State v. E. Yuste

10/06/2026 DA 25-0183 Case Number: DA 25-0183 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 2026 MT 234 STATE OF MONTANA, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. ELIAS WILLIAM YUSTE, Defendant and Appellant. APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eighth Judicial District, In and For the County of Cascade, Cause No. CDC-23-003 Honorable John A. Kutzman, Presiding Judge COUNSEL OF RECORD: For Appellant: Tammy A. Hinderman, Appellate Defender Division Administrator, Charlotte Lawson, Assistant Appellate Defender, Helena, Montana For Appellee: Austin Knudsen, Montana Attorney General, Thad Tudor, Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana Joshua A. Racki, Cascade County Attorney, Michele Levine, Matthew Robertson, Deputy County Attorneys, Great Falls, Montana Submitted on Briefs: August 19, 2026 Decided: October 6, 2026 Filed: __________________________________________ Clerk Justice Katherine M. Bidegaray delivered the Opinion of the Court. ¶1 Elias William Yuste appeals the Eighth Judicial District Court’s denial of his motion to dismiss for violation of his constitutional right to a speedy trial. We address the following issue: Whether the District Court erred by denying Yuste’s motion to dismiss for violation of his right to a speedy trial. We conclude it did and reverse. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND ¶2 Law enforcement arrested Yuste on December 19, 2022, initially in connection with an alleged partner or family member assault against his girlfriend, Shawna Giachello. Later that day, Giachello found partially used boxes of condoms and raspberry-flavored sexual lubricant among Yuste’s belongings. Because she and Yuste had not used those items in their relationship, Giachello asked her teenage daughter, G.L., whether Yuste had harmed her. G.L. alleged that Yuste had subjected her to repeated sexual acts beginning when the family lived in Wyoming and continuing after they moved to Montana. On January 3, 2023, the State sought leave to file an Information charging Yuste with one count of sexual intercourse without consent (SIWOC) against G.L., in violation of § 45-5-503(1), MCA. The court maintained bail at $150,000. Yuste pleaded not guilty on January 19, and the District Court set trial for April 17, 2023. ¶3 On March 1, 2023, the State moved to continue the April trial because discovery remained incomplete. Defense counsel took no position on the motion, and the District Court reset trial for June 12. Four days later—seventy-six days after his arrest—Yuste sent 2 three jail kites to the District Court. In one, he invoked his speedy-trial right, objected that the trial had been continued without his consent, and reported that appointed counsel had met with him only once. Yuste could not post bail and remained at the Cascade County Detention Center. ¶4 Officers had seized electronic devices from Yuste’s former residence on February 7, 2023. On May 30, the State moved to continue the June 12 trial because discovery remained ongoing and the State was “still waiting for forensic analysis of the electronic devices.” Defense counsel did not object, and the District Court reset trial for August 14. At the time of the motion, however, the electronic devices remained in local evidence storage, officers had not obtained a warrant authorizing examination of their contents, and no analyst had received them. Detective Angel Creech obtained the content-search warrant and delivered the devices to Homeland Security Investigations Agent Andrew Remington on July 18, 2023.1 ¶5 On June 8, 2023, the State again moved to continue, stating that the forensic analysis was incomplete and that the assigned prosecutor would be out of state during the week of August 14. Defense counsel did not object, and the District Court reset trial for October 2. In an August 16 omnibus memorandum, the parties stated that October 2 was not viable and that the State remained awaiting forensic discovery. Four days before the October setting, the State sought another continuance. The record contains two copies of 1 In its answer to a motion to compel, the State listed July 18, 2024, as the date on which Creech obtained the content-search warrant and delivered the devices for analysis, but Creech’s report and both parties’ chronology identify July 18, 2023, as the date those events occurred. We use the date on which the parties litigated the issue. 