrest and a hearing under § 46-18-203(4), MCA, was nearly two years, causing substantial prejudice to the probationer. Cameron, ¶¶ 27-28. The substantially shorter delay here, without prejudice to Close, is not sufficient to warrant dismissal with prejudice, and we decline to do so. ¶19 The parties dispute the meaning of § 46-18-203(4), MCA. Specifically, they disagree whether the statute permits a first appearance within 60 days of arrest that is limited to setting bail, with the advisories required by § 46-18-203(4), MCA, provided at a later hearing more than 60 days after arrest, so long as those advisories are given at least 10 days before the revocation hearing. Alternatively, Close contends that the statutory 9 advisories themselves must be provided within 60 days of arrest. Because a petition to revoke must be filed before revocation proceedings may be initiated under § 46-18-203, MCA, the issue presents a question of statutory interpretation. We need not resolve that question here, however, because this case may be decided on the narrower grounds discussed above. Having concluded that Close’s statutory rights were violated, we likewise decline to address the parties’ arguments regarding the due process implications of Larson and Triplett. Moreover, those cases are distinguishable. In both Triplett and Larson, the probationers were arrested after the petitions to revoke had been filed, and the challenged first appearances did not involve APP holds. State v. Triplett, 2008 MT 360, ¶¶ 7-8, 346 Mont. 383, 195 P.3d 819; Larson, ¶¶ 3-4. Accordingly, those decisions do not affect the basis on which we resolve this case. CONCLUSION ¶20 The 127-day delay between Close’s arrest and the November 6, 2024 hearing violated Close’s statutory rights under § 46-18-203(4), MCA. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for dismissal of the Petition for Revocation without prejudice. /S/ INGRID GUSTAFSON We Concur: /S/ JAMES JEREMIAH SHEA /S/ KATHERINE M. BIDEGARAY /S/ LAURIE McKINNON /S/ JIM RICE 10