3 the proposed order but not the motion. The State later represented that the continuance accommodated a district-wide suspension of jury trials while the clerk and sheriff addressed irregularities in forming the term jury pool. The District Court reset trial for January 8, 2024. ¶6 On December 19, 2023, Creech received notice that the devices contained adult pornography, computer-generated pornography, apparent child erotica, and apparent child sexual abuse material involving children other than G.L. The discovery prompted a separate investigation and referral of some images to the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children. Two days later, the State moved to continue the January trial because forensic analysis remained underway and discovery remained incomplete. Defense counsel did not object, and the District Court reset trial for April 15, 2024. The State later explained that it had selected a federal analyst because the devices might contain evidence of federally prosecutable crimes and that Remington’s deployments and other federal assignments delayed his work. ¶7 Yuste continued to object personally. In a December 2023 letter, he stated that the case had been continued repeatedly without his consent and that he had not heard from counsel for approximately ten months. In February 2024, he filed a federal habeas petition alleging ineffective assistance and denial of a speedy trial. On March 29, original counsel Michael Kuntz moved to dismiss for lack of a speedy trial. Kuntz also moved to continue the April 15 setting because discovery remained incomplete and requested a representation hearing. At the April 4 hearing, Kuntz stated that Yuste wanted the speedy-trial motion filed, that Kuntz believed the motion had merit, and that their relationship had reached an 4 irretrievable breakdown. Yuste agreed. The District Court allowed Kuntz to withdraw as Yuste’s counsel and continued trial to June 17 so the Office of State Public Defender could appoint replacement counsel. ¶8 The Office of State Public Defender appointed Molly Woodman on May 1. On June 3, Woodman moved to continue the June 17 trial because she needed time to review the file, consult witnesses and experts, investigate potential issues, and prepare motions. She acknowledged Yuste’s desire for a speedy trial but explained that the seriousness of the charge required meaningful preparation. The District Court reset trial for September 9, 2024. ¶9 On August 27, Woodman moved to compel the forensic material that the State had cited repeatedly in support of its continuance requests. At the September 4 motions hearing, Woodman advised the District Court that the State had produced three clothed photographs of G.L. during the preceding week and had produced the broader Homeland Security material the day before. The newly produced material included approximately 1,100 images involving children other than G.L., about 150 pages of internet-search history, and a small amount of material the State considered relevant to the SIWOC charge. The State explained that Remington had worked over the preceding weekend to finish his analysis and that Creech delivered the material as soon as she received it. The State offered to proceed without the search history rather than risk another continuance. The District Court excluded the search history because the timing did not permit the defense to prepare and maintained the September 9 trial date. 5 ¶10 The District Court then heard the speedy-trial motion. Kuntz testified that he had wanted the device evidence because geolocation information or photographs might assist the defense. Yuste testified about the duration and conditions of his confinement. He described chronic overcrowding; sleeping on a floor pad; recurring lockdowns; limited access to showers, laundry, outdoor recreation, telephones, and tablets; temperature problems; inadequate food; difficulty obtaining medical and mental-health care; and interference with legal mail and attorney contact. Lieutenant Steve Grubb confirmed that the jail was “always overfull,” that every general-population cell held three people, that some detainees slept on floor pads, that the jail lacked a tablet for every detainee, and that outdoor recreation occurred on a schedule. Grubb also testified that detainees received three daily meals and had access to medical personnel, telephones, showers, laundry, and day-room exercise. Creech testified that the discovery of suspected child sexual abuse material caused a separate investigation, that Remington’s federal deployments caused delay, and that she communicated with him frequently. ¶11 The District Court denied the motion. It found that 630 days had elapsed, attributed 483 days to the State and 147 days to the defense, and classified all eight periods as institutional delay. The court found that Yuste sincerely wanted an earlier trial. It also found that the jail remained overcrowded, that the pod where Yuste spent most of his confinement operated ten to twenty detainees over capacity, and that some detainees slept on floor pads. The court nevertheless concluded that the conditions were no more oppressive than the “baseline prejudice” of pretrial detention because Yuste had not been held in solitary confinement or denied visitation or exercise. It found no delay-related 6 anxiety and no impairment of the defense. The court concluded that Factors Two and Four of the Ariegwe analysis favored the State strongly enough to outweigh the length of delay and Yuste’s sincere desire for trial. ¶12 Trial began on September 9, 2024. The jury found Yuste guilty of SIWOC and found that G.L. was younger than sixteen and Yuste was at least four years older when the offense occurred. The District Court sentenced Yuste to 100 years at the Montana State Prison, with none suspended, and awarded 752 days of credit for time served. Yuste timely appealed the speedy-trial ruling. STANDARD OF REVIEW ¶13 A claimed speedy-trial violation presents a question of constitutional law. State v. Larson, 2026 MT 55, ¶ 9, 427 Mont. 153, 586 P.3d 264; State v. Velasquez, 2016 MT 216, ¶ 6, 384 Mont. 447, 377 P.3d 1235. We review the District Court’s underlying factual findings for clear error but review de novo whether the factual circumstances, evaluated under the four-factor balancing test, establish a speedy-trial violation and whether the District Court correctly interpreted and applied the law. Larson, ¶ 9; Velasquez, ¶ 6; State v. Zimmerman, 2014 MT 173, ¶ 11, 375 Mont. 374, 328 P.3d 1132; State v. Ariegwe, 2007 MT 204, ¶ 119, 338 Mont. 442, 167 P.3d 815. DISCUSSION ¶14 Whether the District Court erred by denying Yuste’s motion to dismiss for violation of his right to a speedy trial. ¶15 Article II, Section 24, of the Montana Constitution guarantees an accused “the right to a speedy public trial.” The Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 7 Constitution provide a corresponding federal guarantee. Our analysis, however, rests on the Montana Constitution. Although Ariegwe drew guidance from Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S. Ct. 2182 (1972), Montana’s test is grounded in Article II, Section 24, of the Montana Constitution, which provides protection independent of the federal minimum. Ariegwe, ¶ 35. Because Yuste prevails under the Montana Constitution, we need not separately analyze his federal claim. ¶16 Under Ariegwe, we balance four related considerations: (1) the length of delay; (2) the reasons for delay; (3) the accused’s responses to delay; and (4) prejudice to the accused. Ariegwe, ¶¶ 34, 112–13; State v. Burnett, 2022 MT 10, ¶ 17, 407 Mont. 189, 502 P.3d 703. No factor decides the case alone, and the weight of each factor depends on the record. Ariegwe, ¶¶ 102, 105. The analysis is not mechanical. It must preserve the constitutional force of the right in light of the particular delay, the State’s diligence, the accused’s conduct, and the prejudice the delay produced. Factor One: Length of Delay ¶17 The first factor asks whether the interval between accusation and disposition reached 200 days and, if so, how far the delay extended beyond that threshold. Ariegwe, ¶¶ 43, 107. The parties agree that 630 days elapsed between Yuste’s arrest and trial—430 days beyond the trigger. Fault does not reduce that calculation. Ariegwe, ¶ 62. The defense-attributable periods matter under Factor Two, but the entire 630-day interval determines the magnitude of the State’s burden. ¶18 As delay lengthens, the presumption of prejudice intensifies, the State’s obligation to justify delay grows heavier, and the quantum of proof expected from the accused 8 decreases. Ariegwe, ¶¶ 49, 56, 61–62. A delay approximately twice the trigger requires “particularly compelling” justification under Factor Two and a “highly persuasive” showing of no prejudice under Factor Four. Ariegwe, ¶ 123; Larson, ¶ 13. Yuste’s delay exceeded the trigger by more than twice the amount at issue in Ariegwe. Factor One weighs strongly in his favor. Factor Two: Reasons for Delay ¶19 Under Factor Two, we identify the periods that postponed trial, attribute each period to the responsible party, and weigh the period according to its cause and motive. Ariegwe, ¶¶ 63–67; Burnett, ¶¶ 21–22. The State bears the burden of explaining pretrial delay. Burnett, ¶ 21. Delay defaults to the State unless the accused caused it or affirmatively waived the right for the period at issue. Burnett, ¶ 21. Deliberate delay weighs most heavily against the State. Ariegwe, ¶ 67; Burnett, ¶ 22. Negligence or lack of diligence receives less weight than bad faith but remains an unacceptable reason for delay. Ariegwe, ¶ 69; Burnett, ¶ 22. Institutional delay—delay inherent in the justice system and largely beyond the parties’ control—also weighs against the State, though less heavily. Ariegwe, ¶¶ 67–72; Burnett, ¶ 22. We consider only conduct that caused a trial setting to move. Larson, ¶ 14. ¶20 The State argues that Yuste’s counsel conceded that all State-attributable delay was institutional. The transcript does not support that reading. Woodman described the delay associated with replacing counsel and preparing for trial as institutional. Her separate statement that she saw no evidence of intentional State delay did not concede that the State 9 had acted diligently. Negligence or lack of diligence remains a distinct, unacceptable reason for delay. Burnett, ¶ 22. ¶21 The first 119 days, from arrest to the April 17, 2023 trial setting, constitute ordinary institutional delay attributable to the State. The next fifty-six days, from April 17 to June 12, also constitute State-attributable institutional delay caused by incomplete discovery. Yuste does not challenge those classifications. The combined 175 days weigh lightly against the State. ¶22 The third period—the sixty-three days from June 12 to August 14—does not qualify as ordinary institutional delay. When the State moved on May 30 to continue trial because it was “still waiting” for forensic analysis, it had possessed the devices for 112 days but had neither secured the content-search warrant nor delivered the devices to an analyst. The State offered no explanation for that inaction. The resulting continuance did not stem from an analyst’s unavoidable processing time. It stemmed from the State’s failure to begin the process. ¶23 Our precedent distinguishes delay inherent in forensic processing from delay caused by the State’s failure to initiate or pursue processing diligently. In Ariegwe, we treated delay as lack of diligence when the State failed to deliver evidence for testing in a timely manner. Ariegwe, ¶¶ 129, 154. In Velasquez, we held that a generalized reference to a laboratory backlog did not justify delay when the State knew the accused wanted trial and made no record that it investigated alternatives. Velasquez, ¶¶ 18–20. Yuste invoked his right before the May 30 motion, and the State supplied no reason why the devices remained unsubmitted for more than five months after seizure from February 7 until 10 July 18, 2023. Period Three resulted from lack of diligence and weighs materially against the State. The record does not establish bad faith, and we do not find it. ¶24 The fourth period—the forty-nine days from August 14 to October 2—also belongs to the State. The June 8 motion again cited the incomplete forensic analysis, but it identified an independent reason that the August 14 trial could not proceed: the assigned prosecutor would be out of state that week. The record does not establish that the incomplete analysis alone caused the entire forty-nine-day postponement. We therefore treat the period as mixed State delay and assign it little weight. ¶25 The fifth period—the ninety-eight days from October 2, 2023, to January 8, 2024— constitutes State-attributable institutional delay. The District Court found that a district-wide jury-trial stand-down addressed defects in forming the term jury pool. The omnibus memorandum also referenced the unfinished forensic work, but the stand-down independently prevented a jury trial. Because the record supports the District Court’s historical finding and the institutional cause actually prevented trial, we assign this period little weight against the State. ¶26 The sixth period—the ninety-eight days from January 8 to April 15, 2024—also constitutes State-attributable institutional delay but warrants separate consideration. By December 19, 2023, the State knew that the forensic work had identified apparent child sexual abuse material involving children other than G.L. and had generated a separate investigation. Two days later, the State sought another continuance of the SIWOC trial because the broader forensic examination remained unfinished. The State ultimately 11 acknowledged that most of the material concerned other children and would not be offered in this prosecution. ¶27 The State established that forensic analysts were scarce and that Remington had competing federal assignments. Unlike Period Three, however, the State had obtained the necessary warrant, transmitted the devices to Remington, and initiated the forensic examination. Creech testified that Remington’s competing federal assignments delayed his work and that discovery of suspected child sexual abuse material generated additional investigative work. The record does not establish that transferring the partially completed examination to another analyst or obtaining a partial report would have accelerated completion. We therefore treat Period Six as institutional delay attributable to the State. ¶28 Kuntz had a legitimate strategic interest in potentially exculpatory geolocation or photographic information, and his nonobjection tempers the weight assigned to the period. His interest did not transfer the State’s constitutional obligation to move the prosecution diligently or amount to Yuste’s affirmative waiver. Yuste continued to object personally. Period Six nevertheless remains attributable to the State and weighs against it, although less heavily than negligent delay. We need not and do not decide whether the State used delay as plea leverage; the record does not establish intentional delay. ¶29 The District Court properly attributed the seventh period—the sixty-three days from April 15 to June 17—to the defense. Kuntz sought the representation hearing, Kuntz and Yuste agreed that communication had broken down, and the District Court could not try Yuste with counsel who had been relieved days before trial. We generally attribute delay resulting from substitution of defense counsel to the accused, absent evidence of a 12 systemic breakdown in the public-defender system. State v. Kirn, 2023 MT 98, ¶¶ 29–30, 412 Mont. 309, 530 P.3d 1; State v. Redd, 2026 MT 30, ¶¶ 47–49, 426 Mont. 276, 584 P.3d 124. This record shows no gamesmanship by Yuste, and Kuntz—not Yuste—formally initiated the representation hearing after acknowledging Yuste’s consistent desire for trial. We therefore assign the period to Yuste but give it little adverse weight. ¶30 The District Court also properly attributed the eighth period—the eighty-four days from June 17 to September 9—to the defense. Woodman had represented Yuste for approximately one month when she moved to continue. Her motion cited the need to learn the file, consult witnesses and experts, investigate issues, and prepare motions. It did not identify Remington’s outstanding forensic report as the cause of the requested continuance. New counsel’s preparation needs would have required a later setting regardless of the report, and the late production did not move the September 9 trial because the District Court excluded the search history. See Larson, ¶¶ 14, 20 (considering only conduct that caused postponement). The period remains attributable to the defense, but counsel’s legitimate preparation request receives little adverse weight. ¶31 The proper allocation thus remains 483 days to the State and 147 days to the defense. The proper weighting does not. The sixty-three State-attributable days in Period Three resulted from lack of diligence rather than ordinary institutional causes. The balance of the State’s delay remains institutional or mixed and still weighs against the State, though lightly. The defense periods arose from necessary counsel replacement and preparation, not an effort to avoid trial. Factor Two favors Yuste. 13 Factor Three: Yuste’s Responses to Delay ¶32 Factor Three examines the totality of the accused’s responses to determine whether the accused actually wanted a speedy trial. Ariegwe, ¶¶ 80, 85, 110. We consider the timeliness, persistence, and sincerity of objections; the reasons for any acquiescence; whether counsel represented the accused; and the accused’s pretrial conduct. Ariegwe, ¶ 80. An assertion of the right carries strong evidentiary weight and guides the weight assigned to the other factors. Ariegwe, ¶¶ 78, 110; Velasquez, ¶ 21. ¶33 Yuste invoked the right on Day 76, before the 200-day trigger and before the State’s forensic-based continuances. He objected that the first continuance occurred without his consent, repeated his objections in December 2023, sought federal habeas relief in February 2024, pressed Kuntz to file the motion, and continued to request trial after Woodman’s appointment. The District Court expressly found that he sincerely wanted an earlier trial. ¶34 Kuntz’s interest in potentially exculpatory device evidence does not negate Yuste’s response. Counsel had a duty to investigate evidence that might help the defense. An accused does not surrender the speedy-trial right by demanding both timely prosecution and competent preparation. The accused also bears no duty to advance the State’s prosecution. Velasquez, ¶ 20; Zimmerman, ¶ 24. Yuste’s conduct differs from cases in which the accused asserted the right late, repeatedly vacated priority settings, or engaged in conduct inconsistent with a sincere desire for trial. See Redd, ¶¶ 54–57; Larson, ¶¶ 26–30. Factor Three weighs strongly in Yuste’s favor. 14 Factor Four: Prejudice to Yuste ¶35 Factor Four assesses prejudice in light of three interests: preventing oppressive pretrial incarceration, minimizing anxiety and concern caused by unresolved charges, and limiting the possibility that delay will impair the defense. Ariegwe, ¶ 88. These interests are independent. Although impairment of the defense receives particular importance, its absence does not defeat a claim when the record establishes oppressive incarceration or undue anxiety and disruption. State v. Kurtz, 2019 MT 127, ¶ 41, 396 Mont. 80, 443 P.3d 479. Because the delay extended 430 days beyond the trigger, the State had to make a highly persuasive showing that delay did not prejudice Yuste, while Yuste’s required quantum of proof was correspondingly lower. Ariegwe, ¶ 123. Oppressive Pretrial Incarceration ¶36 Whether incarceration became oppressive depends on all the circumstances, with duration foremost. Ariegwe, ¶ 90. We consider the complexity of the charge, misconduct by the accused directly related to confinement, the circumstances of bail, and the conditions of incarceration, including overcrowding, recreation, food, climate control, medical care, cleanliness, and legal-research capabilities. Ariegwe, ¶¶ 90–93; Velasquez, ¶ 28. The longer the confinement, the more likely it becomes oppressive. Kurtz, ¶ 32. ¶37 Yuste remained incarcerated for all 630 days. No separate sentence or unrelated detainer would have confined him regardless of this prosecution. The SIWOC charge was serious and factually demanding: G.L. alleged repeated conduct over an extended period, in multiple residences and two states. The bail record also contained contemporaneous evidence concerning the charge’s seriousness, firearms, safety, and possible flight. Those 15 considerations support substantial bail and reasonable preparation time. They do not eliminate the prejudice caused by prolonged pretrial confinement when the accused could not post bond. ¶38 The conditions add substantial weight. The District Court expressly found that the jail remained overcrowded throughout Yuste’s stay; that the pod where he spent most of his confinement operated ten to twenty detainees over capacity; that some detainees slept on floor pads; that Yuste experienced temperature problems and found the meals insufficient; that outdoor recreation was limited by scheduling; and that the jail did not have enough tablets for every detainee. Grubb confirmed that the jail was always overfull, that every general-population cell housed three people, and that detainees without beds received floor pads. These were not isolated conditions during a brief detention; they formed the setting of Yuste’s 630-day confinement. ¶39 The State presented evidence that the jail provided three meals a day, blankets, showers, laundry, medical and mental-health personnel, telephones, some tablet access, and day-room exercise. We do not disregard those services or accept every disputed detail of Yuste’s testimony. We need not do so. The District Court’s express findings, together with the undisputed duration, establish confinement materially more burdensome than ordinary short-term detention. ¶40 The District Court used an unduly demanding benchmark when it emphasized that Yuste had not experienced solitary confinement, a total denial of visitation, or a total denial of exercise. Our precedent does not make any of those extreme conditions a prerequisite. The question is oppression, not whether confinement independently amounted to cruel and 16 unusual punishment. Ariegwe, ¶¶ 93–94. The court’s conclusion that “nothing in the record” supported oppression also cannot be reconciled with its own express findings of sustained overcrowding and floor sleeping. The State urges us to infer that the court disbelieved Yuste categorically, but the court made specific findings drawn from both Yuste’s testimony and Grubb’s corroboration. We rely on those findings rather than infer a blanket credibility determination that would negate them. ¶41 The record is closer to Velasquez and Kurtz than to the cases on which the State relies. In Velasquez, 309 days of confinement, combined with restricted outdoor access and other jail conditions, established oppression under an intensified presumption. Velasquez, ¶¶ 34–36. In Kurtz, 422 days in an overcrowded unit, together with other personal consequences, established oppression even though the defense was not impaired. Kurtz, ¶¶ 32–41. By contrast, the accused in Ariegwe spent only four days in pretrial custody and conceded that it was not oppressive. Ariegwe, ¶ 144. In Redd, the accused caused 455 of 613 days; his initial federal custody was inevitable because of his own probation violation, and his conduct caused most of the remaining delay. Redd, ¶¶ 53, 59–60. In Larson, the State caused no negligent or deliberate delay, the accused identified no harsh conditions, and a separate Department of Corrections commitment limited the confinement attributable to the pending case. Larson, ¶¶ 30, 34, 38. Yuste endured 630 days attributable to this prosecution, under conditions the District Court found chronically overcrowded. His incarceration was oppressive. We do not hold that overcrowding, floor sleeping, or any other identified condition, standing alone, renders pretrial incarceration oppressive. We consider those conditions together with the extraordinary duration of 17 Yuste’s confinement and the intensified presumption of prejudice resulting from the 430-day post-trigger delay. Anxiety and Concern ¶42 The second interest asks whether delay unduly prolonged the disruption of the accused’s life or aggravated the anxiety inherent in a serious criminal accusation. Ariegwe, ¶ 97; Zimmerman, ¶ 32. Yuste testified that confinement prevented him from working, disrupted workers’ compensation and medical care, complicated access to his property and ability to retain counsel, limited communication with counsel and the outside world, and caused extraordinary stress. Some of those consequences flowed initially from the accusation, the bail decision, or actions by third parties rather than from prosecutorial delay. The delay nevertheless prolonged those disruptions for nearly two years. Yuste’s repeated demands for trial also provide objective evidence that the ongoing delay itself concerned him. This interest weighs modestly in his favor. Impairment of the Defense ¶43 The impairment interest favors the State. At the September 4 hearing, Yuste did not identify a witness who became unavailable, evidence that disappeared, testimony that changed because of delay, or a particular defense that the passage of time foreclosed. Although excessive delay can compromise reliability in ways difficult to prove. Ariegwe, ¶¶ 99–100. The hearing record does not establish concrete impairment here. We do not rely on memory lapses in testimony given after the District Court ruled; appellate review of a speedy-trial ruling rests on the record before the court when it decided the motion. Velasquez, ¶ 42. 18 ¶44 The absence of concrete defense impairment does not end the prejudice inquiry. Article II, Section 24, of the Montana Constitution protects against oppressive incarceration and undue anxiety as well as impairment of the defense. Ariegwe, ¶ 88; Kurtz, ¶ 41. The State made a persuasive showing on the third interest and established that substantial bail had contemporaneous support. It did not make the highly persuasive showing of no prejudice required after a 430-day post-trigger delay because the record affirmatively establishes 630 days of oppressive pretrial incarceration and prolonged personal disruption. Factor Four weighs in Yuste’s favor. Balancing ¶45 We balance the factors together and in light of the surrounding circumstances. Ariegwe, ¶¶ 112–13, 153. Factor One weighs strongly in Yuste’s favor because the delay extended 430 days beyond the trigger. Factor Two weighs in his favor because the State caused 483 days, including sixty-three days through lack of diligence, while the 147 defense-attributable days arose from legitimate counsel-replacement and preparation needs and receive little adverse weight. Factor Three weighs strongly in Yuste’s favor because he invoked the right on Day 76 and persisted. Factor Four weighs in his favor because the State did not overcome the prejudice of 630 days of oppressive detention, although Yuste did not prove concrete impairment of the defense. ¶46 Ariegwe does not support affirmance on this record. There, significant State lack of diligence accompanied a 408-day delay, but the accused spent only four days in custody and conceded no oppression. Ariegwe, ¶¶ 144, 154–55. That decisive absence of prejudice is not present here. The conditions of confinement in Velasquez and Kurtz were more 19 severe than those established here. Those cases nonetheless confirm that oppressive incarceration depends on the totality of the circumstances, including duration and the actual conditions of confinement, rather than on any single condition. Velasquez, ¶¶ 28, 35–36, 51; Kurtz, ¶¶ 32, 40–43. ¶47 Our recent decisions in Redd and Larson do not require a different result. In Redd, only 158 of 613 days belonged to the State. Redd, ¶ 53. Redd’s initial federal custody arose from his own probation violation, his conduct caused most of the remaining delay, and his conduct undermined the sincerity of his demand. Redd, ¶¶ 53–63. In Larson, the State caused no deliberate or negligent delay, the accused’s conduct reflected gamesmanship, and the record contained no evidence of harsh or unusual confinement. Larson, ¶¶ 30, 34, 38. Here, the State caused more than three-quarters of the delay, the record establishes lack of diligence, Yuste demanded trial early and persistently, and he remained incarcerated throughout under materially burdensome conditions. ¶48 The State deserves credit for choosing on September 4 to forgo the late-produced search history and preserve the September 9 trial setting. That choice prevented further delay. It does not erase the earlier period of State inaction that occurred before the forensic examination began or the continuances the unfinished forensic work already had caused. The strength of the accusation and the jury’s later verdict likewise cannot substitute for the constitutional analysis. The speedy-trial guarantee protects the process by which the State brings an accused to trial; it does not depend on the eventual verdict. ¶49 We decide this case narrowly. The record does not establish prosecutorial bad faith, and we do not adopt Yuste’s contention that 443 days resulted from unacceptable 20 State delay. We hold that the District Court misapplied Ariegwe when it treated all 483 State-attributable days as institutional, failed to recognize sixty-three days caused by lack of diligence, treated institutional delay as favoring the State, and used extreme deprivation as the benchmark for oppressive incarceration. Applying the heightened burden required by this extraordinary delay, the balance establishes a violation of Yuste’s right under Article II, Section 24, of the Montana Constitution. CONCLUSION ¶50 We reverse the District Court’s order denying Yuste’s motion to dismiss, reverse the judgment of conviction, and remand with instructions to dismiss the charge. /S/ KATHERINE M. BIDEGARAY We Concur: /S/ CORY J. SWANSON /S/ LAURIE McKINNON /S/ INGRID GUSTAFSON /S/ JIM RICE Chief Justice Cory J. Swanson, concurring. ¶51 I concur with the Court’s Opinion and disposition of this matter. I write separately to urge the State to receive this outcome as a wake-up call for how it analyzes digital evidence in prosecutions. ¶52 Nearly every adult, most teenagers, and too many children walk around with a small but sophisticated computer and communication device on their person. These smart phones, not to mention the personal computers and tablets in many homes and offices, 21 record an incredible amount of data about our personal lives. Their photographic and video capabilities are truly impressive. They record and generate evidence of criminal activity on a daily basis. Every investigator and prosecutor in Montana knows we will continue to have criminal cases which require someone to download and analyze data from these evidence databases. ¶53 Yet the State has chronically under-invested in the hiring and training of personnel to conduct such analysis, and in the acquisition of software for this purpose. The very skillful investigators at the Internet Crimes Against Children (ICAC) Task Force cannot keep up with the deluge of investigation requests, producing a backlog which often gets referred out to other agencies for analysis. Many law enforcement agencies, large and small, have software and trained personnel to analyze digital data, but they are not keeping up. Even if they can handle routine cases, they may not be specially trained to handle child sexual material, which this case apparently contained. ¶54 Hence the unfortunate decision to outsource this case’s analysis to a federal agent.1 Such a decision may be necessary and advisable in a long-running investigation before anyone has been arrested or charged. But here, Yuste was arrested and subsequently charged, and therefore the speedy-trial clock was ticking the entire time the parties waited for the digital evidence. In such a situation, referring the evidence to a federal analyst, who has other job duties, surrenders the case timeline to someone outside of the prosecutor’s 1 The State also indicated it was initially aware of Child Sexual Abuse Material (CSAM) on the device, and suspected the case might be eligible for federal prosecution. ICAC routinely conducts investigations that are eligible for federal prosecution, so such a possibility does not require surrendering active case evidence to a federal agency’s timeline.